"How did the U-Boat campaign impact Ireland? " Topic

I am currently reading Jonathan Dimbleby's 'The Battle of the Atlantic' and it got me thinking: how did the U-Boat campaign impact the Republic of Ireland?

Perhaps Dimbleby covers this later in his book (I am only halfway through), but I have never thought of this before. Was Ireland self-sufficient in food at the time, or was rationing introduced? Or did it actually export food to the UK – via Ulster, presumably?
But how about other imports – oil etc? I know she was not fighting a war, so her need was hardly comparable with the UK, but surely there was still no way that Ireland could NOT have been impacted to a huge extent: it is not as though the U-Boats would have let ships through to dock in Ireland, but tried to sink those bound for the UK?

Good questions. I'd like to know these answers, too!

There was rationing in Ireland.

I think it ended in 1953 whereas in the UK it ended 1954.

Rationing began later in Ireland too, possibly too late there were dire shortages of food, fuel and raw materials caused by the Battle of Atlantic in the early 40's, and by a reduction in trade with the UK, caused by rationing and deterioration in relations between the two countries during the same period.

I find it fascinating that the UK had plans to invade and occupy Ireland (again) should the need arise, should London ever feel that the Germans were about to establish a client-state relationship with the Republic. I forget if the US was a part of or privy to those plans. It would not have been welcomed by many Americans, not if it met with any resistance from Irish nationalists, which I feel it surely would have been. I've also forgotten if the Irish government was aware of this possibility, too, and so was willing to go along with British mandates to avoid being dragged into the war. Would the government have given in to such an attempt at occupation, I wonder? It's a complex issue. One is glad such an eventuality never came to pass, as a violation of Irish neutrality by the British would have stained Churchill's reputation (which is already under some cloud as it pertains to Ireland), been a blot on Britain's war efforts, and been toxic for postwar relations between the two nations.

The Irish government was at great pains to maintain it's neutrality, they even sent a message of condolence to the German people, regarding the death of the Fuhrer. They didn't really expect Britain to win the war early on so they weren't keen on allying themselves to a potential loser.

I don't think there was any question of Ireland becoming an ally of Germany, although obviously the IRA did make an attempt to do just that. The UK probably would have been justified in taking military action if only to defend the border with Northern Ireland.

The UK was supplying Ireland with imports, often at great cost in lives of merchant seamen of both nations, so it might have felt that Ireland could have done more to assist in fighting the Battle of the Atlantic.

'deterioration in relations between the two countries during the same period.'

Did you not hear of the Economic War that only concluded in '38 relations when not actively hostile were distinctly cool well before the battle for the Atlantic. Feelings were also running high about the inaction of the British government in the face of anti Catholic pogroms in Belfast.

Certainly the Irish Government was very aware of the possibility of a British invasion and was determined to resist it. That said it offered quite a bit of co-operation too. Churchill offered the 6 counties in return for the Treaty Ports – no one believed him.

Churchill offered the 6 counties in return for the Treaty Ports – no one believed him.

This much is true. In May-June 1940, the UK did float an offer to return Northern Ireland to the Republic in return for Eire's dropping their neutrality and joining the Allies. The major sticking point, however, was that the Republic and the government of Northern Ireland would have to come to terms; something that was not possible due to the level of distrust and hatred that existed between the two. De Valera had to reluctantly reject the offer due to the uncertainty getting any kind of agreement between the North and South.

Given the troubled subsequent history of the region, its interesting to consider the impact if such an agreement had been successful.

The UK was supplying Ireland with imports, often at great cost in lives of merchant seamen of both nations, so it might have felt that Ireland could have done more to assist in fighting the Battle of the Atlantic.

The Irish did, on a very quiet level, provide a consider amount of assistance in the form of intel (particularly on German sub movements), weather reports and other assistance. They also allowed Allied use of some well-traveled sea and air corridors withing their territory. One noteworthy tidbit re: the weather reports is that one such report was critical to the timing of the Normandy landings.

In summary, Ireland's neutrality can best be said to have been FOR the UK and AGAINST Germany.

And de Valera not only had the unenviable task of treading a fine political line between the warring Great Powers but also those within his own nation and government. Some elements within Ireland were adamant in their opposition to any cooperation with the UK and openly supported Germany. So De Valera had to tread lightly. With respect to Ireland's neutrality, de Valera said it best:

"peace is dependent upon the will of the great States. All the small States can do, if the statesmen of the greater States fail in their duty, is resolutely to determine that they will not become the tools of any great Power and that they will resist with whatever strength they may possess every attempt to force them into a war against their will."

I don't think there was any serious consideration given to invading Ireland, much as many people are willing to believe anything of Britain. I think there was some resentment that Ireland wasn't really sharing the risks and privations that the rest of the British Isles were having to deal with.

I think De Valera was trying to do the right thing politically and not expose himself or his people to unnecessary danger. His quote above explains this quite well, basically we can't influence world events so we'd best not get involved.

An interesting article here that touches on the subject of Irish Republic, its relationship with the UK and Irish volunteers in the British Armed forces.

link

I think Charlie 12 has called it right…

OTH the 6 counties could n't be returned to Eire since they'd never been part of it in the first place.

Interesting use of semantics to miss the point. Carson of course had no such conceptual problems. Nor had Churchill.

"I don't think there was any serious consideration given to invading Ireland, much as many people are willing to believe anything of Britain. I think there was some resentment that Ireland wasn't really sharing the risks and privations that the rest of the British Isles were having to deal with."

No one in the French navy believed the British would attack them, either. If Churchill perceived a severe threat, he was inclined to act, even if many advisors disagreed.

I think Britain's main aim was the use of bases, I.e. ports to combat the u boat menace, an invasion would've served absolutely no useful purpose, and as someone has already hinted could've damaged Anglo American relations as well as their international credibility.

As it was Ireland did support the Allied war effort, and did risk it's neutrality being called into question as a result.

I'm not one to lionise anyone, least of all Churchill, but he does attract a lot of criticism for things he might have done.

Excellent points, thank you especially Willlucv and Charlie 12. Ireland was in a very tricky situation in that time, caught between so many historical legacies AND contemporary challenges. De Valera probably handled it all as adroitly as any statesman could have (altho' the condolence message to Berlin on Hitler's death was probably a step too far in the one direction, and ill-advised for posterity's sake).