"Joseph E. Johnston or Robert E. Lee" Topic

Before I start I want to be upfront about two things

1) I am not a specialist in the ACW
2) I am biased against the Confederacy (I did go through a phase of guarded sympathy for the CSA, and have the articles to prove it, but its long past)

That said my visit to Keensaw Mountain this year was a great chance for me to become more familiar with the Western Theater. Now I have read some stuff on the Eastern and Western Theaters, but the operations out west were more of a blur in my image of the ACW.

After a bit of reading I began to think that between J.J. Johnston and R.E. Lee, the first might had been the better general on some aspects. I am not saying Lee was a bad general, and in some aspects he was better than Johnston. I just think Johnston was the better one on average.

Let me go a bit into detail

I think Lee was a better Politician than Johnston. People might snicker at this statement, and even say I selling Lee low, but frankly in war political acumen is paramount especially for officers with Theater command. Clauzewitz and Luttwak both make that case and I buy it. Lee knew how to play the political game much better than Johnston, and even post-bellum was better at balancing his image (while Johnston, or in a more extreme form Longstreet were perceived as too unionist).

I think Lee was a better operational general than Johnston. With that I mean that he was more able to do more things with his army within a battle. Chancellorsville is indeed a work of art as an example of the operational level.

But I think Johnston was the better Theater commander. I fully consider his Georgia campaign a work of art at the theater level of analysis,considering the situation he faced (Indeed in my Military Strategy we did a comparative analysis of the Georgia and Overland campaigns and my students were more impressed by Sherman and Johnston then Lee and Grant). At his basic Lee was a army smasher. He might have been someone with extreme competence in using the indirect approach, but the operational risks he was willing to take with his army could had led to its destruction. Luck, Union command issues, and the specific character of warfare in North America meant that many of his gambles worked out, or fizzled with mild consequences, but it could had easily led to catastrophe. Lee was not John Bell Hood, but he was fundamentally someone that was willing to see his army destroyed if it could attain the objective and there are many instances in which he was willing to risk massive combat risks to attain an objective (at least that is my view). Johnston it seems to me was not like that. We can debate if that attitude is the mark of a good general or not in general. But within the specific context of the ACW I believe it was wrong.

Which brings me to my next point which is that Johnston in the end was the better at grasping and dealing with the consequences of the grand strategic situation of the Confederacy. I think both he and Lee understood, especially after 1863 that the jig was up. But I think Johnston's decision to save the army even if it meant sacrificing territory was the right one. As long as the CSA had armies in the field, the chance of a negotiated end was possible. Once those armies became destroyed, it would be an imposition. It was also the humane thing to do. Why sacrifice those boys needlessly. Lee on the other hand still sought the miracle at the operational level that would make up for the deteriorating situation at the Grand Strategic and Theater level (or at least that is how I see it). Partly this might had been due to the fact that Lee was the better politician and understood that he had to tread carefully around Richmond. But I cannot but see it as a lesser form of generalship.

Well that is my cant. And to be frank most of it is based on comparing the Overland and Atlanta Campaigns (though Antietam, the Peninsular, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville were also in my mind) So what do you think. Who was better as a general from a holistic point of view?

1) Robert E.Lee

of

2) Joseph J. Johnston

Lee

Johnston.

Alfred E. Newman

Wait until David Powell starts writing on the Atlanta campaign…your impression of Johnston will change greatly.

How so?

Johnston.

I agree that he seemed to try and keep his army intact at the expense of territory, and in that respect appears to me more like Washington.

Also felt Lee was way to Virginia focused. Not willing to send troops west for Vicksburg, worried more about Richmond then he should have.

Also if Johnston hadn't been wounded at Seven Pines he would have stayed in command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Its interesting to think how that would have changed the war.

I would not call Lee a good operational general. He was a good tactician who had some great moments and some terrible ones. It is worth noting that many of his wins and draws occurred while his army was on the defensive.

What the South lacked was a sound strategic plan. Lee was fixated on defending his native Virginia. Would it have been better for a large part of his army to be sent toward Atlanta? On the flip side, the North had a sound strategic plan form the beginning, and followed it. The Anaconda Plan doesn't always get the glory, but it was a plan that worked. Grant may not have been brilliant on the battlefield, but he saw the big picture, and he kept at it relentlessly.

Jackson did much to make Lee a great general. After his death, the ANV was never the same.

Consider Johnston's subordinates during the Atlanta campaign.

Often, a general's legacy is defined by his subordinates.

Lee's focus was Virginia. The only reason he came to the Confederacy was because Virginia went that way. If Virginia had gone North or remained neutral, he would have followed Virginia. Thus, his fixation on defending Virginia.

Ah, we are giving reasons, I have one that tops them all. Johnston was getting beat by McClellan. Nuff said.

well Dynaman8789 considering that Lee was also beat by McCellan I am not persuaded by your argument. And to be frank. McCellan never "beat" anyone. He could only "beat" himself.

Buckeye AKA Darryl. I will keep my eye open for that!

Keep them coming people, some very interesting posts.

Lee

All you have to do is look at how well Johnston handled the west as a theater commander balancing Tennessee and Mississippi in late 1862 and 1863. Miserable. Unable to concentrate on any one area to overwhelm the Union. When he tried, it was bad timing such as sending Stevenson's Division to Mississippi just before Rosecrans advanced on Murfreesboro. Even though he was hamstrung by Jefferson Davis interfering with Pemberton directly, Johnston failed to personally take command at Vicksburg to make sure Pemberton didn't get trapped in the city, and then took forever to concentrate forces and attack Grant.

At Atlanta, he failed to use the terrain to slow Sherman at several opportunities. He left Snake Creek Gap wide open, and didn't keep a handle on Wheeler to make sure it was being watched. Or even defended. He failed to entrench anywhere from Resaca through Adairsville to Cassville. His excuse was that there was no defensible terrain, yet Lee in Virginia was fortifying any hill or rise to slow Grant/Meade every step of the way. Would Sherman have still flanked him? Yes. However, if Johnston was playing for time, he wasn't making Sherman deploy and waste time nearly enough. Then he failed to defend any of the river barriers to any degree. Pope at Second Bull Run forced Lee to continue marching left because Pope was guarding every ford along the rivers. It was only when Lee send Jackson far around the flank and the Bull Run Mountains to Manassas that this ended. Johnston never defended the actual river crossings on the Oostanaula (other than Resaca itself), Etowah, or Chattahoochee beyond picket lines. At the Etowah, he didn't even adequately burn all the bridges. Lee wasn't perfect in that regard either. Remember at the Wilderness he basically let the Union army cross the Rappahanock unopposed when he could have fortified the crossings all winter long. Yet he bounced back at such water obstacles such as the Second Corp at the Po River, or Jericho Mills at the North Anna. Johnston did a much worse job with the resources he had at hand than Lee did. And yes, he was far worse at the personal interactions with his superior, Davis, and the politics necessary at that level of high command.

Little Mac barely beat Lee, and that with a true godsend of Intel. Mac beat Johnston soundly without it.

Lee

Johnston's had 3 severe problems:

1. As you say, he was not good at playing politics. He irritated Jeff Davis early on by arguing about his standing in the ranks of generals. And he didn't keep Davis informed of his plans (maybe because he didn't have any.)

2. He was a perfectionist. Conditions were never quite right for him to attack or to accept battle.

3. He would rather be right than win. For instance, when told that he still had control of Bragg's army, even after being sent to Mississippi, he refused to make the decision of whether to bring more or all of Bragg's army to Mississippi, saying it was up to Davis to decide between Mississippi and Tennessee -- while he was correct in that, Davis refused to decide, and so did Johnston. As a result, both Tennessee and Mississippi were lost.

Lee, on the other hand, was overconfident. Although he considered Washington "the great prototype" he meant morally/personally. In war, he tried to emulate Napoleon, whose campaigns he had studied intensively. Because of that, he tried, like Napoleon, for the knock-out blow -- the great decisive battle -- which he never achieved. He was excellent and inventive on defense, but overly aggressive and overconfident on offense. True, his offensive often succeeded, to some extent (though never decisively), but that was mostly due to Jackson (and the poor quality of some of his opponents).

Unlike Johnston, he was very good at manipulating Davis to get what he wanted.

Dynaman, Antietam wasn't the only time Little Mac beat Lee. Look at the West Virginia campaign.

Lee was a poor strategist and a terrible logistician. He was marginal operationally, and as for his skill as a tactician, four words – Malvern Hill, Pickett's Charge.

Although Lee and McClellan both campaigned in West Virginia, I don't think they were both there at the same time.

McClellan, Buell, and Johnston were not attuned to the political pressures facing their respective governments. Accordingly, their planned campaigns did not meet the strategic objectives required. Also, their desire to preserve their reputations (and, in the case of McClellan and Buell, the Union without abolition) made them sluggish and ineffective.

Johnston almost lost Richmond, failed to relieve Vicksburg, and was unable to stop Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta. He failed to obey the direction of his commander in chief. By those measures, he was certainly a failure.

Lee saved Richmond, invaded the north twice, and befuddled Union commanders for 2 years. He had an excellent relationship with Davis.

Lee, not even close.

Apples and oranges KTravlos. If you want to compare these two men properly, then you must compare campaigns that were similar in scope, objective and resources.

I always think that a measure of the status of Lee is to be found in the events of the 2nd day at Antietam and the 4th day at Gettysburg. He must have had something going for him

Dan no two campaigns were as similar as the Overland and Atlanta campaign. Comparable forces(120-100,000 union troops facing 70-60000 Confeds in both cases), with Union objectives being the same , taking an important CSA urban center. Difference was terrain (rivers in Virginia were perpendicular to the Union axis of advance, in Georgia they were mostly parallel before Atlanta itself). I disagree that it is apple and oranges. But I am willing to hear why you would argue so.

Before anyone comes down hard on Lee, they should read "The Wartime Papers of R.E.Lee". A number of historians have either glossed over this book, or ignored it completely.

However, the insights into WHY he did the raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania are better understood after reading his correspondence with both Jefferson Davis,and other members of the cabinet as well as the Congress.

In addition, his remarks on supply,ordnance, and his letters to both his wife and children are revealing.

Lee.

The point about understanding the Confederate strategic situation is well made--though the Confederate situation could also have been retrieved by destroying a Union army, something Johnston never seems to have considered. But in the end they were theater commanders with missions for specific campaigns, and none of Johnston's campaigns ended in victory. Bad luck maybe, but that counts too.

"rivers in Virginia were perpendicular to the Union axis of advance, in Georgia they were mostly parallel before Atlanta itself"

???

The Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee are all perpendicular to Sherman's axis of advance in Georgia.

> our words – Malvern Hill, Pickett's Charge.

Lee at his worst, about as good as Johnston at his usual. Sure Johnston lost fewer troops, but at the cost of retreating before there was ever a battle to begin with.

What the South lacked was a politician/grand strategist who was Lincoln's equal. That was where the real lack was rather than Lee vs Johnston.

Chris

Lee

2nd Manassas, Chancellorsville

Bob

this is why I avoid the acw period period

KTravlos, your description of Lee's tactics describes an earlier period, not how he conducted the Overland campaign. I thought you were including this earlier period in your discussion. Also, I feel the Atlanta campaign had much more potential for maneuver. In Virginia only a battering ram could break through.

Hi all, thanks for the input. On the rivers in Atlanta vs. Overland, I should had been more circumspect. Yes not all rivers were parallel, but my reading (such as it is) was that compared to Virginia there where fewer watery obstacles across Sherman's path.

On campaign victory vs. defeat. I am going to take the hard face and ask what did Lee's victories really accomplish at the Grand Strategic or even Theater level. Sure they elongated the war, but they did not break the bad Grand Strategic situation. Sure neither did Johnston's theater strategy change that, but at the basic Lee lost far more men to accomplish almost exactly what Johnston did at the Strategic level. Which is not much beyond lengthening the war (we can discuss how likely a Lincoln electoral loss in 1864 is, and how likely that would lead to Southern independence at another place).

I think that both Lee and Johnston understood the catch 22 that the Confederacy was. What I think is that Johnston understood much better than Lee what Clausewitz also got in his reading of Napoleonic Wars and the SYW. That numerical superiority is simply a massive advantage. Simply because even if you lose, the consequences of defeat will be dampened. I mean the whole 1862-1863 campaign period showed that the Northern armies could shake off some very massive defeats.

Considering the inability of Lee to turn any of his major victories (with Chancellorsville standing as the apex) into annihilation victories, continuing to think you could win a battle of annihilation against armies twice as big as yours, on the north american terrain, was some major miracle seeking. I think that in that sense, in understanding what was possible and was not, Johnston was better than Lee. He simply was incompetent in translating that to a viable grand strategic plan, but as has been pointed out neither was Lee, or anybody in the Confed high command. I am not sure going for the miracle should be considered as the mark of a good general. No one would conaider Hitler's hope of a miracle, or even Frederick the Greats wait for miracle as marks of good generaliship. Its unavoidable in war, but still.

Considering the situation they were in both Lee and Johnston did just fine. Lee got everything that he wanted that was to be had. Johnston's Army of the Tennessee for example couldn't even draw supplies and recruits from the area of its operations. Those were all earmarked for Lee. Jefferson Davis dislike of Johnston springing from a petty argument back in their cadet days doomed the Confederate efforts in the West.

Davis' inability to manage the politics of military command and the West Point pecking order doomed his ability to ever get his armies working together. Lincoln contended with the same quarrels and feuds, but being an outsider he was not part of them. Further both commanders suffered under the Confederate Grand Strategy, of which, after the secession, there was none. The rush to secession was fueled by nothing more than braggadocio and pipe dreams. "If you don't let us have slavery anywhere and everywhere we're going to leave you." Once they left the tune changed to "I know you can't live without us and eventually you'll surrender and grovel to take us back."

no two campaigns were as similar as the Overland and Atlanta campaign. Comparable forces(120-100,000 union troops facing 70-60000 Confeds in both cases), with Union objectives being the same , taking an important CSA urban center.

Actually, Grant's objective was not Richmond, as such, it was primarily to keep Lee's army too busy defending itself for it to interfere with Sherman (by reinforcing the AoT again) or to go off on another raid across the Potomac. To do that, of course, he threatened Richmond, to the defense of which Lee was bound.

At the start of the 1864 campaign you have both Lee and Johnston calling in troops from outside. Johnston brings in Polk's forces from Mississippi, and Lee (and Beauregard)bring in first troops from North Carolina to face Butler, and then troops from the Valley for Cold Harbor. As the campaign wears on though Lee becomes secure enough to detach first Breckinridge's troops, then Early's and then troops from the Cavalry and First Corps to create a diversion in the Valley, which in turn force Grant to dispatch troops from his army. In the west all Johnston and Hood are able to do is dispatch cavalry to raid Sherman's supply lines. This suggests to me that even as Grant is pushing Lee into the lines in front of Richmond and Petersburg, Lee is still thinking as an overall theatre commander. Meanwhile in Georgia Johnston and Hood are fixated on the forces right in front of them.

@Otto-I have read the "all earmarked for Lee" allegations before. What I suspect it comes from is the Confederate government in Richmond saying "Local commander, you can use resources from this area over here, but the resources in the area over there are under our control and allocated by us." I doubt most of those resources were actually being shipped to Richmond. Some perhaps but not most. If you have something to the contrary, please let me know.

Just to back up Don:

Grant to Meade, April 9 1864.

"Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also"

Lee

Lee

"On campaign victory vs. defeat. I am going to take the hard face and ask what did Lee's victories really accomplish at the Grand Strategic or even Theater level. Sure they elongated the war, but they did not break the bad Grand Strategic situation. Sure neither did Johnston's theater strategy change that, but at the basic Lee lost far more men to accomplish almost exactly what Johnston did at the Strategic level. Which is not much beyond lengthening the war (we can discuss how likely a Lincoln electoral loss in 1864 is, and how likely that would lead to Southern independence at another place)."

One of the things many people, and most gamers, fail to understand is that you can not win a war by fighting a pure defensive strategy. when you do you give the initiative to the enemy and he decides where and when and under what conditions you fight.

By fighting defensively Johnston was forced all the way to Richmond by McCllean. Within weeks of taking over from Johnston Lee had the enemy outside Washington by fighting an aggressive, offensive campaign. A campaign which saw the largest capture of American troops ever, with the exception of the Philipines in 1942. Had Lee's lost order not been found that campaign would have ended totally differently.

Had Lee captured Washington, which was a possibility several times, the entire landscape of the war would have changed. A defensive war had zero chance of gaining victory for the South.

The Atlanta Campaign demonstrates this concept perfectly. Johnston set up several excellent defensive positions which Sherman only attacked once. After that he simply maneuvered him out of position and ended up outside Atlanta with relatively few casualties.

When the 1864 csmpaign started Lee and Meade were facing off across the Rappahanock. When it ended they were in Appomatox. Johnston and Sherman were outside Chatanooga. When it ended they were in North Carolina having passed through Georgia, South Carolina, and most of North Carolina. On a strategic/grand operational level fighting a pure defensive war simply doesn't work.

Dn Jackson. Its a bit unfair to saddle Johnston with Hood's mistakes. Hood kinda shows what happens when you fight an offensive campaign when the troop to task ratio is simply not there. If Jonhston was not removed from command, and if Hood did not wreck the Army of the Mississippi (At a healthy 2:1 ratio when Johnston was removed from command), I would argue Johnston and Sherman would had settled in siege lines around Atlanta, just like Lee and Grant did around Richmond.

Also Johnston was not just going to fight defensively. He correctly understood that until Sherman's supply line are cut, any attacks would end up like Hoods did later. He simply never had the forces to accomplish that task.One could argue that the fault was his for lack of political acumen with Davis, though one book I read on the Battle of Keensaw argued that the CSA simply had no troops left that could go after Sherman's supply lines.And yet somehow with this lack of resources, Johnston is chided for not succeeding in pulling off what Lee himself could not, a battle of annihilation.

" A campaign which saw the largest capture of American troops ever, with the exception of the Philipines in 1942. " Which had no effect whatsoever on the overall Grand Strategic situation. The Union replace those troops and even kept two Armies in the field in the Eastern Theater.

"Had Lee's lost order not been found that campaign would have ended totally differently." maybe and maybe not. And had McCellan not being McCellan the war would had ended in 1862.

"Had Lee captured Washington, which was a possibility several times, the entire landscape of the war would have changed." Perhaps, perhaps not.That is an open and largely subjective question. Considering my biases I do not think we could agree on this, so let us leave it.

"A defensive war had zero chance of gaining victory for the South." I do not disagree with that, but when you ignore the reality of the force to task ration you are no better than the Ottoman Commanders in the Balkans in 1912. Excellent operational plans(Read Erickson. They are a damn work of art), choice of the operational offensive within the strategic defensive, total disregard of force to task ratio and end result at Kumanova the Western Army is shattered by essentially a clueless Serbian command who blunders to victory largely thanks to the bravery of the troops, and the Eastern Army is forced to defend siege lines 30km from Constantinople (nowdays Istanbul). You must attack to win, but ignoring the strategic reality only means your attacks will destroy your armies. Lee almost did it, and ended up in a similar position to the Eastern Army of the Ottomans in 1912, and Hood simply emulated to the hilt the Western Army and ended up in the same condition.

Again though, it seems my question is truly irrelevant. Ottoathome is right. It can only be answered in the context of Grand Strategy ,and the CSA had none. And when you have no GS you seek miracles, whether they are foreign intervention, or some mythic Battle of Annihilation which will force Washington to capitulate. Considering neither happened, and perhaps could never happen( a topic for another thread), then I still think husbanding your army is the superior military choice. And Johnston did that, while Lee did not.

Hood did not emulate the 1912 campaing obviously. I mean it is analogous.

The Confederacy's only real chance to win the war was for it to stay alive long enough for the Union to get tired of trying to conquer it. That wasn't going to happen as long as Lincoln was President, so it had to hang on at least until March 1865, but by then it was obvious the Confederacy was doomed. Failing that, they needed Booth's plan to capture Lincoln and bring him to Richmond to succeed, but even if they'd pulled that off, I think Stanton would have kept fighting.

Again its a question of goal. If the goal was independence the GS situation was bad for that. If the goal was a renegotiation during re-admittance that could be achieved. But goals were nebulous as posited. I am just saying that when your government has no clear strategic goals, the safe bet is to keep your army alive.

Robert E. Lee

There is a story about Johnston not sure if it is true but he had a reputation as an excellent shot. Before the war he was invited on a hunting trip and never seemed to shoot at anything. For some reason every shot was just not right, the conditions weren't right to risk it. He finished the shoot with his reputation intact but not having done anything.

War was/is risk and Johnston was afraid to risk his reputation in battle

Lee only had to worry about Northern Virginia – a small narrow front with lots of good defensive positions.

Had he been sent, kicking and screaming, to the West his limitations would become clear and he would do no better than Johnson.

What this shows, once again, the lack of ability and depth in the Confederate high command.

As for me, nothing really to choose between them since Lee wasn't really tested over a large theater.