"Channel 4 documentary on Jutland" Topic

Just watched this; left out lots of detail – some of it very important – but was still interesting, especially regarding Beatty's attempts to fiddle with the official charts and shift the blame onto Jellicoe.

Anyone else see it?

I saw it. Alas not overly impressed. Not much detail, too many inaccuracies inconsistencies and wild speculation. Therre was a radio documentary on Radio 4 on Sunday fronted by Admiral west that was better, and there's another documentary on the BBC on the 29th.

Yes. I didn't think there was anything new in it, except the bits of battlecruisers on the sea bed. Otherwise it seemed to be the bites of sound-bites.

I passed over the battlefield not so long ago: nothing much has changed in a 100 years

I liked it – lightweight and repetitive, but what TV doc isn't?

What I didn't like was its relentless insistence that its findings were "new".
For example, the 'revelation' that a magazine explosion had sunk one of the battlecruisers… as if they were solving some sort of mystery.

Conveniently ignoring the fact that the survivor's testimony had said precisely that, at the time.

It was far too harsh on both Beatty and Jellico I thought.
Jutland very nearly saw the end of the High Seas Fleet

Yep, felt the same.

What puzzled me was that it claimed to be an attempt to vindicate Jellicoe but totally underplayed the crucial decision of deployment. Crossing the T was explained but not how incredibly difficult it was to achieve in limited visibility and with scant information. That he did it twice to me proves he was a good fleet admiral; I dread to think how Beatty would deployed… I'll nail my colours to the mast here: I am a Jellicoe fan!

Thanks for the pointer David – I love R4 and can't believe I didn't think to look for documentaries on radio. Now downloaded – that's my drive to work sorted now!

Nick

Having watched both the BBC and Channel 4 documentaries, I am left with a key question that I don't think either adequately answered.

Scheer and Hipper took the whole German home battle fleet out into the North Sea because they wanted to isolate and destroy *part* of the British home fleet, to whittle down its overall numerical advantage in home waters. Fine. That makes perfect military sense. Achieve mass, etc. etc. But how did they think they could *catch* only *part* of the British home fleet out of port?

In other words, towards the close of the battlecruiser action, when Beatty saw Scheer coming on to assist Hipper, and sensibly turned away from Hipper and ran back towards Jellicoe for support, why did Scheer/Hipper not *assume* that Jellicoe would be behind Beattie?

To put it another way, was it common for either side to risk defeat in detail in WW1 by dividing their forces and sending out into the North Sea only part of their forces? And if so, why?

Redcoat,

By far the best way to explore the German thought process would be to get the classic Jutland: The German Perspective by Tarrant. There you will find your answers.

The Germans had placed U Boats near the exit routes for the various British squadrons a combination of factors prevented them from being effective on the lead up to Jutland.

The various German raids along the coast of the UK were designed to turn British public opinion to force the Grand Fleet to be split up to protect the various coastal towns, each raid the Germans risked a small part of their fleet, the Battlecruisers for a larger objective.

It nearly worked after the Scarborough Raid, 4 British Battlecruisers and 6 Dreadnoughts chased after the raiders at one point this smallish force was only 10 miles from the High Seas Fleet. The assumption here was that the whole Grand Fleet was there, it wasnt but they didnt know that so didnt engage. It worth remembering that in the days before radar and aerial recon you had to rely on what you saw yourself backed up with a bit of intel and from that effectively gamble on your course of action. Get it right your a hero, wrong and your either a coward or a fool.

Its well worth reading up on the background to these raids to understand the build up to Jutland.

Regards Ken

yarkshiregamer.blogspot.co.uk

I thought the BBC documentary with Dan Snow was much better than the Ch4 effort.

It's always difficult with just an hour to get everything in in any level of detail but I thought they did a decent job. Let's face it us sado Naval Wargaming types would want a 12 part mini series and we still would be unhappy.

It dealt mostly with the Battlecruiser action, the turret flash experiment was particularly good. Definitely worth a watch.

Regards Ken
yarkshiregamer.blogspot.co.uk

Thanks, Yarkshire, that already makes more sense.

I recall the turret flash theory having been explored on a documentary perhaps a decade ago. I assume it's based on good evidence that safety procedures (shutting blast doors; not stacking bundles of cordite in gun turrets) were being *routinely* discarded in the British home fleet in order to increase rate of fire, perhaps with official sanction – i.e., not just on one ship, but in many/most/all?

You could definitely do a whole hour on turret flash alone !

Both Navies were fairly easy when it came to flash safety before the war, they were no doubt aware of the issues having suffered premature explosions in magazines. The Germans seemed to learn more however and developed less volatile charges (something often overlooked).

The Germans learnt again at Dogger Bank with the turret hit on Seydlitz, however the belief is that had Seydlitz had British charges she would have blown up. Precautions were in place by Jutland for the Germans, this was mainly a reduction in ready charges . Some flash doors were fitted in some ships but not all by Jutland it certainly wasn't a complete fix as often quoted.

When your dealing with a ship full of explosives being fired at by explosives there is always an element of risk, it's managing that risk that gets you home.

Regards Ken

yarkshiregamer.blogspot.co.uk

I watched both, and got the feeling that they exonerated Jellicoe and exposed Beatty.

I was left wondering what might have happened if the British had adopted safer gunnery practices and their ships not blown up:

1) Was German gunnery superior and would this have told in a longer action?

2) Would the battle cruiser duel have lasted so much longer that Beatty would have been caught by the main German fleet?

Also, were these practices abolished subequently and if so, how (on the quiet I would imagine)? I recall the BBC documentary mentioning that the Gunnery Officer on Beatty's flagship absolutely refused to implement the unsafe changes in the first place.

"I recall the BBC documentary mentioning that the Gunnery Officer on Beatty's flagship absolutely refused to implement the unsafe changes in the first place."

….. Sounds like they were referring to Alexander Grant. The story is actually rather more complicated (and interesting). Go here -

PDF link

- for the relevant chapter 14 of his (so far) unpublished memoirs.

After several decades of research and study, my conclusion as to the numerous losses suffered by the RN as a result of magazine explosions is that the <chief> (but not <sole>) culprit was the dangerously unstable nature of cordite propellant itself. The ignition of about one ton of cordite in LION's Q turret produced a deflagration so violent that it breached the magazine despite the magazine door having been closed and dogged and the magazine bulkhead supported by the flooding water behind; by comparison, six tons of the far more stable German RP/C12 propellant was consumed by fire SEYDLITZ without any such violent deflagration.

Strictly my opinion. of course.

B

Blutarski – Thank you very much indeed for that. Most excellent.

I couldn't help notice he mentions how popular Beatty was.

I thought the BBC documentary pursued too many themes too superficially. Although the simulation of a magazine explosion was interesting: "Now, boys and girls, don't try this at home…"

I sometimes wonder at the unsafe practice theory, which would have to have come from the top; i.e. Beatty.

Everyone knows the famous quotation 'there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today' but never quoted is his next line; 'and something wrong our bloody system too'.

I honestly wonder if, in his heart, he knew after two of his ships had gone up, that the problem lay with his relaxing of the rules. I know this isn't recorded anywhere as an order – like a 'Code Red' in 'A Few Good Men'; I have his 'complete' papers – but he does seem to have presented history in his preferred way so I'm not surprised to find this decision absent, but I do wonder whether this sentence, after seeing two of his ships destroyed and knowing he could easily go the same way, he had a moment of doubt and realisation.

"I sometimes wonder at the unsafe practice theory, which would have to have come from the top; i.e. Beatty"

Hi Boz,
I am by no means a big fan of Beatty as a battle commander, but the idea of relaxing ammunition handling rules in pursuit of a higher rate of fire can be found in GFBOs going back to 1914 and perhaps earlier. With the introduction of Cordite propellant just prior to the turn of the century, the navy believed that not only a much more powerful, but a much safer propellant than traditional black/brown powders had been found. As a result of insufficient testing by both industry and the service, it was assumed that Cordite, outside the confines of a gun breech, was incapable of exploding (or, to be more terminologically precise – violently deflagrating) and hence posed no more than a fire risk. The potential of an ammunition fire was deemed an acceptable risk to bear in exchange for a high rate of fire. The 1914 GFBOs, as a matter of fact, pretty much stated as much in those very words. As a result, the careful magazine practices that had evolved over the preceding century or more to safely handle dangerous black powder propellant were substantially relaxed.

Another factor that complicated ammunition handling was the great increases in ammunition outfit dictated by the Admiralty after the outbreak of war. Main battery ammunition stowage was increased by as much as 25-30pct, which in many cases meant that the extra ammunition was being stowed under ad-hoc and less safe conditions.

So….. while Beatty (and Chatfield) pressed for a big increase in rate of fire after their experience at Dogger Bank, they did so on the basis of a belief system that existed more or less throughout the fleet with respect to Cordite. It is impossible to say with certainty what the state of ammunition handling affairs within the Grand Fleet was, but it is IMO somewhere between possible and likely that they were no safer than those of the battle-cruisers. None of the GF dreadnoughts at Jutland were really hit and tested in that regard.

It's a complicated story.

FWIW.

B

Blutarski – although written some years after the event, the memoirs you linked to (again, thank you for that) mentioned that specific point, namely that the extremely careful black powder regulations had been widely relaxed because of the perceived "safer" nature of cordite.

Coincident to this discussion, a friend of mine reminded me just today of a comment made by an officer who was aboard HMS AGINCOURT at Jutland. He mentioned that in the course of his visits to the various (and numerous!!!) turrets, he observed all manner of propellant charges sitting uncased in the handing rooms.

B