"Germany and Japan Against Russia?" Topic

Would the Axis Powers have done better if they had
"ganged up" against the Soviet Union?

Nope. Japan could make no meaningful difference. The Emperor's carriers could sail to Hawai'i. They could not sail to Siberia.

The Japanese did not have the expansive goals on the USSR that Hitler had. If the Soviet expected a serious Japanese attack they would probably cut a deal, releasing more Soviet units for the East. (and the Japanese would probably take it, so they can focus on China and the US).

Only in a story were Japan puts the dissolution of the USSR over gains in China and issues with the US, does the Japan go full out on the USSR. Even then the Soveits have a lot of land to give up to gain time. The Japanese army is less mecahnised than the German one, and the conenctions between Siberia and European Russia even worse than those between Belarus, the Ukraine and European Russia. I can see the Soviets being able to balance forces on the two fronts in a way that permits them to focus mostly on Europe.

I often think that was the Axis' one chance for a victory. Japan had after all decisively beaten Russia at land and sea in 1904-5. After sharp checks in Mongolia in the 30s, Japan seemingly gave up on expansion in that direction. But even so, Stalin kept significant, experienced forces along that frontier, and only transferred them west to face Barbarossa when intelligence confirmed Japan was looking elsewhere.

A coordinated attack, even if its only a spoiler by Japan, could have had a decisive effect; without extra reserves it's conceivable Moscow could've fallen in 1941. At least, the strategy always worked playing Axis & Allies. :)

Japan and the USSR had already bumped heads long before Hitler invaded and had got the measure of each other. Which probably explains why they kept a distance from each other. Given Japan's limited resources at the time and their involvement else could have where it seems unlikely that they could have launched a significant attack on the Soviets too.

Problem is even if they take the easy gains in the far east, what then?

They aren't marching across Siberia.

I think that this could have gone well for the Axis – but they would have had to act like real allies

So it would involve

i) a deal to send oil to Japan, ideally from captured Russian fields

ii) close coordination with the German and Japanese military to give the Japanese ground forces some credible anti-tank capacity and to give the Germans some fighters with longer legs

iii) coordination in launching an attack timed to keep Russia busy on two fronts

It would have prevented Japan from attacking Pearl Harbour and kept the US out of the war – at least for a long time

I believe that was the reason Hitler declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor. He was hoping the Japanese would in turn attack Russia. But he should have study his history a little better. The IJFs didn't do so well in '39 at Khalkhin Gol. When they and the USSR clashed. link

However, in '45 the IJF did inflict many USSR loses. When they invaded the Kurile Islands. But the IJFs' mastered these "Die In Place" on Pacific Islands tactic. However in the long run the USSR would have rolled up the IJFs as quickly as they did in Manchuria in '45. After Germany's surrender. The USSR was willing to take losses as we saw in the ETO. And they were a modern combined arms mobile army. The Japanese ground forces and their equipment was still stuck in 1938.

Yeah, the IJA was busy gobbling up Korea and Manchuria, after Khalkhin Gol they stayed out of Siberia.

No. The Japanese were good at ship-building but their tanks are junk. Mass banzai suicide charges into Maxim fire would yield the same results as the Pacific.

I'll join the "no" chorus. The Japanese got spanked by the Soviets in 1939 and the Soviet army only got better after that. Japan, not so much.

I would point out that despite the 'spanking,' Japanese pilots routinely achieved air superiority over the Red Air Force in '38 -'39. And before the T-34, most Soviet tanks were pretty junky, as well.

but their tanks are junk. Mass banzai suicide charges into Maxim fire would yield the same results as the Pacific.

Yes, the Japanese never produced any AFVs that were not really beyond about '38-'39 standards.

And before the T-34, most Soviet tanks were pretty junky, as well.

The BT-5s and BT-7s were generally better than anything the IJFs used in '39 or even '45 …

Conversely, many Japanese tank crews held the Soviet 45mm anti-tank/tank guns in high esteem, noting, "…no sooner did they see the flash from a Russian gun, than they'd notice a hole in their tank, adding that the Soviet gunners were accurate too!" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BT_tank

I'd think a BT-5 or BT-7 would easily handle a Type 97. link The Russian 45mm gun would probably not have any problem piercing the Type 97 or any IJF's AFVs' fragile riveted armor.

I think operation Babarosa would have gone much better if Japan gave Germany some of those irradiated iguanas.

On a more serious note. Japan in the end got crushed by the allies b team (not as in quality but in priority)

And there Japan had the advantage of small islands and jungles. While siberia is good tank and massed artillery country. I think russians c team would have no problems.

I'm not sure if Japan's impact would have been enough to prevent the defense of Moscow, which is the real crux of the operation.

If it had been, then I think the Axis could have defeated the USSR.

This would not require that Japan even necessarily be successful on the ground. It would only require that Japan tie up enough forces to halt the constant flow of Soviet divisions westward from July onward.

Could Japan have done this? I'm not so sure. Khalkin Gol was a swift defeat, and the BT-7 tanks which were poor against the Germans were certainly "good enough" against the Japanese tanks. Also, the possibility of the Japanese mainland force completely collapsing is a distinct possibility, and I'm not sure of the ramifications of that. Too much going differently to really accurately predict.

A fun thought experiment, nonetheless!

The IJF's ships and planes were as or in some cases better than others in the conflict. Their weak link was their overall "primitive" ground forces' weapons. You have to have capable ground forces to hold real estate. In the long run the IJF's couldn't do it. The Samurai spirit will only go so far against things like Russian AFVs produced from '43 on … IMO …

What would Japan hope to gain economically from attacking the Soviet Union that could match what they hoped to get in the Dutch East Indies and Burma? Would seizing territory in Soviet Asia have made a difference in the Japanese war against China?

One interesting fact (that I found out while doing some research a while back about what the Japanese were planning and could achieve) is that they only gave lip service to stopping the Pacific Lend-Lease route to Vladivostok. Or it seems that way, since it doesn't look like they allocated many submarines or surface ships to harass that corridor as they did with the US-Australia lanes.

Problem is even if they take the easy gains in the far east, what then?

They aren't marching across Siberia.

This is an important perspective on the whole question.

Several posters have hypothesized how a Japanese attack might have tied-down Soviet forces that were, in real life, pulled westwards to the defense of Moscow.

Most recent historical investigation of the "Siberian Divisions saved Moscow" story have shown that the divisions pulled from the east had, at best, only a marginal impact on the Moscow battles at the critical timeframe of November 1941 – January 1942. But even if we accept the old story at face value, or we presume that even a marginal impact was important in that timeframe, we still have little if any reason to assume that the Soviets would not have pulled those forces at the same rate they did, even IF the Japanese had attacked.

Siberia, in 1941, to the Soviets, was much like the Great Plans, in 1850, to the U.S. It was a barren wasteland that had to be crossed to reach the Pacific coast, where there were a few interesting port cities. Yes eventually it could become an area for resource extraction and agricultural development, but that requires infrastructure that was not in place in Siberia in 1941.

The Soviets fought the Japanese in 1938-39 at Nomonhan (aka: Khalkin Gol) largely for prestige. It was a muscle-flexing exercise. There were no Soviet vital interests in the area. It was useful to slap the Japanese down a bit, as they had been active in interfering with Russian/Soviet development of it's Pacific ports over the decades. But as much as warm water / year round ports have been a forever interest of the Russians, there was so little value in having those ports on the other side of Siberia that even with the ports in place they could never do much with them.

And they knew this.

So … really … imagine a Soviet decision-maker, at almost any level, considering the trade-off. Hmmmm, do we defend our far-distant and economically trivial Pacific ports, and risk losing Moscow? Or do we pull forces as fast as our logistics will allow to defend Moscow, and risk losing Vladi-whatsitcalled?

If they pulled their forces and the Japanese attacked, even a full scale Japanese invasion of Siberia would probably not have even been noticed in Moscow for 3 or 4 years. If they waited 5 or 6 years, until matters were settled in Europe and they had rested and refit their army before taking any action against the Japanese, what would they have lost? Nothing.

What would Japan hope to gain economically from attacking the Soviet Union that could match what they hoped to get in the Dutch East Indies and Burma? Would seizing territory in Soviet Asia have made a difference in the Japanese war against China?

The Japanese considered this question at the level of their war cabinet.

The Army was all for going at it with the Soviets. Well, not "all for it", as they were still smarting a bit over the slap-down they took in 1939. But as I recall from my readings of that time, the Japanese were not too much dissuaded by the defeat they had suffered, as military facts on the ground seldom wandered in to their decision-making processes.

Rather, the key issue was what would they get out of it, other than the opportunity to recover some prestige? There was nothing of value to be gained in Siberia. It would consume all of their petroleum reserves, and earn nothing in return. So to answer the question, seizing territory in Soviet Asia would indeed have made a difference in the Japanese war against China. It would have shut that war down. By mid-1941 the Japanese realized that, with the U.S.-led oil embargo, they had about 6 months of military campaigning they could do, and then no more.

Striking southward, versus striking into Siberia, held the promise of the petroleum production fields in the Dutch East Indies. This was the driving consideration behind the whole Japanese war in the Pacific -- get the oil and protect the seas it needed to travel over.

If Germany could have offered sufficient incentive on the issue of petroleum, they might well have gotten the Japanese interested. They couldn't offer much in 1941, as they didn't have enough oil for their own purposes, while Italy and Hungary were already turning to Germany for oil.

If they had succeeded in taking the Soviet's oil production centers in the Caucasus intact they might have had enough oil the engage in some petro-diplomacy. But there was no real means for Japan to improve Germany's likelyhood of seizing the Caucasus just by poking the Russians on their exposed back-side.

In any case the Nazi government had very little understanding or interest in industrial economics, and went to war without much of a strategy related to petroleum production, access or denial. The Caucasus oil production centers were not even considered as operational targets for Barbarossa. Oddly enough the Japanese, not exactly paragons of good strategic decision-making in 1941, pretty clearly surpassed the Germans on their awareness of this issue.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Also note soemthing crucial.For the Japanese to have an impact they would need a mecahnised army-> the mecahnised army would require rubber and oil-> which would mean attacking Indonesia and Indo-China-> which means a US oil embargo-> which means you are back to sqaure one.

For Japan to change the trends of WW2 in Eastern Europe it would either have to have a very friendly USA, or a USA it defeated.

If they had succeeded in taking the Soviet's oil production centers in the Caucasus intact they might have had enough oil the engage in some petro-diplomacy.

However, transporting that oil from Caucasus just to central Europe would have required a fair bit of organising. Shipping it to Japan would have been very challenging.

As for the Japanese attacking the Soviet far east, the most they could have done would have probably been to occupy port facilities (Vladivostok) and some of the surrounding area. This would stop the Soviets from shipping in any equipment from North America that way – though they would still have Murmansk and Archangel in Europe, plus the route through Persia from the south.

But pushing westwards towards the Urals would have strained the logistics – any land force going that direction would end up with a very long supply line, more or less relying on a single major road and railroad line running along southern border of Soviet Union.

Brookings had an article about 12 years ago: "According to Russian calculations, Siberia holds
just under 80 percent of Russia's oil resources, about 85 percent of its natural gas, 80 percent of its coal,
similar amounts of precious metals and diamonds" – in many ways Russia's economic heartland.

Of course it was largely undeveloped in the WW2 era, but my impression was that both powers strongly suspected the vast, untapped wealth there – why fight along the border otherwise? But I agree the SW Pacific was a much more tempting objective since the resources were already developed/confirmed.

It would have made a huge difference. No Soviet counter offensive before Moscow. Probably no Pearl Harbor, American entry into the war delayed or doesn't happen. Tying up Soviet troops desperately needed against Germany.

This would not necessary mean that the move South was out of the question. I could see the Japanese doing both assuming they would not attack the Philippines or Pearl Harbor and draw the US into the war. Big assumption though.

It would have made a huge difference. No Soviet counter offensive before Moscow.

Why? To suggest that there would have been "no Soviet counter offensive" we would have to believe both that the Soviet counter offensive depended on troops from the Far East oblasts, and that those troops would not have been transferred for the Moscow offensive if the Japanese had attacked.

What evidence is there to support either of these views?

The second is the most obvious fallacy. Do you really, for one moment, think that Stalin would have lost Moscow to protect Vladivostok? Really? Isn't that kind of simple minded?

But the first, the story of vast numbers of fresh Siberian divisions showing up in front of Moscow at the critical moment, is really a long-lived but ill-founded myth.

A pretty complete accounting of the "Siberian Divisions" can be found here: link

Despite the mythology, in fact only 14 divisions were transferred from the Far East to the western areas during the period of August to December of 1941.* Of these 14 divisions only 8 participated in the Moscow battles.

There were 2 small cavalry divisions (18th and 20th Mountain Cavalry Divisions). They were assigned to the 30th and 16th Army (respectively), and did participate in the Moscow battles, but cavalry's effectiveness in the campaign were limited by the deep snow. There were 2 tank and 1 mechanized divisions, but 1 of these (60th Tank Division) went to the Volkhov area (14th Army), and played no role in the Moscow battles.

Of the 9 infantry divisions, the 65th and 95th Rifle Divisions went to the 4th Army, the 21st and 114th Rifle Divisions went to the 7th Army, and the 26th Rifle Division went to the 11th Army. None of those units participated in the Moscow operations.

The 32nd Rifle Division went to the 5th Army, the 78th went to the 16th Army, the 93rd went to the 43rd Army, and the 238th went to the 49th Army. These formations participated in the Moscow battles.

Put it all together and only 1 out of 14 Armies involved in the Moscow battles, only the 16th Army, received more than 1 division of troops from the far east in time for the Moscow battles. The 16th Army had 1 Rifle Division, 1 Tank Division and 1 Mountain Cavalry division from the Far East, in addition to the 4 Rifle Divisions, 1 Tank Brigade, and 6 Artillery Regiments that came from other parts of the Soviet Union.

That's about, what, maybe 25 to 33% of the fighting power of 1 out of 14 armies. And perhaps 5% to 10% of the fighting power another 4 out of 14 armies. Even taking the higher end of my % estimates that still totals up up to something like 5% of the combat power of the Soviet forces involved in the Moscow battles having come from the Far East in a timeframe where they MIGHT not have been available to transfer if the Japanese had attacked.

And we are to believe that that the Moscow battles depended on this? That the offensive could not have taken place without them?

I find it difficult to believe.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

*Caveat: I have deliberately excluded divisions transferred before August of 1941 from my discussion. My reasoning is as follows:
1) Those units transferred in June or July were either already scheduled for transfer before the war broke out, or were transferred despite a very present risk of war with Japan. It was only after July that the infamous Sorge spy ring was able to provide assurance to Stalin that the Japanese were not going to re-initiate hostilities against the Soviets.
2) Most of the units transferred in June / July were used in the early stages of the Barbarossa battles. Even if they survived to participate in the Battle of Moscow, by that time we can hardly guess whether units that were in fact transferred 6 month's prior would, or would not, have been available in some other scenario.

Did the Japanese do that badly at Khalkhin Gol? A reinforced Infantry division fighting against several Russian armoured corps, outnumbered in tanks and aircraft and inflicting higher loses on the Russians, doesn't seem like a major defeat.
I remember reading a book by a Japanese military planner that stated the reason to go south was due to Japan's limited reserves of oil, the Dutch East Indies had the resources to exploit immediately unlike Siberia which would not have produced resources so quickly.
That is a fascinating site mark, the 'doorknocker' article shows what can be achieved by supposingly inferior equipment.

Would have kept the Soviet Siberian army in Siberia instead of counterattacking the Germans before Moscow.