"Napoleon's downfall - analysis by historians?" Topic

Hi all,

I have a student who'd like to write a paper on Napoleon's downfall. She must begin by identifying particular authors who argue that *one* of the following was the 'main' cause:

--Spain
--Russia
--Allied strategic/tactical advances
--British opposition
--his own personality

Might anyone please assist by suggesting particular authors whose value judgements about the above as *relative causes* she could quote?

I can begin by saying that Napoleon himself identified Spain as the root of his downfall (if I remember that correctly). Can anyone point us to other particular authors?

Many, many thanks in advance for any assistance with this.

Peter Geyl's 'Napoleon For and Against' would be the starting point for any serious discussion of this subject. A seminal work of Napoleonic history and of the study of history itself.

Isn't logic sufficient to say Russia? Over half a million men, plus however many horses and cannon lost.

I don't think there's any one scholar uniquely attached to that view. Not helpful I guess.

you couldn't get much better as a stating point than Dominic Lieven and Russia against Napoleon.

I would say the defeat in Russia was the primary cause of his defeat. The Russians followed him all the way back to France.

Secondary causes are more complex such as Britain's help in bankrolling the various coalitions against France. The British Navy and of course the Spanish ulcer. Fighting a war on 2 fronts and napoleon's supply chain of clothing, food and munitions. The list is endless and I hope your student revels and excels in the mass of information available.

Have you tried the Napoleon.org discussion group?

The literature on Napoleon is vast, and so are the opinions about his mistakes. One work that really MUST be consulted in the late Professor David G. Chandler's "The Campaigns of Napoleon," 1172 pages (New York City: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1966). Of course it would not be necessary to read the whole huge book to get a sense of Chandler's views about Napoleon's downfall.

G'Day

Yes I agree with Peter's posting…

Best site for gratuitous…prejudicial attacks on anyone who remotely defends Napoleon ;-)

It is also a good site when bored and need a good laugh at some of the most outrageous remarks…from both sides… ;-)

I used to go there for purely analitical military science…cant even do that any more…I could care less about Napoleon or Wellington…

Best Regards
Art

Second vote for Chandlers book.

Second Geyl

I'd also look at the effect of the revolution and following years on the effectiveness of the French navy, and Napoleon's ability to use it effectively. Napoleon didn't really have a world-class fighting navy and there was no way he could counter Britain who could draw on the commerce and finance of an empire that really couldn't be touched. Therefore, Napoleon was confined to Europe.

Hi Redcoat,

For what your student is looking for I think Alan Schom in his biography 'Napoleon Bonaparte' and more specifically in his 'One Hundred Days' could be seen as arguing that Napoleon's downfall was caused by his own personality. Alistair Horne in 'How Far From Austerlitz' also ascribes Napoleon's downfall to hubris.

British authors tend to give credit to the British and to Wellington in particular. "Napoleon and Wellington' and 'Waterloo' by Andrew Roberts are good examples of this. Roger Knight in 'Britain Against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory 1793-85'' looks at the role that British bankers played in financing the war.

Dominic Lieven in 'Russia Against Napoleon' emphasises the role that Russia played. Adam Zamoyski in '1812: Napoleon's Fatal March on Moscow' supports this view.

Peter Hofschröer in 'The Waterloo Campaign: The German Victory" will have you believe that it was really all down to the Prussians.

I hope that is some help to your student.

<SNIP>

No, not going to make that mistake again….

Art, I've given up on this retirement lark and go back to DMO/CASG (whatever it's called this week) next month. PM your email please, mate.

Cheers.

The OP is asking for authors who think that ONE factor was crucial to defeating Napoleon. All you have done is recommend good books, not at all what was asking for.
Not being a Nappy scholar, I have no recommendations.

G'Day Dal

Good to hear from you…

lasalle@comcast.net

Better get back to the OP…ahhhh…let's see…do something different…it may be jaded..and full of blame on everyone else…but use Napoleon…and find out what he thought his own demise was when he was in exile…

Best Regards
Art

Redcoat,

Charles Esdaile's work on Spain would be very helpful. Further, his Napoleon's Wars is also excellent.

I also agree that Dominic Lieven's book on the 1812-1814 campaigns is very useful.

Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon and the Esposito/Elting Atlas are both an excellent starting point. John Elting's The Superstrategists has an excellent chapter on Napoleon.

Biographies are of varying quality. Cronin's, Englund's, Broer's, and Thompson's are all useful and would be helpful to use. Schom's is full of factual errors and Horne's How Far From Austerlitz also has some definite problems. As references they are not recommended.

Redcoat,

Napoleon made three great mistakes as Emperor of the French-Spain, Russia, and the Continental System. Of the three, Spain was probably the most damaging, as it formed a continuous second front for his enemies and a constant drain on the Grande Armee and the French economy.

Brechtel198,

Did you actually bother to read Redcoat's original post? He is asking for authors who make value judgements about the principal cause of Napoleon's downfall. Whether or not Schom and Horne make factual errors is completely missing the point. They both blame Napoleon's downfall on hubris which is why I mentioned them.

His student is looking for authors who take particular positions not a recommended reading list.

This is TMP. No one has actually answered the OP.

OK, maybe a couple, kind of.

This actually isn't as easy as I thought it would be. I suspect that is partly because it's been too long since I read any of these books, but some of them may help:

Spain: try David Gates The Spanish Ulcer. It is a single volume work on the Peninusular war and while it doesn't specifically argue that this is the ultimate cause of N's downfall, it certainly lays the groundwork.
Russia: Probably Nafzigers Napoleons Invasion of Russia, as I recall it anyway, lays a pretty compelling case for the destruction of N's army and subsequent eviction from the continent.
Allied strategic/tactical advances: I'm not actually sure that ANYONE argues this line of thought. People like Peter Hofschrorer review the updating of the Prussian army, but between the loss of troops in Spain/Russia, most commentators seem to think that there was a level of 'evening out' brought about by French wastage and Allies catching up to the French. The problem is that even in 1813, the allies stuck to the idea of avoiding N, while pummeling his marshals.
British opposition: while we have had a century of this as part of the whole Rule Britannia concept, I don't think anyone pushes it now. Possibly Oman?
His own personality: Here (for my money) is where Chandlers Campaigns of Napoleon, and Eltings Swords Around a Throne shine. I seem to recall Thompsons biography of the man as being useful too.

hope this is of some help?

Did you actually bother to read Redcoat's original post? He is asking for authors who make value judgements about the principal cause of Napoleon's downfall. Whether or not Schom and Horne make factual errors is completely missing the point. They both blame Napoleon's downfall on hubris which is why I mentioned them. His student is looking for authors who take particular positions not a recommended reading list.

Did you bother to actually read what I posted instead of reacting in a snit because I disagreed with your recommendations of sub-standard books?

Chandler, Col Elting, Dominic Lieven, and Charles Esdaile all take positions that were asked for. And the biographers listed also take positions and have produced works that are based on excellent research material, not the nonsense that Schom and Horne write about.

Redcoat

I would be interested to know the purpose of your student's essay? What is it meant to prove or reveal? To me, whoever has set the title has given the poor student an almost impossible task. There is no one main cause as to the fall of Napoleon, although in my opinion, Britain would be right up there. What the title appears to be requesting is that the student try to find some really bad history books and bad authors, which they would have to be in order to qualify the title.

Saying that, I agree with SJDonovan, in that Schom's title would probably match the essay requirements and probably the only one, which is why it is such a bad book. Schom obviously lays the blames for the great man's fall on Napoleon himself. However, should your student decide to go with this author, they should certainly read the linked review on the book which explains why it is so bad.
link

One of the titles I would suggest for your student, in order to obtain a fairer and more honest view, is Andrew Roberts Napoleon The Great, especially his conclusion in which he mentions that Russia 1812 'undid him' (page 814). I don't know the time limit for your student's essay, but both Roberts and Schom's titles are large books and would take some time to read. But they could certainly be useful for contrasting and comparing viewpoints.

SJDonovan

I actually agree with you on the suggestion of Schom's book, but I think Bretchtel198 (and others) are also right in offering their viewpoints and other suggestions. The reason being that for the student to research and write a decent essay, they would need other viewpoints and certainly opposing viewpoints, in order to come to a credible and fair conclusion.

Did you bother to actually read what I posted instead of reacting in a snit because I disagreed with your recommendations of sub-standard books?

Chandler, Col Elting, Dominic Lieven, and Charles Esdaile all take positions that were asked for. And the biographers listed also take positions and have produced works that are based on excellent research material, not the nonsense that Schom and Horne write about.

Brechtel198 you are attacking when you ought to be defending. You missed the point the first time and you are continuing to miss the point now.

Redcoat

That's a tough question. I don't know if there are many historians worth their salt that would take a strong position for a single particular cause after Napoleon's final defeat. Each of them separately wouldn't be enough to justify it. Although Russia comes close to the mark, without the other variables is highly doubtful that the armies of the Tsar would have gone further than Warsaw.

My advice? Tell your student that if she identifies a historian that makes the argument that ONE cause -those mentioned or others- was what provoked Napoleon's downfall, then she should put those historian's books on doubt. History is all about nuance, not certainties.

What I do find fascinating though, is that while I think the concesus on the topic would be that it was a combination of factors that brought Napoleon down, the Austrians don't even rate a mention as a possible, even though they fought him longer and more consistently than anyone else.

Just a thought.

Langobard,

I'm not looking to start a fight here, but the Austrians certainly did not fight Napoleon longer and more consistently than anyone else. They were persistent enemies of Napoleon, but they repeatedly dropped out of the war after defeats, whereas Great Britain was at war with France throughout the wars of the French Revolution and Empire, except for a period from 25 March 1802 to 16 May 1803, when Europe was mostly at peace. That does not mean, however, that I think Britain was the only, or even the most important cause of Napoleon's downfall. My own opinion inclines more to Napoleon's egotism and opportunism for the greatest single factor.

I can't see that anyone has identified any writer who addresses the "personality" angle for the OP. As regards that my suggestion would be Correlli Barnett's "Bonaparte", which is pretty much wholly from that angle.

So we have:

--Spain: Esdaile
--Russia: Lieven, Zamoyski
--Allied strategic/tactical advances: Chandler
--British opposition: Hmm.
--his own personality: Barnett

The fourth above is the hard one. Many authors make the point that the 7 successive Coalitions were all orchestrated / funded by Britain, and that the Spanish / Russian mistakes were in consequence of the Continental System which was itself a mistake in consequence of Trafalgar. I struggle to think of one author who pots all that into a single account although I think Chandler and Andrew Roberts (Napoleon the Great) give it an airing.

Corelli Barnett's Bonaparte may very well be the worst 'biography' if Napoleon in print, along with that by Schom's. It is riddled with factual errors based on the anti-Napoleonic propaganda of the period. For these reasons using it as a source would be a mistake.

Napoleon's character and personality are excellently presented by Vincent Cronin in his biography Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography.

And Napoleon's character and personality are outlined and discussed in the relevant chapter of The Superstrategists by John Elting.

It is interesting, though, that in popular perception, between plucky Britain/perfidious Albion and Russia, if not The Russians, Austria's role in the Great War seems frequently to be reduced to that of hapless also-ran among the powers responsible for defeating France (Honourable mention for Prussia, of course). How fair is that?

The Hapsburg's objectives were fluid to say the least, as characterised by the understandable indignation of Marie Antoinette's nephew in 1793 to Marie Louise providing Napoleon with a Prince Impérial in 1811.

I suppose that one of the problems would be that Napoleon had two downfalls and the main agent of the first would not be the main agent of the second.

Plus reasons three and five feel qualitatively different from one, two and four. It is hard to disentangle the defeat in Russia from the subsequent Russian/Allied advance; likewise the defeat at Waterloo from the subsequent Allied/Prussian advance.

@attila, fair point! Like many others (Napoleon included) I tend to take a landlubbers perspective of the Napoleonic wars, which does lead me to often overlook the admittedly persistent and vital opposition of the Brits!

4th Cuirassier:

I don't think that Esdaile defends the idea that the war in Spain was the main culprit after Napoleon's downfall. Don't mistake his interest in the Peninsular War with him defending such hypothesis. Actually, it is the opposite. I've read his books and while he admits that Spain was important, he thinks the events in Russia and Germany as more relevant. Being fair, he is quite balanced in his analysis on the causes of Napoleon's downfall.

Neither Lieven makes of Russia the key actor in the fall of Napoleon. His declared purpose was to research the role of Russia in the Napoleonic Wars from a Russian point of view, and while he makes of Tsar Alexander a excellent politician, he puts the emphasis in the role of Russia as lynchpin of the anti-Napoleon alliance, but not the only, not even the decisive, factor. Lieven is to Russia's role in the Napoleonic Wars what Leggiere is to Prussia's.

Schroeder "The Transformation of European Politics"-his own personality.--Allied strategic/tactical advances

Esdaile "The Napoleonic Wars"-his own personality,--Allied strategic/tactical advances

Nicholson "The Congress of Vienna",-his own personality.--British opposition

@ Brechtel: I don't say I agree with Barnett, just that he sets the case out. Essentially, Napoleon the statesmen set impossible tasks for Napoleon the general. It's also not a long read, which helps.

@ Basileus: Good point re Esdaile, it's a while since I read him. Likewise Lieven, although my takeaway from that was that he very much saw Russia's as a twin campaign of invasion, then counter-attack, aimed at removing Napoleon. It's hard to see why there needed to be an 1813-1814 campaign if removing Napoleon was not the goal, although IIRC, Alexander never envisaged accomplishing all of this unassisted.

The problem for anyone seeking to claim the victory for Austria or Prussia individually is that Russia won the 1812 campaign comprehensively with those two countries fighting on Napoleon's side. Being a liability to your ally is not the same as being the cause of his downfall, and the fact that Russia was able to beat all three for me undermines the idea that those two then made the greatest individual contribution the following year.

Their previous form in that regard is not stellar either. They got thoroughly taken apart by the French on every occasion. Austria lost wars in 1797, 1800, 1805, and 1809. Prussia lost wars in 1794, 1806, and was losing in 1813 until the ceasefire; Prussia was likewise losing in 1815 until they linked up with Wellington, whose stand at Waterloo saved them when they'd lost both the battles they had fought so far.

The key to Allied battlefield victory over Napoleon was to concentrate overwhelming strength against him. Even that frequently wasn't enough, but in 1813 to 1814 it was done by having the Russians in the field. In 1815 you did it by having Wellington on the field or by getting to whatever field he was on.

I digress. Perhaps the reason it is so difficult to cite the necessary claims is that they are straw men; nobody makes a case for their being the sole cause of Napoleon's downfall. One sees this fault in Hoffie's books too – they exist to refute the idea that the Prussian contribution is under-recognised, but not one of the works in the bibliography advances such an idea. If I had to say in one sentence what unravelled Napoleon it would be that his inability to defeat Britain by his usual means led him to attempt it by unusual means, which included invading Spain and invading Russia.

Langobard

@attila, fair point! Like many others (Napoleon included) I tend to take a landlubbers perspective of the Napoleonic wars, which does lead me to often overlook the admittedly persistent and vital opposition of the Brits!

By your use of the word "landlubber" I take it that you see Britain's contribution as mainly Naval?

I have to remind you that the British fought Napoleon for almost six years in the Peninsula, almost constantly. That's apart from the smaller European actions, raids and Island expeditions around the world. In short, Britain fought Napoleon and spilt its blood constantly.

Paul :)

I have to remind you that the British fought Napoleon for almost six years in the Peninsula, almost constantly. That's apart from the smaller European actions, raids and Island expeditions around the world. In short, Britain fought Napoleon and spilt its blood constantly.

For all of that, the Peninsula was a secondary theater for the duration of the war there. And the British 'investment' in manpower was not overwhelming. Without the Portuguese Army, albeit British reorganized and trained, Wellington could not have operated successfully in Portugal and Spain.

Further, without the Spanish guerillas the same thing that happened to Moore would have happened to Wellington.

And the wastage Britain incurred in operations such as Walcheren did not help the British effort in the Peninsula.

The bottom line is that it was British subsidies to its continental allies that kept the wars going against France as without them the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians could not have remained in the field in 1813-1814.

Mr Kiley,

What you seem to fail to understand is that, while the British military contribution in Spain and Portugal may have been small in terms of absolute numbers, it was enormous in terms of its impact on Napoleon's military. Merely by being there, the British encouraged Spanish resistance and contributed immensely to tying down hundreds of thousands of Napoleon's troops, who suffered enormous casualties.

Without the presence of a very dangerous British army that had a habit of beating the French in major field actions, many of those troops would have been available for service against Austria an 1809, against Russia in 1812, and against the Allies in 1813-14 if that campaign had even happened.

A sideshow certainly, but a crucial one.

it was British subsidies to its continental allies that kept the wars going against France

Indeed. The British manpower contribution looks more significant if you include the manpower tied up in the navy, of course. In the Georgian era you could have the world's largest army or its largest navy, but you couldn't have both. The navy was about 200,000 men IIRC, so to have those permanently in the field was a pretty substantial commitment. This meant (and has always meant) that Britain at war needs allies or proxies to do the land fighting.

For me the indirect cause of Napoleon's downfall was British enmity. All his key errors were made trying to prosecute war against a sea power whose navy he could not beat. Hence the Berlin Decrees, the invasions of Spain and Russia and the consequent occupation of France.

The significance of the Peninsula was that by being able to concentrate and supply a small field army there, Britain forced the French in Spain to attempt the same thing while holding the rest of the country down. The best estimates I have seen of what this cost are 250,000 men in the Pensinsula and about 250,000 casualties. So in effect, the Peninsula cost Napoleon about what the Russian campaign cost, alberi spread out over longer.

Brechtel

And the British 'investment' in manpower was not overwhelming. Without the Portuguese Army, albeit British reorganized and trained, Wellington could not have operated successfully in Portugal and Spain

And what of the thousands of foreigners in Nappy's army? Many of which enabled him to have huge manpower for his invasion of Russia and allowed him to hold on for longer in the Peninsula?

The bottom line is that it was British subsidies to its continental allies that kept the wars going against France as without them the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians could not have remained in the field in 1813-1814

So will you for once tell the audience what you truly mean by this statement that you keep churning out in debates like this? Seems like you see it as some kind of crime or cheat to do such a thing.

The bottom line is that it was U.S subsidies to it's European allies that kept the war going against Germany as without them Britain and her Allies could not have remained in the field.

So the bottom line is that Nappy was always going to lose because he could not and never came close to defeating Britain and virtually every time where either his army or Navy joined in battle, Napoleons hoards were put to the sword or belaying pin.

As for Russia. Yes, she drove the Napoleon abandoned French army out of her country (as did the British who drove the pre-Empiric, Napoleon abandoned, army out of North Africa) But without the power of British military prowess and wealth, Nappy may well have been dominant up to the time that he would have pegged it in 1821.

Napoleon's own personality is a poor excuse as a reason for his downfall, unless everyone expected him to roll over whenever he was challenged.

And we must remember that Britain destroyed the main chance of continued peace when they broke the peace treaty and declared war against France in 1803.

But it is clear there were several factors, as expressed in the above posts, leading to his eventual downfall. The various and continuous campaigns he had to fight was certainly a main factor, with the odds growing against him as time went on. And again, it must be noted that some of these campaigns may not have occurred but for the British paying (or subsidising as some prefer)other nations to wage war. Even in 1815, when the French king did a runner and Napoleon reclaimed the French throne with ease, the allies refused to budge until Britain agreed to fund them.

In a sense, you could say that the British had every right to fund others to go to war with their enemy, but it does imply that the need for war against Napoleon, was far more important to them at the time than peace, and at any cost. As anyone STILL paying their Income Tax introduced to fund the war, will testify. LOL.

But it does make you wonder what Britain would have done, had the allied nations told Britain where to stick their bribes, sorry subsidies. And of course, who knows, no stress related wars and campaigns and Napoleon may not have 'pegged it' in 1821.

What you seem to fail to understand is that, while the British military contribution in Spain and Portugal may have been small in terms of absolute numbers, it was enormous in terms of its impact on Napoleon's military. Merely by being there, the British encouraged Spanish resistance and contributed immensely to tying down hundreds of thousands of Napoleon's troops, who suffered enormous casualties.
Without the presence of a very dangerous British army that had a habit of beating the French in major field actions, many of those troops would have been available for service against Austria an 1809, against Russia in 1812, and against the Allies in 1813-14 if that campaign had even happened.
A sideshow certainly, but a crucial one.

I never characterized the war in Portugal and Spain as a 'sideshow.' I stated that it was a secondary theater which is something entirely different.

However, the British investment in military manpower in Iberia was relatively small and had to be augmented by a large Portuguese contingent, especially in artillery (the Royal Artillery brigades and troops being especially small) in order to take the field in anything approaching numbers to fight the French armies.

And it is also correct that Wellington would not have survived if not for the Spanish guerillas (and vice versa) because they tied down large numbers of French troops that otherwise could have been employed against Wellington.

The bottom line is that the impact of the British army in Portugal and Spain would have been much less if they didn't have the Portuguese and Spanish to augment their numbers in the field. In fact, it may have been disastrous.

If's, could, should and Might don't cut it. Did, had and was does.

Oh! and: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 by Rory Muir is my recommendation.

Paul :)

Well done, Mr Kiley:). You get a round of applause for pointing out the damned obvious and the utterly irrelevant.

The whole point of the successful British involvement in Spain and Portugal is exactly that it was as part of an alliance.

The British army provided a force in being that proved supremely capable of beating the French in the field time after time in a war that bled them white and prevented experienced troops being used in the main theatres of war.

As such, it was a masterpiece of how to use a small army to defeat a much larger one through coalition warfare and the use of irregular troops.

The bottom line is that the British and their allies utterly defeated the French in the Peninsular War and denied Napoleon the use of hundreds of thousands of men in the primary theatres of war.

Your ifs, buts, and maybes are staggeringly irrelevant; they only show that you are unable to construct a valid argument.

'The bottom line is that the impact of the British army in Portugal and Spain would have been much less if they didn't have the Portuguese and Spanish to augment their numbers in the field. In fact, it may have been disastrous.'

Which could just as easily read………..

'The bottom line is that the impact of the FRENCH army in RUSSIA would have been much less if they didn't have the AUSTRIANS, PRUSSIANS, BADEN, SAXON, POLISH, WURTEMBERG, WURZBURG, WESTPHALIA, BERG, NAPLES, SWISS, AND ITALY, to augment their numbers in the field. In fact, it may have been disastrous.'

Oh wait, it WAS disastrous.

While I agree that the slavish, 'Britain were the good guys' is overdone, so is the dribbling blind worship of Napoleon, it's the same thing, different view. And, while we're at it, calling books 'works' or 'volumes' and articles 'essays'reading those books, 'studies' and looking down on those who don't, or just being plain sarcastic, or condesending, is a nasty trait. The above posters can decide where they fall.

Oh, sorry, nearly forgot, LOL

John

And apologies to Redcoat, hope you got what you wanted, sifting amongst the jetsam

John

The British were acting in what they perceived to be their national interest, as were everyone else.

In pursuing that approach they did some things that were less than ideal; such is the real world.

Had Napoleon not been side tracked into fighting on other fronts, such as in 1809 against Austria, he could have kept his complete attention towards the British involvement in the Peninsular.

And claiming the British helped 'tie down' thousands of French troops that he could have employed elsewhere, is just a cover up of the fact the British, with their allies, were incapable of doing anything else. They relied heavily
on Napoleon's attention not turning towards them. And even then, without having to face Napoleon himself, after he had successfully organised the Brits being kicked out of the Peninsular in 1809, it took them 5 long years to eventually force the French out of Spain. It is simply naïve to class winning after five years of struggle as a 'masterpiece'. Six months, a year, yes, but to class a five year struggle containing embarrassing retreats as such, is only for the biased fools to believe.

I think it was Barnett, or maybe McCourt, who contends that Napoleon avoided returning to Spain because it was unwinnable and he needed not to be associated with failure.

So instead, Massena, Ney, Soult, Jourdan, Marmont, Lannes etc got to be associated with it.

4th Cuirassier

Truth be told I am not fond of that interpretation. Napoleon's Correspondence, neither his public letters nor private, show any hint that he believed the war unwinnable. What they show is that after the Austrian War of 1809, he became worried of being too far for too long from Paris. Mind that Paris was for Napoleon more than just a capital. It was the center of his power over France. Conspiracies were real, and a constant in Napoleon's regime. He wasn't particularly sure about the future of his dinasty. Both Jacobins and Monarchists were conspiring against him, and if he left Paris he would face a real risk to his future as Emperor. Only when he felt he faced an existential threat in the form of Russia abandoning the Continental Blockade, he decided to leave Paris again. In that sense your observation that his inability to defeat Britain lead him to the wars in Spain and Russia is spot on.

I think that rather than thinking that the war in Spain was unwinnable, what Napoleon believed is that it would take several years to pacify the country and force the British to re-embark. Years that he couldn't devote to a theatre of war that wasn't fundamental to France's and Napoleon' future, as none of the centers of power in France could be threatened from the South and any Allied victory couldn't change the balance of power as long as Napoleon controlled France and most of Central Europe. In my opinion, Napoleon decided that to win the war in Spain his presence wasn't necessary, but if he was forced to stay away from Paris for too long his hold on France could be in grave peril.

I would have thought the Continental System was the root cause and ultimate reason for the defeat of Napoleon. His actions against Britain and British Foreign policy throughout, his actions in the invasion of Spain and Portugal, his actions in Russia and his constantly making political decisions where military decisions were necessary throughout 1812 were all a result of his political obsessions regarding a European Economic Union with France as the leader and Britain's economy straggled as a result, hence also covering his own personality.