"Pickett's Charge 1863 " Topic

"This is about as far from being an obscure incident in an obscure battle as it's possible to get. Pickett's Charge, in fact, ranks right up there with D-Day as one of the most famous military events in American military history. So why is it a post in my increasingly misnamed blog, Obscure Battles? Because I have the urge to talk about some of the more obscure but important aspects of this battle-within-a-battle that, in my and several of my resources' opinions, had a direct bearing on how it turned out. In playing this as a wargame innumerable times, those aspects have turned out--at least in laboratory--to be critical factors. And there are some obscure details of this charge that may explain the inevitability of its failure.

Also, the real reason is that I just had to get some things off my chest. So the theme of this post will be obscure in its point of view. Not to say downright revisionist. To inveterate Confederates what I'm going to write here may be considered Yankee propaganda and heresy. But I was never a Confederate in sympathy; my ancestors all fought for the Union--on my mom's side, at least.

Because it's probably the most written-about battle in American history, I'm not going to spend any time on the buildup to Gettysburg, or even on the events of the first two days of that three day battle. I'm only going to reflect on what I imagine was the strategic mindset of Robert E. Lee as he conceived of this doomed attack on this third day of one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War…."

More here
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Amicalement
Armand

Interesting.

That was pretty scathing.

An observer of the men in the Irish brigade wrote, shortly afterward, that the men armed with muskets (the three NY regiments) had taken the packets of rounds out of their cartridge boxes, and opened them up, placing the rounds on top of the rock wall, or on stones on the ground beside them.

The soldiers, knowing it would come down to a close engagement over relatively flat &open ground, were breaking up some of their paper cartridges, removing the powder section so as to make double-charges of buck & ball, the ammunition which they were normally issued with.

The remainder were left close at hand for faster loading.

You can understand, from this, why the Irish stood their ground and caused such devastation to their front.

Didn't read it all -- too long.

Great maps and pictures, though!

Glad you enjoyed it my friend!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Very interesting article! I am no expert on the ACW, but Meade's interior lines rarely seem to get attention. The rest is fascinating, thanks for finding this Armand!

A votre service mon ami!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Meade's interior lines were useful during the second day but had little effect on Pickett's charge. The Confederate barrage overshooting had the inadvertent effect of a WWI box barrage, cutting off the targeted portion of the line from any assistance and clearing the rear area of support troops, HQ and reserve artillery. But the front line hadn't been suppressed, aside from some II Corps guns. The defending infantry and the large number of flanking guns were enough to handle the attack.

While I think Berry's article is a good one, he doesn't understand Lee's thinking… He notes that he was supposedly sick and:

. He reasoned that Meade, having had to reinforce both his left and right wings from the previous days' fighting, would have had to weaken his center. He also thought the Yankees were on the verge of moral collapse, having sustained such horrific casualties since Wednesday. That he didn't reach that same conclusion of the moral status of his own army, who had also sustained terrible losses, betrays his introspective blindness.

This, too, was another example of success-induced failure (see my articles on Lobositz and Blenheim); the Army of Northern Virginia was full of itself after having enjoyed one glorious victory over the Army of the Potomac after another since Lee took command. Lee felt his army was invincible.

That wasn't entirely true…On the evening of July 2nd, here is what Lee was thinking:

Problems:

1. Strategically, he couldn't continue North with the AoP between his army and Virginia. He couldn't flank the Union south until his supply trains were clear behind him…one reason he didn't move through the 4th of July. That he was in this strategic bind is Lee's fault, including letting Stuart go off and leave him blind in Pennsylvania.

2. He had enough supplies for one more engagement… having burned through a great deal of it on the 1st and 2nd of July.

3. Time was not on his side. More Union troops would be coming via the RRs if he simply sat there waiting for Meade to attack him.

4. No one in the South doubted that given time, the Union's superior manpower and industry would win. If the South was going to win, it would have to be psychological, convincing both Europe and the North that they couldn't win at all, or at least quickly or easily.

5. A lot of invaluable men had been used up that the South couldn't replace, so either Lee made it worth the cost or cut his losses. He had to get the Union to retreat.

6. His newly promoted commanders [2/3 of his corps commanders and 1/3 of his division commanders] had not performed well, which is why he placed Longstreet in command of the July 3rd attack.

Points in favor of the attack:

1. Lee didn't necessarily think the Union troops were close to morale collapse. He did know that he had destroyed three Union corps. If he had left it at that, it would have been a tactical victory easily the equal of
2nd Manassas or Chancellorsville, where far less damage was inflicted on the larger Union armies.

2. Only two months before, Lee had induced the morale collapse of Hooker at Chancellorsville. Hooker admitted that "he had lost confidence in Hooker." At the end, Hooker had built a series of ramparts out of wood that amazed Confederate engineers, according to Artillerist Alexander. Hooker had at least 70,000 fresh troops behind them. Lee decided to attack May 5th with 35,000. Hooker retreated rather than face that attack. Alexander noted that it was the highest compliment to the Army of Northern Virginia that two people felt that the army would be successful: Lee and Hooker.

3. Meade was a relative unknown who had been in command for less than a week, commanding an army that had never taken a worst beating, or been smaller. Psychologically, these were strong indications that if attacked again, the AoP would again retreat.

4. On July 2nd, Alexander noted that 20,000 men of Longstreet's Corps had beaten Union 40,000 troops. Both sides knew this. Lee didn't necessarily believe his troops were invincible… but he had good reason to trust their ability to give better than they got.

Lee couldn't know that after a year of beatings, Meade would show greater confidence in the AoP and himself than Hooker, Burnsides or McClellan. This isn't 'success-induced failure.' It was something else. It was a situational-induced gamble that failed.

It was a gamble, a desperate one and Lee knew that. He was also a gambler from the start. Taking Risks was a strategic necessity for Lee and the South. Strategically, the Union never faced the same need to take risks.

A year later Grant had his own Pickett's Charge at Cold Harbor--twice. It made little difference in the strategic situation… It isn't compared to Lee's blunder for that reason, rather than similar casualties in a stupid head-on attack. But strategically, the South was running out of any chances to win the war in July 1863.

Lee accepted his role in Pickett's Charge and offered to resign once the ANV was safely in Virginia. Davis refused to accept it.

Davis didn't have any choice.

Davis didn't have any choice.

Sure he did. He could have brought Bragg over from the West.

I would have to take exception to Bill's analysis of Lee's frame of mind prior to Pickett's Charge. Based on quite a lot of witnesses and memoirs (including Longstreet's), which, in hindsight, were admittedly probably self-serving, Lee did feel that his army was invincible, based on the fact that it had beaten the Potomac (under other commanders) prior to Gettysburg. And he did reason that Meade was weakest in the center after two days of defending his flanks.

You are right that he urgently felt the need to end the war, and undoubtedly believed a decisive victory on Union soil would have probably pushed the European powers to recognize the Confederacy. As victorious as he had been since taking command, he was impatient to end this.

You are also correct that Grant had more than one of his own Pickett's Charges (Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania, the Crater being just three--actually it was Meade, who was still in command of the Army of the Potomac), and though they were tragic, the Union could more afford awful attrition than the South. I'm not defending these banzai-styled charges on either part; they were callous of incalculable human suffering and death.

I also believe (having worked sick myself) that Lee's failing health was a factor in impairing his judgement, much as Napoleon's was at Waterloo.

BL:

I think that Lee used the word 'invincible' in making his apologies for Pickett's Charge, but considering the Confederates' performances at the battle, there is some reason to consider them as formidable. For instance, during Pickett's Charge, the divisions were ordered to march 'quick time.' Under fire, they were asked to do three oblique divisional maneuvers, centering on the grove of trees, cross several fence lines all while under fire… and made the 1600 yard journey in 19-20 minutes [based on a dozens of eyewitnesses] That is parade-ground speed. Quite an accomplishment. In some respects, Lee was betting that like Hooker, Meade would think the Rebels were invincible. That was a gamble, but I wouldn't chalk it up to Hubris.

As for Lee being sick. According to historians, he had a mild heart attack before Chancellorsville and suffered from sciatica. That has never been seen as a hindrance in May 1863. Grant wasn't sick when he ordered the attacks at Cold Harbor.

Lee may have been sick, but I think it doesn't explain much of anything…that he failed because he was sick or thought too highly of his own troops.

I also believe (having worked sick myself) that Lee's failing health was a factor in impairing his judgement, much as Napoleon's was at Waterloo.

And addendum:

So, Lee got better? If he was in failing health, how did he stand up to the rigors of two more years of pounding war, carrying out successfully executed defensive actions with many of his best officers MIA? The relationship between his being 'sick' and his decisions hasn't been demonstrated. His behavior--or decisions weren't all that different from his other battles.

One note, Lee's incompetent chief of artillery was not Sandy Pendleton, but Sandy's father, William Nelson Pendleton

Thanks for the correction. Made it. Sandie was on Ewell's staff. But I had named W.N.Pendleton as the ANV artillery chief.

While it does sound good on paper that Pickett's division had made a series of oblique maneuvers during their approach under fire toward Cemetery Ridge. All of the reports of eyewitnesses shows that those few who got there arrived at the Angle as a disorganized mob, with all of the regiments mixed up. This was not a comment on their lack of tactical ability or prowess, but this was not a parade. This was a desperate charge across more than a mile of open ground, under fire, everybody moving as fast as they could, and not worrying about dressing ranks. It was like a banzai charge. Or probably more culturally appropriate, like the Jacobite charge at Culloden.

I think you are right, though, that Lee likely felt the spectacle of thousands of troops rushing toward them, all (presumably) screaming a Rebel Yell, was supposed to frighten the Union troops into fleeing before contact was even made. He just misjudged the bravery and tenacity of those particular Yankees. Which validates my thesis, that this whole episode was another example of overconfidence due to past success.

It is never good to under-estimate your enemy.

While it does sound good on paper that Pickett's division had made a series of oblique maneuvers during their approach under fire toward Cemetery Ridge. All of the reports of eyewitnesses shows that those few who got there arrived at the Angle as a disorganized mob, with all of the regiments mixed up.

BL:

That was after the twenty minutes I was speaking of. Only a portion of the Confederates actually pushed beyond the two hundred yards beyond to the Angle, which is one reason they were all mixed by that time. The Union also speak admiringly of how long the Rebels kept their formations before stopping to fire [estimated at about 200 yards. They still crossed that open ground under fire as quickly as units on a parade ground at quick march.

I think you are right, though, that Lee likely felt the spectacle of thousands of troops rushing toward them, all (presumably) screaming a Rebel Yell, was supposed to frighten the Union troops into fleeing before contact was even made.

BL: No, that wasn't what I was saying. That wasn't what Lee was attempting to do at Chancellorsville, 2nd Manassas or the Seven Days. It was the commander's resolve he was attacking… They were the ones who gave up in the past, gave the order to retreat, not the troops. The Union troops during each of those engagements apart from those outflanked didn't run at any spectacles or Rebel Yells.

I also believe (having worked sick myself) that Lee's failing health was a factor in impairing his judgement, much as Napoleon's was at Waterloo.

Lee was undoubtedly more and more below par as time went on but it was 1864 before things got serious. The loss of Longstreet and Ewell in The Wilderness and the under performing of Hill, who had reached a promotion too far, meant Lee was running the whole army. At one point he went a number of days without sleep and then had what's thought to be dysentery for good measure!

To preserve his strength he took commanding from a carriage and eventually from his tent. He was never that ill in 1863. If he had been, 1864 would have likely killed him!

The real thing at Gettysburg was desperation.

By the start of the Chancellorsville campaign, the ANV had eaten Virgina. The battle itself while tactically brilliant hadn't even come close to destroying the AOP and at the end of it all they were back where they started from and the ANV were still eating rations a dog would have rejected.

Hence the invasion and the original idea of getting Meade to attack, rather than what happened. Having wrecked Sickles (all be it be accident) and inflicted plenty of other damage, Lee gambled and lost, trying to force the issue and avoid a return to the strategic defensive he knew would ultimately fail.

BTW: Don't forget Lee had previous form in this type of attack – Malvern Hill should have provided an example of what not to do in these situations!

Very good points. Trajanus. Malvern Hill is also a good cautionary tale. And I think you've hit on the crux of what Pickett's Charge represented. "The real thing at Gettysburg was desperation."

After two days of combat (unintended, since Lee was sucked into it against his will), his failure to break the AoP's or Meade's resolve had induced him, exactly out of desperation, to attempt a Hail Mary Pass. But rather than psyching Meade as he had intimidated Hooker, McLellan, and Burnside, it was Meade who ended up psyching Lee.

But it is all of these "what-ifs" and interpretations that have made the battle so wargamable. And prompted so many books.

Well "Hail Mary Pass" is one thing but I think Pickett's Charge was that other old saying "Never throw into double coverage" :o)

Yes, and Malvern Hill and the planned attack against the entrenched Union at Chancellorsville had one thing in common: The AoP retreated.

Actually, I may be thinking of another battle, but I believe at Chancellorsville it was Jackson's sneak run around the AoP, hitting the unentrenched and surprised XI Corps in the flank, that caused the collapse, not Lee's dogged frontal attacks on entrenched positions. Oh, and Hooker's head bonk.

The Confederates suffered terribly in that battle (over 13,000 casualties or 22% of their total force, the Union almost 18,000 or 13% of theirs) in their previous frontal attacks on the Union center. The first day was so discouraging to Lee that that's when he was open to the risky nighttime outflank that Jackson proposed. So Chancellorsville was the opposite of Gettysburg, at least in terms of Lee's behavior.

The day after Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville was nothing BUT dogged frontal attacks against the entrenched Union position. Lee threw his men at the Union trenches in a series of attack and counterattacks. Taking over Hazel Grove was the key to unlocking the position and forcing the AoP to retreat.

This is what so fascinates me about history--and historiography; the need to tie things up in neat little packages of definite causes and effects. It's nothing but journalism and editorial.

It's epitomized by that hoary proverb:

For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the message was lost.
For want of a message the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

This is one of the reasons I started the Obscure Battles blog, to approach each battle with my own theories on what might have happened and why. And to get people speculating themselves.

The other reason was to please myself.