"Facts, and more about the Battle Of Little Bighorn" Topic

"…Terry Flower, a physics professor at the College of St. Catherine in St. Paul, Minn., conducted a second test in 1995, again using a Springfield carbine and appropriate powder loads. In a 25-page report on his test, Flower wrote, ‘Volleys heard at Reno Hill most probably did not originate from Last Stand Hill [about 7,000 meters away].' Only on-site testing will answer the question with certainty, but such testing has not as yet been permitted at the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument (known until 1991 as the Custer Battlefield National Monument).

Still, if it is probable that gunfire from Custer Hill could not have been heard on Reno Hill on July 25, 1876, then where could the sound of gunfire have come from? Interestingly enough, there is testimony from the Reno court of inquiry that may suggest an answer. Sergeant Edward Davern testified: ‘Shortly after reaching the top [of Reno Hill], I heard volley firing from downstream….I could see Indians circling around in the bottom on the right, way down and raising a big dust….I spoke to Captain [Thomas] Weir about it. I said, ‘That must be General Custer fighting down in the bottom.' He asked me where and I showed him. He said, ‘Yes, I believe it is." Statements made by Lieutenant Edward Mathey and Lieutenant Edgerly supported Sergeant Davern's observation.

The ‘bottom' is, of course, where the Indian village was located. If Davern's observation was correct, then it would indicate Custer had conducted a successful charge across the river–probably at Medicine Tail Ford, also known as Minneconjou Ford–and into the Indian camp. The testing done by Terry Flower indicates that shots fired near that ford could have been heard on Reno Hill. ‘U.S. Government Survey maps indicate that the Minneconjou Ford is located about 4,300 meters from the Reno entrenchment,' Flower said. ‘While single shots could marginally be heard, volleys and multiple firings could most likely be identified.' There are statements from Indians who were in the camp that seem to indicate soldiers were in the camp and fighting there. Indian participants such as Gall, Red Horse, Kill Eagle and Thunder Hawk mentioned women and children being killed and tepees set afire. There is no evidence that this killing and tepee-burning was done by Reno's men, and most accounts from survivors of his command say Reno's charge was stopped short of the village. Stray bullets could kill women and children, but they would not set tepees afire.

In his official report of the battle, Reno mentioned that Custer may have crossed the river and attacked the camp, but he later changed this view. Benteen, in a letter to his wife, also mentioned the possibility that Custer got across, but by the time of the Reno court of inquiry, he had changed his view: ‘I can't think he [Custer] got within three furlongs of the ford.'

The distortions and untruths told by Reno and Benteen about the Battle of the Little Bighorn are so many and so obvious that almost everything they said about it becomes suspect. These ‘errors' have been pointed out by many researchers. ‘There are many elements to this story that indicate that others besides Reno and Benteen were involved in a coverup of the facts, distortions and outright criminal acts,' Zimmerman said. ‘Some of these issues require a more in-depth investigation to expose the truth.'…"
More here
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Amicalement
Armand

Anyone that is in the "neighborhood" and wants a guided tour can contact me.

A truly well preserved site

I was there when I was 15. I want to go again now that I know more about the battle.

Back in 1979, when I went to the battlefield, there was a small visitor centre, a few markers and not much else.
It's interesting that splitting the command was SOP.
According to the guide we had back then, Custer saw a village approximately 10 miles long and 2 wide. How can anyone decide the hammer and anvil will work on something that big? They were sturring up a hornets nest with between 2000 and 10,000 warriors, again according to the guide. Sheer lunacy!

Terrement, made me spit out my wine I laughed so hard!

I always figured the "Big village--bring packs" message represents the point at which Custer himself saw the village. At that point, he'd long since divided the command, and the two surviving orders were to concentrate on him.
As for the acoustics business, I's skeptical. Except for I think one head, no 7th Cav bodies were found across the Big Horn. I'll believe some element crossed, but I find it hard to believe they were firing volleys--and especially that they were still there firing volleys as late as when Weir got to Weir Point.
An old grad school buddy worked the site, and told me that a guidon at Weir Point was (just) visible from Custer Hill. He figured the volley was Custer's last attempt to signal that he--or at least some element of his command--was still alive and fighting.
I think the best alternative is Sioux firing weapons in celebration. But I think if Custer's battalion had been intact and fighting in the village as late as when everyone else had reached Reno Hill--i.e., they were NOT dead and scattered around Custer Hill already--they'd have been able to fight their way to the rest of the command. (I'm a simple soul. I figure the bulk of the fighting is where you find the bodies and shell casings.)
But as for the investigation--yeah, usually the dead guy turns out to have made all the mistakes.

My wife and I went to the battlefield a couple years ago… just a comfortable hour drive out of Billings. The Ranger guides are outstanding… many are authors on the battle. If you go, I recommend the Crow bus tour… really well done.

According to the guide we had back then, Custer saw a village approximately 10 miles long and 2 wide. How can anyone decide the hammer and anvil will work on something that big? They were sturring up a hornets nest with between 2000 and 10,000 warriors, again according to the guide. Sheer lunacy!

More modern research puts the camp at about 1-1/2 miles long.

Reading this one right now link

Read this one a number of years ago link

Both set it at that size, extending to Medicine Tail Coulee. Probably in the area of 2000 or less warriors so basically a fair fight.

That village was not 10 miles long and two miles wide. That is sheer insanity.

An outstanding historian who actually knows about what he writes, Greg Michno, in his book Lakota Noon (the story of the battle based primarily upon Indian accounts) devotes an entire 18 page chapter to the village size. In fact the village was about 1.5 miles by about 300 yards. This is still 163 acres.

Does anyone know how many tepees you could put in an area 10 miles by 2 miles?

The first whitemen on the scene after the fight thought the village was about three miles long. This was due to the evidence they saw of where the lodges had stood. They did not realize what many of the Indians later said, that the tents were moved downstream after the fight. Apparently it was a custom to move a village after deaths.

The Indians who were there described the village size. They did not use whiteman "miles". They used landmarks. The land marks they used came out to roughly Greg's estimate.

Tom

The gunfire was first heard by Herendeen in the valley at roughly the time of Reno's retreat. Others heard it even later on Reno Hill.

I have spent a lot of time out there, and the wind usually comes from the north which would carry the sound of the gunfire towards Reno Hill.

What Weir and Edgerly saw and heard from Weir Point as quoted above was much later.

The earliest gunfire from Custer's command would have been from the high ground between Medicine Tail Coulee and Deep Coulee. The particular area is commonly called Luce Ridge. A number of cartridge cases were found up there in the 1940's if I remember correctly. I have seen the white stakes up there that were used to mark where they were found.

Many, many more cases (hundreds) have been found closer to the river, still on the divide between those coulees. This was originally known as Blummer Ridge, but is now more commonly called Nye-Cartwright Ridge.

All of these rounds were fired before any of the serious fighting by Custer's five companies began. They are all on land that is outside of the NPS fenced in Battlefield property.

These would have been what was first heard.

When using the distance to Last Stand Hill, one has to remember that was at just about the farthest point from Reno Hill. Calhoun Hill is nearly 3/4 of a mile closer. Blummer and Luce Ridges are probably at least a half mile closer yet.

Tom

"…Greg Michno, in his book Lakota Noon (the story of the battle based primarily upon Indian accounts)…"

Did he said how many indians casualties were in the camp?…

Seems Custer and his men spend a lot of ammo there…

Amicalement
Armand

Casualties are really not known. I don't remember what Greg said. Probably less than 80 killed, maybe only 30 or so. Indian accounts vary. Lots more wounded. Some Indian accounts say the wounded died for days afterwards.

Lots of shooting and now much hitting was very common in the Indian Wars, as it is in most wars.

If I remember correctly, Crook claimed to have fired off about 10,000 rounds at the Rosebud and killed only a few handfuls as well. Someone with the time to search it can correct me.

Tom

Very interesting. Did Capt Weir verify the testimony? If he did, it would be a compelling reason for his advocacy of moving to aid Col Custer. Good digging.

The use of the term 'volley firing' seems to be very subjective in the survivor's accounts. Most don't mention it – those who do, don't all mention it occurring at the same point in the battle.

Godfrey recalls "Two distinct volleys" after Benteen joins Reno – said volleys prompting Weir to seek permission to investigate.
He also describes the Indians firing "volleys at command" during their overnight harassing fire.

Benteen's 1876 statement and his (detailed & extensive) correspondence with Pte. Golding include no mention of volley fire.
(None of Golding's various versions do, either.)

Edgerley, Windulph, Varnum and Trumpeter Martin all describe "heavy firing", with no mention of distinct volleys.

Reno (1876 account), Kanipe, and Fred Gerard make no mention of volley fire.

Sgt. Ryan describes the fire as "scattering".

DeRudio appears to use the term "volley" for any group shooting.

Herendeen's 1876 account, in the Bismarck Herald, makes no mention of volley fire.
His 1878 statement describes the fire in the timber – which killed Bloody Knife next to Reno – as a volley.
It's this account which also records nine distinct volleys, heard while sheltering in the woods with DeRudio, O'Neill et al, having been left behind after Reno's withdrawal to the bluffs.

That's all the first-hand accounts I have at hand short of a trawl through the bookshelf.

FWIW, I reckon the suggestion that the
Indians used "volley fire" is the shallow end of the pool which ascribed the Indian victory to white intervention – "Sitting Bull went to West Point", there were "White Renegades" among the hostiles, the "Indians all had Winchesters", etc.
Entertaining exercise in folklore that sheds light on the media and culture of the time.

OTOH, the suggestion that Custer ordered the use of volley fire to signal distress… I don't find that convincing at all.
Was there ever a recognised system of using volley fire as a method of signalling in the US cavalry?
Because if not, the idea that anyone would fire random shots in the hope that somebody hearing the gunfire would ascribe some communicative intent to it, just seems silly.

Could Benteen/Reno help Custer…?

If the answer is yes… all of them have died also…?

Amicalement
Armand

Strongly doubt it, simply because of the time factor.
By the time Benteen had reached Reno, rallied his men, combined forces, waited for the packs, and moved out…it would have been all over for Custer's battalion.
Proof of the pudding is that by the time Weir advanced his company, there were plenty of unengaged Indians available to stand him off and drive him back.

If Benteen hadn't diverted toward Reno hill, and had followed after Custer?
Then you have to ask whether or not he'd have waited for the packs.
If he'd obeyed Custer's order and waited for the packs – same outcome. All over by the time he arrives. Benteen's battalion and the pack train would simply have been 'dessert' for the Indians.
If he'd disregarded the despatch, left the pack train, and made all speed after Custer?
Maybe.
Conventional wisdom says there were more than enough Indians to deal with the 7th even if they'd arrived en masse, BUT – previous studies of the battle have been based on very high numbers of hostiles.
Newer interpretations have been revising that figure downwards.
By the time Benteen reached the bluffs, the greater part of the hostile force – which crossed at the same fords Custer's battalion had been repulsed from, and followed him up Medicine Tail Coulee and Deep Coulee – would have been between Benteen and Custer.
There might well have been enough Indians there to stand Benteen off, but the question for me is – would they have stood their ground, between the two battalions?
That seems counter to usual practice. My feeling is they'd have melted away, allowing Benteen through.

Then the question becomes – do the Indians have the resolve to commence 'Round Two' against the newly reinforced Custer/Benteen battalion?

They'd certainly have continued to encircle the combined battalion, and maintained harassing fire. If their numbers and firepower proved sufficient to pin the 7th, they'd have kept it up, and won by attrition.

If the Combined command had been able to stay mobile despite harassment, another question arises: would they have attempted to withdraw, (either north-east, directly away from the hostiles, or south-east, towards Reno) or would they have persisted in trying to find a crossing point and attack the camp?

The former option would be problematic. There would be wounded to move (or abandon!) One or two troops who'd had their horses stampeded, and as Reno discovered – retrograde movement invited attack.

The latter seems madness. The true extent of the camp was now apparent, Bouyer had informed Custer of Reno's repulse, and Custer's battalion had a mauling. I wouldn't even consider the possibility, had anyone but Custer been in charge.

Many thanks my friend… so… they did well… I always have my doubts…

Amicalement
Armand

NDL, what about Reno and the many wounded? Leaving them behind very well could have meant their deaths. Benteen had a nasty choice to make, save Reno or save Custer. Packing up the wounded and heading for Custer was not a realistic option. Leaving behind those who could not ride wasn't really an option. I doubt Benteen had the manpower to bounce back and forth across the battlefield to save one, then the other. A terrible choice to make. Of course it really wasn't Benteen's choice, Reno was the superior officer on site. This is an ongoing debate without a clear path to an acceptable explanation for those interested in the battle. I haven't said this much about it for a very long time. My own thoughts have been evolving for several decades, and I'm not sure where I stand on the debate now. Too much speculation and not enough facts for a definitive answer. Oh well.

True enough, DJ.

According to Benteen, Reno approached him, and several other officers overnight on the 25/26th, and discussed the possibility of pulling out, abandoning the wounded.
Benteen told him bluntly that it was out of the question.
That conversation didn't become public knowledge for some years, and Benteen claimed this is what soured Reno's reputation in the regiment.

They certainly did attempt to move the wounded on the 25th, when the combined commands started to move out to follow Weir.
It was a cripplingly slow and awkward process, with casualties carried in a blanket by six men. I do not believe it would have proved viable.

BUT – that possibility only arose because Benteen diverted to Reno hill.
Had he pressed on after Custer, the question would not have arisen because there's no way Reno's command could have moved out unsupported.
If course, if Benteen had pressed on after Custer, it doesn't really answer anything – just opens up more questions!

As for the seniority of command – their current regimental ranks were pretty much meaningless.
Both men had been colonels – it was correct etiquette and correct military terminology for them to refer to each other as 'Colonel'.
Had Reno tried to 'pull rank' because he currently happened to hold a Major's post, the bullish, alpha-as-hell "Captain" Benteen would have laughed in his face.
It was a complicated system: substantive rank / brevet rank / title / current post.
This is how they ended up with Custer – a substantive Captain, who'd been Brevet-promoted to Major General, and therefore was always referred to as 'General', holding the post of Acting Lieutenant-Colonel.

While I was on active duty, I was privy to a few situations where seniority was determined by DOR. And, once that was determined, the pecking order was firmly established. I should hate to navigate the "rank/brevet/title /current post to determine seniority. I found myself senior Captain a few times during peacetime. Once I was the ranking officer and orders were cut making me the unit commander for a few days. It must have been lunacy after the ACW.

I read some where that when Crazy Horse was asked about the battle he stated that Custer had almost won if he could have crossed the stream. When asked to clarify, Crazy Horse stated that Custer was chasing the women & children and had most likely planned to take them hostage and move them to the front of his command as he had done 8 years before in an other engagement. The hostages would have stopped the young warriors cold and would have most likely forced them all back to the reservations. That put the battle into a whole new light for me.

Interesting…

Amicalement
Armand