"Did Wellington Scout towards Blucher on the Big Day?" Topic

Curious thing I have always pondered over THE Battle (18th June 1815).

The impression seems to be that Wellington had little more idea of the whereabouts of the Prussians than Boney did. OK, he at least did know they were on the way from the East. He knew about the first arrivals, but that seems to have been it. Otherwise, subsequent progress, he seemed to have relied on what Muffling could learn from their messengers.

Now, Boney or Marbot are always criticised for not sending scouts further into the Bois de Paris or towards The Lasne.

Did DoW send scouts off from all those light cavalry on his east flank? They seemed to spend so much of the battle inactive, would they not have been more useful as an advanced reception for the Prussians?

I guess what I am asking is did DoW "just" sit on that ridge and hold on or did he make efforts towards the Prussians, as they did towards him?

Almost certainly he must have. The Duke was an extremely efficient commander. Very keen on details. If there was a potential ace to be had (Blucher for instance) he must have known it would come to be at some point during the day. Similarly, Blucher had a clear, if not distant line of communication with Wellington at the battlefield. The only reason he might not send a messenger is for fear that his plans would be discovered.

It just strikes me that Zeithen's Corps just arrived on the battlefield, without any idea what they were facing…

Hence their attacks on the Netherlanders and Nassau units around Papelotte, La Haye, Smohain.

There seems to have been no reception planned to guide them as to where they were needed. I do accept that DoW probably had his hands full at the time, but those light cavalry units, Vivian especially, had a "quiet" battle until moved.

Actually, looking even closer at an Adkin map, I have now noticed a few detached vedettes of 10th Hussars, down by Frischermont.

Otherwise the Allied cavalry positioning on the east flank seems more like covering a possible retreat, along their lines of communication to the west, than ensuring co-operation with the Prussians

Wellington was well informed – in stark contrast to Napoléon, look at the Waterloo archives by Glover, there is plenty material in there.

In case, the best book to discuss all those aspects is by Bernard Coppens – Waterloo les mesonges – the lies

Well I do have all six volumes of Glover's Archives, so no excuse. I will look through this again.

It always amazes me that, 200 years ago, a commanding general (Napoleon, I mean, not Ney) could be unaware of an entire opposing army (well a large proportion of it anyway)within a few miles of him. It does reflect badly on the French light cavalry, whose job was surely to screen and then guard the flanks.

Let me now find out if the Allied Light Cavalry did any better to their Eastern flank.

Right, Vols 1, 3, 4 and 6 are British Sources (would you not suspect 4 out of 6 vols would be!)

It always amazes me that, 200 years ago, a commanding general (Napoleon, I mean, not Ney) could be unaware of an entire opposing army (well a large proportion of it anyway)within a few miles of him.

Just remember, Napoleon did exactly the same thing during the opening moves of the campaign. He was suddenly on the allied doorstep with 120,000 Frenchmen! The first realization of Napoleon's location was when he crossed the Sambre.

According to Hofschoroer in his book "The Waterloo Campaign",
a patrol of the 2nd Silesian Hussars met a patrol from the British 10th Hussars lead by Captain Taylor at Smohain around 10am. Taylor sent Lieutenant Lindsay to Wellington's Headquarters with the news that Bulow was at St. Lambert and was advancing.

Smohain is not all that far from the Allied front lines. More the case are the Prussians scouting for French along their route of march.

Very good point about the opening moves…….I do find it so hard to put myself in the shoes of an early 19th century commander. Indeed….some of the best books of 2016, I thought, were about how the news eventually got back to the UK. For days no-one knew what was happening just across the Channel.

Wrgmr1. You have answered my question…just looked it up.

Had the Prussians met any serious resistance before leaving the Bois de Paris does not bear thinking about……

Thanks both

Our three games of Waterloo, two in 28mm one in 15mm the French won. They placed the Guard Light cavalry against the Prussians along with Lobou and the Young Guard infantry. The Prussians were stymied each time.

If they had been placed far enough forward, I can well imagine, just what you found.

Trying to move along those roads after a legendary downpour, with local conditions, to support DoW……….any French resistance at all…a few dozen Hussars with carbines, hiding in the trees, even…….. would have led to chaos. There was no resistance…absolutely none………until they were on the field and formed!

The whole problem was Boney's surely….he was convinced that the Prussians had had such a thrashing, they would not dare feature yet again. He did not need to guard his right flank, there was no threat. Blame everyone else of course…..

But never underestimate your opponent….unless you are a gambler

Yes, that was his genius I know, but statistics say that…..in the end………you will get it wrong…..it is called regression to the mean

I have always wondered why a Waterloo refight allows the French to position a Blocking force in Bois de Paris as they know that the Prussians are coming, but doesn't allow Wellington to redeploy his 17,000 men with Colville as he would know that there is no French flanking attack further West…

Nice one.

A cynic would say that Boney was a gambler…he had nothing to lose let's face it! Imagine what a few dozen of his mounted skirmishers could have done against guys trying to move artillery through mud.

DoW instead had his priority to keep his small polyglot army in being, even if it meant withdrawing from Blucher, but onto own his supply lines, evacuation even, and safety. He kept his reserves west.

No Waterloo Bridge, Station, Battlefield Museum (with a Hanoverian skeleton who might have lived to be a grandfather instead of a freak show). Wellington's reputation lessened…not destroyed.

The same result in the end whatever, just so long as the rest of the Allies had the will to fight on. ("Aye, but there's the rub" to quote the Bard and that "Cursed Play")

Who really believes Wellington would have led his troops to Wavre to save Blucher and thrash Boney, had things worked out differently after Q Bras? Ney has one corps to "fix" DoW, everyone else is onto the Prussians 12 miles east of history.

I think Blucher was insane to do what he did, to move west to Waterloo. DoW was far more sensible, see if he does turn up, but guard against it if not. One was a Hussar, the other one was a general, a diplomat, a Prime Minister and the only person who could have led what is called an "Allied" army.

I have asked this here before. Would DoW have (indeed could have) done what Blucher did?

Yes, he was a professional, he knew in case they wanted to beat Napoléon they had to support each other at the utmost, this the Allied learned in 1813 / 14 – despite all difficulties it worked.

A few skirmishers in the trees would have been little more than lancer fodder.

Grouchy was supposed to be pressing the prussians hard, a commander commits his troops to percived and known threats. Only when a commander knows he will have a treat to his flank will he position reserves appropriately. Wellington did not place significant troops to his left flank, had Grouchy turned up would this discussion be the otherway round. Wellington knew as little as Napoleon rellying on messangers and vedetts placed within support distance of the army.

The DoW would not have supported Blucher, he would have retired on Brussels. The DoW never showed any ability or inclination to move his army rapidly along bad roads or indeed any road, apart from in retreat. If he had it is unlikly that the staff work would have been up to it or that the troops would have been able to do it.

Wellington did no retire to Brussels, he decided to make a stand – risking the destruction of his whole army – on a promise of Blücher, what more could you ask for??

Totally agree…….and it worked. But we cannot resist playing what if games?

Had it been Blucher at Wavre facing the main French Armee du Nord, now The Prince will only fight again if he is, this time, guaranteed DoW will turn up (Imagine the conversation with von Gneisenau after the events of Ligny/Quatre Bras and the pressure to fall back much further).

DoW is facing just Reille and some odds and ends, while sitting on his ridge. Would he (indeed could he?) now move that army down those lanes to Wavre? Away from his lines of supply and of safety, uncovering Brussels, risking getting caught strung out along those lanes. Blucher was crazy and also a genius/hero/legend to do what he did….because it worked!

Are you so sure Napoleon did not know about the Prussians, There is a variety of commentary that suggest he did, but not necessarily all his generals.

Had it been Blucher at Wavre facing the main French Armee du Nord, now The Prince will only fight again if he is, this time, guaranteed DoW will turn up (Imagine the conversation with von Gneisenau after the events of "Ligny/Quatre Bras and the pressure to fall back much further).

DoW is facing just Reille and some odds and ends, while sitting on his ridge. Would he (indeed could he?) now move that army down those lanes to Wavre? Away from his lines of supply and of safety, uncovering Brussels, risking getting caught strung out along those lanes. Blucher was crazy and also a genius/hero/legend to do what he did….because it worked!"

Now this would be a good "what if" to see played!

MG

Are you so sure Napoleon did not know about the Prussians, There is a variety of commentary that suggest he did, but not necessarily all his generals.

Yes – he was utterly surprised and later a cover up story was constructed to cover this up, you should read the book by Bernard Coppens who discusses this topic competently.

Wheter Wellington would or would not have marched on Wavre hinges on whether Wavre was a good defensive position in which the Prussians could have held on.

Blucher was a poor chooser of ground and having been booted out of the Ligny position with superior numbers the chances of his holding on at Wavre on ground that he had not chosen look slim indeed.

Wellington would have urged a more northerly concentration.

Excellent point…..but that must mean abandon Brussels.

Also there is this thing of supply lines. Risky not to fall back along what is established already. If both do that they can wave farewell to each other.

I just cannot see DoW's "infamous" (I admit an earlier description) army making the journey that Blucher's three Corps did manage and then making a useful intervention.

But your point is good. Chances are they would never have attempted it anyway!

Although count Gneisenau supposedly is credited with sealing the fate of the French

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it was actually Karl Wilhelm Georg von Grolman that did

"Grolman had the greatest share in directing the Prussian operations of 1815.

In the decision, on 18 June 1815, to press forward to Wellington's assistance, Grolman actively concurred, and as the troops approached the battlefield, he is said to have overcome the momentary hesitation of the commander-in-chief and the chief of staff; himself giving the order to advance."

link