"Whatever happened to Regulating Battalions?" Topic

I am eagerly waiting for these rules – they sound really good
In a report on your blog you have a reference to
passage of lines (one of my favourite rules)
Could you describe this rule please ?

here you go, the rules are indeed really good…..

John

Passage of Lines
 A Passage of Lines manoeuvre must be ordered by a Colonel or Brigadier using a Command Action. The two units must be in Line formation and be within 6" of each other. The manoeuvre does not require the troops to roll for movement, but Untested troops need to throw as for a Difficult Maneuver.

John:

Then the answer is it couldn't, a battalion commander would not, could not voluntarily move out ahead of its brigade--without consequences, both battlefield and military. You see, the battalion on the side away from the regulating unit would follow that battalion. He might be forced to catch up to his brigade or forced to move forward because of terrain etc. or he might even be individually ordered to [requiring a unique order] but he wouldn't be 'allowed' to make that decision.

Let us not forget that we are talking about a game! This game is a lot of fun because of the degree of friction there is in the game. The movement, firing and combat mechanisms are pretty simple so one gets to focus on the big picture tactical aspects.

You may very well be correct that a battalion could not move on it's own but since I was not there I could not possibly comment.

G'Day John

I am not certain I understand why both bodies must be in a line formation…

Most wargame designers today explain that the passage of lines as being too complex to execute, and that it was easily disordered by untrained troops executing a passage of lines.

With that said it is very important for the wargame designer to understand that there are two types of passage of lignes; a passage de lignes en retrait, and the passage de lignes offensive ou en avancant.

Untested or un trained troops were not the true reason behind the disinclination of Commanders to execute a passage of lines.

The aim to understanding why a commander was reluctant is twofold;

1) Which of the two types of passage de lignes were executed; a passage de lignes en retrait, or then there is a passage de lignes offensive ou en avancant.

2) Why was the passage de lignes executed.

Hence the misunderstanding is that the Commander was reluctant to execute a passage de lignes en retrait in the proximity of the enemy. But this should not be confused with a passage of lignes offensive ou en avancant.

But why was the Commander reluctant to execute a passage de lignes en retrait in the presence of the enemy but not the passage de lignes offensive ou en avancant?

(As a matter of fact the French execution of a passage de lignes en retrait in the presence of the enemy, with the Reglement de 1791 was superceded by the passage de lignes from the Reglement de 1776).

The actual concern about the execution of a passage de ligne en retraite in the presence of the enemy, was that the retiring battle line was too fractured with numerous isolated small body of troops which had no cohesion with each other. Which gave a competent enemy commander the opportunity to assault the fractured numerous small body of troops which had no command, nor battalion cohesion.

Thus it had nothing to do with untested troops.

With the Reglement de 1791, when the line retiring, "if in retreat, it is too much broken; and the single company is not sufficiently strong to sustain a sudden attack; the second line in like manner loses its compactness, which is essential to repel the charge by being open at several points to admit the passage of alternate companies; the movements cannot be made in good order when in such small bodies and under so many detached commands, and the loss of a platoon or even an officer of one of these detached parts, may endanger the whole".

General Schauenbourg went one step further in 1793-1794, and due to the colonne d'attaque having too many moving bodies in two different directions, it was therefore forbidden that the second battle line execute any passage of ligne in colonne d'attaque…but only en colonne par division.

To expand on this problem, "when both battle line were deployed in the proximity of the enemy and the first battle line had to retreat, due to no ammunition, shattered battalions, fatigue, routing battalions, or any other particular circumstance that required an execution of a passage de ligne, the concern was as followed:

"it caused too many fragments, a splitting of the retiring line into so many small parts; (at the perilous moment those exchanges are effected) where, followed up, it is taken in the flank and in the rear, while performing the difficult flank march, unavoidably lead to a rout with every probability of carrying along the second line in the flight".

Consequently to attempt to assure success of an execution of a passage de ligne en retraite, preventive measures had to happen, should an enemy attempt to profit and assault while the passage de lignes was being executed, therefore the following was expected to happen…"while the first line is passing, the flanks of the pelotons / platoons of the second line ought to be well covered or guarded by officers, or steady non-commissioned officers or soldiers, least the first line should pass confusedly, and throw the second into disorder."

With the passage de lignes offensive ou en avanceant in the proximity of the enemy, it was executed in the following manner:

Normally after a front line has given a certain quantity of fire, or that an impression has been premeditatedly made, hence with tiralleurs in front, to cover the movement of the second line as a fresh corps, to bring them to the charge of bayonet while in close columns.

This is explained in the Reglement de 1776 and in Colonel Gay Vernon's 1805 text. Vernon was a Military professor of fortification at the Polytechnick Institute, and "by order of the French government," prepared a 2-volume work, "A treatise on the science of war and fortification." Then, "after being submitted to the revisions of a Board of distinguished Marshals and Engineers, was by order of the Emperor Napoleon, adopted as the text and class book of the Polytechnick and Military Schools."

The best example of a passage de lignes offensive, is the the Battle of Valls in 1809, which was a text book example of the L'ordre perpendiculaire ou l'ordre tactique actuel, with the assaulting colonne serre par peloton.

It must be understood that the assaulting colonnes serre par peloton do not deploy, but attempt to use shock to breach the enemy line.

The passage de lignes offensive may likewise be effected by colonne par regiments (par peloton) for both lignes.

In this case the second line must form en colonne serre par regiments, with the right in front, either upon the first division of uneven battalions, or upon the fourth division of the uneven ones.

Each colonne shall march forward and pass through the interval between the two battalions of each regiment of the first line which precedes them.

After having gained sufficient ground, each colonne shall form into line upon one of the divisions prescribed for its formation. –In this case the colonnes of the second line does deploy, uniting the ordre profond to the ordre mince, but not within the presence of the enemy.

I hope this helps
Best Regards
Art

Let us not forget that we are talking about a game! This game is a lot of fun because of the degree of friction there is in the game. The movement, firing and combat mechanisms are pretty simple so one gets to focus on the big picture tactical aspects.

John:
I haven't forgotten. What I hear you saying is that more friction than was present historically is more fun. That's Okay, but I am not sure whether anyone has established how much friction there was, let alone how that was exhibited within a regulating brigade or division.

You may very well be correct that a battalion could not move on it's own but since I was not there I could not possibly comment.

I wasn't there either. The only things we know about what Napoleonic military men did and experienced is what they wrote about it. I am assuming that history is what is being modeled by the rules if they are representing something from the period. What less is there?

The regulating method didn't work at all if each battalion commander could choose when and where to 'do his own thing' even to the point of contact. It is like every band member deciding on his own direction when and where he wanted as part of a marching band performance at halftime.

When you read battalion commanders describe what they did during a battle, if they weren't sent on individual missions by the brigadier, they spent their time making sure their battalion was aligned with and 'connected to' left and right flanks. Read Napier's account of managing his battalion/regiment at the battle of Corunna. He made sure his flanks were secure, what the battalions next to him were doing and that's it. Everything else, sending out skirmishers, advancing into the town etc. was either permission he asked for or orders he followed.

As Clausewitz said, as you go down the military chain of command, lower officers had fewer and fewer decisions to make and responsibilities, while having very strict methodologies to follow. It is what made things simpler… and provided higher commands with some kind of control

I would think that if the rule for battalions with the 1D6 is as you describe it, it would be much simpler to have individual battalion actions very limited.

But if doing it the other way is more fun, then I have no problem with that as long as everyone knows that is why those mechanics are there and not actually representing something historical.

Art:

Thanks for the passage of lines explanation. How did that work for Girard at Ocana? He executed a passage of lined on the battle line. The British and Spanish did it twice at Albuera. Obviously dangerous, but little mention is made of any difficulty or danger, though according the the Spanish and British the French V Corps was well within 80 yards of their line… albeit with lots of smoke.

McL,

I think this goes back to the matter of incidence. There's the correct way and then there's what happened on occassions.

The French had multipul soloutions and went to great examination of battlefield happenings as Art can always show us but you can't help but feel in the heat of action while someone puzzled over the "recipe book" a senior voice was screaming "JFDI ! "

Albuera is a classic example, if you need fresh men on the firing line you find a way to do it, or the entire position gets swept away.

All very interesting, thank you.

I am hoping that I have not hijacked a thread on Regulating Battalions with a discussion of a specific rule set.

John

Not at all, its always nice to see what other people are up to!

As to Black Powder allowing free movement: I was in a BP game late last year. While it certainly doesn't have regulating battalions, units (and brigades) may easily not move. I saw a brigade fail to arrive for two turns in a row, to the intense disgust of the player running that brigade. So BP players are not always able to move everything. Plus they can roll blunders. That should make them less likely to cough up at the restrictions of regulating battalions.

Non-regulation passage of lines during the ACW: at Corinth the officers of the heavily engaged brigade had a short conference with the fresh unit coming up. The engaged unit lay down, the fresh unit walked over and past them, then fired into the Confederates. I also read of an attempt to pass lines without a conference. The two lines became intermixed.

Of course, we are talking of volunteer units with a middling level of training. And out of period.

I think this goes back to the matter of incidence. There's the correct way and then there's what happened on occassions.

Trajanus:

Well, obviously it is more dangerous to do any formation change with close range of the enemy, and the message seems to be that the French warned readers of that danger.

The French had multiple solutions and went to great examination of battlefield happenings as Art can always show us but you can't help but feel in the heat of action while someone puzzled over the "recipe book" a senior voice was screaming "JFDI ! "

That may be true, but you don't get any feeling that people were screaming JFDI when the Spanish and British accomplished it. Actually, the descriptions are very matter of fact when you have two different national armies carrying out that combined operation in the face of the enemy. Abercrombie did it too.

Albuera is a classic example, if you need fresh men on the firing line you find a way to do it, or the entire position gets swept away.

So, why isn't it presented that way with that kind of whoopla? "Guess what we did…no really!"

The inclusion of Regulating Battalions obviously will make any Napoleonic or ACW rules more true to the historical situation being simulated. But how does one also include provisions for times when Regulating Battalions do not seem to be used.

I have been reading Cozzen's The Shipwreck of Their Hopes about the battles for Chattanooga and want to draw attention to his description of the fighting at Tunnel Hill on 25 November 1863.

Impatient with Sherman's progress on the left flank Grant issued orders for Sherman to "attack the enemy at the point most advantageous from your position at early dawn". Sherman received these orders at midnight and issued instructions to two of his nine brigades, those of Corse and Loomis of Ewing's Division. Corse was to advance on Tunnel Hill from the north while Loomis went forward against the northwest face of the hill.

The 30th Ohio Regiment of Morgan Smith's Division was told to "assist" with the advance of Corse's Brigade. This last order was issued directly by Sherman himself, bypassing Morgan Smith entirely.

The 130 men of the 30th Ohio moved out immediately at dawn, pushing back the skirmish line of the 24th Texas. Expecting Corse's Brigade to join him at any moment, the colonel of the 30th Ohio advanced his regiment towards the crest of Tunnel Hill, only to receive a hail of canister fire from the battery on the top of the hill. The 30th Ohio fell back to some cover and their Colonel sent back a request for reinforcements. An hour later help arrived in the form of the 37th Ohio, which fell into line to the left of the 30th Ohio.

At about the same time the first of Corse's regiments arrived. Corse had spent some time forming up his brigade, deploying the 40th Illinois in a skirmish line with the 46th Ohio in a single line behind the 40th. The 103rd Illinois and the 6th Iowa were formed up to the rear in double columns. Corse took command of the front two regiments while the Colonel of the 46th Ohio left his regiment to take control of the two supporting units.

The arrival of the 40th Illinois saw this regiment make an unsupported attack on the crest of Tunnel Hill, which, like the attack of the 30th Ohio, was unsuccessful. Finally Corse arrived with the 46th Ohio and was temporarily persuaded from ordering yet another immediate attack on the hilltop.

About an hour later a message arrived from Sherman expressing displeasure that the attack was stalled. Corse ordered the 103rd Illinois and 6th Iowa to join the rest of his brigade, but before they arrived he launched another attack on the top of Tunnel Hill, supported by the 30th Ohio. This too was unsuccessful, but was followed by yet another attack at about 10:30 as soon as the 103rd Illinois and 6th Iowa were up.

This last attack resulted in a savage fight for the crest of Tunnel Hill, but in the end the Federal units were forced to fall back. Sherman acknowledged that the northern approach to Tunnel Hill was finished and he ordered the remains of Corse's Brigade to simply hold their position.

At the same time this fighting was taking place Loomis' Brigade made an advance from the northwest. After some delay, Loomis finally moved forward with his four regiments in a single line of battle. Emerging from the woods into open ground the brigade was halted for half an hour before orders arrived at about 10:30 to again move forward. Now under Rebel artillery fire, the brigade went forward several hundred yards before stopping again when informed about Corse's repulse. Here, unwilling to continue his advance and not having orders to fall back Loomis remained in positon.

Looking at these two advances it seems obvious that Loomis would have been using a regulating battalion to control his line of battle. But Corse's attack was hopelessly piecemeal, not because the regimental commanders were not conforming to a regulating battalion, but because they were ordered forward individually. The attack was a disaster because the commanders made bad decisions.

Thus could it not be argued that in a game with initiative rolls the players should have the choice to make bad decisions as well and ignore the use of regulating battalions and sent in units individually?

But Corse's attack was hopelessly piecemeal, not because the regimental commanders were not conforming to a regulating battalion, but because they were ordered forward individually. <>

Ryan:

Not exactly Sherman ordered the 30th forward, so it was a command from the top that disengaged the 30th from the brigade. The 40th was deployed as skirmishers in front of Corse's brigade. It made the attack as skirmishers.

Corse still didn't have his entire brigade, the 103rd Ill and 6th Iowa. He did have the brigade in order when eh attacked without waiting for those two regiments. Corse had spent some time forming up his brigade, deploying the 40th Illinois in a skirmish line with the 46th Ohio in a single line behind the 40th. The 103rd Illinois and the 6th Iowa were formed up to the rear in double columns. Corse took command of the front two regiments while the Colonel of the 46th Ohio left his regiment to take control of the two supporting units.
When Corse attacked, it was in brigade formation with a regulating unit, though without the 103rd and 6th.

The last attack was after the 103rd and 6th arrived and obviously put in formation with the brigade. The 30th was in support… which means it would have been in the second line and regulating on the first line RU.

qThe attack was a disaster because the commanders made bad decisions.But how does one also include provisions for times when Regulating Battalions do not seem to be used.

So, the two times that I can see that a regulating unit wouldn't have been used [how else did Corse attack with his brigade together] was the direct order Sherman gave to the 30th and the 40th Ill operating as a skirmish line. Corse's problems were Sherman's impatience while Corse had to wait for his brigade to actually arrive and Sherman's 'interference.' A player as a divisional commander or higher certainly could move a individual regiment away from their brigade and/or have the brigade attack without all of its regiments present.

I agree that regulating battalions were used, but much of the overall attack was done by individual regiments acting on their own, albeit under orders from above.

Sherman's initial order for the attack went through the division commander Ewing and then to Corse. After issuing the order Sherman separately ordered the 30th Ohio forward. The 30th was from a different division than Corse and there is no evidence that Corse knew the 30th was supposed to "assist" his own attack.

The Colonel of the 30th asked for helpafter the failure of the first attack, but he made this request to his own brigade commander and the help he received in the form of the 37th Ohio, which fell into line to the left of the 30th Ohio, was again done without Corse knowing anything about it.

When Corse finally started off he very well could have designated a RB, but if he did it was of little use. His skirmishers, the 40th Illinois, pushed ahead of the regiment, the 46th Ohio, which followed behind them. When the attack of the 40th Illinois failed, Cozzens writes that "Hall had expected support. Swearing a blue streak when the second line of his own brigade failed to follow him he withdrew his five companies". Remember that Corse had taken command of the forward two regiments so this now meant that Corse was left in direct control of only the 46th Ohio until he came up to join with the 40th Illinois. At this time the 40th and the 46th again formed into a coordinated structure. The Colonel of the 30th Ohio put up a strong argument about how his regiment would co-ordinate its movement with the two regiments of Corse's Brigade – remember this regiment was not part of Corse's Brigade and was only under verbal orders to "assist" Corse.

Meanwhile there was a delay while the remaining two regiments of Corse's Brigade moved forward from their reserve position about 500 yards to the rear. These two regiments were under the control of Colonel Walcutt of the 46th Ohio. Walcutt had been detached from the 46th to take up this command while Corse took over the command of the 46th. Only when these last two regiments came up was the brigade again reunited.

What I see here is units shifting in and out of a command structure that made use of a regulating battalion. The 30th Ohio went up by itself, as did the 37th Ohio. These two regiments presumably then regulated on the 30th. The skirmishers of the 40th Illinois were first formed up in formation with the rest of their brigade, but then spit off on their own, whether by advancing too fast or not having their supports keep up with them. And at the point the advance began the rear two regiments, the 103rd Illinois and 6th Iowa, were formed into a separate formation under Walcutt as they were left behind in reserve.

In previous postings you quite rightly pointed out that individual regimental commanders were not supposed to act on their own initiative, but were enjoined to act on the leadership of their regulating battalion. But here we see a situation in which regimental commanders are given orders and act on them outside of any regulating battalion construct.

But how does one set up rules for this? If the player is a divisional commander, telling him that all movement must be done with the use of a regulating battalion(s) should help to prevent the mess that Corse set up from occurring. But historically it did occur. On the other hand, assume that the rules allow not using regulating battalions. This should most likely result in piecemeal and uncoordinated movements and attacks because of the need now for numerous separate initiative rolls (Hello General Corse).

Some of this I am not following:

but he made this request to his own brigade commander and the help he received in the form of the 37th Ohio, which fell into line to the left of the 30th Ohio, was again done without Corse knowing anything about it.

If the 30th and 37th didn't belong to Corse's brigade and Sherman is the one how ordered the 30th to attack, then what is the issue? The brigade commander of the 30th responded. The 37th fell into 'line' with the 30th [guess which was the regulating regiment.]

When Corse finally started off he very well could have designated a RB, but if he did it was of little use. His skirmishers, the 40th Illinois, pushed ahead of the regiment, the 46th Ohio, which followed behind them. When the attack of the 40th Illinois failed, Cozzens writes that "Hall had expected support. Swearing a blue streak when the second line of his own brigade failed to follow him he withdrew his five companies".

First, the skirmishing regiment wasn't part of the brigade line, but in front of it and not influenced by the regulating procedures. The 46th was 'assumed' to be the formed support of the 40th. In that regard, they were
a "coordinated structure", skirmishers and their support…at least in Hall's mind.

The Colonel of the 30th Ohio put up a strong argument about how his regiment would co-ordinate its movement with the two regiments of Corse's Brigade.

An argument to whom, Corse? If so, the colonel was arguing for his regiment to support a skirmish action. Three regiments committed to a skirmish action from a brigade with no other support present for formed action would leave any brigadier doubtful.

What I see here is units shifting in and out of a command structure that made use of a regulating battalion…In previous postings you quite rightly pointed out that individual regimental commanders were not supposed to act on their own initiative, but were enjoined to act on the leadership of their regulating battalion. But here we see a situation in which regimental commanders are given orders and act on them outside of any regulating battalion construct.

Yes, it is called skirmishing… that was what the 40th was doing so any 'supporting' units would be committed to that skirmish action--its own coordinated structure… and attaching regiments to a brigade without informing the brigade commander, Corse can create 'regulating' problems.

Regiments are quite capable of operating independently, but what I see here is a lot of confusion over what to do when with which regiments… when and if they were there.

Was the 46th ordered to support the 40th, or simply an expectation Hall had that had nothing to do with what Corse ordered.

But how does one set up rules for this? If the player is a divisional commander, telling him that all movement must be done with the use of a regulating battalion(s) should help to prevent the mess that Corse set up from occurring.

I think the question is what created the the mess. Did Corse 'set it up' or did Sherman with his unreported 'help' and pressures to attack and Corse not having his whole brigade there until late in the day? That was the piecemeal part.

First of all, if Corse is going to move his brigade as a brigade force the method is the regulating regiment. If he sends regiments off in every direction [which he didn't do--which may have annoyed Hall]. He certainly didn't have anything to do with the 30th and 37th operating. If regiments are ordered to operate independent of the brigade like the 30th and 37, then each will have their own orders and remain unsupported. [There is where individual initiative rolls would be expected.]

Both things can be represented by rules, if they aren't already.

G'Day Gents

I think there is a slight misunderstanding…

Earlier someone mentioned that the regulating body had to come from the Brigade Commander…this is not true, to the point that it is wrong.

Even detached compagnies had a regulating body while skirmishing.

The regulating body, and notice I did not say battalion since I am referring to the parallelism of a march of any size of multiple bodies, to include the parallelism and distance to be observed in the formation and movement of any body of troops, can in fact come from a regiment…and in the French l'ordre tactique actuel…it had to be the regiments quite often.

For those who have game designs that are brigade level…then of course the regulating flank will be designated by the Division Commander (not Brigade Commander)…and there is a reason to why the regulating battalion comes from the left or right flank. The flank that is nearest to the direction of attack or appui shall have the regulating battalion.

I believe everyone understands how a regulating battalion controls the parallelism of march with a considerable body of troops operate…

But going back to the Napoleonic era…especially for the French when they switched to l'ordre Francaise…l'ordre perpendiculaire…or l'ordre tactique actuel…they had to substitute division and brigade movement with something smaller.

Therefore the French used three types of regimental colonnes, as did the Russians.

colonne par bataillon
colonne d'attaque par bataillon
colonne par regiment

These three colonnes were the director-regulating bodies used for manoeuvre…of course which were vital to the Russians and French…but they cannot be used in a brigade size game since the smallest formation is the brigade.

Therefore the question I ask is this…of all the game designs that use regulating battalions…do they include the three regimental colonnes I have mentioned?

Best Regards
Art

Earlier someone mentioned that the regulating body had to come from the Brigade Commander…this is not true, to the point that it is wrong.

Even detached compagnies had a regulating body while skirmishing.

Hi Art:

Yes, a skirmish line had a regulating or guide 'file'. However, we were only talking about brigades, thus the comment… unless some other officer in a brigade determined which battalion was to be the regulating unit.

Bill

Earlier on in this thread it was quite correctly stated that regimental commanders did not have the authority nor the inclination to act independently on their own initiative. Their movements were constrained to acting within the structure provided by the use regulating battalions.

However, if ordered to do so, they could be tasked with independent movement. This was not done on the initiative of the regimental colonel but instead came down from a higher level of command, be it from brigade, division or higher level. This is what can be seen happening in the attack on Tunnel Hill.

But in game terms how do we differentiate an order from a divisional commander to have one regiment move forward by itself from a regimental commander doing so on his own initiative? In both cases the casual observer could say that regiments look as if they are acting on their own and not conforming to their regulating battalions. Yet one type of movement is historically justifiable and the other is ahistorical.

I hope I am not just being difficulty – what I hope is that the discussion might throw out some ideas of how we can arrive at good gaming mechanics to simulate the historical situation. Initiative dice rolls offer one alternative with regulating units having an advantage over units ordered to act independently, but are there other approaches that could be considered.

But in game terms how do we differentiate an order from a divisional commander to have one regiment move forward by itself from a regimental commander doing so on his own initiative? In both cases the casual observer could say that regiments look as if they are acting on their own and not conforming to their regulating battalions. Yet one type of movement is historically justifiable and the other is a historical.

Ryan:

Rules can and sometimes do cover those contingencies. Players can as divisional or corps commanders provide a separate order for an individual regiment. And rules cover units failing to move or other act outside of the brigade line. It did happen, but not that often. Usually it occurred because of enemy actions or terrain… but sometimes the communication confusion you described above.

In both cases the casual observer could say that regiments look as if they are acting on their own and not conforming to their regulating battalions.

Well, players and historical wargame designers are not 'casual observers.' To a casual observer it could look like the superior commanders didn't care or were completely inept, such as Sherman in the above example.

Speaking purely game design here is an idea.
As a player when given the opportunity to act with a brigade I could either;
- Act with one unit individually, leaving other units in the brigade passive/reactive (possibly even with a variable amount of activity).
- Act with all units by designating a regulating unit, acting with it, then all other units must mimic its actions AND keep relative position.

You give the player a option to act in detail or with broad strokes. Imagine the GdB having just enough time to give one order, and its either to one battalion, or to the brigade as a whole.

I agree that some sort of constraining structure has to be placed on activating units. And as been talked about up-thread, issuing orders to a regulating battalion would see the orders transmitted down the line relatively rapidly. In contrast orders to a unit acting on its own would either have to be done by direct contact with the officer issuing the orders or by courier. And the use of a courier means there is the problem of delay.

Again look at the situation on Tunnel Hill. The 30th Ohio's attack was unsuccessful and the regiment fell back to some cover. Colonel Jones then sent back a request for reinforcements. It took an hour before help finally arrived in the form of the 37th Ohio, which then fell into line to the left of the 30th Ohio.

After Corse was on the hill with the first two of his regiments, the 40th Illinois and 46th Ohio, he sent back Colonel Jones of the 30th Ohio to report the situation and ask for help. Sherman ordered the attack to continue and promised reinforcements, but it was still about an hour from when Jones went back until the rest of Corse's Brigade came up.

How can these delays be simulated in a game? Activating an RB and the units it is regulating should have a very high probability of success. But what should be done if the brigade officer or another officer with the authority to issue orders to the RB is not immediately present with the RB?. The activation roll could have a negative modifier dependant on the distance (modified by the terrain) the order needs to travel. ADC figures could be used to transmit orders.

I know part of the problem is that as gamers we simultaneously take the role of several different levels of command. What I know as a brigade commander on the front line may not be something I would know as the commander of the division. Rule sets have come up with different ways to inject friction into the system, but I suppose I'm looking for a simple yet effective method that mirrors the historical reality.

Ryan T:

Well, I am not sure why 'delays' moving units or joining their brigade late should be a particular problem in creating rules. Lots of rules have such mechanisms.

Having only part of the brigade in formation with a RB is not a particular problem in moving. The units that are their regulate on the designated RB, particularly in the ACW.

Because the gamer will be moving/taking the role of several command levels, whatever we do with the rules, the options for a player in the role of a division or corps leader should be limited when moving a single brigade because the brigade commander was limited in what he could do… It gets complicated when every regiment is portrayed on the table because apart from direct orders, the regiment commander's options were even more restricted.

Part of our problem in understanding what ACW commanders did and could do is two fold:

1. The processes were so universal and expected, they were assumed rather than explained at times and
2. Many historians simply aren't interested in nitty-gritty methods involved in commands maneuvering thousands of men together in the chaos of battle.

One of the first things I look at in a rules set is its approach to command and control. I suppose I am just hoping for something new and innovative that provides even more historicity will being simple and effective.

Sources can indeed be a problem. Reading AARs in the ORs often, as you said, leave out details that are assumed to be understood. Secondary sources usually at best will provide a narrative that has to be interpreted in light of established SOPs. The only modern academic study of ACW tactical procedures that I know of is Hess's recent work. Now if only a similar study on ACW cavalry…

Ryan,
I think I have the rules that you may be looking for!
Essentially, units follow orders and these units are regulated, but there`s also the possibility of inititiatve by subordinates or by more lowly unit commanders.
But it gets harder to do this the lower down the chain of command that you get. Within the practice of regulation, initiatives by regimental, or battalion commanders were rare and exceptional.

The solution is not to be found in some "new or innovative" game mechanism; rather the answer is to model games on the actual methods of command and control… they were, after all, the simplest and most effective means that were actually found in over 2,500 years!

The rules are at: grandmanoeuvre.co.uk

G'Day Gents

Would someone please explain what initiative and activation mean in their game design…

Michael…I agree that…."the solution is not to be found in some "new or innovative" game mechanism; rather the answer is to model games on the actual methods of command and control…"and I agree that in l'ordre Prusse that the regiment was tethered…

But in l'ordre perpendiculaire…or l'ordre tactique actuel…these French regimental colonnes were quite often on their own.

colonne par bataillon
colonne d'attaque par bataillon
colonne par regiment

Now that I think of it…I shall also add le colonne de retraite…this formation was used at Waterloo by the Garde and the 85e Regiment.

-and to include this battalion

le colonne d'aile

Jomini stated that this colonne should have been used at Waterloo…and I agree 100 percent

Best Regards
Art

Art,

Good to see you here!

But would you please expalin what "l'ordre tactique actuel" is?

I`ve been thinking of adding "colonne d'aile" to my third edition!

I can`t help you with your question as I don`t have "activation"… Commands have, or are given orders.

Initiative is about generals/officers intervening to suggest or give new orders; like Senarmont at the battle of Friedland, or Hardinge at Albuera, or Colborne at Waterloo in wheeling the 52nd Light Infantry.

Regards,

Mike

colonne par bataillon
colonne d'attaque par bataillon
colonne par regiment
le colonne d'aile

Jomini stated that this colonne should have been used at Waterloo…and I agree 100 percent

Which begs the question about what the advantages in movement and combat each colonne offers, particularly colonne par regiment.

So, what are the benefits and disadvantages of each in movement and combat… enough to have an impact on a brigade with battalions in such configurations?

G'Day Mike

Quite often I read of someone posting a comment that in their game design a brigade or a considerable body of troops were activated or had the initiative…I still have not had someone explain it to me…

But your definition of initiative only emphasizes our previous discussion on a military system that is neither under the restrictions of l'ordre separe or a processional army, such as l'ordre Prusse. Of course as time went on, even though we find that linear armies restructured their military system for independent movement, of several masses or grand bodies of troops (considerable bodies of troops), with an independent sub-command, each country and commander still had a varied length of tether on what was possible in regards to initiative, such as Wellington with his short tether on his sub-commanders.

For the French in 1804, and shortly thereafter for the British, these two countries had a more modern method of lenience for the body of troops towards counter actions, which falls in line with your example of the British at Waterloo being allowed to wheel upon the flanks of an enemy, something that was not normally allowed with the Prussian system.

When looking at the various military systems from the Napoleonic era to the civil war…sometime we will use an example of the an action that transpired in the civil war to explain an event or principle used during the Napoleonic era, or vise-versa. While each military system may seem like just one forest at a distance….once we take a closer look at the weeds in the forest…we find that the general principles for each military system are not the same…which leads some to try bend, transform rules and regulations and maxims to match an example from a different era to another. I have even seen where posters have attempted to compare the French military system of 1831 to the French Napoleonic era.

As an example you will not find the difficult and confusing effects of the regle de endivisionnment in the French military system of 1831 or American Civil War. I rather doubt that in the Civil War that an officer had to concern himself about l'ordre separe and the consequences of limited cooperation between considerable bodies of troops due to this antiquated system.

Mike…As for l'ordre perpendiculaire it was l'ordre tactique actuel which means the actual tactical order used.
As I already mentioned, I am a firm believer that a thread should not post two different era's such as this one, I have reread the entire thread and noticed only one posting about a division and regulating battalions. Even if this thread was about regulating battalions in a brigade, during the Napoleonic era you need to know if the brigade was attached or detached.

During the Napoleonic era, all military systems formed their divisions and brigades in two dispositions…no exceptions:

Dispositif de la division avec chaque brigade en ligne, or each brigade formed on a single battle line with the second brigade acting as the reserve.

Dispositif de la division par brigade accolées, or brigades side by side with each brigade formed with a second battle line in reserve

If there should be those who may say that this thread is merely about a single brigade, then if that is the case, in accordance to the British military dictionary of 1816, the following is written in regards to regulating battalions and the parallelism of a march; "parallelism and distance to be observed in the formation and movement of any considerable body of troops. In the Rules and Regulation, it is laid down as a general maxim, that no considerable body should ever be formed without a proportion of it being placed in reserve, or in second line, and more or less according to circumstances. The movement of such a second line will always correspond with those of the first, and it will always preserve it parallelism and distance."

Of course the parallelism and distance varies with each military system, and an isolated or detached brigade would form with a second battle line in reserve and with a minimum of two regulating battalions. But with that said, quite often the French (and other military systems) would form en echelon and require a regulating battalion for each echelon.

John…"The Directing Battalion moves first, with an additional 6" of movement, and may choose to move all or part of the distance allowed"

Remember that a considerable body of troops must first form into an order of battle, and then once the order of battle is complete with all battalions, the regulating battalion steps off with the entire formation together, not piece meal, and it always marches at the ordinary step, and if other battalions have become embarrassed or advanced and need to correct their alignment, they will either "step out or step short".

Normally the only time a regulating battalion must stop is when there is a change of direction while in close column. The change of direction for a body of troops in close column is a lengthy affair. The regulating battalion will first do a change of direction with a flanking manoeuvre (wheel), then each battalion in turn shall execute the flanking manoeuvre one by one. The Austrians has the advantage over all other military systems in 1807 by being able to do an oblique with a close column. Also each country has a different principle on how many battalions may be formed together while in close column.

The manner in which a maneouvre in a body of troops while in a close column, may be found in the Rules and Regulations, French Reglement, with additional information in Antonio Suasso established works.

Nichols…"I can't help suspect that proper application of the regulating battalion concept might also elegantly evaporate the dense gangs of attack columns that dominate Lasalle battlefields."

Actually it is not an issue of regulating battalions and the parallelism of a march, but game designers not understanding l'ordre tactique actuel – the actually system de tactics of each country. Normally when a close column assaults it is either en colonne par section serre ou en masse…or en colonne par peloton serre ou en masse…but this is entirely a different thread.

Bill…as for begging the question…so you feel that I have made a conclusion based on a premise that lacks support, and I have failed to demonstrate the required proposition…which you add…what are the benefits and disadvantages of each in movement and combat… enough to have an impact on a brigade with battalions in such configurations?

I think there is a misunderstanding on what a colonne par bataillon, and colonne d'attaque par bataillon are….or even used for. They belong to l'ecole de brigade…and when Napoleon was about to create a new Reglement in 1805, he was also hoping to create an ecole de brigade et division using the colonne par bataillon et colonne d'attaque par bataillon (Journal de Science, Bardin et al). But the first ecole de brigade (evolutions par brigades) was not published until 1814, which became official in 1815 and has both the colonne par bataillon, and colonne d'attaque par bataillon.

If you recall the instructions of 1813, which you have, and have been posted on TMP…(but badly understood), the regiments starts out in colonne d'attaque par bataillons and deploys to single battalions en colonne d'attaque.

Therefore these but only three of my supportive based validations of facts….which I think are enough…

The colonne par regiment was used by both the French and Russians, but only on occasion due to particular circumstances.

As for what are the benefits and disadvantages of each these three colonnes in movement; it is not about benefits and disadvantages that these collones were formed, but due to the manner of execution required from these colonnes. As for the colonne par bataillon, the regiment was formed with bataillons en colone directe (right leading) or colonne renversee (left leading), and as for the colonne d'attaque par bataillon, the regiment was formed with bataillons en colonne d'atttaque.

But all that ended with the application of the regle de endivisionnment…but I am certain I have put everyone to sleep, so that will have to be another thread in itself…as for the colonne d'aile…I posted that a long time ago on TMP…

Best Regards
Art

Bill…as for begging the question…so you feel that I have made a conclusion based on a premise that lacks support, and I have failed to demonstrate the required proposition…which you add…what are the benefits and disadvantages of each in movement and combat… enough to have an impact on a brigade with battalions in such configurations?

Hi Art:
No, I wanted to know the 'so what?' If you felt that one formation was better than another, I was asking why? I didn't have the supporting information.

I think there is a misunderstanding on what a colonne par bataillon, and colonne d'attaque par bataillon are….or even used for.

That could well be. That is one reason I was asking the question.

They belong to l'ecole de brigade…and when Napoleon was about to create a new Reglement in 1805, he was also hoping to create an ecole de brigade et division using the colonne par bataillon et colonne d'attaque par bataillon.

Beyond the obvious benefits of consistency throughout the army, what benefits would Napoleon see with a ecole de brigade et division using those two colonne formations?

As for what are the benefits and disadvantages of each these three colonnes in movement; it is not about benefits and disadvantages that these collones were formed, but due to the manner of execution required from these colonnes. As for the colonne par bataillon, the regiment was formed with bataillons en colone directe (right leading) or colonne renversee (left leading), and as for the colonne d'attaque par bataillon, the regiment was formed with bataillons en colonne d'atttaque.

Hence my question. If there were no benefits to movement and combat between the various formations, why have them?

G'Day Bill

A regulating battalion controls the parallelism of march for a dispositif de la division avec chaque brigade en ligne, and a dispositif de la division par brigade accolées.

These considerable bodies of troops cannot manoeuvre as well as a colonne…so…

A directing element was needed for a regiment when in colonne, which was a colonne par bataillon and colonne d'attaque par bataillon which was the solution for l'ordre perpendiculaire or l'ordre tactique.

Again there is no benefit between a colonne par bataillon and a colonne d'attaque par colonne, it is the name given to explain how they needed to be formed due to the type of sub-fraction which was a battalion instead of a peloton.

Let me ask you a question…what are the benefits and disadvantages between a colonne par division and colonne d'attaque…when is each colonne supposed to be used and why?

Answer that and you have answered your own question…

Why was an ecole de brigade or division or evolution par brigade needed…

The Prussians came out with the first ecole de brigade in 1812…next the French in 1814…then the Russians in 1826 which conformed with the French during the Napoleonic era…

The ecole de brigade…or…evolution par brigade replaced the evolution in line…as for when the British replaced their evolution in line, I do not know…

I know you have Gerome and Renard…both go into detail why it was necessary.

I hope this helps
Best Regards
Art

Sorry to be late to the topic, but I have really enjoyed Michael Collins' Grande Manoeuvre rules as a fast-playing grand tactical game. The regulating battalion mechanism goes faster than random activation or command dice (I only throw 1's anyway), plus it puts your brigadiers right where they need to be. It looks beautiful on the table, until battalions start breaking in combat, or the brigade starts hanging up on some terrain. So the brigade general needs to move to that spot to sort out the confusion and get his brigade moving. I like the discipline of the regulating battalion so much that even in rules that don't use it, I will try to handle my formations and position my commander in just this fashion.

Grande Manoever is so inexpensive that Michael could not have enjoyed more than two pints with what I spent for my copy. He includes almost a treatise in national preferences in formations and deployment. Yet my guess is that he has not yet become as wealthy as he deserves for this under appreciated set of rules.

Thanks very much, it`s nice to be appreciated for this!

B.T.W. re. other periods, there will pretty much be the same rules for regulation in my new ancient Roman rules… it`s the terminology that may change – that`s all.

The battle of Gergovia was an example of where regulation failed to work (and maybe an element of Caesar bungling too in his general plan of attack)… Caesar`s orders and the horn calls to halt were not heard and contact was lost between the leading and some of the following cohorts in the Roman line of battle.

But, sorry mustn`t ramble too far off topic here – I`ll just do that on the Ancients discussion board!

Let me ask you a question…what are the benefits and disadvantages between a colonne par division and colonne d'attaque…when is each colonne supposed to be used and why?

Answer that and you have answered your own question…

Art:

Actually, it didn't help. I am not sure how that answers my question about your statement:

le colonne d'aile

Jomini stated that this colonne should have been used at Waterloo…and I agree 100 percent

I simply wanted to know why that formation 'should have been used'? Obviously, you and Jomini felt it had some benefits that the configuration actually used didn't.

You stated that: "it is not about benefits and disadvantages that these collones were formed, but due to the manner of execution required from these colonnes."

Don't their manners of execution provide advantages and disadvantage on the battlefield? Why have two different methods if they didn't.

Colonne par division formed with a two company front and formed on the left or right. A colonne d'attaque formed on the center. From what I understand, it had advantages of deploying faster than an colonne par division but could not extend a brigade line because of the way it was formed. The colonne d'attaque wasn't used as much as other configurations because of this rigidity on brigade or higher scales. It seems to form a colonne d'attaque, a battalion had to form in line first.

So, the two configurations had their benefits and disadvantages. That was all I was asking about your comment concerning the le colonne d'aile.

The ecole de brigade…or…evolution par brigade replaced the evolution in line…as for when the British replaced their evolution in line, I do not know…

I know you have Gerome and Renard…both go into detail why it was necessary.

Are you referring to the preferred use of the le colonne d'aile at Waterloo? How does the 1814 ecole de brigade
fit into this?

I simply wanted to know why you said what you did, not play 'gotcha' or disagree. You and I have better things to do.

Best Regards, Bill

As I already mentioned, I am a firm believer that a thread should not post two different era's such as this one

Art,

Completely agree with the sentiment but I do have to point out the original post was restricted to Regulating and while there may well have been differences between eras and tactical systems, as we all know the concept goes back to antiquity.

Where things appear to have "come off the rails" so to speak, was the expanding of the discussion into passage of lines and your question regarding the use of colonne par bataillon, colonne d'attaque par bataillon, colonne par regiment in rules.

I cannot believe that after all these years you seriously imagine that any Napoleonic rule writer (certainly a commercial one) with the exception of Mike, even knows the appropriate usage, or correct forming, of these. Much less has created rules where the differences would be contextually meaningful!

G'Day Mr. T…

I have but a few minutes…

In the 80s…during the Cold War Era…we had to practice NBC drills with AFVs…remember that old acronym ;-)

We used regulating AFVs since we were not permitted radios while in an NBC environment to keep in formation…so you are right…the concept is here today and goes all the way back to antiquity…

A regulating battalion controls the parallelism of march of a considerable body of troops…the regulating-directing body for the French and Russians when in column was the use of the colonne par bataillon, colonne d'attaque par bataillon, and colonne par regiment.

I have been saying this over and over again…players have to use the colonne par bataillon, colonne d'attaque par bataillon, and colonne par regiment as regulating-directing columns…unless you want to go back to l'ordre Prusse and just use the old processional columns.

we started using regulating battalions in our game design in the mid 90s…and I first started reading about this mysterious column (colonne par bataillon) in the late 90s…and it wasn't until I started working with Mike and Ned…that we were able to susse it out.

Perhaps these colonnes will never make it to commercial use…but that does not mean we cannot add these directing columns ourselves…

Right…It would seem that Bill has given me a task…so I shall work on his questions this weekend…

Best Regards
Art

Ah! Cologne par Battalion du M113! :o)

Liked to have seen that.

BTW: Don't forget the joy of cross posting. ACW readers will not only be confused by the terminologie Francaise but still be wondering why Regiments arn't advancing in line! :o)

Tee Hee, just noticed the first line of my post above. You just have to love auto correct – even when it screws up your jokes!

Well they have M113s in the Bundeswehr after all. :o)