"The Myth of Italian cowardice." Topic

Fred Cartwright…good analysis..but i suppose you're nt aware or have dificulties to understand, in order to complete the reason why list, that typical Italian menthality when faced by such a kind of duty..which i'm sure was that of the majority of Italian soldiers during WW2 and during this particular campaign…

Tirailleur corse…intersting link…also for inspiration of uniforms…but you probably now that the behaviour of French partisans and France Combattante soldiers was'nt exactly "trés comme il faut" toward those Italians.. that after having fired at the back of retreating , outnumbered and already beaten Germans pretented a new verginity in face of their former ennemies now new allies…

Italwars please explain what you mean by the typical Italian mentality when faced by such a kind of duty. I see the Itslian failure in those early desert battles as a failure of command. The British commanders were able to capitalise on success, plan and execute the next phase of the operatIon before the Italians had fully grasped the implications of the last defeat. Italian command was continually off balance reacting to information that was already out of date. The same thing happened to the Allies in France and the Low Countries and to the Russians in Barbarossa. Large numbers of allied and Russian soldiers were forced to surrender as a result. Was the average British, French, Russian, Dutch or Belgian soldier a coward or just a victim of the the circumstances they were placed in? What makes the Italian soldier different to the others in these circumstances? If Imhad to identify anything to set the Italians apart Imwould say it is the poor quality of Italian junior leadership and the lack of any rapport with their men. It was that which in the final battle to large numbers of Italian infantry just sat in trucks. A more dynamic leadership would have tried to do something with those troops, not just leave them sitting there.

Italwars please explain what you mean by the typical Italian mentality when faced by such a kind of duty. I see the Itslian failure in those early desert battles as a failure of command. The British commanders were able to capitalise on success, plan and execute the next phase of the operatIon before the Italians had fully grasped the implications of the last defeat. Italian command was continually off balance reacting to information that was already out of date. The same thing happened to the Allies in France and the Low Countries and to the Russians in Barbarossa. Large numbers of allied and Russian soldiers were forced to surrender as a result. Was the average British, French, Russian, Dutch or Belgian soldier a coward or just a victim of the the circumstances they were placed in? What makes the Italian soldier different to the others in these circumstances? If I had to identify anything that set the Italians apart I would say it is the poor quality of Italian junior leadership and the lack of any rapport with their men. It was that which in the final battle to large numbers of Italian infantry just sat in trucks. A more dynamic leadership would have tried to do something with those troops, not just leave them sitting there.

The defeat of the raid on Tobruk was an Italian victory. It was their infantry/coastal artillery that did the most damage to the ships and yet today you can find countless fictional accounts of how it was a couple of German 88mm AA guns that won the battle and sank the destroyers.

"Italwars please explain what you mean by the typical Italian mentality"
the lack of sense of duty..the non didentification of a common identity and a common Nation…the obsessive search for subterfuges to counter a defy or a problem…if you study the recent Italian history and Foreign policy you could detectd soomething similar…but even if have a chat in a coffee shop..or, just smiling, if you assist at a football match our Italian National team

Italwars thanks for explaining that. It is not something I was aware of for WW2 Italians. Definitely not true for Brits whose attitude was there is a job to do so let's get on and do it. Nobody liked or wanted the war, there was no cheering at the outbreak of war as there had been in 1914, and no feeling it will be all over by Christmas, but a grim determination to fight to the finish. My parents lived through the war and still remember it vividly. As for modern times I would have said not typically Italian more a modern malaise. No common purpose or feeling of doing things for the common good it is all me, me, me! And our football team is even worse then yours! They put up such a pathetic performance at Euro 16 that the fans booed them off the field after the final game. Football as in soccer for our American friends.

I should make it clear that I am not attributing the relaxed attitude to doing your duty applies to the modern British army, they seem as brave and dedicated as ever. More the general population, or maybe it is just I'm becoming a grumpy old man.
If you have time Italwars can you point me to sources that support your view of WW2 Italian forces? As I have said before my reading suggests other plausible explanations for Italian disasters. Early Italian defeats for similar reasons that defeated the Western Allies in 1940 and the Russians in 1941. The surrender at Alamein from having no transport to escape in and no where to run/walk to.

Fred Cartwright…if you give me, please, some more time..i'll ponit out the sources..my thinking has been all built trough sources..for the moment:
the fist source (ref to WW1) , which i mentioned in my early posting was rejected as unrealiable by another TMP menber – Rommel's "Infantry Attacks" …despite that..if you read it you will be amazed…another source that come to my mind: "To Benghazi" – Australia in the War of 1939-45- author Gavin Long…"The War of a Hundred Days: Springboks in Somalia and Abyssinia, 1940-41" , J.A. Brown

Also if not related to WW2/WW1 see also for the typical behaviour of average Italian Soldier when faced by the duty to make war and obbey orders: "BATTAGLIA DI ADUA 1 MARZO 1896 MEMORIE VIVE ED INEDITE DI UN UFFICIALE SUPERSITE" by Gian Carlo Stella

for the Italian Navy in WW2…..you can find books from Antonino Trizzino which i'm almost sure they have been translated in English..my uncle survived both the attack from Gloster Gladiators by the Royal Navy at Taranto and the sinking of the Battleship Roma trough a German experimental guided bomb..i perfectly rember he told me that the night of Taranto every sailor and every officer was aware of the imminent attack and, in expectation, the order (which every soldier accepted) had been to light up all the harbour..diminish the sentries and go off duty…and don't ask

sorry…Swordfish..not Gloster Gladiator

Italwars I will certainly check out your suggestions when I am back amongst my reference material. Your uncle's story is astonishing! It suggests a sailors pride in his ship was even lacking, which seems to be a pretty universal feeling amongst sailors that the loss of one's ship is a cause of great sadness and shame. How did your uncle feel about such an order?

….of course i'm not speaking about "official" written orders ..or orders given at the morning parade with a megaphone….and i'm speaking about a simple sailor..not an officer..anyway..as i had, when i interviewd him in the Eighties, already read something on that matter..i rember he told me.."everybody was aware of the imminent attack"..i also asked him if it was true that anti-torpedo nets had been purposly removed.and he told me "no torpedo nets at all"..so i imagine something is true..he also add me that everybody was talking about the attack..and the attitude of Petty Officers was to downplay everything…and he perfectly remenber the lights turned up… .if you read Trizzino book similar details are present..
his feelings…don't really know as he already was a crippled man quite blind…but i rember while talking about the sinking of Battleship Roma (he stayed a night in water among oil..that's the raeson of his semi-blindness) that he perfectly know that the real mission of this last travel or Roma was'nt to go attacking the Allies ships but instead reaching them and joinnig with at Maddalena or Malta..after my objection to his lack of pride in switching side (of course i'm not pro German..but frankly the switching of side of Italy during the war is not something to be proud of)he get quite angry..telling me "why the hell should i had continue to fight along with Germans"..that's revealing what other posters rightly stressed that, among Italian soldiers and in many case thanks to the Axis allies, one of the reason of not accepting to fight was the imposed , non latin, comrade in arms..

the lack of sense of duty..the non didentification of a common identity and a common Nation, the obsessive search for subterfuges to counter a defy or a problem…

Having lived for three years in Italy and thus knowing how slowly change occurs and how ingrained this indifference to responsibility is, I don't believe it began after the war.

I also know that Italians view their actions differently to outsiders. What others may see as obstructionist laziness, they see as stylish nonchalance, and what others see as thoughtlessness they see as acting in the moment. What I see as procrastination, as Italian colleague of mine sees as not being hasty.

I'm sure there's a similar disonance in perception between what outsiders back then saw as cowardice and how Italians saw the same actions.

"this indifference to responsibility is, I don't believe it began after the war"
:-))) i suppose it began after the decline of Romam Empire..as you can perceice, in a certain way, from the top book on the matter by Edward Gibbon (of which i had the insane perseveration to find all the 6 volumes and read them in English)
well Muerto..i appreciate, that also if it's sad for me to admit such characterisation of Italians,you are able to understand, thaks to your direct experience, part of my postings..
my final thought is that if such stances od a people are present not only in every day life but also when called to defend their nation or at least their flag..there is something more than simple lazyness

I promised I would not continue this, but… Fred Cartwright, if you're interested in the war in the mediterranean, I would strongly suggest to avoid the discredited books of journalist Trizzino. He was well know for inventing theories without any proof in order to explain unknown facts. Example: how come the british had so many info on Regia Marina operations? Trizzino smeared the admirals as traitors. for years his unsupported theory destroyed careers. then, Enigma became common knowledge.

if you want to read about the regia marina, find anything from Giorgio Giorgerini. He's a proper historian.

well Muerto..i appreciate, that also if it's sad for me to admit such characterisation of Italians

I'm sorry to highlight the faults of another culture, but all cultures have 'em. As Dr. Maturin teaches us, uncritical patriotism is either "My country right or wrong", which is infamous, or "My country is always right", which is imbecile. On the plus side, Italians are the best tabletop game designers in the world!

I remember reading that the Regia Aeronautica used Stukas because there was an embarrassing failure to develop an Italian dive bomber. I read it and knew that someone, somewhere, went "Bo" to doing his duty, even in a state of total war.

This has been a very interesting thread so far … it is difficult to discuss such topics without falling in to the trap of national prejudices and hyperbole, and yet we have managed to see several very well reasoned postings on "delicate" topics.

Fred Cartwright: My own thinking is pretty closely aligned to what you have described. I think you have highlighted common factors in several armies defeated by mechanized warfare techniques that were not well understood at the time.

I also think you have put your finger on a key issue in the relationship between the Italians and the Germans. The Germans clearly looked down on the Italians, and this was not lost on the Italians. Coalition warfare is not easy, and the Germans were very poor at it.

ITALWARS: I greatly appreciate the perspective you have offered. But I would encourage you not to draw conclusions that are too broad from your own personal observations.

Notably:

- It is VERY common for soldiers to lack the motivation to do even the most basic tasks, if there is no sense of unit cohesion and common purpose. All armies struggle with this issue. Some respond by imposing harsh discipline from the top down, some by efforts to build motivation from the ground up.

- I have never before heard even a hint of the Italians knowing of the Tarranto raid in advance. It hardly makes sense, and I would want to see credible sources on how the Italians might have discovered the plan before I would accept even first-hand accounts of "well someone knew…" I would not underestimate the possibilities that efforts to prevent low-level sabotage or commando attacks (turn all the lights on) have been spun into a belief of some conspiracy theory after the fact. We see that effect even in the case of the USN experience at Pearl Harbor.

The truth is, as hard as it is for us to see now in retrospect, in 1940 it was almost inconceivable that naval ships would be at risk of a genuine substantial attack while in a defended, alert naval harbor. For centuries the cutting-out expedition and similar commando-style raids had been the primary risk to ships in port. Often under-appreciated even in discussions of naval history, the aircraft carrier fundamentally changed the relationship between ship and shore. Before WW2, all navies assumed that a fleet could not dare to attack a properly defended harbor, as it would invariably lose in any exchange of fire with shore batteries.

- To suggest that it was somehow dishonorable for the Italians to switch sides is a perspective I can not accept. I would not fault any Italian, general or private, for concluding it was better to fight against the Germans than with them in 1943. It may have been heartbreaking, but it was not dishonorable. Morally (right and wrong) and politically (Italy's best interests) they were on the wrong side, and they needed to change that.

Muerto: While I agree that "My country right or wrong" is infamous, I hope you will not begrudge me the opportunity to give more fitting context to that, so often mis-used, statement.

The author of that quote was Carl Shurz, who made that statement in remarks before the U.S. Senate in 1872 while he was Secretary of the Interior under the Taft Administration.

The full quote, as contained in the Congressional Records, is: "My country right or wrong. If right, to be kept right; if wrong, to be set right."

Shurz was the first German-American to be elected to the U.S. Senate, and had been a General in the US Army (Union) in the ACW. By the time he became part of the Taft administration he was a well known reform-minded statesman. He struggled to reduce cronyism and develop a culture of professional civil service in the Interior Department, and was often in conflict with the US Army over his efforts to reform the Bureau of Indian Affairs and to rely less on military violence in approaching conflicts with native populations.

His so-oft abused statement was in fact his assertion of the role of the patriot in the American democracy. He held that patriotism did NOT mean accepting the country's actions blindly without question, but rather that the role of a patriot included an obligation to participate in the governing of the country in order to ensure honor and morality.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Reading what I wrote, it reads the opposite of what I intended, ITALWARS. I meant to say you'd avoided Dr. Maturin's trap, but it sounded like I accused you of falling into it. My apologies.

The "switching sides" accusation is indeed pure nonsense. The old government was removed from power and their bitter enemies came to power. Of course they'll take the opposite policy. It's not like Italy is an individual who changed his mind. The king was, but regardless of what he could or couldn't have done, the nation can't be held responsible for his actions. Most importantly, it's better to leave the dishonourable side than to stay consistent.

The truth is, as hard as it is for us to see now in retrospect, in 1940 it was almost inconceivable that naval ships would be at risk of a genuine substantial attack while in a defended, alert naval harbour.

Why? On 19 July 2018 OPERATION F.7 had taken place and an attack on the German High Seas Fleet was planned for 1919 using Sopwith Cuckoo bombers. The Italians had already tried bombing Gibraltar from July 1940 and the fact of the defences in place shows there was an awareness of the risks.

totally disagree with you Muerto…there was'nt changing of government …you should have to read, including sources in English, what reall y happened…also the US sources (Walter Bedell Smith; Eisenower) commented almost disgusted the notorious "switching of side"….it was also one of the main reason of the opposition, after the war, from UK to allow Italy into NATO..simply because they're accostumed to change side..

the carreer of this Admiral is very interesting ..maybe it's the only one to have received for actions on the same period bot Italian medals and the US Legion of Merit

link

While i agree that alliance with Germans was'nt a good thing and neither a natural choice for Italy…examples of collaborating with ennemy , so a deshounoranle conduct, are plenty..the just token defence of Amba Alagi in Italian East Africa while the Viceroy tried without informing the Governemt his "own" armistice with Britain; the Attack on Taranto (Italian journalist Trizzino is very reliable; the boycot of German defences during Husky; the subsequent boycot of Italian action after the landing in Calabria; the boycot and betrayal of both Germans and Allies the 8 of september after the proclamation of the armistice..please read memories from US Gen Walter Bedell Smith and above the comments by Maxwell D. Taylor during his secret mission to Rome

and i forget the useless and enourmous number of victims that could have been spared without this conduct…in Rome september 1943.(.and from my office in this very momement i can see the bullets damages still present on some futuristic style buildings..)few ad hoc Italian units were left , without any orders, to be slaughterd by German angry paras..while their goverment and deshounarable king escaped to the south and to the Allies by- passing, without any trouble, every German checkpoint standing between Rome and Pescara..so a definitive and notorious "switching of side"

Maugeri who, after the German occupation of Italy, risked his life to organize and lead a clandestine intelligence service providing the allies with vital information on nazi activities, is only one of the many examples of courage that testify how ridicolous the accusation of "cowards" against Italians is.

that's fantastic statement…the admiral never provided infos about nazis operations but only about italians ones….and was carried in front of a court not during but after the war by the Italian Navy obviously epurated by fascist elements and supervised by the Allies

Sorry, not true. He was brought to court by a far-right magazine, qnd acquitted. In fact remained in the navy until retirement. He was awarded by the allies for his intelligence service after 8 september.

the Official Comission of the Marina Italiana lead by the Minister of Defence .."far right" ????..we should be afraid of that if it's true…a magazine? maybe you was the publisher/editor of this magazine but sorry nobody is aware of it except you….

Ok, I'll specify. He was brought to court because a neo-fascist magazine, Asso di bastoni (directed by RSI veteran Vanni Teodorani) launched a diffamatory campaign against him – and other sailors. You see, the fascists were very interested in accusing the military of treason, so that they could say the horrible defeat was not a responsability of Mussolini and his lap dogs. The far right in Parliament then repeated the accusations, and the Navy opened an investigation on Maugeri.

Basically the whole accusation was based on a book by Maugeri (From the ashes of defeat) in which he basically said he knew that the only way for Italy to be free was that the Axis lost the war.

However, the Procura Militare in november 1950 decided that there were absolutely no proof of anything againsta Maugeri. Also the Procura was able to find numerous instances of secret operations known only by Maugeri and few others, and none of these operations were leaked to the enemy. So the procura declared him innocent and closed the file. In fact Maugeri remained in the navy until 1955.

We should be proud that men like Maugeri and all the thousands of men from the Resistance fought against the nazi and their fascist slaves, thus saving Italy's honour after the shameful fascist period.

.Great piece of brilliant propaganda!!!!…..as you're perfectly aware of..despite what you choose to say to a foreign audience probably not accostumed (and probably less interested in) to read Italian sources and easy to influence.. the papers said the opposite..he was just a die hard fascist changing shirt at first occasion..and heavy involvment of money was also mentioned ..nothing to do with "resistance"..from which he was snubbed ..never heard of "far right " influence in an Italian parlament in those times…about 5% votes of a moderate/catholic/US financied and backed party in a parliament cannot be labelled " Influencing far right" ..is also a matter of fact that the former fascists veterans , certainly "far right" oriented, tried to depict the military action as only eroic ones to counter what was required in such a post war society, as in Japan, that wanted to see armed forces only as a rightly epurated instrument of peace..it was even non politically correct to talk about WW2 without mentioning the Allies..But that kind of history revisionism could be easily countered by looking at primary sources…is what i tried to think after reading the heading of the post…from memory a very funny general situation that i perceived, time and time again, is that foreign texts on Italian military conduct tend to use only scant Italian sources and, in another hand, Italian texts don't care about foreign sources….i was interested, time ago, at the Free French Campaign in the Fezzan .among others .i read French sources from Centres d'Etudes Montpellier, "quaderni studi piacentini" (Resistance);War Daries from the Italian/Colonial units involved at our Archivio SM Esercito plus this beatiful book
link
based on interviews, on the spot tours and multi sources
well the infos provided were totally different between various sources…but, as in the case of this elusive Mr Maugeri, the picture of a tendency from the Italian soldiers, in majority of cases and contrary to what we are accostumed to think, provided with best equipment, aerial support, full motorised and in overwhelming numbers, was , to simply show a reluctance to do their job and, if possibility arose, collaborate with the ennemy …. The picture that emerged was of Free French Officers and New Zealand LRDG commandos disgusted tales of very happy surrendered Italian officers giving up their garrisons and toasting with chianti wine with their French captors who looked at them with contempt and slippery Italian prisoners guiding their captors toward Italian still resisting positions begging only to be protected from arabs…. . ……i don't think is fair , even if you have to fight side by side wih an embarassing ally, at least until there is a clear cleavage, to actively undermine your army…
from sources, also by Italian exiles and resistance , the support from Italian people to Fascist Régime was, untill 1942-43 almost total…so a later virginity and whitness of this same people is difficult to believe

I would be interested to know which papers says Maugeri was a traitor. As far as I know he was acquitted by the military tribunal in 1950 and remained in the navy until retirement in 1955, but feel free to show me I'm wrong.

Gen. Castellano's papers..Armistice Draft Cassibile Whashington Archives--Archivio AUSME (Foreign Affairs) that you can look by yourself…same archive Files concerning Military/Naval Attaché in Sweden..never "acquited" but, as well as the quasi totality of less imprtant fascist criminals including those responsible for war crimes in Jugoslavia/Balkans during WW2 and Ethiopia/Lybia before and the die hards of RSI, took advange of the "amnesty" required by the Peace Treaty ratified in 1947 and, as an unelusive consequence, endorset by Italian Cassazione Court in 1948..so never "acquited" but "amnestied"..which is really different

But we were talking of the accusation of treason of 1950. The things you mention are from the '40s, and seem to regard accusation of war crimes. Was Maugeri accused of war crimes?!?

You stimulated my interest in this. If you google atti processo contro frano maugeri you will find the pdf of the parliamentary discussion of 20 june 1950. This was the day when Defence minister Pacciardi defended Maugeri (please read his interesting explanation of the book thing) but at the same time announced he asked the military prosecutor to open another investigation. So this discussion is BEFORE Maugeri was aquitted once and for all. The debate betwee fascist and communist members of parliament is quite funny..

you're talking..not me ..of a supposed Court of 1950..and before that you even mentioned a Military Procura..and again a Military Tribunal"…. .which never existed or even could'nt exist in view of that case..in fact only a Comission..without any sanction power..i suppose neither jurisdicional power …but in fact, just before, carried duly in front of a real court , with real power, with the result to never have been "acquired" but only "amnestied"…an amnesty resulting from a very compromised law aimed, in practice, at letting go scot free the bad boys….something that was, obviously, not even conceived by Allies jurists for Occupied Germany and, partially, envisaged for Japan war criminals and responsables..but Italy was expected (mainly by US Gvt whishes ) to become a future essential NATO border without totally compromising their double-face élite….it's up to you to read papers that i suggested and read evidence plus draw conclusions of this, among others, Italian ambiguos indifensible soldiers….

Valerio..thanks,..i'll read it…also if before reading what you rightly labelled "funny debate"..i have to go downstair and drink a double strong coffee to survive reading a parliamentary debate in Italy..(not different from today's ones)

Pacciardi, despite my simpathy during the SCW coul'dn be associated with the Republicans, had been one of those very rare example of clear anti-fascists intellectual and volunteers…he fought on majority of SCW campaigns…strongly supporting the idea of an "all Italian unit" of Italian "internacionales"…he had the great onesty and courage to dare to defy the Comintern and spanish Comunist HQ not accepting and strongly opposing the idea of fighting vs their Anarchist Comnrades in arms during the Barcelona repression…he fought with valour both during WW1 and SCW…a typical example of a too much clear person to accept comunist diktat

I thought we were talking about Maugeri's supposed treason. Which as far as I know was only discussed in the 1950 trial whih acquittdd him. Apparently we were talking about different things

Ps of the doc I signalled you only really need to read the pacciardi initial speech, and then if you want to have fun also the final part with accusations of "you guys would like to see the russians coming" "you want to see mussolini back" and stuff like that

The performance of the CSIR and later the ARMIR in the Soviet Union speaks volumes about the courage of Italians fighting men under the worst possible conditions, with poor equipment and against better armed and more numerous enemies. The ARMIR was hammered, ground up and encircled by the Soviets in Jan. 1943 IIRC and fought its way back to friendly lines over two months, suffering about 100,000 casualties in the depths of a brutal winter war. They suffered about 50% overall casualties and much higher casualty rates in the combat formations but still managed to fight their way out of a trap which defeated the Germans, Hungarians and most Romanians in Army Group South. The grit and determination of the CSIR and the ARMIR should be considered when evaluating Italian fighting prowess in WWII but is often overlooked or obscured by focus on the strategic loss which Army Group South suffered as a whole.

Cheers.
Rod Robertson.

R I R…you have underlined the most clear example of Italian devotion to duty..maybe, as a general example, the only one…War Vs URSS was , thanks to anti Comintern propaganda, perceived as a just cause…while in fact it was a useless agression …plus we have to understand that Italian soldiers in Russia, also if more accepted by the population than the Germans, thought that they had no alternative than to fight until the end…the fighting and victorious retreat by foot of the élite (in this case a true élite )Alpine corps trough Russian held territory was carried by determined and well lead soldiers…but could also be explain in view of the peril to not falling in ennemies hands….before that , in any case,during the falling of the whole River Don 's front.(."Saturn Op." )following the great Russian offensive ..was the result of wrongly planned.hastly set up static defenses and a certain lack of initiave and morale from the Binarian Italian divisions …different in training and without the endurance to fight of the Alpine Corps…

unfortunatly Africa, France 1940 and War at Sea (except submarines) was another less iconic story…

Regardless of views of Italian competence or cowardice, two things stand out to me

(i) they essentially had at best a "between the wars" colonial army, obsolescent by 1939 and obsolete by 1941, and in East & North Africa they had difficulty in getting adequate supplies to it, and

(ii) once equipped with Allied or German kit post '43, they were reasonably competitive again.

And of course, the victor always gets to write the official histories.

Just thought I'd post this extract from a US Army wartime analysis of the Battle of the Omars, November 1941 -

" All Italians captured on November 22 and 23 in the Omars belonged to the Savona Division and were reported to be tougher on the whole and better disciplined than the Italians of the Trento Division captured in December 1940 and June 1941. The prisoners were a well-clothed, well-disciplined group, who had put up a good fight and knew it. The 6 German and 52 Italian officers, as well as the 37 German technicians, were very bitter about their capture and would not speak."

It is dangerous to over-generalize about things such as morale and psychology. In this case, it seems that there was nothing at all wrong with Italian soldiers when properly led, fed and motivated.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B