"Henry Adams' Conclusions on the War of 1812" Topic

American Privateers:

‘The English admitted themselves to be slow to change their habits, but the French were both quick and scientific; yet Americans did on the ocean what the French, under stronger inducements, failed to do. The French privateer preyed upon British commerce for twenty years without seriously injuring it; but no sooner did the American privateer sail from Frnech ports, that the rates of insurance doubled in London, and an outcry for more protection arose among English shippers which the Admiralty could not calm. The British newspapers were filled with assertions that the American cruiser was the superior of any vessel in its class, and threatened to overthrow England's supremacy on the ocean.'-Henry Adams, History of the United States of America during the Administrations of James Madison, 1337.

The US Navy versus the Royal Navy

‘Another test of relative intelligence was furnished by the battles at sea. Instantly after the loss of the Guerriere the English discovered and complained that American gunnery was superior to their own. They explained their inferiority by the length of time that had elapsed since their navy had found on the ocean an enemy to fight. Every vestige of hostile fleets had been swept away, until after the battle of Trafalgar, British frigates ceased practice with their guns. Doubtless the British navy had become somewhat careless in the absence of a dangerous enemy, but Englishmen were themselves aware that some other cause must have affected their losses. Nothing showed that Nelsons' line-of-battle ships, frigates, or sloops were as a rule better fought than the Macedonian and Java, the Avon and Reindeer. Sir Howard Douglas, the chief authority on the subject, attempted in vain to explain British reverses by the deterioration of British gunnery. His analysis showed only that American gunnery was extraordinarily good.'

‘None of the reports of former British victories showed that the British fire had been more destructive at any previous time than in 1812, and no report of any commander since the British navy existed showed so much damage inflicted on an opponent in so short a time as was proved to have been inflicted on themselves by the reports of British commanders in the American war. The strongest proof of American superiority was given by the best British officers, like Broke, who strained every nerve to maintain an equality with American gunnery. So instantaneous and energetic was the effort that, according to the British historian of the war, ‘a British 46-gun frigate of 1813 was half as effective again as a British 46-gun frigate of 1812;' and, as he justly said, ‘the slaughtered crews and the shattered hulks' of the captured British ships proved that no want of their old fighting qualities accounted for their repeated and almost habitual mortifications.'-Adams, 1337-1338.

Land Engagements:

‘Unwilling as the English were to admit the superior skill of Americans on the ocean, they did not hesitate to admit it, in certain respects, on land. The American rifle in American hands was affirmed to have no equal in the world. This admission could scarcely be withheld after the lists of killed and wounded which followed every battle; but the admission served to check a wider inquiry. In truth, the rifle played but a small part in the war. Winchester's men at the river Raisin may have owed their over-confidence, as the British 41st owed its losses, to that weapon, and at New Orleans five or six hundred of Coffee's men, who were out of range, were armed with the rifle; but the surprising losses of the British were commonly due to artillery and musketry fire. At New Orleans the artillery was chiefly engaged. The artillery battle of January 1, according to British accounts, amply proved the superiority of American gunnery on that occasion, which was probably the fairest test during the war. The battle of January 8 was also chiefly an artillery battle; the main British column never arrived within fair musket range; Pakenham was killed by grapeshot, and the main column of his troops halted more than one hundred yards from the parapet.' -Adams, 1339.

The Battle of Chippawa 1814:

‘The best test of British and American military qualities both for men and weapons, was Scott's battle of Chippawa. Nothing intervened to throw a doubt over the fairness of the trial. Two parallel lines of regular soldiers, practically equal in numbers, armed with similar weapons, moved in close order toward each other, across a side open plain, without cover or advantage of position, stopping at intervals to lad and fire, until one line broke and retired. At the same time two three-gun batteries, the British being the heavier, maintained a steady fire from positions opposite each other. According to the reports, the two infantry lines in the center never came nearer than eighty yards. Major General Riall reported that then, owing to severe losses, his troops broke and could not be rallied. Comparison of the official reports showed that the British lost in killed and wounded four hundred and sixty-nine men; the Americans, two hundred and ninety-six. Some doubts always affect the returns of the wounded, because the severity of the wound cannot be known; but dead men tell their own tale. Riall reported one hundred forty-eight killed; Scott reported sixty-one. The severity of the losses showed that the battle was sharply contested, and proved the personal bravery of both armies. Marksmanship decided the result, and the returns proved that the American fire was superior to that of the British in the proportion of more than fifty percent if estimated by the entire loss, and of two hundred and forty-two to one hundred if estimated by the deaths alone.'-Adams 1339-1340.

Conclusions:

‘The conclusion seemed incredible, but it was supported by the results of the naval battles. The Americans showed superiority amounting in some cases to twice the efficiency of their enemies in the use of weapons. The best French critic of the naval war, Jurien de la Graviere said: ‘An enormous superiority in the rapidity and precision of their fire can alone explain the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants.' So far from denying this conclusion the British press constantly alleged it, and the British officers complained of it. The discovery caused great surprise, and in both British services much attention was at once directed to improvement in artillery and musketry. Nothing could exceed the frankness with which Englishmen avowed their inferiority. According to Sir Francis Head, ‘gunnery was in naval warfare in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have just described, when our lean children, the American people, taught us, rod in hand, our first lesson in the art.' The English text book on Naval Gunnery, written by Major General Sir Howard Douglas immediately after the peace, devoted more attention to the short American war that to all the battles of Napoleon, and began by admitting that Great Britain had ‘entered with too much confidence on war with a marine much more expert than that of any of our European enemies.' The admission appeared ‘objectionable' even to the author; buthe did notadd, what was equally true, that it applied as well to the land as to the sea service.'
‘No one questioned the bravery of the British forces, or the ease with which they often routed larger bodies of militia; but the losses they inflicted were rarely as great as those they suffered. Even at Bladensburg, where they met little resistance, their loss was several times greater than that of the Americans. At Plattsburg, where the intelligence and quickness of Macdonough and his men alone won the victory, his ships were in effect stationary batteries, and enjoyed the same superiority in gunnery. ‘The Saratoga,' said his official report, ‘had fifty-five round shot in her hull; the Confiance one hundred and five. The enemy's shot passed principally just over our heads, as there were not twenty whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action'…-Adams 1340-1341.

So then…
The War wasn't a tie?

If the criteria for the American "victory" on the high seas during the War of 1812 was applied to the American Civil War, then the Confederate navy "beat" the Union's.

Have either of you read Adams?

Wow! Such cherry picking and such blatant bias!

Important to remember – you can win ALL of the battles and still lose the war.

The war of 1812 was decided more by economic factors than musketry and artillery. Both sides lost a lot of merchant shipping and that impacted their respective economies. Both sides needed peace to recover.

That US troops and ships (regulars, not militia and privateers) performed very well in combat was due to the fact that the US had a very small army and navy compared to the UK at the time. Our land forces were often poorly supplied but, were reasonably well trained and disciplined.

The militia forces could stand and fight but, being mainly civilians, didn't have the same discipline as the regulars. Privateers could do a lot of harm but, didn't have much chance against the Royal Navy…

In many ways, neither side really "won" anything in that war.

In many ways, neither side really "won" anything in that war.

Except that Britain was finally forced to honor the commitments made in 1783 and recognize the validity of the Louisiana Purchase. Not inconsiderable gains for the US.

Such cherry picking and such blatant bias!

First, have you read the book? If you haven't it might be a good idea before you make such blatant accusations.

Second, since Adams used French, English and American primary source material for his book, and that is mentioned in the sections quoted, how is it biased?

If you disagree, which you obviously do, then post something from credible sources that contradict Adams.

Yes Adams is totally correct in stating that the American ships and tactics were superior to those of the British. In WW2 the German Italian and Japanese all had superior versions of Allied vessels yet like the Americans in 1812 they lost the 'naval"war.

The basic rolls of a Navy in wartime are to, protect their coast from attack, to defend merchant trade, to meet and destroy the enemy navy and prevent them from using the seas for trade or military use. If you want a reference try Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History

The American Navy failed to achieve any of these during the war of 1812. Yes they had nicer ships and yes they won a lot of single ship actions an yes they won some battles on the Great Lakes .

By 1813 the British were free to launch an attack on any part of the American coastline Using basically the same tactic, as the US privateers, British and Canadian privateers swept the American Merchant fleet from the seas and closed entry to every major American port. By the end of the War the Navy and privateers had captured 200 American Privateers, over 900 merchant ships and 20,000 American seamen were in prison.

At the same time the British still had full control of the sea lanes to transport reinforcements and supplies across the Atlantic and then up the St Lawrence and Great Lakes system to all fronts of the war. British merchants had to pay higher insurance rates but still made money.

Probably The only American merchant ships still at sea were those supplying Wellington in Spain and the British islands in the West Indies. Wellington admitted that he coul not have survived in Spain were it not for the American supplies

Of the US frigates that participated in the war by 1814 the USS Constitution USS Macedonian and USS Unites States were still at sea. The USS Boston USS Adams and USS Constellation were blockaded in port The USS Chesapeake, USS President and USS Essex were captured by the Royal Navy

Prior to 1812 the major source of Revenue for the US government was the custom duties and other tariffs charged on incoming goods On October 4, 1813 the US Federal Government declared itself to be insolvent, On November 11, 1813 the US defaulted on payments due to the National Debt and for the Louisiana purchase. By the treaty of Ghent the defaulted amount was up to $2.8 USD million with another $15 USDD million coming due forwhich there were no cash.

Negotiators in Belgium were surprised to have rceived the offer of "Status quo ante bellum" as they expected much worse.

In truth both sides were exhausted the Americans financially and the British psychological The British had been fighting for over 20 years and wanted peace British taxpayers were not going to pay for another American War on a territory they could not hold

in the spring of 1812 Britain had sent a delegation to Washington with a proposed Treaty that addressed all the American concerns that led to War. Madison refused to submit it to Congress, as he knew he did not have the votes. Along with the warhawks he wanted Canada and felt, as Jefferson

The Treaty of Ghent did not address any of the American concerns and left them as in 1812 Canada was still British. In fact the only territorial gains made by the US were taken from the Indians and they probably would have gained them without a War with Britain

Everything i have written is not opinion but fact and available in any competent war history For a counterpoint to Adams, l would suggest ory The Challenge Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812 by Andrew Lambert A good American point of view that gives the same type of information is Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 by William Weber

Finally, Henry Adams was a product of the early 20h Century when America was in the middle of developing a world class navy and in acquiring an overseas empire All his writings are a product of a time where myth was more important then fact and the need to show why a strong Navy was necessary. The books I cited will give you a much more balanced and factual story.

Have either of you read Adams?

Nope. I was making a joking comment on the Truth we have always been taught, that the War of 1812 was a tie, with the last major being fought after the war was over. Vast over-simplification, I agree.
But you chose to regard my joking attempt with a chip on your shoulder, like you always do.

And you have to make a personal, pejorative comment in response.

The comment didn't come off as comical, but condescending and somewhat ignorant. It lacked both wit and demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the period.

Well done. (That is sarcasm if you can't figure it out)

Of course it wasn't a tie Winston. The Canadians won and the Indians lost. Any Fule Kno That.

Adams' position is refuted by Murray in his 1998 Edinburgh lecture on British foreign policy: YouTube link (Includes some naughty words).

As the War of 1812 was fought on the British side by the British army with little active support in the fighting by Canadian units, with a few notable exceptions, the idea that Canada 'won' is 'interesting' as Canada was owned by Great Britain at the time and was not an independent country.

And the war was a draw, as nothing changed per the Treaty of Ghent.

And it was a draw because of the British military failures in 1814 and early 1815: the Niagara, Plattsburg, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Those American successes caused the British delegates to Ghent to change their demands and settle for what had existed before the war.

Wellington himself had some interesting things to say about the initial British demands for US territory during the peace process.

Yes Adams is totally correct in stating that the American ships and tactics were superior to those of the British. In WW2 the German Italian and Japanese all had superior versions of Allied vessels yet like the Americans in 1812 they lost the 'naval"war.

The German, Italian, and Japanese fleets were destroyed by the allies in War II. And those three nations surrendered to the allies. Those circumstances did not exist at the end of the War of 1812.

The basic rolls of a Navy in wartime are to, protect their coast from attack, to defend merchant trade, to meet and destroy the enemy navy and prevent them from using the seas for trade or military use. If you want a reference try Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History

The following references are also helpful:

The Naval War of 1812
-The Rise of American Naval Power by Harold and Margaret Sprout
-Edward Preble by Christopher McKee
-Stoddert's War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France by Michael Palmer
-The Naval War of 1812 by Theodore Roosevelt
-The Age of Fighting Sail by CS Forester*
-The Search for Speed Under Sail 1700-1855 by Howard Chapelle
-The History of American Sailing Ships by Howard Chapelle
-The History of the American Sailing Navy by Howard Chapelle*
-The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History edited by William Dudley (Volumes I and II and Michael Crawford (Volume III)
-The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 by NAM Rodger
-Six Frigates by Ian Toll
-The Congress Founds a Navy by Marshall Smelser
-Ships of Oak Guns of Iron by Ronald Utt
-Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785-1827 by Craig Symonds
-Perilous Fight by Stephen Budiansky
-1812: The Navy's War by George Daughan
-A Treatise on Naval Gunnery by Howard Douglas
-The Frigates by James Henderson
-Lords of the Lake by Robert Malcolmson
-Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812 by William James
-The USS Essex by Frances Robotti and James Vescovi
-Fighting Sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay by Barry Gough
-Thomas Macdonough by David Skaggs
-HMS Detroit: The Battle for Lake Erie by Thomas Malcomson and Robert Malcomson
-Captain Blakely and the Wasp by Stephen Duffy*
-A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign 1812-1813 by David Skaggs and Gerard Altoff*
-Wellington's Navy by Christopher Hall
-Utmost Gallantry: The US and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812 by Kevin McCranie
-Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, Volume 2 by AT Mahan
-Knights of the Sea by David Hanna
-Our Country Right or Wrong by DF Guttridge
-Oliver Hazard Perry by David Skaggs
-A Call to the Sea by Claude Berube and John Rodgaard
-Maritime Power and the Struggle for Freedom by Peter Padfield
-Broadsides and Boarders by Marvin Albert
-Dawn Like Thunder by Glenn Tucker
-The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire by AT Mahan
-If By Sea by George Daughan
-Preble's Boys by Fletcher Pratt
-Millions for Defense by Frederick Leiner
-Splintering the Wooden Wall by Wade Dudley
-The Naval Chronicle, Volumes 29 and 30, edited by James Clarke and John McArthur*
-Truxton of the Constellation by Eugene Ferguson
-The US Navy Pictorial History of the War of 1812 by Don Phillpott
-The Naval War of 1812 edited by Robert Gardiner*
-Frigates of the Napoleonic Wars by Robert Gardiner*
-The Line of Battle edited by Robert Gardiner*
-Warships of the Napoleonic Era by Robert Gardiner*
-The Sailing Navy 1775-1854 by Paul Silverstone
-Warships of the Great Lakes 1754-1834 by Robert Malcomson
-A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession by Christopher McKee.
-The Frigates by Henry Gruppe.
-Sailing Warships of the US Navy by Donald Canney.

The American Navy failed to achieve any of these during the war of 1812. Yes they had nicer ships and yes they won a lot of single ship actions an yes they won some battles on the Great Lakes.

The US Navy of 1812 compared to the Royal Navy would not have been able to obtain control of the seas, and that was not the US Navy's object. Additionally, the Jefferson administration had crippled the expansion of the US Navy that was planned by Secretary of the Navy Stoddert, which undoubtedly would have led to more success at sea in 1812-1815.

The US Navy won the overwhelming majority of the ship to ship engagments in the war and destroyed the British fleets on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, while engaging in a naval arms race with the Royal Navy on Lake Ontario.

Wellington remarked on the strategic value of control of the lakes:

‘I have told the ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the Lakes is a sine qua non of success in war on the frontier of Canada.'

Since the British did not control the lakes and lost two fleets attempting to do so, that was a signal strategic failure.

By 1813 the British were free to launch an attack on any part of the American coastline Using basically the same tactic, as the US privateers, British and Canadian privateers swept the American Merchant fleet from the seas and closed entry to every major American port. By the end of the War the Navy and privateers had captured 200 American Privateers, over 900 merchant ships and 20,000 American seamen were in prison.

Source(s) regarding losses and the number of prisoners?

At the same time the British still had full control of the sea lanes to transport reinforcements and supplies across the Atlantic and then up the St Lawrence and Great Lakes system to all fronts of the war. British merchants had to pay higher insurance rates but still made money.

Probably The only American merchant ships still at sea were those supplying Wellington in Spain and the British islands in the West Indies. Wellington admitted that he coul not have survived in Spain were it not for the American supplies

Source(s)?

Of the US frigates that participated in the war by 1814 the USS Constitution USS Macedonian and USS Unites States were still at sea. The USS Boston USS Adams and USS Constellation were blockaded in port The USS Chesapeake, USS President and USS Essex were captured by the Royal Navy. The Chesapeake was defeated by a better captain and a better-trained crew. Lawrence was cocky and full of himself.

The USS President and USS Essex were defeated and taken by more than one ship, which is usually overlooked. And the President had damaged her hull coming out of harbor. The Essex was caught in harbor with her topmasts down.

Prior to 1812 the major source of Revenue for the US government was the custom duties and other tariffs charged on incoming goods On October 4, 1813 the US Federal Government declared itself to be insolvent, On November 11, 1813 the US defaulted on payments due to the National Debt and for the Louisiana purchase. By the treaty of Ghent the defaulted amount was up to $2.8 USD USD million with another $15 USD USDD million coming due forwhich there were no cash.

You left out the British economic and financial problems. One of them was that the French franc germinal was the most stable currency in Europe, the British had an almost overwhelming national debt, and the economy at home was a mess.

More on Ghent:

Coles on Ghent:

'At the beginning [of the negotiations] the British announced that their Indian allies be included in the treaty as a sine quo non. They also expected a cession of territory in eastern Maine and northern New York and between Lake Superior and navigable water on the Mississippi. A permanent Indian dominion to consist of all the Northwest behond the line of the Treaty of Greenville of 1795 was to be created. The right of Americans to dry fish on British shores in the North Atlantic, guaranteed by the Treaty of 1783, was declared to be forfeited, to be revived only by granting an equivalent.'-250-251

'The American commissioners had not the slightest intention of granting any of these demands…the British of course did not expect that they would be accepted. It was obvious to all that they were stalling for time and expected their armies in the field to accomplish what their diplomats at the conference table could never hope to do. Still the government did not want the negotiations broken off; they would yield just enough ground to keep the Americans talking. When news of the fall of Washington reached London on September 27, the British government had already decided to abandon the Indian buffer state. Completely confident of the success of British arms they suggested uti possidetis as a basis of settlement. Rejecting uti possidetis just as firmly as the Indian buffer state, the Americans again made ready to leave Ghent. Toward the end of October news of the naval battle of Plattsburg, Prevost's retreat into Canada, and the repulse at Baltimore reached London. Though shaken by these unexpected reverses the cabinet resolved to remain firm in their demands. Bathurst informed Goulburn that the military developments had not affected the government's plans, but 'had Lord George Prevost kept Plattsburg…we would have had a better case of it.'251-252.

'The cabinet might attempt to ignore the situation in America, but they could not remain indifferent to their own internal situation and the unending power struggle on the Continent. Prevost's retreat meant that the American war, which had already cost far more than anyone had contemplated, would have to be continued another year at an estimated cost of L10 million. To raise such a sum the hated property tax, due to expire within a few months, would have to be extended, and the chances of being able to secure such an extension were negligible. The war was an expensive nuisance in many ways. Because of the activities of American privateers insurance rates in the Irish Sea were three times as great as at the height of the war with France.'252

'Hoping a one and the same time to get Wellington out of Paris, where they feared for his life, and to rid themselves of the war, the British cabinet asked the Duke to assume command in America. Serving as ambassador to France since the end of hostilities, Wellington had long since become the cabinet's chief adviser not only on military matters but on nearly every important questions of policy. In reply, Wellington said he had no objections to going to America, but he could not promise much success there. 'That which appears to me to be wanting in America, or a general officer and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes.' Since a military solution was so unpromising why not simply end the war on the best terms possible, he suggested. 'In regard to your negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war to demand any concessions of territory…Why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed the state of your military operations however creditable does not entitle you to any.'-253.

'Not only was the greatest soldier of the empire pessimistic, everywhere the ministry might turn there were symptoms of war weariness. Parliament assembled on November 8 and soon opposition to the war was openly expressed. The position of those opposed to continuing the war was strengthened when details of the early negotiations became public knowledge…In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Landsdowne said that while he was willing to support the dictum of perpetual British allegiance and of the right of impressment, he would not support a war for conquest or territory, for the lakes, or the Indians.'-253-254.

'Actually the ministry needed no urging. Having made up their minds to terminate the miserable affair they lost no time. On November 18 Lord Liverpool wrote Castlereagh they had determined not to continue thhe war for the purpose of securing territory. The reasons he alleged were: the lack of progress in the negotiation at Vienna, the 'alarming' situation of the interior of France, the stateof finances, the difficulties of continuing the property tax, the opposition in Parliament, and the views of the Duke of Wellington.'-254

So, the British withdrew their demands for territory for the above reasons, and it should be noted that the British were not in a very good financial position either, not as bad as the Americans, but bad enough. They had a huge national debt, the pound was not as stable as it could have been, and they were definitely war-weary. The recent American victories were certainly a deciding factor in the British demands being withdrawn, and the prewar situation was agreed upon.

Negotiators in Belgium were surprised to have rceived the offer of "Status quo ante bellum" as they expected much worse.
In truth both sides were exhausted the Americans financially and the British psychological The British had been fighting for over 20 years and wanted peace British taxpayers were not going to pay for another American War on a territory they could not hold

The issue is the sequence of events that led up to the Treaty and how the negotiating position of the British delegates changed over time because of military events in North America which were major British failures in 1814.

The British positions, among other things, was the demand for territory from the United States. As the British military failures added up in 1814 (the Niagara, Plattsburg, and Baltimore) the British decided to mount an expedition to New Orleans and to retain any territory gained by that expedition to at least have a bargaining position against the American delegation at Ghent.

And there was no fixed 'by date' that the treaty had to be signed. When the British gave up any territorial claims against the United States and anything else that changed what had been in existence when the war began regarding territory and rights (such as American fishing rights in Canadian waters), then the treaty was agreed to by both parties.

And the British issued no recall orders to Pakenham before the fighting at New Orleans, all of which took place before the Americans ratified the treaty. Some of it, such as the American attack of 23 December, took place before the British ratified the treaty (in fact before it was signed).

So, instead of merely reading the provisions of the treaty, in order to understand how the terms of the treaty came about, the process in Ghent and the sequence of events of how it came about should be looked at and analyzed.

in the spring of 1812 Britain had sent a delegation to Washington with a proposed Treaty that addressed all the American concerns that led to War. Madison refused to submit it to Congress, as he knew he did not have the votes. Along with the warhawks he wanted Canada and felt, as Jefferson

In truth, the British did cancel the Orders in Council, but by the time they did the United States had declared war.
Did the British delegation in the spring of 1812 state that they would cancel the impressment of American seamen on the high seas?

The Treaty of Ghent did not address any of the American concerns and left them as in 1812 Canada was still British. In fact the only territorial gains made by the US were taken from the Indians and they probably would have gained them without a War with Britain

The taking of Canada was not one of the American war aims.
The following might be helpful:

Three excerpts from the Committee on Foreign Relations: Report on the Causes and Reasons for War, June 1812, which was an official report from the subject committee as to the causes of the war, and as an 'appeal to arms' against Great Britain:

'…After the experience which the United States have had of the great injustice of the British Government towards them, exemplified by so many acts of violence and oppression, it will be more difficult to justify to the impartial world their patient forbearance, than the measures to which it had become necessary to resort, to avenge the wrongs, and vindicate the rights and honor of the nation. Your committee are happy to observe, on a dispassionate review of the conduct of the United States, that they see in it no cause for censure.'

'…More than seven years have elapsed since the commencement of this system of hostile aggression by the British Government, on the rights and interests of the United States. The manner of its commencement was not less hostile than the spirit with which it has been prosecuted. The United States have invariably done everything in their power to preserve the relations of friendship with Great Britain…'

'…This lawless waste of our trade, and equally unlawful impressment of our seamen, have been much aggravated by the insults and indignities attending them. Under the pretext of blockading the harbors of France and her allies, British squadrons have been stationed on our own coast, to watch and annoy our own trade. To give effect to the blockade of European ports, the ports and harbors of the United States, have been blockaded. In executing these orders of the British government, or in obeying the spirit which was known to animate it, the commanders of these squadrons have encroached on our jurisdiction, seized our vessels, and carried into effect impressments within our limits, and done other acts of great injustice, violence, and oppression. The United States have seen with mingled indignation and surprise, that these acts instead of procuring to the perpetrators the punishment due to unauthorized crimes, have not failed to recommend them to the favor of the government.'

'Whether the British government has contributed by active measures to excite against us the hostility of the savage tribes on our frontiers, your committee are not disposed to occupy much time in investigating. Certain indications of general notoriety may supply the place of authentic documents, though these have not been wanting to establish the fact in some instances. It is known that symptoms of British hostility towards the United States have never failed to produce corresponding symptoms among those tribes. It is also well known that on al such occasions abundant supplies of the ordinary munitions of war have been afforded by the agents of the British commercial companies, and even from British garrisons, wherewith they were enabled, to commence that system of savage warfare on our frontiers which has been at all times indiscriminate in its effect, on all ages, sexes, and conditions and so revolting to humanity.'

So it appears that the maritime issues were causes of the war…

British impressment of American seamen from Donald Hickey's Don't Give Up the Ship!, page 21:

'Based on State Department figures, contemporary American newspapers often reported that 6,257 Americans had been impressed between 1803 and 1812. This figure included some duplications, but it probably omitted other cases that went unreported. Based on various figures provided by the State Department, one might conservatively estimate that 3,000 Americans were impressed from 1793-1802 and 7,000 from 1803-1812. Thus, in all, perhaps 10,000 American citizens were impressed into British service during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.'

Canada is not mentioned at all in Madison's 'War Message to Congress' in June 1812.

Canada is not mentioned in the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations 'Report on the Causes and Reasons for War' previously mentioned.

Canada is mentioned in a letter from Secretary of State James Monroe on 13 June 1812 to John Taylor, mentioning that 'in case of war it might be necessary to invade Canada, not as an object of the war but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.'

So, it does seem by these three documents that the conquest of Canada was not a war aim of Madison but as a means to attack the British on land. That seems to be a common sense idea in order to take the war to the enemy and not wait on the defensive. Any idea of 'conquest' would come as an afterthought, not as an initial war aim by the Madison administration.

The War of 1812 by Harry L. Coles has some interesting discussion of the causes of the War of 1812 in the first chapter, Prologue to War, 23-25.

He notes that President Madison submitted his ‘war message' to Congress on 1 June 1812 and that ‘the document was an indictment of British policy under five main heads.'

First-impressment.

Second-‘the practicw of British cruisers hovering near American ports and harassing entering and departing commerce.'

Third-‘the blockades that were…illegal even according to definitions issued by the British themselves.'

Fourth-the Orders in Council. Madison charged ‘that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation.' George Canning charged in parliament ‘that the Orders in Council had been transformed from a blockade into ‘a measure of commercial rivalry.' And Canning was ‘a staunch adherent of strict blockades.'

The ‘commercial rivalry' denounced by Canning ‘had been done through the sue and the abuse of a system of special licenses. The Board of Trade had the power to issue licenses exempting ships and cargoes from the effects of the blockade. It is not difficult to see that the interests of the empire might be well served by a judicious use of such power. The issue of licenses, however, became honeycombed with favoritism, corruption, and fraud. Many an Englishman who would have supported the government to the death on impressment and legitimate blockades blushed at the traffic in special licenses.'

Fifth-‘the renewal of Indian warfare on the western frontier.'

So, of Madison's five points for declaring war, four were concerned with maritime issues, and one with the Indians. There were none for invading and taking Canada as a permanent possession.

Regarding the Canadian issue and the land-hungry Americans in the west, there has been a plethora of scholarship on it by Louis Hacker, writing in 1924, and continued by Julius Pratt the next year in his volume, The Expansionists of 1812. George Taylor, Warren Goodman, AL Burt, Reginald Horsman and others supported the idea of invading and taking Canada as a main war aim for a variety of reasons.

Beginning in 1961, Bradford Perkins, in Prologue to War, and others, maintained that the reasons for war were both because of maritime grievances and ‘national honor.' Roger Brown's Republic in Peril continues the discussion, and both he and Perkins believed that ‘the sectional character of the vote for war has been overemphasized.'

Harry Cole (1965), who evaluates the above source material in his book (27-37) concludes that ‘Expansionism still has its advocates, but Burt, Horsman, Perkins, and most recently Brown have all rejected the idea of a sectional conspiracy to enlarge the boundaries of the United States. Among these historians there is a consensus that the war hawks were interested in Canada primarily as a means of waging war rather than the object of war. This is not to deny, of course, that what was originally a means could not easily have become an object of war. To use a modern expression, a war to win recognition of maritime rights by seizing a hostage could easily have escalated into a war for maritime rights and territorial conquest. It cannot be denied, furthermore, that certain members of Congress wanted both Canada and Florida, and it is possible that they voted for war hoping to get one or both. But Brown maintains, and his conclusions seem borne out by recent research, that ‘Republicans were willing to give their votes for war even without assurance that either Canada or Florida would ever be annexed. In the face of many objections it is doubtful that anyone voted for war primarily on the basis of a future annexation of these areas.'

So, based on Madison's five points for a declaration of war, and the above conclusion and the evidence supplied, that the conquest and annexation of Canada (and/or Florida) was not a primary reason, and may not have been a reason at all, for the American declaration of war against Great Britain on 4 June 1812.

Everything i have written is not opinion but fact and available in any competent war history For a counterpoint to Adams, l would suggest ory The Challenge Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812 by Andrew Lambert A good American point of view that gives the same type of information is Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812 by William Weber

No, you have also relied on your own opinion, which is fine. And all that you have posted is not accurate. Perhaps the following references will help you in further research on the War of 1812. I have found them very helpful:

War of 1812 Sources:

-The British at the Gates by Robin Reilly.
-Military Uniforms in America, Volume II-Years of Growth 1796-1851, edited by John Elting.
-The War of 1812: Writings from America's Second War of Independence, edited by Donald Hickey.
-Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolution and 1812 by Louis Norton.
-The Man Who Captured Washington: Major General Robert Ross and the War of 1812 by John McCavitt and Christopher George.
-Amateurs, To Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812 by John Elting.
-The US Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study by Robert Quimby
-Capital in Flames: The American Attack on York, 1813 by Robert Malcomson.
-The Captain Who Burned His Ships: Captain Thomas Tingey, USN, 1750-1829.
-The Battle of Lundy's Lane by Donald Graves.
-While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort Erie 1814 by Joseph Whitehorne.
-The Battle of Sackett's Harbor by Patrick Wilder.
-The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814 by Anthony Pitch.
-Don't Give Up the Ship: Myths of the War of 1812 by Donald Hickey.
-Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 by C Edward Skeen.
-Flotilla: The Patuxent Naval Campaign in the War of 1812 by Donald Shomette.
-Naval Occurrences of The War of 1812 by William James.
-A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of The Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America by William James.
-The War of 1812: Land Operations by George Stanley.
-Sword of the Border: Major General Jacob Jennings Brown 1775-1828 by John Morris.
-A Very Brilliant Affair: The Battle of Queenston Heights 1812 by Robert Malcomson.
-Historical Memoir of The War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815 by Arsene Lacarriere Latour.
-The Battles at Plattsburg by Keith Herkalo.
-Memoir of Alexander Macomb, The Major General Commanding the Army of the United States by George Richards.
-The United States Army in the War of 1812 by John Frederickson.
-The War of 1812 by JCA Stagg.
-The War of 1812 by Harry Coles.

Finally, Henry Adams was a product of the early 20h Century when America was in the middle of developing a world class navy and in acquiring an overseas empire All his writings are a product of a time where myth was more important then fact and the need to show why a strong Navy was necessary. The books I cited will give you a much more balanced and factual story.

Henry Adams had access to English, French,and American archives and I seriously doubt that he relied on any ‘myth' than on solid research.

Lastly, all of the references I have listed I have in my personal library. I highly recommend them all, warts and all.

i am not going to get into a long arguement with someone that has such strong opinions and the time to copy prodigious amounts of information from various books I do not have have the time

All of the numbers i made are found in the two books I reference "Neither Vanquished or Victor' and The Challenge Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812 by Andrew Lambert I would highly suggest that you add both to your library A historian worth the name is not afraid to read books that contradict many of his cherished ideas. Your library is impressive i know i have most if not all along with many others To me your library is also imbalanced with a lot of personal memoirs (never accurate0 and dated historiography

I would suggest adding the following 2 books that will give you a much more balanced view
The civil war of !812: American Citizens British subjects Irish Rebels & Indian Allies ( Alan Taylor)

The Incredible War of 1812 A Military History J Mackay Hitsman, updated by Donald Graves

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You cannot build an argument from quotes from various historical authors you need primary sources I will cite two as an example

Saying that the conquest of Canada was not a factor behind the war is"questionable"

The biggest booster for war, was the Kentuckian, Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, who hammered away for hostilities, telling the members of Congress, in November 1811, before war was declared,"The conquest of Canada is in your power." He summoned up the spirit of 1776, declaring, "I cannot subscribe to British slavery upon the water." He later claimed that the object of the war was to bring redress of injuries and Canada was the instrument by which redress would be obtained. Andrew Jackson joined in, the hullabuloo, by harkening back to Harrison's battle at Tippecanoe. "The blood of our murdered heroes must be avenged," he bellowed, conveniently ignoring the fact that Harrison had provoked the attack on the Natives. The frontier press shrieked, "The scalping knife and tomahawk of the British savages is again devastating our frontiers."

During this period of high tension and histrionics, one of the few voices of reason and restraint was John Randolf of Virginia, who left the Republican party to form a peace party called Quids. He opposed war and argued its real purpose was "a scuffle and a scramble for plunder." It was, he said, nothing but a cover for land grab. "One word like a whip-poor-will cried one monotonous tone: Canada, Canada, Canada."

Little provision was made for a naval increase, but the regular army was more than tripled in size and supplemented by 50,000 volunteers. Warlike speeches in Congress left little doubt about their intended employment – the invasion of Canada

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As to the American negotiators in Belgium John Gallatin wrote the following passage to President Madison on June 13 1814"…that under the existing unpropitious circumstances of the world, America cannot by a continuation on the war,compel Great Britain to yield any of the maritime points in dispute, and particularly to agree to any satisfactory arrangement on the subject of impressment, and that the most favourable terms of peace that can be expected, are the status ante bellum"
Source
Gallatin to Madison in Henry Adams, ed, the writings of Albert Gallatin 9 3 volumes Philadelphia 1879) vol 1 pg 627

The treaty of Ghent did not address any of the points The necessary orders in council that allowed impressment and the stopping of neutral ships were repealed by the Brirish parliament after Waterloo

You cannot build an argument from quotes from various historical authors you need primary sources I will cite two as an example

I used a mixture of primary source material and credible secondary source material.

If you do not care for secondary sources, why are you referring to books by Hitsman and Taylor, which are both secondary sources?

Saying that the conquest of Canada was not a factor behind the war is"questionable"

I posted the information from President Madison's war message, which is a primary source. Canada isn't mentioned in the reasons the US went to war…

It should be noted that the only way to get at the British on land was through Canada. That is why it was invaded. It was not a war aim as announced.

OK you win . Clay Jackson and Jefferson and the other warhawks that wanted control of Canada were not factors in the US declaration of War and of course if the US had won they would have left Canada and returned home

I never said that the 'warhawks' were not factors in the US declaration of war against Great Britain.

What I did say, and posted primary source information to support it, was that the taking of Canada was not one of the reasons that the US declared war. It was not in the war aims of the United States.

Canada was invaded because that was the only way the US could attack the British on land.

If you have contrary evidence, then please show it. You might want to consult Don't Give Up the Ship by Donald Hickey as the subject is addressed quite well there.

"The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching; & will give us experience for the attack of Halifax the next, & the final expulsion of England from the American continent."

Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 4 August 1812

Jefferson was not in the government in 1812 and did not dictate policy.

He was also wrong, but that is another topic. In short, Jefferson was incredibly naïve and was not a good president. Neither was Madison for that matter. Declaring war on the leading sea power in 1812 when the US armed forces were woefully inadequate was not a shining example of common sense.

Here's another Jefferson gem:

'Our quarters for this winter will probably be in Montreal.'-Jefferson to Lafayette, 30 November 1813

Like I said, he was an idiot-dumber than a bag full of hammers.

From Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812 by Donald Hickey, 36-37:

'Most scholars have stressed the maritime issues, particularly the Orders in Council and impressment, caused the war and this view has the weight of evidence behind it. Whether speaking in Congress, in their newspapers, in the diplomatic documents, or in personal letters, Americans in the years before the War of 1812 devoted far more attention to the maritime issues than to the prospect of acquiring Canada. Randolph's argument, however, has never gone away. It enjoyed considerable vogue in the early twentieth century, when its proponents argued that the United States went to war either to get more farmland or to put an end to British influence over American Indians. Even today Randolph's view still has some adherents in the United States and a great many more in Canada.'

From page 39:

'Without the maritime issues, is it likely that the United States would have declared war on Great Britain in 1812 to get Canada? Probably not. However, if the United States had had no territorial ambitions, is it likely that it still would have gone to war in 1812 over the maritime issues? Probably so. In short, what drove American foreign policy in this period was not the wish to acquire Canada (as desirable as this might be) but a determination to win recognition for what contemporaries called 'Free Trade and Sailors' Rights.'

I would highly recommend to obtain and read this book, agree with Hickey's conclusions or not. He makes excellent arguments and understands especially the social and political side of the war.

…in the spring of 1812 Britain had sent a delegation to Washington with a proposed Treaty that addressed all the American concerns that led to War.

That is not a completely accurate assessment of what the British were offering in May 1812.

From Donald Hickey, Don't Give Up the Ship, 36:

'In May 1812 Britain offered the United States an equal share of its license trade with the Continent. The licenses gave those who held them the right to trade in defiance of the Orders in Council. Since Great Britain issued an average of 10,000 licenses a year, this offer was significant. in effect, the British were willing to suspend the Orders in Council in practice as long as American merchants conducted their trade with the Continent under British licenses.'

Impressment was not address as far as I can see and that was a significant reason for the declaration of war.

Further, from above, it wasn't a treaty, but a trading license, and that brought the issue of national sovereignty into play.

I don't suppose we're allowed to say here that Mr. Adams, being a Doodle, might have been a bit off in his assessments, are we?

I would hate to suggest that a historian might have… dare I say… drawn a different conclusion from the evidence than say, another historian may draw?

Only using the Operational Planning Process and other systems analysis approaches here. Just the stuff real staff monkeys use to provide real data analysis to real world military leader types.

But I'd bet a Jos Louis and a two cans of Molson, side by each, that Mr. Adams, for all his ability, might be given to a particular view.

Just saying.

Eric