"Casualty rates in Napoleonic battles" Topic

These days it's easy to find statistics about overall casualty rates resulting from Napoleonic battles, but still much harder to calculate the actual rate of casualties suffered by a single unit in contact from the various sources of harm (artillery, musketry, swords, bayonets, etc.). Where should I look for a good analysis? Any help appreciated.

ACW gaming made me a fan of using stand removal to represent casualties, and the high casualty rates in that war probably did have an appreciable effect on the frontage of a unit in combat. However, in earlier periods combat was more morale-oriented and much less casualty-intensive, and many rules for earlier periods even predicate that unit frontage shouldn't change at all, on the principle that a battalion commander would sacrifice depth (e.g. reduce ranks) to maintain frontage. Is there any evidence of Napoleonic units losing frontage during the course of a battle but remaining in combat?

I would like to get a better idea just how much a Napoleonic unit's frontage would actually narrow from casualties before it would break morale and lose cohesion. I'm not looking for a concise answer (surely an impossibility), but rather a feel for the "correctness" of a given progression.

As ever, pointers to previous discussions on this topic much appreciated. There is nothing new under the sun, but as sometimes happens, TMP archaeology on this topic has so far proven fruitless for me.

- Ix

My understanding is that they would try to preserve their frontages for as long as possible. Before each engagement, french companies would reorganize themselves to companies of equal size. (Elite companies were not included in this.)

Battalions don't operate in a vacuum and look to their flanks and sides to regulate their place in the overall battle line.

I don't think the casualty rates in the ACW are higher than the Napoleonic period. It seems about the same. Some of the battles are bloodbaths, some less so.

I think the differences are more driven by terrain and tactical doctrine than technology, as least in tactical terms.

Yes keeping frontage was very important. As Flashman notes, in part you were protecting your neighbor, and in part they were protecting you. Staying within mutual supporting distance, so to speak, was very important.

As a result I don't remove casualties immediately. Instead, I have a "reform" type function. You pull the unit out of line, and it can "recover." Once it recovers you remove stands. At this point lines are dressed, companies reorganized, everyone has some water, etc.

As for casualty sources, the data you want probably does not exist. Some work was done at Gettysburg, but it was at the hospital so only survivors would have been counted. the killed or wounded who returned to the line would not. There simply aren't the records available in any systematic way to get at that level of detail. Frankly, at the "battle" level determining whether artillery or small arms caused more is even fairly problematic.

Several separate questions here. If you want to sort out Losses by arm, I don't think published casualty reports as such will work. (Hugh's Firepower, if I remember correctly, has some material but it's inferential bordering on speculative.) You might get somewhere looking for the losses of units which were primarily engaged with one arm.

Frontages. For horse & musket warfare I tend toward the "reduced frontage" camp. The drill points in that direction--closing up on the center of the line and not leaving gaps--and I've never seen a letter or memoir in which a contemporary officer describes changing from three ranks to two or from two to one as casualties mounted. Certainly maintaining regular depth made the unit less vulnerable to melee troops, kept up the volume of fire for a given frontage, and made it easier to add units to the firing line. Even when I can find accounts of badly attrited units regrouping--Scott's Brigade at Lundy's Lane, for instance--no one mentions reducing the number of ranks. They just have fewer platoons.

Now, BETWEEN battles is a different story. Most drill manuals allowed for a reduced depth to maintain frontage. I'm just not convinced anyone changed drills in the middle of a firefight.

I could be wrong, And different armies or even units might have done things differently. But as I say, I can't find the account which says "we went into the battle in three ranks and ended in two (or one.)" Until I do, I'm a hard sell.

Flashman's quite right about equalizing the "peletons" before battle by the way. And Prussian drill did the same thing. even pre-1806.

As gamers, ,when we are fielding company or even smaller sized bases we are in effect using the battalion as the base strategic unit In reality both in ACW and Napoleonic era warfare the actual base tactical unit would be the Brigade .

Brigade commanders would be expected to be able to cover an allotted section of the front line or segment in an attacking column for example Going up the command structure ,"divisional" and "Corps" commanders would have also had their own responsibilities for how much "front" they could occupy.

In gaming I would suggest that the fighting capabilities should vary from "unit to unit" whether you use a battaion or brigade as your base unit. This value would be expressed in such terms as numbers, firepower, melee capabilities and morale They would then determine combat effectiveness and in effect what the upper level commander could expect from the individual unit under their command.

Units ( Brigade/Battalion) would have the same frontage but larger units with more men would and should last longer once they start taking casualties Casualties would not be removed individually the unit would remain on the table until it is removed in its entirety

The frontages would remain fairly constant but at some point the brigade would be "fought out" either due to high casualties. a morale penalty or simply just exhaustion At that point they could no longer hold their place in the front and would have to be pulled back or have other units pass through them In some cases they could simply break and run.

Their superior commander ideally would have been aware of this possibility and would have the appropriate reserve necessary to put in place On the other hand if unexpected there would now be a crisis that needs to be solved before it spirals out of control This ability to react or not is what often causes you to lose a battle

Using base reduction to show gradual shrinkage is not realistic as it gives the opponents too much information particularly those that play the rules. For example seeing a four based unit reduced to two bases the opponents knows that he will probably take less casualties and by concentrating fire he can cause a break Picking off units one by one gives them an advantage in forcing their opponent to reach an army break point for example.

In reality the opponent might sense that an enemy is wavering but would not know for sure until the opponent broke or retired leaving the "dreaded gap" He would then have to have the means to exploit it before the enemy can close it Again this is how battles are won or loss

Grande armee takes that approach. A brigade is a 3" base and a roster tracks strength points. Either hte brigade is combat effective or not. And you can pull a brigade out of line and it can regain strength (SPs reflect overall effectiveness – so numbers and morale and training).

Hmm. Part of the disagreement may be that I usually prefer to play around a 1:20, and not stand=brigade.
I've got no trouble playing a game in which a brigade is a single base, slowly reduced in strength. I DO have some difficulty imagining the troops are now in a single rank, or are at double-arm interval. Even the 300 meter frontage for all brigades is a bit of an artifact.
As an example, I'm thinking of one of the XI Corps brigades chopped up at 1st Day Gettysburg. As what was left of them was reforming on Cemetery Hill, an aide commented to the brigade commander, that finally he'd be able to command the brigade by voice alone. I don't think anyone would want to argue that the 500 or so men were assigned a 300 yard frontage. As I recall, they were running about four men per yard. As a wargaming artifact, we consolidate the smaller brigades even when we know this was not done, because the focus of the rules is elsewhere. (You can see this in some of the "official" V&B scenarios for instance.)
You can justify a roster system for losses, but it's not the only system which can be defended.

My biases may be showing, of course. After a career as an OOB analyst, keeping a written record of unit strength is NOT recreation. If people want me to do that, they can write me a check.

Napoleonic: What I think happened is that a unit that was in line, would thin the back rank to keep the same frontage. If they had to change formation (say to a column and then move and then change back into a line), they would reform into a less wide frontage. Part of this is that they did not have a drill for two and a half ranks to change formation. To cover a greater frontage, many units could go to a 3 rank open formation or change to a 2 rank formation.

So I use casualty markers for a unit until what time it changes formation- then whole stands can come off.

ACW: Here I believe a more open formation was the standard and usually only two ranks. When casualties occurred, the men would close files to keep in contact with their mates and the width of a line of battle would decrease. So as soon as a whole stand of infantry is dead, it comes off.

Seems two rank lines had a " close up " order barked more often than 3 ranks ones who used the third rank to fill the first two.
When moving out of line, i.e firing line to say, column they would reorganize to proper ( shorter) 3 ranks.
Keep frontage above bn formations yes up to a point. Which frontage? Most often not two brigades have the same numbers. Roughly.

Can't think one can be too doctrinal on this, as terrain ( thorny bush in the middle?) would also easily add space to deployments. 10-15% more or less for games can't be too bad.

Then we base Fr and Russian/ Austrian napies the same, but in real life the French were not supposed to be as close, touching shoulders as still nowadays " blue book drill" US army parade does, but I learnt in basic training decades ago to align with bent elbow. So some approximations within reason is our lot.

How relevant this is for gaming purpose lies mostly in your scale (time and surface).

To lose a third of your men (say a third rank worth) would be considered catastrophic. I think a formation would cede ground before they were eliminated by fire. Not saying it didn't happen at times, but those would be exceptional circumstances.

As gamers we are a lot more bloodthirsty than real commanders.

I'm in the retain the same frontage camp.

Wargaming losses tend to be far higher than real casualties and I don't see the evidence of units shrinking. Or at least of that shrinking changing its zone of operations.

And wargamers tend to cram battalions together much closer than they did historically, so shrinking exacerbates this.

Finally unless you have lots and lots of sub-bases you are being very arbitrary in base removal. It is common for wargames battalions to be based on a number of bases equal to it's 'company' sub-structure. If you remove bases, you break that sub-structural representation.

Of all the multitude of abstract representations present on the wargaming field of battle, keeping battalions at a constant frontage is way, way down the list.

Oh and it's not just the French that equalised their peleton, sorry company, sorry non-denominational sub-unit. it was all nations. Battalion drill demands it.

The Inniskillings took 82% casualties in square at Waterloo, and they most certainly did shrink their footprint as a result. So, I think, did most others, because by 6pm or so the DoW was having to form cavalry up behind the infantry to make the line look continuous.

I agree with the point above about reliability of casualty figures. I am sure I have seen sources that noted a very low incidence of cannonball wounds among the wounded, for example. Likewise, the oft-mentioned lack of bayonet wounds among the injured doesn't mean there were few bayonet wounds. In both cases, it likely means that that most who sustained that type of wound were killed outright, or if not, that few survived long enough to obtain treatment and to show up in stats.

Disagree about bayonet wounds. We have the casualty list from Paoli, where the British used cold steel with little or no musket fire. US losses: 53 killed, 113 wounded, 70 captured.

I don't think most bayonet wounds were fatal. I'm sure people were stabbed in the extremities too, even though they never are in films.

I also think the Duke may have put cavalry behind his infantry late on that day to show the infantry there wasn't much point in running.

The eye witness accounts for Auerstadt clearly indicates large gaps forming between the battalions in the prussian firing lines.

These units were 3 rank at the start.
Casualties is not clearly stated to confirm these units went through the third rank or were closing up on the centers.
My guess is the later.

MG

Worth remembering that losses from the firing line tend to be much higher than official casualties. When I've been able to compare memoirs "we marched off at the end of the fight with X many men" to recorded killed wounded and missing, I generally find that twice as many men were gone as were casualties--that a unit of 500 men with 125 killed, wounded and missing would only have 250 still in ranks. Mind you, I'm talking about good units, not militia stampeding away.

As for casting removal and formations, less trouble when the castings are individually mounted.

I think either system is defensible--possibly casualty removal more defensible at battalion and two ranks, and roster at brigade and three. But all wargaming is an approximation

On a completely unrelated note.

I hate stand removal because it takes so long to collect, paint and base the s I want them out to look at as long as possible!

I no longer understand why people feel that unit effectiveness is based upon casualties. What counts is how long the unit remains under control of it's leaders- keeping them functioning as a unit. As long as the unit remains as a unit, it remains as a threat to the enemy and must be dealt with.

Some units routed with little or no casualties while others fought to nearly the last man. Clearly, casualties is a bad metric to use for those that desire their games to reflect more of the historical record (or simulations if you don't care to be PC!).

Its the effects of the casualties on the unit's abilty to remain under command that should count, Right? There is no magical formula that predicts when a unit will vacate their ground. (Would love to see someone else's research that supports that idea.)

Now in a game (where all line units of any country are rated the same, as are veteransm conscripts , elites the same rating regardless if they are the 45th or 46th; they both will act predictability as if carbon copies); X number of casualties will always see them break at the same breakpoint and give fire at the same chances. This must be a game thing because it is not an accuarate reflection of the reality it is trying to portray. Why?

Units are made up of men. No two men are alike. They be similar in abilities but there are more differences than similarities the larger the unit studied. Therefore, how can two units be alike? Their composition is diverse as man himself. There will be natural informal (and formal) leaders in every unit. There will those that are shirkers. Sometimes the round you fire will hit, most of the time, not.The difference comes into play when things go wrong at the wrong time and the unit's leaders can no longer keep them acting together. Loss of control , if not regained quickly, can see the unit loose all sence of formation and unity of effort. The effect is that the unit ceases to function. All sense that and react not as a unit, but as a herd of individuals as the men realize to stay there, no leadership able to keep the unit working as all have trained; regaining that at THIS spot ain't gonna happen!

Like, in discussing the merits of a French 6 pound ball velocity verses an Austrian or Prussian one at 100 yards, any will kill the man it (men) it can hit. The difference if a man dies from one hit or 100 is that 99 others live a bit longer. I put forward the idea that in a battalion deployed into line in the Napoleonic Wars, a man on the right flank being hit would have little effect on the rest of the line as it would take a lot of time (and most likely not until the current bout/impulse of combat is over with) before the battalion might learn how bad they had suffered….but only if the battalion remained holding their ground due to the leadership retaining sufficient control over the men.

Suggested stuff to ponder over……

Tom

X number of casualties will always see them break at the same breakpoint

I guess there are rules like that but others include not just casualties but circumstances: under artillery fire, skirmisher fire, in hard cover, etc. I agree it would be silly for all units to do the same thing at 15% casualties, although historically, if it got up to 30 or 40% they mostly did all bug out at that point.

Exceptions are also circumstantial – a Waterloo square with 82% casualties didn't run because staying put meant you only might get killed, but running in the presence of cuirassiers ensured you would.

Most rules I've seen use dice at least in part because units are not predictable, and things happen below our level of visibility. (I can tell that Reno's battalion is being shot at, and maybe that it's taking casualties. I can't tell that Reno himself has just been splattered with the blood and brains of the man next to him and may panic.)
And most rules seem to allow both for the quality of the troops and the effect of casualties, and I thin rightly so. A green unit may bolt with less excuse, but even very good ones can sometimes be worn down.
Tom, where did you find these rules under which all veterans break at the same loss point?

Impossible. I know of no records/studies of how men were killed. Especially in big battles where surgeons were too busy.
The dead were dead and tossed into graves or burned.

You may find records of the wounded.

4th Cuirassier

Exceptions are also circumstantial – a Waterloo square with 82% casualties didn't run because staying put meant you only might get killed, but running in the presence of cuirassiers ensured you would.

So the 27th stayed put because they were too scared to run? Even during the pauses between charges and at the end of the massed cavalry attacks and the bombardment by artillery that caused most of the casualties?

Perhaps they had a similar resolve as that of the 57th at Albuera.

You can be assured that the Cuirassiers caused them little damage and the casualty rate was 62%.

The SOP for most armies was that battalions unable to show at least one rank with the battalion frontage would shrink on the standards.

X number of casualties will always see them break at the same breakpoint

The US Army used to hold to that belief, [about 30% losses rendered a unit 'inoperable'. While a nice generalization as a tool to gage the condition of a combat unit, studies found it wasn't a constant in combat for any conflict you want to choose.

For instance, Houghon's Brigade at Albuera lost better than 60% of its strength in an hour-long firefight against the larger French V Corps and didn't retreat. It all depended on conditions within and outside the unit. I can provide a lot of examples.

@ dibble

I got 82% off Wiki, so….

They stayed put because it was safer than running.

They stayed put because it was safer than running.

That is a rather facile explanation. Why would it be safer to stay for them and not for other units that routed… like the French later???

American Kriegspiel was written right after the US Civil War. It puts forth methodology for determining reactions to combat as a function of casualties over time. So, a given number of casualties inflicted in 60 seconds will be more likely to cause a unit to break than the same number of casualties inflicted over five minutes, ten minutes, and sixty minutes. Furthermore, a unit will remain fighting for a very long period of time despite taking greater total casualties, whereas the same unit might break and run in total disorder were to to take less total casualties in a shorter period of time.

That said, the rate of casualties in AK is found to be a function of the weight of fire into an area and the density of targets (men/formations) in the area. There is a complex interplay implied in the rules, because the formation also effects command and control, so that a unit in line, although it will take less casualties than a unit in column, will be more likely to break due to a reduced command and control. That said, columns in the AK period don't fair too well- men moving in an attack column could expect to be massacred (4-16 x the casualties would be inflected against an attack column as against the same unit in line over the same amount of time).

They stayed put because it was safer than running.

That is a rather facile explanation. Why would it be safer to stay for them and not for other units that routed… like the French later???

Maybe because the cavalry wasn't right there in front of them, ready to chase them down?

To run from a cavalryman is to die. You cannot outrun his horse.

The 30% (well, 33%) rule of thumb is still used in the US Army today. It's particularly true in small units, where wounding one man takes two or three out of the fight (except for close assaults, when if you're conscious you need to use a weapon or you will die).

Extra Crispy:
Yes keeping frontage was very important. As Flashman notes, in part you were protecting your neighbor, and in part they were protecting you. Staying within mutual supporting distance, so to speak, was very important.

This is one of the reasons I like variable size units and casting/stand removal. Units of different sizes that change frontage/depth over the course of the battle create a lot of small, subtle, but important tactical nuances in the game, without requiring any special rules or abstractions to do it. In a game with fixed frontages, gaps only open in the lines when whole units bug out, but in a game with variable unit sizes and casting/stand removal, gaps start to open as units shrink under fire or in contact.

Extra Crispy:
As a result I don't remove casualties immediately. Instead, I have a "reform" type function. You pull the unit out of line, and it can "recover." Once it recovers you remove stands. At this point lines are dressed, companies reorganized, everyone has some water, etc.

That's actually a really neat idea. I'd like to know more. Are these published rules, your own rules, or house rules grafted onto published rules?

- Ix

Maybe because the cavalry wasn't right there in front of them, ready to chase them down?
To run from a cavalryman is to die. You cannot outrun his horse.

Lion:
Perhaps, but Houghton and Abercrombie weren't menaced by cavalry, nor were the French.

The 30% (well, 33%) rule of thumb is still used in the US Army today. It's particularly true in small units, where wounding one man takes two or three out of the fight (except for close assaults, when if you're conscious you need to use a weapon or you will die).

The British noted that during the Falklands war that a battalion company attacked frontally was willing to take up to 40% casualties before retreating, whereas companies from the same battalion were unwilling to take 10% casualties before retreating when hit in the flank with no forces to their front. In other words, the tactical situation could have a lot to do with how many casualties a unit was willing to suffer… And as noted above it could be the length of time it took to suffer those casualties could also have an effect.

The Army's 33% number is a useful rule of thumb or they wouldn't use it, sort of the same average rule of thumb regarding the number of children in an American family, 2.4… but you never see that number in any real family.

Extra Crispy:
As a result I don't remove casualties immediately. Instead, I have a "reform" type function. You pull the unit out of line, and it can "recover." Once it recovers you remove stands. At this point lines are dressed, companies reorganized, everyone has some water, etc.

Whoa. That is the dynamic in my set. Commanders only had the vaguest idea of losses [few, lots, severe] until such re-alignment. Then they could tell by the loss in the number of files.

4th Cuirassiers

They stayed put because it was safer than running.

Perhaps you have evidence of this?

And as I said, It was the French artillery (and some skirmisher fire) that caused the casualties. The Cavalry charges caused very little in comparison. In fact, there are accounts from soldiers that said it was a blessed relief when the cavalry milled about because it caused the cannons to ceasefire.

So please post some evidence that the 27th wanted to run away but the ineffectual cavalry prevented them.

Paul :)

No, the presence of the cavalry (else why would they be in square?) is what kept them taking that massive fire.

FWIW
27th Inniskillings had the strength of 698 officers and men.
They lost 105 killed and 373 wounded leaving some 220 troops unscathed. I make that 67% losses.

The 2nd Pomeranian landwher lost 287 killed, 2 missing and 178 wounded. A lot of the Prussian units in the 14th and 15th Brigades have distorted K/W ratios as many prisoners and wounded were murdered by the imperial guard. The 11th infantry had 44 killed and 314 wounded, 52 missing…

If we look at the 1st Hanoverian brigade at Waterloo…
Bremen IR – 12 killed, 124 wounded, 35 missing.
Verden IR – 63 killed, 101 wounded, 53 missing
York IR – 24 killed, 72 wounded, 45 missing
Luneburg IR – 32 killed, 142 wounded, 48 missing.
Grubenhagen IR – 16 killed, 78 wounded, 48 missing.
Jäger-corps – 12 killed, 41 wounded, 19 missing.

In a less intense action El Bodon
45th 1 missing
88th 5 missing
5th 5 killed, 14 wounded
77th 4 killed, 14 wounded, 5 missing.
83rd 5 killed, 14 wounded, 5 missing.
94th 1 missing
11th LD 8 killed, 16 wounded,
1st kGL Huss 5 killed, 34 wounded, 5 missing.

Edwulf

FWIW
27th Inniskillings had the strength of 698 officers and men.
They lost 105 killed and 373 wounded leaving some 220 troops unscathed. I make that 67% losses.

Well I have 746. Made up of:

2 Captains
15 Subalterns
34 Sergeants
8 Drummers
687 Other Ranks

The casualty figures finally settled upon on the 13th of April 1816 were:

83 Killed in action
34 Died of wounds
16 Amputations
48 Discharged as unfit for further service
9 transferred to invalid Battalions
1 Remaining in hospital at that time
236 Recovered from their wounds and returned to the colours.

Which comes to 427. but if we take away the 'unfit' and transferred, it comes to 371.

Paul :)

On a completely unrelated note.

I hate stand removal because it takes so long to collect, paint and base the Bleeped texts I want them out to look at as long as possible!

Me, too.

The losses listed for El Bodón are really light. Did any of those units actually break and run? How big were they at the start of the battle?

- Ix

No. no units broke. I think some light companies may have had to run pretty quick.
I'll look up some bloodier battlkes later.

I'll check unit strengths later.