"Open files (the formation, not the rules)" Topic

So just read a 71st orderly book that stated that the formation of order (Open files) is one pace apart, that open order is two paces apart, and that extended order is three paces apart between files.

Did the writer place any context on his description? Was this for a certain type of terrain or conditions??

No, it was the standing orders for the battalion, so when the command was given they knew how to form.

Two ranks in all cases?

The Battns. to be drawn up in two Ranks for Action and a foot apart

The files 1 pace asunder for Common order
2 paces for open order
3 paces for Extended Order

The men to Stand upright & firm on their Ground and to preserve the utmost attention and silence…
[fol. 86r]
[fol. 88r]
The soldiers are to level constantly at the enemys waist bands and with their right eyes direct to the Barrels of their pieces on that Object the Instant they pull their Trikers…
[fol. 88r]
[fol. 88v]
If the Battn. is commanded to engage in a wood, thicked or country, one or more Sections will be detached in front of each company with an off at the head of each who are immediatly to occupy every tree Stump Log Bush Rock clife hedge wall, or in short any kind of covering which can afford them tolerable Shelter from the enimy

When the Signal for Action is given, the firings are immediatly to commence on which Occasion every man Shall take the most direct Aim possible at the most favourable object in his front & without waiting for an Officer's orders with respect to times continue to load present & fire with the utmost Alacrity deliberation and Accuracy ‘til the firings are ordered to Cease. In the execution of this service Officers commanding companies are to take particular care that their companies shall preserve their proper Stations in the Battn

Officers commanding Sections to observe the Same attention with regard to their particular
[fol. 88v]
[fol. 89r]
place of their Sections in front of each Company and that their respective divisions shall not only be judiciously dispersed but that every Soldier shall hug their coverts in the most compleat manner possible for giving annoyance to the enemy and perfect security to themselves –

If the troops are ordered to move in any direction they are to spring from tree to tree, Stump, Log, &c with the Outmost Agility & continue to fire, load & spring as they advance upon or from the enemy

If the point of war is Beat, they are to rush upon the enemy with Charged Baynotes -"
[fol. 89r]

"Orderly Book of the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment of Foot, 1778, Apr. 21 – Sept. 9." Huntington Digital Library.

link

Hopes this helps

33rdfoot.org/open-files.html

I would be more inclined to go with the basic description for open files as referenced above – "Common Order" since that differentiates it from the manual exercise postion of Order (musket on the ground).

I also prefer the paces mentioned as well, as that is a more easily achieved result than a specific measurement of inches or feet.

Mark ,
was the word of command explanation chart on your link a direct quote or a translation to feet ?

Well @historygamer you've hit the jackpot with that 71st Foot Orderly Book. And the gold dust in there is not to do with file spacing. It's true that it differs slightly from some others – for example Howe's initial formulation of open files being a separation of 18 ins.
The really interesting stuff relates to something that we generally assumed happened a little later, a thing that makes the fighting of troops in order a little closer to modern infantry fighting and lies at the heart of the British firing techniques used to such devastating effect in the Peninsular wars of 1807-1814. And this is to do with allowing the infantry soldier to chose his own target and when to open fire on it – or in the words of your document:

"every man Shall take the most direct Aim possible at the most favourable object in his front & without waiting for an Officer's orders with respect to times continue to load present & fire with the utmost Alacrity deliberation and Accuracy ‘til the firings are ordered to Cease"

This moving away from the conventional manual exercise in which men load, present and fire on the officers' words of command is critical to the British way of fighting and something many other European armies never mastered during the Napoleonic period. A good many armies never really understood that if you expected the entire volley to fire on the officer or NCO's word of command, there might be a good many men who had not really spotted anyone to shoot at and whose fire would therefore be wasted.
As for the British, the received wisdom was that certain veterans of the American War applied these techniques in light infantry units, first in the Caribbean in the 1790s, and later at the famous Shorncliffe Camp in the early 1800s. Wellington spread the technique more widely, throughout his army, once he'd seen the Light Brigade in action in 1809.
Now it's true with tactics in this period that some techniques were used and then completely forgotten – or were applied by people in different places without apparent communication between them. Many of William Howe's ideas, applied from the summer of 1775 (for example moving immediately from a three to a two deep line, something retained for the rest of the AWI) are assumed to be tactical practices that he learnt while commanding a light battalion in the French and Indian Wars, but there's no paper trail of evidence.
So what you have with the 71st, which was always intended to operate as light troops, is an explicit adoption of the rule that fire discipline will be devolved to the individual soldier once they have been ordered to load and make ready. It's very significant because while people may have assumed that that's what happened anyway (i.e. fire discipline breaking down into individuals loading and firing as fast as they could) here you have evidence that it was a deliberately sanctioned practice, part of 'American fighting' no doubt but with profound implications, not least in giving the individual infantryman such discretion.
EC

Many of William Howe's ideas, applied from the summer of 1775 (for example moving immediately from a three to a two deep line, something retained for the rest of the AWI) are assumed to be tactical practices that he learnt while commanding a light battalion in the French and Indian Wars, but there's no paper trail of evidence.

Should we not consider his "Light Infantry Discipline" training of manual in 1774, and Townshend's memorandum on how two-man files of light infantry should operate (eg one man covering the other, one man always being loaded, etc etc) as evidence?

I assume the targeted fire talked about is for the skirmishers (section) sent out from each company, though in the same paragraph the author shifts back to talking about the officers commanding the companies.

Interesting to as it gives credit to the drum beat for the point of war and that the men are to charge (company officer's command?) upon hearing that signal.

I'd also have to look up what a "section" translates to in terms of men.

Supercilious – well I've gone in search of what was taught to those light companies at the 1774 camp and saw some description of the evolutions. It does specify 2 deep line / 2 man files but is pretty skinny on detail more generally. There certainly isn't a 'manual' of pre-AWI light infantry practice that I've seen. And the problem is that even if there was you'd be seeking proof that it might be the system taught by Howe. We have fragments in all sorts of places – of course the general orders for Howe's army spell out the 2 deep line and then the 18in file separation but lots is left unsaid. The David Library have some fascinating notes on the drills of the 1st Light Infantry Battalion which have some very interesting details. But once again it's hard to tie it to Howe – and even the American war in that case. What we really need is some detailed notes or comments from some officer involved in the training at Halifax in the summer of 1776. That seems to be the moment when the message goes around the army 'we're going to do things differently' and the LI system seems to come into tactics, dress, and attitudes more widely.

Historygamer: yes you may be right, that *could* be an instruction to the skirmishers. But then again look at the second part of that paragraph, in which commanders are told to take care of the alignment of their companies when on that service – companies rather than sections.
EC

Gems like this are such a treat. An authoritative history of the 71st has yet to be written.

Another thing to bear in mind is that the 71st arrived in America largely untrained, notwithstanding an unquantified number of re-enlisted veterans from Fraser's 78th disbanded after the 7YW. On embarking, the men were described by Peebles of the 42nd as "stout, raw and irregular."

There seems to have been some drilling on board ship during the voyage from the Clyde in 1776, but plans for systematic training after the regiment arrived in America were scuppered somewhat by the death in Boston Harbour of Major Menzies, the officer expected to take charge of training of the regiment. I am not sure whether that would have consituted anything more in the way of dedicated light infantry training than the bush fighting drills carried out by Col. Stirling with the 42nd RHR. Even that would have been ambitious.

It's a moot point how much Menzies might have achieved in the few weeks before Howe ordered the landings on Long Island. The 71st, despite being "stout, raw and irregular" were deemed to have aquitted themselves well in the ensuing battle of Brooklyn but from then on the battalions were assigned mainly to reserve positions. They suffered badly from sickness in cantonment during the winter 1776-77 and then were assigned to line of communications for much of the Philadelphia campaign, before being sent back to New York in december 1777. All of which, arguably, raises questions over the regiment's level of training in that period.

It would have been during the sojourn of the 71st in New York while Howe's army remained in Pennsylvania then withdrew under Clinton, that these open order drills were being formulated. That autumn, November 1778, the 71st (minus their grenadiers) were sent 'southward' to Georgia from which point they really got into the war and achieved their reputation for effectiveness, initially under Maitland.

In Georgia, Captain Baird, OC of the 71st LI, took command of the Light Infantry corps under Abercromby. He built on the reputation for ruthlessness he established at Old Tapaan in Spetember 1778.

The light infantry aspects of the orders under discussion are particularly interesting, since by contrast the Light infantry of the 71st saw consistent action in the period 1776-78 as part of Maitland's 2nd LI. They remained with the 2nd LI until the 71st regiment was posted southward.

The Light Infantry arrived back in New York in July 1778 when the component light companies had been briefly returned to their regiments, an order rescinded around the time these orders were drawn up on 9th August 1778. Perhaps the open order drills show the experiences of the Light Company being disseminated to the line battalions of the regiment.

EC – From what I recall (been a while since I last saw a copy) the 1774 "manual" was more about how to manoeuvre a battalion, than the operations of an individual company (much less a single file). Some years ago, Christian Cameron told me about a "light infantry treatise" by a chap called Stevens from the SYW period, or just after, using his experience of fighting in Europe, and that this was probably the first such paper authored (as opposed to an English translation of a foreign work) by a British officer. I got the impression that it focused on Anglo-Hanoverian light forces post-Minden, and must have given a lot of coverage of European-led tactics and formations. Sadly, I've never been able to find a copy, but it might be worth looking at.

As a final thought (to all readers/participants in this thread), we should remember that a single, unitary drill manual for the infantry was almost 20 years in the future when the AWI broke out – even the 1764 Manual was only used more widely than any of the others (and even then was open to various interpretations). As such, finding anything close to a common drill being used by an entire force in the field, would be close to unique in this period.

The David Library have some fascinating notes on the drills of the 1st Light Infantry Battalion which have some very interesting details.

Eclaireur- that is interesting. What form do the notes on the 1st LI take. Is it the early period 1st LI (1776-1778) or the second formation in 1780?

42Flanker
I would have to dig out the copies I have of this…
but from memory its some notes that include the evolutions of the light infantry battalion and a separate note on preparing a corps of LI for dispatch to the Caribbean. It's not clear when they date from which but appears that they're from a time after the AWI, and it's someone trying to codify what they did back in America prior to a unit being sent to the tropics in the 1790s. It's catalogued as item 111 in the Sol Feinstone collection of the DAR
PDF link

Supercilious – yes the camp of 1774 was largely about bringing different light companies together and getting them to harmonise their tactics for when acting as a larger body. One of the few distinctive things I can recall from reading the notes of their training was a stipulation that LI companies and groups of them should begin their evolutions from the centre of the line rather than from one of the flanks, as it would allow the movement to be completed faster,
EC

Eclaireur thanks, According to the catalogue entry, it is a memo of the battle of Brandywine (1777), with an account of the 1st LI Battalion drills at that time, which formed an ''Examination of the 'Dundass System', answered according to the practice fo the 1st Batln Light Inf."

The notes must date from after the publication of Principles of Military Movement (1788) (which was used as a basis for the Infantry Drill Regulations published in 1792).

Much has been made, too much possibly, of Dundas' choosing not to discuss in any detail light infantry or skirmishing drills, which he saw as an accessory to the main infantry battle.

Dundas wished to counteract the 'American' influence, that had led to regiments post-1783 adopting ad hoc light infantry-style drills, using loose formations and rapid, showy evolutions, and promote instead more solid formations and a uniform system of drill more appropriate to the European battlefield.

Given that, as it would seem, many battalions at the time were already placing more than enough emphasis on light infantry style drills, he clearly did not think the topic a priority.

The West Indies campaigns against the French resumed in 1794, IIRC, so that would be the likely date of writing. That was when flank coys of a number of regiments were detached and sent out to supplement the British force.

(There is also a compilation of notes in the same hand on the campaigns in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania 1776-78 (No. 409)

42Flanker – I believe the notes were attributed by some to officers of the 17th Foot light company…
EC

Aha! That rings a bell.

In 1792 the 17th (Leicestershire) Regiment arrived in Ireland where Dundas had been appointed Adjutant General in 1789, and was promoted Major general in 1790. He had scope to promote his 'Principles' with his drill being practised by 9 battalions stationed there. In 1792 'Rules and Regulations for the Formation, Field Exercises, and Movements of His Majesty's Forces, were published.

In 1793 the flank coys of the 17th were detached and sent to the West Indies. The battalion coys followed in late 1795. after service in Sto Domingo and Jamaica what was left of the regiment returned home.

Curiously, Major Turner von Straubenzee of the 17th Regt. was joint commander of the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion, although the light company of the 17th was assigned to the 1st LI Bn.

Does anyone have any more information on Turner van Straubenzee (like his first name, perhaps)? I know he transferred from the 17th Light Dragoons and was a descendant of a Dutch officer who had come to England under William III, but that's about it.

I had assumed his first name was 'Turner'.

They seem to be an extensive family, still with Yorkshire connections and a long heritage of military service down the generations.

This appears to be our man:

'Sacred to the memory of Turner Straubenzee formerly Lieut Col 23rd Regt who d 5 Apr 1823 aged 75; Vice Lieut of the N Riding & Col of 1st N. Yks local Militia. Also Lydia Straubenzee relict of the above named Turer Straubenzee who d 8 Jul 1825 aged 68yrs.'

link

It would seem, however, his full name was Marwood Turner van Straubenzee, Turner being his mother's maiden name, Marwood being another 'family' name on the distaff side. (See below)

Philip William Casimir van Straubenzee1
M, #616384, b. 20 April 1723, d. 1765

Philip William Casimir van Straubenzee was born on 20 April 1723 at Tournai, Belgium.1 He was the son of Abraham Johannes van Straubenzee and Johanna Hendrina Schoncken.1 He married Jane Turner, daughter of Cholmley Turner and Jane Marwood , in 1745 in a eloped marriage.1 He died in 1765.1
He was naturalized as a British citizen, by Act of Parliament in 1759.1
Children of Philip William Casimir van Straubenzee and Jane Turner

Hendrina Johanna van Straubenzee1 b. 6 Jan 1747
Lt.-Col. Marwood Turner van Straubenzee1 b. 1748, d.5 Apr 1823
Charles Spencer van Straubenzee+1 b. 1750, d. b May 1809

link

There seems to be some confusion over the cirumstances of the father's coming to England. References to the Dutch Blue Guard would appear to refer to van Straubenzee pater's role as "an officer in the Dutch forces co-opted to resist the Jacobite rebellion" of 1745-46, not a topic on which I am equipped to comment.

You also can pick out some details regarding Marwood Turner van Strubenzee's non-Christian forenames here:
link

Nothing as yet on his military service.

Thanks – he became a captain in the 17th LD on 10th February, 1770, and then a major in the 17th Foot in 14th May 1776; not sure about before that (I managed to start looking at LD officers in American just as the NAM decided to close for restoration!).

I knew from a genealogy site that he had to be either Marwood or Charles from the timeline, but it wasn't clear which (he is always called just "Turner van/von Straubenzee" in the Army Lists). His brother's descendants maintained the military tradition, most of them serving with the Green Howards (19th Foot) and/or the local yeomanry and militia; the last of the professional soldiers (that I know of) died in 2005, aged 93 – he served with the West African forces against the Japanese in India/Burma and was on Mountbatten's staff during Indian independence. I believe the current generation are friends of William and Harry and support some of their charities, but that's pretty much it.

How do others reflect this in wargame basing?

I simply open up space between the stands.

As recommended in the "British Grenadier rules……

… of course. :-)

Oh, yes.