"Thoughts on Monty?" Topic

Miniature Building Authority hosted a LaserGrenadiers game at CMON Expo in Atlanta, Georgia, on Saturday afternoon and provided a spectacular layout for a sci-fi shootout on a backwater planet.

The after action report is posted on the LaserGrenadiers blog at:
lasergrenadier.wordpress.com

The great general certainly has his flaws but none of them seem to be related to his competence. In reading about El Alemein, he seems to have performed more ably than his predecessors with the exception of maybe Wavell and by extension O'Conner. The evidence you ask? You only need to see the results of his first battle.

He starts off by kiting the 15th to Alam El Halfa ridge where an inconclusive battle is fought. The 21st fights another some distance to the west against the 22nd and 23rd tan brigades. At this point the Germans are running short on fuel and probably can't make the coast if they pressed the attack. So Monty seems to have coupled his strengths and played them against the Axis weaknesses. He is bitterly criticized for not attacking with his numerically superior tank force to finish off the Germans. Seems to have been a wise decision after all as the result of the campaign shows. Point Monty.

At Ruweisat Ridge, Monty opts for an infantry attack preceded by a barrage from every artillery piece in his considerable arsenal. The attack goes in at night. The next day, the ridge is largely secure. His artillery and tank reserves were enough to beat back any Axis attack. Point Monty

Once the Germans were good an beaten up, he THEN went for the general breakthrough (Supercharge) and the rest is mostly history. While he did not completely finish off the DAK and Italian army, this turned out to be one gigantic beat-down on the Desert Fox. The Allies lost something like 13000 killed and wounded. The Axis lost 35,000 killed and wounded and another 30,000 captured.

At no point in that campaign was there any doubt what so ever of Monty being incompetent. In Normandy, he is also criticized for being plodding. That is also probably undeserved since he also bore the brunt of many of the panzer attacks including that from his old "friends" in the 21st Pz Division.

Arnhem was a ambitious and uncharacteristically bold plan coming from Monty. I think it was foiled by the performance of some of his subordinates as well as the unexpected presence of the German army. To be fair, the Germans thought they were "out of the way" up in Belgium.

So, we can certainly say Monty was arrogant and abrasive. But I suspect that much of the criticism heaped upon him was an extension of the dislike from his peers because of his personality. Like they say, you don't have to like him. You just have to work with him.

Your thoughts?

John – Yes. I am American. I'm supposed to take the Movie "Patton" as gospel.

Monty was an excellent general; not a great general, but very, very good. He was not the best Britain had (that was Slim), but he was the best available and an excellent fit for what the British needed him to do. Also, like Patton, he was an arrogant, self-important prick. Unlike Patton, he never let that get in the way of his career.

It's interesting that Monty got the reputation for being plodding in Normandy. Most people who critisise don't look at the Overlord plan as a whole. At the end of the day The allies reached the final Overlord objective – the River Seine – ahead of the planned schedule date.

Unforetunately politics – both between Generals along with their staff and on a Government/Country level have got in the way of an objective view of most commanders as each tried to out do each other in grabbing the glory and sticking the knife into their "Allies" with the Press.

And, yes, Hollywood bears a lot of blame for not letting historical fact get in the way of a good story – which too many folk then believe as truth.

Looks like the bug strikes again!

The LaserGrenadiers stuff looks great! Well done!

As far as Monty goes, I'm very split on him.

In North Africa with the British 8th Army I think he did a fantastic job that is very commendable.

In Sicily and Italy, I found his performance to be fairly uninspiring.

As commander of all ground forces in Operation Overlord, I think he did a fantastic job that is really underrated.

As the genius behind Market Garden, he gets plenty of deserved flak. However, it was a good idea that didn't work. Plenty of commanders get more kudos for worse ideas that only worked by sheer luck.

So, I give Monty a mixed rating, tending towards positive. My granddad fought under him in the British 8th Army in Africa and Italy, and I am an American who loves the movie "Patton", so I think I have the biases cancelling each other out :)

Monty was an excellent WWI-style general.

Failed to take Caen for months, which he was slated to do on D+1, or D+2, IIRC.

Arnhem was a disaster, and much of the blame for that falls on him, not his subordinates. Given all the things that had to go perfectly for it to succeed, in hindsight, it should have been clear it was almost an impossible endeavor.

Patton was much better, and I suspect it was his dashing exploits and demeanor, and competition for resources that forced Monty's hand on the Arnhem plan, since he wanted similar cachet. Sadly, thousands of men paid with their lives so he could stroke his ego, while trying to live up to Patton's legacy.

He had excellent resources and motivated troops and, for the most part, fought as part of a functioning military system*, against an enemy who did not have all those things; all he needed was to Not Suck and he'd do alright.

I think his main strengths was keeping cool (no easy feat!) and understanding what his forces were capable of and good at and fighting accordingly.

*by which I mean no insane political limitations/non-military objectives, parts of his own military completely outside of his control or given to extreme insubordination, an intelligence apparatus that worked, etc

Churchill said it best when he said of Montgomery
"In defeat unbeatable: in victory unbearable."

The premise that Montgomery was too slow during the Normandy is not exactly true. Paris was liberated about one month ahead of the date set out in the original campaign outline with lower casualties then expected.

As for Arnhem Monty would have been a genius if it succeeded and Eisenhower did approve it as CinC . Victory has many parents while defeat is an Orphan.

His own worst enemy.
Ever thin-skinned, he believed himself in danger of being overshadowed by more politically savvy US commanders.
His subsequent attempts at self-publicity have left a lasting stain on his legacy.
Without the grandiose pre-battle promises, his failure to make good on them, embarrassing backtracking and unconvincing pretence that everything was going exactly as planned – without all that, I think he'd be remembered as an outstanding Commander. But Monty's obsession with self-publicity was so pervasive that it's impossible to ignore.

He was good at taking a fixed position with an assault. He was not good at mobile warfare.

Not many in WWII were good at mobile warfare---throughout the war we see generals overstretch their forces, get divorced from their logistics, suffer encirclement, extreme fatigue and losses in the forward units, etc. The Soviets got the biggest results but suffered the highest casualties. German mobile war ended in disaster in 1941 in Russia, and in 1942 in Russia and Africa, and never really got running in 1943.

I'd be tempted to argue the best mobile fighting of the war happened in the southwest Pacific, with the use of transport aircraft and jumping up the coasts of islands, and even in CBI, with the hard overland marching of the Commonwealth forces late in the war.

I was his double.

If that helps at all.

Forgot to mention Sicily. That was kind of an uninspired performance with the direct route over the mountains.

Unlike Patton, he never let that get in the way of his career.

So you are saying Patton was a bigger prick? …hmmm… I buy that.

Churchill said it best when he said of Montgomery
"In defeat unbeatable: in victory unbearable."

I'd never heard that quote before! Thanks for that!

John

Is it this time of year already?

Same old tosh trotted out by a lot of the same folk, who frankly, I thought knew better

@Mako11
Agree with you about Arnhem. As for Caen,the fact that it sucked in most of the German armoured reserves enabled the Americans to breakout. The taking of Caen was also achieved with fewer casualties in 21st Army Group than the planners had predicted (50000 or so as compared to the War Office estimates of 66000).
Your categorising Monty as "an excellent WW1-style general" is probably fair if you are thinking of August 1918 onward, when the British had effectively developed the "all arms battle" and had develoed the use of artillery as the main offensive weapon, rather than the fragile bodies of their men. I think Monty was deeply affected by his experiences in WW1 and, generally, planned his battles to reduce casualties on his own side by ensuring overwhelming firepower.

FFS, not again…

Mako,

Considering how many times those same tired arguments are shot down in flames on TMP, I'm surprised that you repeat them.

'Excellent WW1-style general' – From that I take it you mean the British Army of 1918, which was probably the best that Britain has ever had…?

Caen:

'Months' = 1 month and a couple of days, to be precise.

'Meant to do on D+1 or D+2' – Nonsense. As soon as the Germans made a stand at Caen, there wasn't a hope of taking it until further divisions were landed. 3rd Division had sufficient forces to establish a bridgehead on a defended beach and then take and hold defensive positions inland – not to conduct a frontal assault on a defended city.

Monty himself said in the orders for the seaborne landing that he 'hoped' that Caen could be 'captured on the bounce' (i.e. grab it undefended once the coastal defences were broken and before reinforcements arrived). As soon as elements of 21. PD established themselves there on D-Day (followed by 12. SS PD during the night of D-Day), that was absolutely not possible.

Patton would absolutely not done any better.

If you're going to blame Monty for Caen, why aren't you crediting him with completely blunting the counter-attack by I. SS Panzer Korps (21. PD, 12. SS PD & Pz-Lehr)? Their counter-attack completely failed to make any headway, completely failed to take any ground and had completely lost the initiative by 11th June. Three panzer divisions (soon joined by many more) were then ground up fighting a defensive battle.

Ditto the halting of II. SS Panzer Korps counter-attack of late June/early July. What? Not crediting him with that either?

Not crediting him with reaching the Seine ahead of schedule and then driving 21st Army Group across France faster than the German Blitzkrieg did in the opposite direction?

How about Operation 'Cobra'? Monty was the Army Group commander responsible for planning and launching that assault. If you're going to blame him as an Army Group commander for Arnhem, surely by the same logic, he takes the credit for Cobra? No…?

If Monty had been half as good as he said he was, he would have been the best Allied general. If he was half as good as the he claimed in his memoirs, and suggested through deliberately destroying contradictory evidence, he would have been the best British general. (After the war, when CIGS, he ordered all copies of Auchinleck's so-called 'retreat to Alex order of the day' destroyed, but not all were, and of course it turned out to be no such thing, a 'stand and fight' plan that simply included a standard 'what-if' retreat route mapped as is the case with all responsible OpOrders).

He lied so egregiously about his predecessor's contribution that after his statements in his BBC TV show were investigated in a court case he had to retract…

The famous Alam Haifa position was actually selected and the plan designed by his predecessor, the Auk, who actually still commanded when Rommel was first stopped at '1st Alamein' – Monty arrived just in time to take the credit, and botch the lame duck follow up of '2nd Alamein', once he had waited for 7:1 superiority.

A convicted bully whilst at Sandhurst, he was little more than a lying braggart and gifted self publicist.

His appalling record in Normandy and NW Europe, and his lies about the relative merits of Allied and Axis armour to the politicians, are well known…

After the war he was quietly removed from his NATO command position for professional incompetence.

But the British Army of the 1942, largely staffed by wartime volunteers and conscripts, lapped up all his soundbites and photo ops and loved him!

And that was what was needed at the time.

Monty's biggest problem was that he was his own worst enemy. He took credit for things that others did which made him enemies. When he made errors he minimized them or blamed others (also making enemies). He didn't seem to learn from his errors and with the enemies he made could not be given a theater command.

This is turning into a Napoleonic Discussion type thread!
Warm up the DH!

"And of course Market Garden might have turned out very differently had Gavin seen fit to attack the Nijmegen bridges shortly after landing when they were barely defended. For an operation which was supposedly all about bridges, that was one hell of an omission. By leaving the first attempt until early evening, and sending just two companies (one of which got lost and didn't turn up), Gavin more or less killed the operation. Not that you get much recognition of that from Montgomery's detractors."

So the success of the entire army-level operation hinged on a single battalion-level attack? What a concise description of the problem with Market Garden.

Auk could have won First Alamein had he paid attention to coordinating his infantry and tanks. Just read through the battle account on WIKI. While probably not a "perfect" source, by the time you read how the Brits took a position and then were driven back because they had no AT weapons or Tank support, you will want to shake your fist and scream.

The claim that Monty had an advantage of 7:1 is pure garbage worthy of the Patton movie. He had an edge in men, tanks and planes. But only an edge. His main strength was his short and very secure supply line which he used to its fullest while Rommel's supplies dwindled.

Was he the best the allies had to offer? That is subjective. He was easily in the top 5…though admittedly also a subjective statement.

What, it's Monty-Bashing-Day again already? Damn, I left me pitchfork and flaming torch in me other trousers…..

Can we bash someone else next month? There's plenty of candidates to choose from (Mark Clark, Blamey, MacArthur, Horii, Harding, Fredenhall, etc) and bashing Monty & Arnhem & Caen & Alamein is getting boring.

We haven't had Monty bashing for a bit, so clearly it is time again.

Frankly I can't be bothered and would refer our esteemed readers to previous threads on this topic.

My views on Arnhem (which are hardly original) have also been expressed many times before.

After the last outing with this, I did have a look at Robin Neillands book on Normandy, which had some very interesting observations on Monty bashing in general.

Yes there has perhaps been too much subjective comment, although if that is not appropriate on a forum, where is it?

Just a couple of points then:

Auk could have won First Alamein

He did win it!
link

The claim that Monty had an advantage of 7:1 is pure garbage

True – sorry – I was folding the standard factor 3 force multiplier Monty enjoyed through having complete signal intelligence on the enemy's plans, dispositions and material state…

Physically he only enjoyed a mere 2:1 superiority according to wiki:

"The Allies frequently had numerical superiority in the Western Desert but never had it been so complete in quantity and quality. With the arrival of Sherman tanks, 6-pounder anti-tank guns and Spitfires in the Western Desert, the Allies gained a comprehensive superiority."

Monty is one of those great personages that make history fun to discuss. Here in Eindhoven, NL we have named a major boulevard after him. (This street is larger than Pattonlaan and Eisenhowerlaan combined!) So I guess that is how the Dutch vote on the issue.

My great uncle served under Monty and had nothing, but praise for him. His visits to talk to front line troops and his support for their right to "horizontal recreation" as he put it, which often put him at odds with the clergy and his fellow officers endeared him to the ordinary fighting man.

Re Martin's observations- I too would recommend neillands' Normandy book ( and his follow up Rhine one) and his take on Monty, but it might be a bit too much of a balanced, objective, and truthful bit of history for some of you to take

I'm not sure why most of you are reacting to a "Monty Bashing" thread. Many of the posts here simply defend his record with various degrees of praise. Sure there are some who would rather continue bashing him. That's their prerogative.

My great uncle served under Monty and had nothing, but praise for him.

I'd heard that his men loved him. I suspect a lot of the admiration stemmed from the fact that their was a greater chance of a) not ending up dead and b) after his debute he gave a sense that they had a real chance of winning the war.

Here in Eindhoven, NL we have named a major boulevard after him. (This street is larger than Pattonlaan and Eisenhowerlaan combined!) So I guess that is how the Dutch vote on the issue.

That's awesome! Thanks for the post Daler240D!

There seems to be this overwhelming belief, even in wargaming circles that the "cavalry" generals were unbeatable geniuses and those who preferred a more methodical approach were idiots. The Patton movie and the "Cult of Saint Rommel the Great" have really skewed that debate.

That being said Monty was a rather nasty person. Self-aggrandizing, spiteful to those above him, despising most below him and shrewd enough to keep his cards to his chest so they couldn't call him out on mistakes.

He did have a knack for making himself popular with the troops (or was often shown in the media as such) and certainly knew how to rebuild defeated troops and keep up morale.

He very honestly admitted that mobile warfare and dashing about wasn't his cup of tea. He was however a pragmatist in his approach to military affairs. His understanding of warfare was mostly formed during WWI and he based his whole modus operandi on the principles he had learned during that time, ie : let the equipment do the job and spare the men.

I would rate Montgomery as competent. He happened to be in the right spot at the right time and became almost too important to sack after Alamein. I think the balance of his efforts isn't as bad as many would think, I'd say he gets a bit too much flak for Arnhem (an uncharacteristic rushed operation that could and did go wrong in too many ways) and too little praise for the things that may have seemed self-evident but did require careful attention. He did make several mistakes, may have been overly cautious at times where he could have used a bit of "cavalry dash" and did consciously muddle his intentions to avoid flak from Churchill.

So, not the legend some portray him as, nor the abysmal failure that has become the standard trope. A skilled if not particularly inspired man with some rather nasty personal traits, but then again generals are paid to fight wars not for their personality.

Bashing Mark Clark isn't so much fun – there doesn't seem to be anyone who will rise up to defend the guy.

Yes the cavalry generals do get a lot of praise, but were far from perfect. Take Patton for example. A one trick pony, good at the pursuit of a defeated enemy, but his aggressive nature lead him into trouble at times. His handling of the battle of Metz demonstrates that the set piece battle was not his forte. Also not a pleasant individual, there are the soldier slapping incidents, and his well documented antisemetism.

Both Monty and Patton would have been much better off if they had learned to keep their ***** mouths shut.

Re Monty, at least we can all agree that his troops loved him – not a minor point in a mass army! (Although I was interested to read that in the autobiographical novel 'Warriors for the Working Day', by Peter Elstob, subsequently issued to subalterns on the RAC Troop Commanders course, the author hints at having 'seen through' Monty's theatrics…)

And no, I did not form my poor opinion of Monty from novels, no matter how relevant, but from the likes of Correlli Barnett and Niall Barr, as well as the late great Robin Neillands, who I was priviledge to meet at a Royal Signals symposium and who was a wonderful gentlemen, as well as soldier and scholar.

Interesting slant on 'cavalry' generals – that revisionist angle is also very current regarding Red Army generals at the moment. One of the academics at my uni, Stephen Brown, has done a lot of research rehabilitating the likes of Voroshilov, and I must say, despite my scepticism, its hard not to agree he has a point. Unfortunately the Russian archives seem to be inaccessible again…

Interesting slant on 'cavalry' generals – that revisionist angle is also very current regarding Red Army generals at the moment. One of the academics at my uni, Stephen Brown, has done a lot of research rehabilitating the likes of Voroshilov, and I must say, despite my scepticism, its hard not to agree he has a point. Unfortunately the Russian archives seem to be inaccessible again…

I'd say that people put far too much emphasis on the Generals who tried to seize the initiative and win every battle with a bit of clever manoeuvre.

Montgomery and Auchinleck before him knew very well that they couldn't beat the Germans at their own game, but they could hold the Germans in check by using defensive positions that couldn't be turned or flanked, forcing Rommel to either fall back or try to force his way through. I'll refer to battles such as Monte-Cassino (and much of the Italian campaign), Stalingrad and Kursk as further examples that positional warfare could be a key element in warfare.

This is not to say that Rommel or Patton were incompetent, but mobility and seizing initiative only work to a certain degree, once your opponent knows how you fight they can come up with a riposte and checkmate you. Patton was lucky that the Germans never regained their strength after Normandy, on a level playing field Patton's Third Army could have been countered and made to pay a very heavy price.

I think Montgomery's image would be far greater had he been the type to stand on a tank, waving a sabre and perpetually edging on his men to charge forward and keep the initiative, like all proper generals in WWII did, but his style was more akin to the criminally incompetent idiots who ran WWI as a slaughterhouse (again showing a deep misunderstanding of WWI warfare)

WWII warfare is far more complex than having commanders like Rommel doing some clever flanking and building a reputation as a "perfect" general.

And this also implies that Montgomery was not an exceptionally good general, he knew his job, performed somewhat adequately and was lucky to last until the end.

Montgomery did manage to hold the northern shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge, while Patton pulled his troops out of battle, turned them 90 degrees, and had them travel quickly over "impassable" roads during a snowstorm to relieve Bastogne.

Even Patton's superiors didn't think he'd be able to do that so quickly, but he and his men did so effectively, despite very difficult circumstances.

That's a tribute to both the men under his command, and his vision to be able to do what others think to be impossible.

When it comes to theatrics it was the Americans that exceled at that. Patton with his pearl handled revolvers and MacArthur with his shades. Theatrics or not Monty's restored the morale of 8th Army.
Patrick R have to agree it is not like haring off after a retreating Afrika Korps had worked well before! Monty was determined that it would be the last time 8th Army went west and that meant proper logistics able to sustain the spearhead right in to Tunisia.
As for the Red Army generals the revisionist view is old news. In fact isn't about time it swung back the other way?!

I think he was good. He operated within his and national goals and guidelines.

As for the Red Army generals the revisionist view is old news.

Of course it is – I was specifically referring to the Red Army cavalry generals, who are still being routinely portrayed as unable to cope with mechanised warfare…

Dynaman8789,

Bashing Mark Clark isn't so much fun – there doesn't seem to be anyone who will rise up to defend the guy.

Good point. And bashing Mac is getting boring, too.

You wouldn't feel like playing Devil's Advocate for Clark, then? I often wonder how, if he made such a mess of things, he was allowed to continue his career and even get promoted. It's almost like he was a sacrificial lamb to protect someone else (probably a superior)- "You take the blame for this now, but we'll look after you later!". My knowledge of the Italian campaign is even less than my knowledge of the ETO, so the above is basically guess work.

I don't know enough to defend Clark either, I've done very little reading on the Italian campaign – something I should look into since it is a fascinating subject.

Monty didn't hold the Northern Shoulder of the Bulge. US 1st Army did. The majority of the action was done before Eisenhower split the responsibility.

Of course it is – I was specifically referring to the Red Army cavalry generals, who are still being routinely portrayed as unable to cope with mechanised warfare…

Well by the time that's done it will be time to revise the revisionist view.

A good argument can be made that Montgomery's failure with Market garden had a lot to do with Horrock's failure to press the attack with sufficient urgency. Not a great fan of M. personally, but he was rather let down by some of his subordinates….Browning especially, though inn fairness Browning and Urquhart (and to a lesser degree Gavin and Taylor)were compromised by Brereton's policy toward airdrops.

Monty Good! Monty Bad! Makes the board red-faced and sad.
Let's be happy and full of glee; we should talk of General Lee.
Not nasty Caesar or cruel Attila, but noble Alex, a right fine fella.
And shush on Cochise or General Giap, we won't stand for that kind of crap.
Don't mention Mao or wise Sun Tsu, or you could be in some dawgy-pooh.
Grant and Patton they're just fine, but Arnold, well that's across the line.
Let's give the Nazis a big wide berth, or a locked account could be your hearse.
So let's limit talk to minis and games, of cataphracts and viking Danes.
We play with toys and don't shape the past, so let's try to not leave ourselves aghast.
With angst and bile and spite and rage, lets leave the wars on the table-stage.
Let's roll our dice and not sling mud and make our plans like Elmer Fudd.
And when our schemes come all to naught, let's smile and say, "A game well fought!"

Cheers and good gaming.
Rod Robertson.

BRAVO, Rod!

Monty didn't hold the Northern Shoulder of the Bulge. US 1st Army did. The majority of the action was done before Eisenhower split the responsibility.

..

..

Bruce C. Clarke, commanded Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division during the critical defense of St. Vith. Montgomery paid several visits to the 7th Armored front: "General Montgomery was impressive to me," Clarke later said,
"Very cool in battle" Before Montgornery's order to withdraw, Clarke said, "lt looks like Custer`s last stand to me."
.
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Eisenhower's Lieutenants.· The Campaign of France and Germany l944-I945. While critical of Monty's arrogance, Weigley acknowledged that
Montgomery "took hold on the north flank with the energy and verve that were as characteristic as his peacockery." Weigley defended Monty's tactic of giving ground the better to build up his reserves, or where the benefits of holding on would no longer match the cost. He withdrew the U.S. 7th Armored Division and the 82"' Airborne Division from their forward positions. General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander of the 7th Armored Division, reported on December 22 that
the time had come to abandon St. Vith. The defense of St Vith had dealt a crippling delay to the German's 6th SS Panzer Army drive on Leige-as important an action as Bastogne's stand, though not as dramatic, Hasbrouck's corps commander, however, General Matthew B. Ridgway opposed withdrawal. He was decisively overuled by Montgomery. Soon a message reached Hasbrouck from Monty, "You have accomplished your mission-a mission well done. It is time to withdraw." Hasbrouck would later go so far as to say that Montgomery "saved the 7th Armored Division."

J. D. Morelock, Generals of the
Ardennes; American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge.
while Bradley and Patton were angry at Monty`s receiving command in the north, many lower level American commanders were delighted to have the British Field Marshal take charge of the confusing situation in the northern sector of the Bulge. Monty's "timely assumption of command in the north," writes Morelock, was welcomed by Hodges, Simpson (9th U.S. Army commander), and their subordinate commanders who were fighting desperately to stop the German drive. He comments, "it cannot be denied that Montgomery brought much needed order and discipline to a confused and chaotic situation." Hodges‘ 1st Army headquarters was in a shambles, his staff having abandoned their command post in Spa in such panic that secret documents and classified operational maps were left scattered about.

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.
Carlo D'Este:

The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years."

His appalling record in Normandy and NW Europe, and his lies about the relative merits of Allied and Axis armour to the politicians, are well known…

Not to me. I know the Montgomery who as ground commander totally demolished the German Army in Normandy.
Nor do I know of any 'lies' about Axis armour.
Perhaps you are a bit confused?

The US 1st Army had also come under temporary command of (or in very close liaison with) Montgomery's 21st Army Group on a number of previous occasions between Normandy and the Bulge, so command structures and working relationships were already in place.

As for his troops loving him: In the ACW, McClellan's troops loved him, but that doesn't mean he was a great general.

Confederate General D. H. Hill once said that the troops will love a general who brings victory, whether he does it by clever maneuvering or by clumsily using overwhelming numbers, so long as he wins.