"Monmouth scenario without Lee" Topic

In Washington's original plan for Monmouth, the army was supposed to shoo the British army out of New Jersey, attacking the rear guard to give them s bloody nose.
Lafayette had this command in the plans. However, Charles Lee, having just been exchanged by the British, pulled rank and demanded Lafayette's command. He didn't know the plan, didn't know the troops, and thought the whole army was rubbish. Coincidentally (?), while a guest captive of the British, he was free with his ideas on how to smite the Yanks. Ahem.
Anyway, Lee's "attack" failed, or never even started. He ordered a panicked retreat.
After a few kind words, Washington relieved Lee on the spot, and the battle settled down into a bloody draw.

What if Washington's original plan was carried out, with the aggressive but inexperienced Lafayette in charge of the attack?
Every gaming scenario I have seen has the battle start AFTER Lee was routed.
Does anyone have information about the British Ladayette would have faced?
I hope it's not the Cornwalis Task Force, the ideal of every cheating gamer who ever lived. ALL the Guards, ALL the grenadiers, ALLA the light infantry, King Tigers, Typhoons in air support… Not to mention that all those units were twice the size of regular regiments. As I recall, they arrived late as reinforcements.

Novak, at least in my original editions, (We Have Always Governed Ourselves), only lists forces available. Do the Old Glory reprints have more information?

I started a thread early this weekend on the same subject, but The Bug crossposted to Ironclads, and in trying to remove the cross posting, the topic got nuked.

Anyway, I would like to do Monmouth, by the original American plan vs what would have been the British lineup at the time. Any help appreciated.

Winston,

I have both editions of Novak's books and think that the Old Glory edition is by far---Much Better!
TomS.

I've answered this in two separate posts to keep the topics distinct. You've started with two misconceptions, which I've tried to explain; the second post deals with the initial forces.

In Washington's original plan for Monmouth, the army was supposed to shoo the British army out of New Jersey, attacking the rear guard to give them s bloody nose.

This is not strictly correct; Washington's overall battle plan, constructed over several councils of war, was:-
1) Surprise and overwhelm Clinton's rearguard
2) Bring Clinton's main army to battle and defeat it
3) Move on to seize and plunder the British wagon train (1,500+ vehicles), which should have been halted by raids from Morgan and various NJ militia forces operating to the northern and southern flanks of the British line of march.

No "shooing" was planned by GW and his supporters; it was Lee who suggested the British should be given every opportunity to make good their escape ("give them a golden bridge" as he put it himself). As far as GW was concerned this was intended to be a full-on battle. Whilst it is not actually mentioned, GW would be less than human if he did not see this as an opportunity for the kind of crushing victory that would re-habilitate his reputation in the wake of Gates' perceived success at Saratoga and the growing support for him to replace GW as C-in-C.

Anyway, Lee's "attack" failed, or never even started. He ordered a panicked retreat.

Again, this is not what actually happened. It was Scott and Maxwell who first agreed (only between themselves) to "bug out"; it was only after Lee saw them withdrawing, and found the buildings of Freehold were made of wood rather than stone (and thus could not be defended by La Fayette's brigade against the oncoming Cornwallis) that he ordered a full-scale withdrawal. It should also be mentioned that GW was way (WAY!!!) too far behind to give Lee any practical support – Lee had to retreat for almost an hour before he encountered GW's most advanced troops. Lee would have struggled to beat Clinton/Cornwallis on his own, but had he stood his ground, he would – arguably – have brought GW's main force onto ground in which the British could have defeated him. As it was, Lee's retreat unintentionally allowed GW to hide behind the Perrine Ridge.

For the forces, you should obtain a copy of the British Grenadier Scenario Book2, which covers the morning action from first light. Just to help you out with the initial set-up, the British have three units – the Queen's Rangers and 16th Light Dragoons (each comprising infantry and cavalry) and the 1st Light Infantry with one 3-pdr. The British reinforcements are indeed the Cornwallis "uber" reserve:-
- Meadows' Grenadiers (two battalions, one 6-pdr)
- Kospoth's Grenadiers (three battalions, three 4-pdrs)
- Matthew's Foot Guards (two battalions, no flank coys or guns)
- III Brigade (five battalions, including two from the 42nd)
- Artillery Park (12-pdrs, 5.5" howitzers)
- IV Brigade (four strong battalions)
- V Brigade (three weak battalions).

The Rebel forces comprise, in order of march with the first three on the table from the start:-
- Hunterdon Light Horse (2 troopers)
- Wayne's Brigade: four battalions, two artillery sections
- Durkee's Detachment: one battalion, one artillery section

Then comes La Fayette's Brigade (three "picked" battalions and one artillery section), Scott's brigade (the same), and finally Maxwell with four battalions (weak as they were 40% militia levies) and a militia light horse troop.

Yeah yeah. I'm wrong about Monmouth. I usually am.
But I still need scenario help.

My understanding of the morning action had Lee assign Wayne to a pinning assault. It was not explained properly so Wayne attacked fiercely, while the flanking pincers didn't understand their roles and went forward gingerly, the opposite of what should have been going on. Lee didn't know his subordinates and they mostly disliked him, a bad combination.

The second season of Turn posits Lee as a traitor, though I believe one should not credit malice when incompetence can explain things.

BG SB2 is definitely your friend here – there is even a timetable for reinforcements for each side. You can add in a programme for GW arriving if La Fayette holds, but bear in mind he (GW) will be doing much more marching than historically, will arrive piecemeal, and there will be a big time delay for the bulk of his main force to get cross the three brooks.

To give you some idea of how big an effect the heat was, in the actual battle, GW had to abandon two attacks late in the day (as the British were withdrawing) as his brigades were too exhausted to move forward.

And I believe some deaths on both sides from heat stroke.

In other words, a confused mess.

The second season of Turn posits Lee as a traitor, though I believe one should not credit malice when incompetence can explain things.

Well, yes. There is that.

The new book on Monmouth blows much of the above away.

Lafayette had made a hash of the advance when he was in command. Lee did a credible job of unscrambling that after he took command. The new book on Monmouth is outstanding and does a lot to dispel the confusion of this battle.

The new book also lets the German grenadiers off the hook as the authors state they were in a reserve position in case of a reversal. The attack elements were the Guards, Grenadiers, who got into a very sharp fight with Wayne in the Point of Woods. Lee retook command of the rearguard to cover Washington forming the main army behind them. Lee was offered to take command of the reserve if he wished, but he chose to stay in the fight with the rear guard.

His orders for that day were ambiguous, to say the least.

What new book?

Thanks,

John

link

SM:

The new book makes a good case that Washington never intended to engage the entire army in an all out attack. The authors state that no attack order was given to Lee, only a vague engage and see what happens, I'll be behind you situation.

The book also lays out the idea that Clinton was looking for such a chance to get in one more good lick before leaving, thus why his forces were able to come on so quickly.

The book also makes the case that the Royal Army was a lot bigger than GW supposed (bigger than his force). They also make the case that Lee, while trying to flank the rear guard (long out of Freehold) realized he was being flanked in turn and quickly withdrew, as other American commanders did on their own when they realized what was happening. Lee comes off a lot more credible as a battlefield commander taking command of the rear guard at the Hedgerow (Wayne was on his own) and buying time for the American army to form up behind him. He conducted a credible retreat as well.

The problem with some of the BG scenarios is that the maps are so vanilla they leave out a lot of the terrain contours that played a crucial role in the battle, offering shelter to one side, then the other. This might be a hazard of the rules where contours play no role in movement, not sure.

In short, after reading the battle portion (now on the Courts Martial section of the book), there is no way Lafayette would have done any better (again, his earlier handling of the command was a mess – he was just a kid after all with little battle experience), and likely Clinton would have crushed his entire command had it been trapped on the far side of the morass.

One other thing that came through was Lee's frustration in trying to communicate orders. The heat affected the staff officers' horses greatly. He ran out of staff to convey his orders. The commands were all new to him (and his staff), and the officers not easily recognized either. With Washington not in supporting distance, he could not engage the forces coming at him and hope to survive.

The reason Morgan was sidelined was a fluke of writing an order at 1:00 am (does "tomorrow" mean later today, or the next day?).

Really some super works coming out the past few years on the key battles of the period, and this book adds to them.

Just my 2 cents and understanding of what I've read on Monmouth. Not claiming I am correct, but enjoy reading replies from those who have a lot more knowledge than I.

1. General Lee was an experienced officer. Washington gave him a commanders "intent" briefing and left the details for Lee to plan with his staff??

2. I thought I'd read, General Lee's Officers said he didn't have a commanders briefing with them or give them any instructions what his plan of attack was??

3. I always thought Washington's intent was to hit the british rear guard and bloody their nose. Not engage Clinton's entire Army?? But he wanted to keep his command close to Lee, in case the British Army turned around on him?

4. After Washington removed Lee from his command, I know General Lee claimed he took command of the rear guard, but I've not read of a source that's verified Lee's claim??

5. On the weather that day (Heat), I've read several sources that talked about soldiers dying from heat stroke. For gaming purposes, we added a "heat" morale modifier to the game. So when ever a unit had to make a morale check, the heat was taken into account.

6. I really enjoy reading S. Maximus & Historygamer's different takes on the historical information.

Thanks, HG – I need to get this obviously.

Does it consider the discussions at the various councils of war prior to the day of battle? From reading a couple of books that are more even-handed with Lee than most of the pro-Washington stuff of modern authors – which this book also appears to be? – I got the impression that GW wanted to bring Clinton to battle (although, as you say, he may have been under-estimating the size of Clinton's force at the time).

Really hard to explain in an exchange like this. The book is certainly not pro-Washington. The authors take a very even approach, in my view, and are somewhat more sympathetic to Lee, while recognizing his personality and previous undercutting of Washington.

When I was speaking with one of the author's in January (Gary Stone), he told me he could have written an entire book on how Washington's family was out to get Lee after the battle, which he does address in this book as well. In fact, it was like the mafia settling scores, as Conway was challenged to a duel as was Lee (who was lightly wounded). I'm just finishing the book now.

Excellent maps for gaming!!!!!

SM- Indeed the book goes into great length on the muddled councils of war, and the changing objectives. Overall I'd have to say that, personality aside, Lee did a credible job considering what he was facing and the fact Washington was not within supporting distance. The book goes into the politics within the Army, and with Congress, as well as what Clinton was thinking. I'd give it five out of five stars.

historygamer, thanks for the posts. I've ordered me a copy of the book.

I think before the best book on the battle was the Osprey book (though the Osprey format of putting maps on two pages – usually with the action in the middle – is maddening. This book will go right beside it.

SM – to address your point more, it goes into the multiple councils of war, and discusses who was in favor of doing what. It started with the background of the radicals in Congress wanting to dump Washington due to his losing ways (they ignored what he had to work with and what he was up against). Gates was the flavor of the moment with the radicals. The book does a great job laying out the politics (hence the title) and pressure on Washington to come up with a win.

Washington, IIRC, did want to get some of Clinton's army, and did try to move forces to surround him, but Clinton's force was so big, and handled so well (he was a very good general, though another personality hard to work with) that the rebels could not "Burgoyne" him. The militia largely failed to materialize in the numbers needed and the lack of cavalry hampered operations as well.

Washington had this vague idea, but never issued direct attack orders, as laid out by the authors.

Even as the BG scenario shows, the Crown forces were too great for Lee's van guard to take on.

Neat little battle though when the Guards and grenadiers were advancing on the rebels and got caught in a nasty flank fire by Wayne at the Point of Woods. They wheeled to chase him out of the woods, the moved forward toward the Hedgerow where Lee commanded the covering force. Nasty fight all around.

Some good coverage of the archeology backing up some of the story as well.

There will be a sizable Rev War re-enactment event at the Monmouth Battlefield in September. No doubt at least one of the authors will be there to sign his book. I missed him at the June event but will track him down then to sign.

I am not too old a dog to learn new tricks. I'll be ordering that book this weekend.

I think before the best book on the battle was the Osprey book (though the Osprey format of putting maps on two pages – usually with the action in the middle – is maddening. This book will go right beside it.

Stone approved the Osprey manuscript (making a few corrections) before it went to print. He also said it was the best book yet published on the battle – but much of the credit for that goes to him, as he provided a lot of background info including some very detailed maps of his own (which went into the Bird's Eye Views) – even down to what crops were growing in the fields! The Guards lost about 40 men in Wayne's ambush.

Obviously it is not fair to compare an Osprey book to a 300 some page history book. But, I will keep them side by side as the definitive works on the battle. :-)

Well, if I'm buying one…
Is it in the Campaign series? Author? Amazon link?

Next thing you know, youse guys will try to talk me into liking Gates.

Osprey has good maps and a much shorter evaluation/description of the fight, obviously. We use it (and others) for setting up terrain to supplement the vague BG maps.

Concur on the discussion thus far. One thing that really came out of the new book was just now badly muddled pre-battle planning was. Even during Lee's court martial, none of the witnesses could swear that they had been ordered to attack, even the GW partisans who had made such claims.

The nasty post-battle political fight is covered in some detail--GW was ruthless and would pretty much do whatever it took to destroy anybody he saw as a political opponent--or threat to his status as army commander--real or imagined.

GW lost a lot of battles against the British but never against an internal foe in the army.

Another book I must buy, and that Osprey too. Curses, you guys!

Fatal Sunday has a lot of maps too, eh? So I would be advised against getting the Kindle version.

Ok. I looked up the Osprey book. I've heard of the author.

Maybe Rochambeau had this in mind when he talked Washington out of attacking New York, and instead besieging Yorktown.

You can't fault Washington for not being aggressive.

I think the authors make a good point that being a good politician was part of being a good general – so it is not a knock against Washington.

The analysis at the end of the book is very good, and usually missing from most history books. They review Washington's and Lee's options, and give a rather honest assessment that Lafayette was still learning his trade and his best days were still before him as a general.

Osprey has good maps

As somebody pointed out, Osprey have an annoying habit of printing maps across two-page spreads which, with the tight bindings they use, means that the middle of the map, buried in the deep crease of the central fold, is frequently illegible.