"The Myths of Medieval Warfare" Topic

"The study of medieval warfare has suffered from an approach that concentrates on its social, governmental and economic factors to the detriment of military methods and practice. The nature of feudal society has been analysed in great depth, but its application to how wars were actually fought has largely been ignored and frequently misinterpreted. Despite recent important work these misinterpretations have been stubbornly persistent, perpetuating the long-held myth that the art of warfare reached its nadir in the Middle Ages. John Keegan's latest book, A History of Warfare (Hutchinson, 1993), reflects the view of some leading military historians in referring to ‘the long interregnum between the disappearance of the disciplined armies of Rome and the appearance of state forces in the sixteenth century'. In The Wars of the Roses (Cassell, 1993), Robin Neillands regards knightly warfare as involving no great skill, being simply a matter of bludgeoning one's opponent to the ground. Whereas these and other historians have assimilated a number of the more correct observations on medieval warfare, the complete picture has remained frustratingly obscure.

That this should be so is due in the main to the success of the pioneering work of historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, among whom were Henri Delpech, Hans Delbrück and Sir Charles Oman. Oman's influence has been particularly pervasive because of the continuing availability of a work considered a classic, The Art of War in the Middle Ages (the first edition was published by Blackwell in 1885, with a ninth printing by Cornell University Press in 1990; the final revised and improved edition in two volumes was published by Methuen in 1924, reprinted by Greenhill in 1991). Although much of Oman's wide-ranging work was of value, his conclusions on ‘feudal' warfare remained flawed. Ironically, both he and the distinguished historian, Ferdinand Lot, recognised the supreme importance of fortified places, but they concentrated instead on the appeal and drama of knights and battles.

Collectively, damaging myths of medieval warfare emerged from these historians. Battles were all important, fought by opposing armies of knights who would inadvertently encounter one another. The ensuing melee was a confusion of individual duels by glory-seeking knights set on establishing a martial reputation. The knight was ill-disciplined, too proud to fight on foot, adhered only to the most rudimentary tactics and was poorly led. No thought was given to logistics and ravaging was carried out for want of a coherent strategy. Infantry and archery, if present at all, were only marginal and ineffective, insignificant until the revolutionary tactics of the fourteenth century. The early modern period saw a new age in warfare, marked by the greater efficiency and tactics of the standing armies and by the prevalence of sieges…."
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Amicalement
Armand

Hmmm.I can't speak to some of the others,but Delbruck's study is by no means as crude as caricatured here.

I'm beginning to wonder if the Medieval boosterism has begun to swing too far. . . Was there a Medieval army,of comparable size,with the logistical resources to stay in the field as long as a First Century Roman army,for instance?

I don't know the answer to that question, but some of the statements in the article seem dubious,to say the least.

Hafen, that's a good question. I tend to agree with your leaning in your response. Having said that, I will have to read the article.

Yet the Roman army was for much of its history a local power, fighting tribal wars in Italy. It took several centuries for Rome to grow into a major power able to extend its influence across the sea. And an important factor is that Rome grew into a unified empire.

By contrast it took several centuries to go from local warfare after the fall of Rome to something like the Crusades, behind which was not one central state, but several, cooperating towards a common goal.

And we have technology, you need quite an amount of know-how to make quality plate in large numbers as seen by the end of the 15th century. The better quality of armour was starting to reach common soldiers who could aspire if not to have a full harness, at least have a breastplate, helmet and decent arm and leg protection.

And if we extend the Medieval period even further afield we see armies that would exceed the size and logistics of even the Romans.

Medieval warfare may not have looked like the grandiose mass spectacle of a Cannae or Hydaspes, but it was perfectly adapted to its day and needs and by the end of the Medieval period we have seen enormous changes in tactics, equipment, logistics, social structures, economics etc.

Add a few centuries more and many European nations alone exceed what required a whole Roman Empire to muster.