"Cheating at Statistics" Topic

""I must say, that the increase in dead and wounded was greatly inconvenient for German officials, filtering information from the front, and attempting to present it in the best possible light. As one of them admitted to me later, they worked on the principle of "Let us lose the war in reality, but we must win it on paper."" – Hendrick C. Verton, In the Fire of the Eastern Front, The Experiences of a Dutch Waffen-SS Volunteer, 1941-1945

In the wake of the apparently controversial M4 vs Panther myth article, I was asked to write a similar article for the Eastern Front. However, since there is no "authority" on the subject that claims any kind of ludicrous ratio like Belton Cooper did for the Western, I'm going to have to do my own legwork.

You might have heard some kind of ridiculous figures like "Each Tiger would take out 10 T-34s". First of all, let's start with the fact that a Tiger that even engaged enemy tanks on its own in the first place was not doing its job. Tigers were meant to act as parts of assault groups, accompanied by infantry, assault guns, and tank destroyers. Even if a s.Pz.Abt goes off on its own and starts fighting enemy tanks, we run into a different problem. German tank losses were counted much differently than Soviet losses. A German tank is considered lost if it is destroyed, and, more importantly, there is no longer hope of recovering it. That is why losses can show up days, even weeks, after the tanks have actually been destroyed. When looking for German tanks losses, a much more reliable method is to look at dead crew members. You can't fake those…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Ah those statistics
If we, that is the Germans, only had numerical equality. Yet they won with fewer numbers, for a while, until the other side got toughened up and fought smarter.
Gamers of the Tiger Tank obsession dont like it when they discover that the lowly Typhoon or Stormavik did in a lot more Panzers than tbe games allow for.
They also conflate disabled stats, claiming these recovered tanks as not really knocked out, thus getting the ten for one ratio in szlected instances.
Yet the Super Panzer will always be with us. It is great
as a marketing tool, along with "You can change History!!"

The Germans also never set up a proper replacement parts system.

Actually CAS did in very few Panzers…

My understanding is that Sturmoviks and Typhoons destroyed very few Panzers – directly.

The most effective ground attack aircraft were MG/Cannon armed fighters attacking targets of opportunity. Lacking stand off rockets they had to close in and use their guns, which could actually hit the target.

Rockets were usually used from near maximum range as an area effect weapon. This caused delay and confusion but few losses.

The fighters typically engaged trucks and other soft targets, causing enormous logistical nightmares for the Germans.

I would assume the Eastern front was broadly similar.

I think the fear and loathing for allied air power is largely a convenient excuse the ground forces could use to deflect criticism onto the Luftwaffe.

I'm scornful of tactical games that have aircraft over the tabletop. If you are at the sharp end then you don't want your aircraft overhead dropping bombs short and strafing your leading elements. You'd want them over the enemy rear area, hitting HQs and paralyzing any movement of reserves.

I know it's only a game and if people want to have Typhoons or Stukas or A10s [in a modern setting] over the table then why not? But I'm not interested in such WW2 fantasy variants.

The British conducted tests showed that even against static targets like gun batteries and without anyone shooting back kill rates were very low. This was born out by operational research post battle in such engagements as the Mortain counterattack. That didn't stop the exaggerated claims of course.

Looking at the article he mentions crew loses as being more accurate assessment of German tank loses, but I doubt that is true. Crew particularly commanders can be killed without the tank being knocked out and of course crew are killed when out of the tanks. Don Featherstone's unit lost a number killed and wounded when they were shelled while in bivouac.

My dear old departed Dad was a Typhoon pilot, he didn't think he ever hit a target with rockets, and that he never missed with cannon, unless there was ANY flak around, in which case he never hung around, and dumped ALL unused ammo on the ride back..(his theory being that the longer it took to re-arm his plane, the fewer sorties he had to fly)

I wouldn't go by much of what 'For the Record' or "Archive Awareness' spouts off on these "cheating" posts. They often site the true numbers are what the Russians say they are then compare the German numbers to that.

In many cases it's a matter of misidentifing tanks, places or even times. Sometimes double counting enemy killed/destroyed because two nearby units both claim them. On AA I saw one Russian AAR saying so many Ferdinands were KO'd at some location in a date in 1944. When all remaining ones were in Italy at the time.

Also, these cheating instances never seem to be covered by any of Glantz's books so we can see which units were involved, when and where.

There are 3 kinds of lies: Lies, damned lies, and statistics.

Hell, even my Dad (a PHD mathematician) calls statistics "creative lying with numbers"

Great anecdote Christot, I recall hearing of a similar attitude from an MTB chap in the Med.

Looking at the article he mentions crew loses as being more accurate assessment of German tank loses, but I doubt that is true. Crew particularly commanders can be killed without the tank being knocked out and of course crew are killed when out of the tanks. Don Featherstone's unit lost a number killed and wounded when they were shelled while in bivouac.

The other way around is probably more prevalent. There is a fascinating statistic quoted in "Brains and Bullets":

"The realisation of Sherman vulnerability is reflected in the way tank and crew casualties changed over time. For US armoured divisions, the first week in combat saw four crewmen killed or wounded for each tank that was destroyed. Crew casualties dropped sharply after the first few weeks then bounced along, gradually declining until, by the fifteenth week in combat, only one crewman was lost for each tank destroyed…

Veteran tankers have told how their immediate action on contact with an 88 was to fire all their weapons as fast as possible in any direction while reversing quickly into cover, then dismount and get away from the vehicle before it was hit."

I'm scornful of tactical games that have aircraft over the tabletop. If you are at the sharp end then you don't want your aircraft overhead dropping bombs short and strafing your leading elements. You'd want them over the enemy rear area, hitting HQs and paralyzing any movement of reserves.

I know it's only a game and if people want to have Typhoons or Stukas or A10s [in a modern setting] over the table then why not? But I'm not interested in such WW2 fantasy variants.

By 1945 the RAF was flying CAS no more than 500 yards from troops. Not a minimum of 500 yards from friendly troops, a maximum. Troops had become so confident about the accuracy of the Typhoons that they were willing to make final advances with the aircraft roaring by overhead. This was particularly the case when attacking a pillbox or bunker where the location was well established. Obviously, you didn't try it in fluid situations.

Now, I agree with your overall point about roving and harassing fighters making a mess of German movements. I will note that tanks seem to have scattered and sought shelter under trees during air attacks. Even if they weren't actually vulnerable to air attack, the crews certainly felt they were. (There's a great recon photo of a field in France where German tanks came under air attack. Tracks just go every which way …)

Apparently the only way to achieve a hit on a tank with the rockets available at the time was to fire all eight of them at once.

US Army tankers counted the P47s of Quesada's 9th Air Force among their very best friends. The 9th Air Force functioned not only in the close air support role, but also acted as a very effective reconnaissance asset scouting not only well ahead along the axis of advance but also keeping watch for any threats to the armored force's otherwise exposed flanks.

Quesada developed a lot of this close air support tactical doctrine "on the fly" so to speak and, in doing so, basically re-invented much of the successful LW early air-ground support techniques that had proven so effective in support of the German army's deeply thrusting armored offensive operations.

B

"By 1945 the RAF was flying CAS no more than 500 yards from troops. Not a minimum of 500 yards from friendly troops, a maximum. Troops had become so confident about the accuracy of the Typhoons that they were willing to make final advances with the aircraft roaring by overhead. This was particularly the case when attacking a pillbox or bunker where the location was well established. Obviously, you didn't try it in fluid situations."

The crucial phrase here is "By 1945"…prior to the last 2 or 3 months of the war this was simply not the case. by the time the Allies get over the Rhine CAS is not a problem, largely because the Germans aren't moving about much. Advance to village/roadblock..lead tank gets knocked out. Call in as much air and artillery as you can. rinse and repeat.
In France and the Netherlands it wasn't like this at all. Thousands (and I mean THOUSANDS) of allied ground troops were killed or wounded by their own aircraft, The bomb lines for fighter/bombers in Normandy were measured in kilometres, not a few yards, and for heavy bombers it might be 10 kilomtres or more and still there were daily friendly fire incidents. Allied air support was amazing,particularly after late July 44, but it wasn't the CAS wet-dream envisaged by most wargamers and rule-writers. IF the target was something static like a German village, not much of a problem, but elsewhere Aircraft tend to be effective when they discover German troop concentrations forming up well away from the front line or attacking rear area targets.
The happy-time for allied FB pilots at Falaise and Argentan occurs because the Army boundaries were kept apart to allow aircraft and artillery free reign, and yet still there were heavy casualties (numbering several hundreds) on Canadian, Polish, British and US units within a single week.
I have yet to see a set of WWII rules which makes more than a passing attempt to replicate the significant dangers to friendly ground troops when aircraft attempt to engage front-line (or not so front line) targets

I have yet to see a set of WWII rules which makes more than a passing attempt to replicate the significant dangers to friendly ground troops when aircraft attempt to engage front-line (or not so front line) targets.
Then you haven't seen the Panzer War rules. It does have friendly fire (mistaken air attack) rules dependent on distance to the nearest friendly unit.

My old ops manager used to say "the numbers never lie but people usually lie about the numbers" :-)

Yes i've seen plenty of lip-service friendly fire rules,including PW, and I've still not seen any remotely reflecting the real dangers, because if they were even moderately realistic players would never use aircraft at all on a wargames table.
I played in one mega game where a heavy bomber raid went (mildly) wrong and the players were outraged, and, it killed the game…CAS can be, and should be, even riskier

So on the Western front, if the Aircraft didn't do it and the "burning shermans" didn't do it, what did in all those German Tigers, Panthers and other cats? I am not being cynical, but I am just curious having never studied the AARs.

Many German tanks were lost for logistical reasons. Destroyed by own crew is a very common fate for panzers.

Direct air attacks were rarely effective but attacks on soft skins and supply were effective – strangleing the panzers. In one engagement in Bulge Panthers had to use only HE v. M4s since AP ammo was exhausted and resupply cut off by air (and lack of trucks/logistical tail).

Lack of fuel, parts, ammo etc. were big killers.

This combined with huge advantage in tanks produced rendered the technical superiority of the PzV & VI irrelevant (unless your the unlucky lead M4 – just have to hope your a Jumbo version).

TomT

of course allied tanks destroyed german tanks, as did allied aircraft…both of them did in their hundreds, (and caused many more to be rendered ineffective) what didn't happen was aircraft swooping low over closely engaged friendly troops called in on a sixpence within seconds to supplement an existing firefight which is what happens in countless wargames.

Exactly Christot. Players want to indulge their fantasy and after all the biggest fantasy is that we are in command of troops and not playing with toys.

But there are degrees of fantasy.

During and after WW2 those lobbying for more spending on air forces and indeed the creation of an independent USAF exaggerated the impact of air power on the outcome and we are still living with the consequences.

IMO air power can only support ground or sea power, never supplant it.

Jentz books were pretty good about explaining the German tank losses. The Tiger battalions would have 40 of their 45 tanks on the books, but every day there were only 10-15 'runners', the rest were in some depot awaiting parts. Then the enemy would overrun the depot and suddenly the battalion had 10-15 tanks instead of 40. The question that vexes the statistician is: When did a tank become a casualty, when it had to be recovered for repair or when it actually became unrepairable? Also, I think that sometimes the issue was repair capability and not just parts. That is to say the repair crews didn't have enough time to repair all the tanks in the queue for the day.

Yes i've seen plenty of lip-service friendly fire rules,including PW, and I've still not seen any remotely reflecting the real dangers.

You are right. I somehow left out the Mistaken air attacks out of the PDF version of my rules. I had it in the original paper version but when put in pdf form it was omitted. I'll have to update the rules to include them once more.

It went something like this. There is a descending chance based on distance to visible friendly unit from the intended target of air attack. Roll chance. If mistake happens enemy player gets control of your aircraft and can attack that turn one of your units within the above distance (not necessarily the nearest unit).

The Tiger battalions would have 40 of their 45 tanks on the books, but every day there were only 10-15 'runners', the rest were in some depot awaiting parts. Then the enemy would overrun the depot and suddenly the battalion had 10-15 tanks instead of 40.

And in the next day or two they would have 4-7 'runners', with the rest again awaiting repairs.

But often these tanks were not actually "in" the depot. They may well have been listed as "depot", but they were still in the process of being recovered. So long as the engineering support was in possession of the vehicle it was a "depot" vehicle, even if it was still in transit to the depot. At least that is my understanding.

Also, I think that sometimes the issue was repair capability and not just parts.

And recovery capacity. Tigers were very difficult to recover and transport to depots for repairs.

If three Famo's were tied up for a whole day recovering one Tiger, then that means three Famo's not available to recover other Tigers.

This is one reason so many Tigers were demolished by their own crews. Oop, tossed a piston? Ain't gonna be no one here to tow it away or help fix it for 2 days. Pull the ammo out of the bins and toss a charge inside, we're walking home, boys!

One of the problems with the Tiger fan club is they fail to see this as a basic flaw of the tank. Oh, it was technically superior to (insert allied tank model here) because it had a bazillion-to-one kill ratio. Well, first off no, it didn't. And second, it was very hard to keep it in the fight.

As a tool of war it had very limited productivity. In the right circumstances it made an out-sized contribution to winning a tactical engagement. But as a tool of war it seldom made a positive contribution to a campaign. Given the enormous resources, in design, production, and support, it seems to have been a net drain rather than a net contributor.

We might see this, or something else altogether, depending on which stats we look at.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

One of the things I really miss from Flames of War v1 was the chance of flubbing the dice on an air attack and giving your opponent a chance to drop that attack onto one of your own units.

IMO, BF really should have put that back into the rules for Vietnam (after all, they put other v1 rules in like transport capacity).