"Amphibious Aspects Of The Normandy Invasion" Topic

Quite interesting…

"The amphibious operations of the Pacific, which in 1945 will open their greatest chapter, will profit by the lessons learned on the beaches of the Bay of the Seine in the summer of 1944.

But in turn the success of the Normandy invasion and the defeat of Germany owe much to the experiences gained and the technique developed in the prior campaigns of the Pacific. Germany lost the Battle of Normandy-and as a result, the war-because the Allies were able to land and supply over open beaches an army that numbered a million men twenty days after D-day, and close to three million within four months. The Germans had based their defense of the West on the defense of ports; they underestimated the Allied amphibious strength and the Allied ability to supply an army over open beaches.

The enemy was bemused with his own lies about the effectiveness of the submarine campaign; many of the German prisoners taken in Normandy were amazed at the Allied armada of ships and craft of all types used in the invasion of Normandy. The capacity of our landing craft and the Allied skill in the general technique of amphibious war were other surprises. One of Hitler's greatest mistakes-and he has made many-was his failure to keep a closer eye on developments in the Pacific, developments which have revolutionized the difficult art of amphibious war.

Two other great factors, one of them an erroneous German G-2 "estimate of the situation", insured the success of the invasion of France, and the victory in Normandy…"
Full text here
link

Amicalement
Armand

Interesting to get a marine perspective particularly one written in 1944

During the planning for the Normandy invasion there was serious thought given to bringing a Marine division from the Pacific to spearhead the American landings. This was later rejected.

But pretty much everyone agrees that the preliminary bombardment was much too short to have any serious effect on the German defenses. In the Pacific, pre-invasion bombardments could last for days or even weeks. But against an island you can do that since there is no chance for the enemy to bring in reinforcements. At Normandy the surprise factor was so important, the landings had to take place very soon after the fleet arrived.

But I've wondered if the Allies could have been more aggressive with their naval assets. Perhaps start a series of bombardments all along the Channel coast starting in January, right up to the time of the invasion. Maybe once a week the fleet would show up, bombard the heck out of a stretch of defenses for three or four hours and then withdraw. Naturally they would have to do most of these in the Pas de Calais region to deceive the Germans. Apart from the physical damage done, the Germans would become used to the routine so when the fleet showed up to hit Normandy again in June, they wouldn't pay any special attention to it. The Allies could have had a much longer bombardment before landing without losing surprise.

As I understand it the Allies did a reasonable job of deceiving the Germans as to the location of the invasion without putting the fleet at risk every week for five months or so. And unless all these bombardments was also accompanied by a parachute drop or two I think the real one would stand out from all the others.

I had heard the reason for no Marines at Normandy was many of the US Generals want no Marines in the ETO.

Many Gernerals were veterans of WW1 and Felt that the Marines had gotten to0 much credit for the Victory.

Navel gunfire was a major force Multiplier in the days after D-day,

deephorse, I wasn't suggesting the naval bombardments as part of the deception plan, but as a way to get a longer and more effective bombardment on D-Day itself. As for the risk, yes, they would have lost ships, but at this point in the war the ships were largely expendable, there being no naval threat except for U-boats and Tirpitz up in Norway. The cruisers and old battleships had no role anymore except shore bombardment. All that mattered was the success of the invasion.

The Allies also learned a lot from the amphibious landings in North Africa, Sicily, and Salerno. And experience with airborne operations, also.

Barring a way to get direct hits on the bunkers from 14" guns (like guided shells), I'm not sure any amount of preparatory bombardment would have worked.

interesting that he places great faith in the amtracs but is dismissive of dd tanks and doesn't even mention the other 79th armoured division specialist vehicles..I wonder if he was even aware of them?

Glad you enjoyed the article guys!. (smile)

I like ScottWashburn idea…

Amicalement
Armand

Actually the Luftwaffe still remained a threat and dont forget the E-boats.
link

Mines would also have posed a significant threat.

If the Luftwaffe tried to attack the ships, they'd just be destroyed that much sooner. Ditto for the E-Boats. They'd probably do some damage, but so what? The Allied navies could absorb that without blinking. The mines would be the worst threat, but again, this could be turned to an advantage. The Allies could aggressively clear mines without tipping the Germans off about where the invasion was going to land.

I'm sure the admirals gave exactly the reasons you state for NOT doing something like this. They were all overly protective about their ships and could never accept the idea that a battleship was expendable.

'the ships were largely expendable'

I bet their crews felt differently about it

There was a lengthy thread on this topic recently on the Battleship versus Battleship Forum. Short story was this -

1 – Although allied forces had previously made amphibious landings in both N Africa and the ETO, none (with the exception of the disaster at Dieppe) had been executed in the face of an intensive water's edge defense.

2 – It is inexplicable why those responsible for the tactical planning of the Normandy landings solicited no participation or even staff planning input from the USMC, who had literally written the amphibious landings doctrine and manual used by the US Army) and in 1944 effectively represented the state of the amphibious landing art.

3 – Amtracs would have been of great value in getting the troops ashore at Omaha Beach.

FWIW.

B

"I bet their crews felt differently about it"

And I'm sure that any soldier, sailor, or airman sent into a dangerous situation wasn't all that happy about it either. My point is that I think the Allied navies could have made a significantly greater contribution to the ground forces success if the naval commanders hadn't been so worried about losing ships.

1. I fail to see why a slower moving Amtrac would have any benefit over a faster moving LCA, marginally better armour, but a much lower freeboard in the Normandy surf.
Omaha could have been executed better had the Americans adopted the 'funnies' they were offered, to get their armour over the soft sand and shingle, and over the seawall.
2. The pacific was a different war, against a different opposition. Same rules didn't necessarily apply. Britain had been learning about amphibious landings since the Lofotens and the Narvik raid. Many lessons were learned at Dieppe (at a cost) while the US Marines were still learning their trade, and cutting their teeth at Guadalcanal.
I'm not sure the Pacific assaults met such heavy physical defences as those at Normandy.
FWIW

I do wonder sometimes if the argument about the lack of USMC involvement in Normandy takes into account the actual timeline of Pacific operations.

1st Mar Div landings on Guadalcanal Aug42 (unopposed on the beaches, heavily contested thereafter).

3rd Mar Div lands on Bougainville Oct/Nov43 against beachhead opposition.

2nd Mar Div lands Betio (Tarawa) 20th Nov 1943 against extraordinarily intense defensive fires. First use of Amtracs to transport assault troops to the beach. Elements of the Div conduct further small scale landings into Dec43.

1st Mar Div lands Cape Gloucester, New Britain, Dec43.

4th Mar Div lands Marshall Islands Jan44.

The big, multi-divisional landings in the Pacific involving the USMC all come after D-Day has been and gone in Normandy.

2nd and 4th Mar Divs land Saipan 15th June 1944. 4th Mar Div assaults Tinian in Jul44.

3rd Mar Div, and 1st Prov Mar Bde, land Guam 21st July 1944.

1st Mar Div lands Peleliu Sep44.

3rd, 4th & 5th Mar Divs assault Iwo Jima Feb45

1st and 6th Div land Okinawa Apr45.

I think some folks look at the assault landing capability the USMC had reached by the time of Iwo Jima and Okinawa in early 1945 and backdate that to June 1944, and ask the question why it was not applied to Normandy. As a few have mentioned above, the USMC was still learning its trade at that date. Undoubtedly the hardest assault they'd faced before Saipan (which went off over a week AFTER Omaha) was Betio, and they took the casualties to prove it. A lot of the multiple landings they made in late 1943 into early 1944 were small scale RCT level, some against island chains which diluted the defenders ability to concentrate and required penny packet assaults.

Also, the US Army had no shortage of amphibious ops before D-Day in Normandy. North Africa, Sicily, Italy all gave them plenty of opportunities to get their feet wet. And likewise, there were multiple US Army assault landings in the Pacific, some in concert with the USMC, others purely Army ops.

I agree also it was a different war against the Germans and the IJA and switching from one to another would not have been seamless. I'm also not convinced that Amtanks and Amtracs would have prospered especially against the anti-tanks weapons available to the Germans on the Normandy coast in June 1944.

Gary

Would there have been the Amtracs to spare for Normandy?

1. I also note that original article is hardly independent, having been written by a USMC officer, and refers almost wholly to the US portion of the landings.
2. His assertion that "in turn the success of the Normandy invasion and the defeat of Germany owe much to the experiences gained and the technique developed in the prior campaigns of the Pacific" is largely Marine Corps trumpet blowing with no supporting evidence given.
3. Pattons phantom army was just that, the Phantom First US Army Group (a British Intelligence idea and plan),and not the 3rd US Army he subsequently commanded.
4. No mention is made of 'Jedburgh' missions or French resistance efforts, which played a big part in disruption German movement and tying down troops. It wasn't all down to the air forces.

In short the whole article is an advert for the Marines, who 'made it possible' and could have done it better, apparently.
It makes me spew!

Before we come down too hard on the report linked in the OP, let us remember that it was written in 1944! Interestingly enough, the author probably did not have the internet, google searches, well organized research facilities with access to all pertinent documents, and full access to German archives.

Even if he was a US officer (USMC in this case), that does not mean he had access to all US documents. Many were top secret at that point, and even if he had authorization they were not collected and collated for his convenience.

That said, in my own observations I think that some of the critiques of Overlord presented here have merit, although I might adjust them a bit given my readings.

1 ) Shore bombardment: Having a fleet cruising up and down the coast for 4 or 5 months is not a small issue. Let us remember that shore defenses fire back -- often with telling effect. It's much harder to sink a bunker than a boat. And bunkers are cheaper to build, and can be built with better levels of protection. The only challenge is concentrating … while fleets of ships can appear on short notice, bunkers kind of stay where you put them. But the channel is not such an expanse that it could not be well covered -- and it was. Shore batteries were a major concern for the amphibious operation.

Also having your fleet sailing up and down the coast bombarding numerous targets for months means you have a fleet that ISN'T somewhere else for half a year. Like Salerno. Like Anzio. Like the Murmansk convoy route. And … most capital ships only deployed for a few months of action at a time before returning for refit. I can't think of an occasion of a WW2 era battleship that fired off a full magazine of ammunition in operations and then did NOT return to port for refit/overhaul. If nothing else, the guns would need to be replaced, and the violence of that much shooting probably required replacing all the antennae, if not the electronics using the antennae. So 4-5 months of shore bombardment meant 7-10 months not available for other duties.

So sailing glibly up and down the coast engaging real or imagined shore defenses for the sake of de-sensitizing the Germans seems like a rather substantial prioritization of resources for a rather minimal return. Better to bomb incessantly. Airplanes are more fungible and flexible (only takes a day or two to put 'em somewhere else, not 4 weeks).

And that is exactly what the allies did. Had the useful side-benefits of whittling down the Luftwaffe and providing lots of photo evidence of the actual installations, too.

I'm not convinced that more bombardment would have been a useful application of resources.

2) US rejection of British "funnies".
I don't see how British "funnies" would have made any meaningful difference to the US experience.

The problem the US Army had on Omaha was getting tanks TO the beach. The failure of the DDs was a major loss to the momentum of the attack. Bobbins or Petards or fascines or bridging would have made no difference if they were offshore floating around in boats. The US Army simply didn't get enough armor ashore on Omaha, and the PBI paid the price.

On Utah the DD landings were notably more successful, and the armor helped clear the way. There was not notable lack of momentum due to not having "funnies" about.

I don't think the presence of "funnies" in the US force would have made any meaningful difference.

3) Amtracks
I think Amtracks and Amtanks would have been very beneficial, particularly at Omaha.

While not substantially better than LCIs at getting to the beach, they offered two great advantages -- superior coverage for the troops while off-loading, and the ability to go further up onto the beach. Many soldiers where gunned down by MG42 fire the moment the ramp went down on their LCIs. Many soldiers drowned in the surf at Omaha. These casualties could have been reduced by Amtracks.

Amtanks would have been even better. Any armored fire support on the beach was a GOOD THING (tm). While I expect Amtanks would have paid a high price, given their inability to stand up to even the most limited anti-armor weapons, the fact is there just weren't that many AT guns in the beach defenses … certainly not compared to the number of machine guns. The best ways to overcome the AT guns that were present would have been first to concentrate fire on those that were in front-facing positions. That required mass … more guns than made it ashore with the DDs. And then secondly to clear the path for the infantry to flank and close-assault those that were in defilade positions. That whole clearing the path for the infantry was the key, of course.

I think Amtracks and Amtanks would have been quite beneficial.

Just my musings. Your mileage may vary.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

The advantages that Amtracs would have conferred at Omaha were:

(a) the ability to crawl over the various sandbars that stopped a number of LCI's and resulted in the discharging of their heavily laden passengers into deep surf (sometimes in water over their heads) whereupon they were forced to painfully struggle through the waves with a not trivial number drowning outright.

(b) the ability to make their way through the surf zone, advance across the several hundred yards of open beach and deposit dry passengers and their equipment into some sort of cover, as opposed to the men having to struggle across a billiard table shooting gallery under the fire of mortars and crossing/enfilade fire from multiple MGs.

(c) the ability of the Amtanks to support advances through the wide swath of flooded marshes lying behind the bluffs of Omaha beach and the Amtracs to provide cross-country logistic support before the roads had been unblocked and de-mined.

As to availability of these vehicles, they were not made available because no one in a planning capacity apparently asked for them. IIRC, five US Army Amtrac battalions were concurrently taking part in the Saipan landings and several hundred more were available to British forces, who employed them in the later Walcheren operation.

Strictly my opinion, of course. And as my good friend Mk 1 has already commented – ymmv.

B

Wackamole9,You mentioned the Army Generals not wanting USMC in the ETO due to fame from the First World War and you are correct. Bradley learned that a company of Marines from the Battleship Texas was going in by ships boats to reinforce the depleted Rangers at Point du Hoc and he stopped it with some harsh words to the Captain of the Texas. The Rangers had to wait many hours for reinforcement by overland US Army troops instead. In fact,German prisoners were turned over to the Marine Detachment but only at sea for Bradley did not want any Marines to set foot on Normandy for fear that the press would mention US Marines at Normandy and steal away the Army's thunder.

There are a few discussions on various forums about the absence of LVTs for Normandy. No one seems to be able to offer a 'doctrinal reason' as to why they weren't considered, or pin it on a refusal from a particular party.

Another point is when they LVT IV, with the rear ramp for entry/exit, actually became available. 79th Armd Div got their LVTs in August 1944 (5th Assault Regt, RE, switching from AVREs) and started with a mix of LVT IIs and IVs per Sqn (one IV at Sqh HQ and three Tps, with three IIs and five IVs). I was trying to find a figure for Saipan, which was the first chance for IVs to be available, if they were, but couldn't.

Re the amphibian tank version, they began life armed with the 37-mm gun and changed to the 75-mm pack howitzer calibre weapon later on. I know I did some digging into when the 75-mm models became available and thought it was a while after D-Day in Normandy. Can anyone else recall?

I did find an interesting comment from the USMC 2nd Armored Amphibian Bn, for Iwo Jima.

"As learned by experience the LVTA with one fourth inch armor base offers insufficient protection from small arms fire. This battalion equipped all LVTAs with with the auxiliary armor plate kit for LVTs which consisted of a half inch bow plate and four 1/4 inch pontoon plates. In the majority of cases the added armor stopped shell fragments and in no instance did small arms fire penetrate the added protection. Small arms fire and shell fragments did penetrate the 1/4 inch armor not protected by the additional armor." (Annex Mike to 4th Mar Div ops report).

Another question then is whether the additional armour plate kit was available circa Jun44?

I tried to do a quick familiarisation re the defences and shingle situation for Omaha, but haven't had much time. One site tried to list individual WN armaments and I counted around 10 Pak38s, assuming of course the info is accurate.

Gary

Starfury – You can freely download this document via Google. Highly recommended – extremely informative.

ALLIGATORS, BUFFALOES, AND BUSHMASTERS
THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LVT
THROUGH WORLD WAR II
by Major Alfred Dunlop Bailey, USMC (Retired)

A close reading will make clear why I believe that use of LVTs would have been of great benefit at Omaha Beach; The USMC experience at Tarawa is a good place to start, as it shows the value of even the early unarmored LVT1s compared to the Higgins boats.

The LVT(A)4 with 75mm howitzer and the factory armor upgrade kits for otherwise unarmored LVTs were available in quantity by the time of the Saipan landing – which were contemporaneous with Normandy.

FWIW.

B

Off at a tangent slightly but I've always wondered why the US forces didn't use half-tracks (carried in LCMs or LCTs) to traverse the beaches and/or provide the engineers with cover and logistics as they cleared the obstacles. Not as independent as LVTs but they were certainly available and pretty much part of the doctrine of US forces in Europe, if not for dedicated assault troops.