"Best ACW Tactical Studies?" Topic

Civil War Infantry Tactics: Training, Combat, and Small-Unit Effectiveness

Earl J. Hess

Some of the books mentioned by Queen are good, but aren't actually 'tactical studies', more focused on the narrative of various battles rather than examining tactics.

Eric J. Wittenberg wrote books on both the Brandy and Trevilian Station cavalry battles. While more of a battle narrative, he does look at what worked and didn't in both battles.

Paddy Griffith's Battle Tactics of the Civil War is well worth a read. I found it most thought provoking. It gives a fair analysis of how and why pre-war tactical theory based on Napoleonic experience using professional armies changed during the war in the face of battlefield experience, citizen armies and technological advances

Battle in the Civil War: Generalship and Tactics in America, 1861-65Paddy Griffith

link

As one reviewer wrote " It was very useful in seeing how armies marched and fought during that period as well as the logistical requirements for battle.The book is filled with great line drawings depicting the various aspects of the Civil War battlefield including march order, medical treatment, spies,fire fights and more."

This is an excellent starter and Quick Reference for both tactics and strategy To me it is essential reading before wading into detailed texts costing much more You have to know the basics and this book gives it to you

The illustrations are fantastic and clearly illustrate the material

Antietam: The Soldier's Battle by JM Priest

Paddy Griffith's books are good. There are some useful illustrations in Osprey and the hardback, published first, sets out his case.

Griffith's get bad reviews, because he argues that the ACW, was heavily influenced by Napoleonic theory that it was not as modern as some would think harking back to the earlier wars of the 19thC. Compared to the Wars of German Unification and the Franco-Prussian War I'd say his was correct.

"Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam"

link

I recommend any book written by Stephen Sears.

Go to the source: Hardee's and Casey's "Infantry Tactics"!

@Queen Catherine

Unfortunately very few scholars have gone to the trouble of studying the drill manuals. No matter what modifications were made for field service (and they were fewer than many might think) everything still comes back to the drill manuals. The soldiers and especially the officers used the manuals to learn their trades and the evidence is conclusive that most of the time what was used on the parade ground was also used in battle.

Sadly, many otherwise good historians have failed to go to the work of understanding the manuals. Just a few months ago I had a very interesting exchange of e-mails with Earl Hess, helping him understand the numerous technical mistakes he made in his book "Civil War Infantry Tactics: Training, Combat, and Small-Unit Effectiveness". (It's still a very good book despite the errors.)

Of course the best way to understand the tactics is to actually go out and do them. Reenactors such as myself have a big advantage in that regard.

Of course the best way to understand the tactics is to actually go out and do them. Reenactors such as myself have a big advantage in that regard.

Agreed Scott. Learned a lot as a reenactor.

Mind you, it's getting wargamers to accept the validity of your experiences, let alone historians; there was a argument here a few years back about the ability of artillerymen to remove wheels from artillery and take them into a Napoleonic infantry square. I pointed out that as a reenactor I had removed a wheel from a gun for maintenance at an event. My unit did it with a 12pdr Napoleon. For those who are interested a Napoleon an carriage weighs about 2,100 lbs, to remove the wheel you have between 3 or 4 men on the hand spike which is passed under the axle tree and slightly lifted off the grown. The retaining pin is pulled out and the wheel pulled off. The men on the hand spike keep the gun upright until the wheel or the relacement from the second cassion is put on. Whilst it is theoretically possible to lower the axle to the ground you then have the problem of raising the gun carriage and barrel upright this work was normally done with a block, tackle and a tripod. When I pointed out the problems of taking off the and relifting the gun. The reaction?

With no disrespect to our re-enactor friends, the re-enactors main objective is to have fun whist remaining un-injured and fit for work on Monday morning. The Waterloo artillerymans' motivation was to stay alive and keep their guns firing as long as possiblle. I would have thought the deciding factor of whether the wheels were taken off or nor would have been the distance to the squares and what was considered to be "the last moment possible."

From here:

TMP link

So whilst we get something out of the experience those who choose to sit in their armchairs and not accept our experiences.

Well, that is a problem. But some historians are receptive. Earl Hess seemed genuinely interested in what I had to say and admitted my knowledge of the book tactics far exceeded his.

When I was in graduate school my advisor was Russell Weigley, widely regarded as one of America's top military historians, and he felt my reenacting experience, combined with my book studies gave me a unique and valuable perspective on CW tactics.

ScottWashburn – were most of the tactical mistakes you corresponded with Hess related to his misperception of moving by the flank? He simply got it wrong by talking about narrow columns. He seems to assume the files turned 90 degrees right or left in place to do the movement whereas a column of fours would be formed perpendicular to the line's front to conduct the actual movement. I always felt this was fairly clear in the drill manuals and was surprised to see the error. Just curious if there were others I missed as otherwise he seemed pretty on the mark (though he missed the importance of the column of fours).

gamertom, yes, the problems he had in his book with marching by the flank made up the bulk of our conversation. I think I've got him straightened out :) He also seemed to be treating a column of divisions and a double column as the same thing. While they might look the same (two companies wide by five 'divisions' deep) they are two very different things when it comes to ploying and deploying.

Drill book errors aside I'm a fan of Hess. I have to confess I never picked up on the items Scott refers to no doubt for the same reasons.

You really do need some detail to spot where a column of divisions and a double column are being used in a conflated manner.

That said I'm not aware of anyone else who has conducted a study in the same way, though I'll be happy to read anyone who has. The notation of use of various formations in terms of what, where, how and why backed up by examples is excellent.

BTW: I was intrigued to see the old Griffith debate pop up here.

Particularly as Hess in his earlier "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat" openly states he was previously in disagreement with one of the main areas of Griffith's work which many people derided – the actual range that fire combat occurred.

I don't think I have ever heard anybody attack Hess on the research into the matter that appears in his book, or the conclusion that – guess what Griffith was right!

For the most part the achievable range of the rifle musket was not exploited and actions commonly took place at under 150 yards, due to all the factors Griffith had illuminated.

The Griffith haters out there (of which there are still quite a few) might do well to read an American confirmation of what he said almost 30 years ago!

Queen Catherine,

The thread you quoted from was mine I believe. The books I recommended are battle studies at the regimental level which allow following the struggle at a more detailed tactical level as opposed to a broader overview approach. They are perfect for the battlefield tramper.
While these books contain some formational information, they are not "drill book" studies or focused on the same audience as Hess and Griffith let alone Hardee or Casey,

Queen Catherine,

There's a strong probability we won't see any thing more from Paddy being as how he passed over in 2010.

I side with Scott on all of this. You absolutely MUST have a foundation built from reading and understanding the manuals of the period BEFORE you can understand why some modifications were done here and there, and almost always as a result of a specific and unique situation that arose.

The men drilled at least 3 hours a day, and often 6 (two periods, one morning, one afternoon) per day monday through saturday. Heck,they even drilled while on campaign when idle for a few days. The men, having that solid foundation in drill, and instinctively knowing what to do when a command was given, either by mouth or bugle, could then react to a shortened command, phrase, or some such action.

For example, during the Wilderness Campaign, the 3rd Maine was deployed in a reserve position, in line, but laying down. Suddenly, a courier rode up and gave the division commander's orders for the 3rd to move forward in support of the advanced line. Moses Lakeman, the 3rd's Colonel, recounts this event. He wrote that he rode to the front of the regiment, drew his sword and ordered "3rd Maine, Forward!" and started to advance. The men of the 3rd knew exactly what he wanted, and quickly rose up, shouldered their arms, unfurled the colors and advanced, dressing their ranks on the march.

One other point: Knowing instinctively the drill according to the manuals let the troops react VERY quickly to virtually any command or situation, and many wargamers and historians are unaware of just how quickly trained troops can change formations, and respond to orders such as throwing out a skirmish line, etc. It doesn't take but a minute or two to deploy from column to line, and only seconds to go from a line of battle to marching by the flank.

So my advice is to learn the manuals, and THEN start to go through the actual AAR's from the various regimental and brigade commanders to see how they were used. You'd have your eyes opened right quickly about the differences between the real soldiers back then, and how they are treated on the tabletop. Or in the history books.

Right you are TKindred. When I was in graduate school (and already a long-time reenactor) my master's thesis was, in part, about whether the by-the-book tactics were really used in the field. I went through thousands of reports in the Official Records looking for detailed accounts. Sadly, most reports don't mention the specific maneuvers that were used in action (such things being so routine that few officers felt it worthwhile recording). But when they did include details I found my knowledge of the drill invaluable in interpreting what was written. I remember one fascinating account of a brigade of USCT making a diversionary attack on the extreme eastern end of Lee's Petersburg lines in November of 1864. The brigade found Confederate cavalry on their right flank, so they put one regiment in square(!) to hold off the horsemen while the other two regiments assaulted the entrenchments. One regiment successfully carried the works (which were held only by a line of skirmishers) and captured two artillery pieces. But the other regiment passed through some woods and became hopelessly disorganized and their attack failed. Reading the report, I realized exactly what had gone wrong and how the disorganization had occurred. Without knowledge of the drill, the report would make little sense.

Tim & Scott,

The problem for gamers is that authors either don't understand the basics, or if they do, applying them screws up the wargame world they have invented.

With rules that have no accurate ground scale, frontage or time relationships, its a lot easier to say any column to line, or line to column move is half a turn and just leave it there.

Selling rules where any base size is cool as long as both sides are the same is now the custom. Nobody likes re basing and you lose most of you potential buyers from the get go if you insist on it.

By that point you will already have lost the "its only a game, who cares?" contingent anyway.

However, one of the things I liked about Hess is it raised the possibility of some kind of menu option for rules where, based on circumstances, you could chose drill manoeuvre A,B or D but not C, E or F. Time and positional considerations would then be applied.

Now granted according to his findings a lot of that would come down to "marching by the flank" (regardless of the total accuracy of how its actually done, for the moment) because all he had to go on was what Col.Hiram F. Soggybottom wrote 150 years ago.

That said, at least the record is there and if, as he states, "marching by the flank" was a go to option so be it. I've played Civil War rules where it doesn't even exist!

It makes me scream that we can't get more of this detail into Civil War gaming – at what ever level.

Here we have a conflict were the enemies shared the same language, within minor details, the same drill and a massive level of recorded practice. Why in hell are we stuck with "half a turn" style rules!

Look a Napoleonics with multiple nations and languages, totally different drill practices and a war where things evolved over three times the length of conflict of the Civil War and you can understand why its beyond the possible to have detail reflected on the table top.

What's the excuse in the Civil War?

Trajanus,

You are correct that trying to add all the details of the drill would make for an impractical game. Years ago I created a set of charts as a training aid for my reenactors. Each chart took a standard formation (line of battle, column of companies, marching by the flank, etc.) and then showed all of the possibilities for movement or formation change from that formation, giving the proper command and referencing the paragraphs in Hardee's or Casey's that explained it. It was really useful (and I sent a copy to Earl Hess who was quite tickled with them). I then happened to show them to a gamer and he tried to turn them into the heart of a set of game rules. Well, it sort of worked, but most casual gamers had no patience for all the fiddly parts since they didn't care about 'getting it right'. So it is (has been , and always will be) a delicate balancing act between realism and playability. But a knowledge of how the tactics work is still valuable.

Trajanus,

I concur with you and echo Scott's comments.

What I would do, game system wise, would be to allocate so many points per unit to be expended as it executes actions. Each point could be X number of inches of movement, or a single round of fire, or a formation change, etc. I would let the unit do whatever actions it wanted to in any order it wanted, as long as it had points to spend. Once they are gone, that unit's turn is over.

You could reduce the number of points depending upon whether the unit was green or poorly trained or led, or increase them for better trained/led units, etc.

I'm just tossing out stuff here, but having an "average" unit, and say allocating it 6 points, could be a good baseline. You could also add or subtract points based on morale.

These points could be kept on the unit's roster sheet or card, and just checked off as spent. At the end of the turn the boxes are cleared and the points available for the next turn, etc.

Heck, you wouldn't need a lot of charts with this sort of system, just a list of available actions and what each one cost, point-wise.

I think I'm gonna sit down and work on this idea a bit.

ScottWashburn, Trajanus, TKindred: What studying I have been able to do on tactics in the Civil War, which is no where near as extensive as the three of you have done, has lead me to believe as you do about going to the drill manuals. This topic has fascinated me for many years and since time and space limitations have prevented me from doing the research I would like to have been able to do I always find your comments interesting and insightful. I wonder, and please excuse my ignorance in these academic matters, if it is possible to obtain by purchase a copy of Scott's masters thesis on tactics. Thank you, John Miller

John,

I may have to do a little digging! I wrote that over 20 years ago using an Apple IIC computer! I may be able to find a hard copy and scan it.

In the meantime, if you have any interest in my Formation Change Matrix, I just now put it up on my PaperTerrain site as a PDF download. You can find it here:

link

Scott, I notice that in your chart you use a 6-company battalion. Why is that?

I became interested in the drill manuals and various tactical formation changes after meeting George Jeffreys in the early 1980's and participating in one of his variable length bound games. He then disappeared from the wargaming world only to surface again in a Yahoo group in the mid-1990s. While his VLB system remained essentially unplayable (in reality it was a type of Kreigspiel game), the need to understand how long these formation changes took remained an interest. The difficulty with saying anything definite is the number of variables involved, one of the main ones being the amount of drill undertaken by the majority of the unit's members.

I too tinkered with ways of introducing this into gaming rules. I ran into several consideration which complicated the issue. To really do this right, some form of point system similar to that described bu TKindred is necessary. I happen to think time intervals best represent these points. For example, each point could be said to represent 30 seconds of time with one turn representing 5 minutes (10 points). Depending upon the deployment or ployment method being used, the longest length of ground covered by one single subunit (say a company) may dictate how many points are needed. And the length of each company also factors into this because the final frontage covered by that company affects the amount of ground that has to be covered. So a unit of 200 men should be able to make most formation changes quicker than a 400 man unit (depending upon the formation change – going from line to a column of fours to march by the flank would not be appreciably affected. Then you need to look at the ground scale being used in the game and the figure scale and make sure these all make sense given the point system being used. If your unit of maneuver is a full brigade, you're unlikely to be using 30 second intervals.

I finally concluded that for the gaming scale I most frequently use for a regiment being the unit of maneuver (1"=20-25 yards, 1 figure=20 men, one full turn=10 minutes), none of this stuff really had much impact on the game over simply saying it took half a turn to make the formation change. In the end I always asked myself, how does doing x and y matter in terms of the overall game? It's one reasons I don't use skirmishers much in my games. I have rules for them, but using them slows things down and ultimately using them doesn't have much impact at the scale I'm using. In a moderated game where you didn't have the helicopter view of where all the units are, I certainly would be using skirmishers. But I play one on one unmoderated games where all the cards are visible on the table. Which is why it's a game.

Don, It was strictly to save space on the paper! The principles remain the same with 6 companies as they do with 10, but I could make the diagrams a little bigger and easier to read using only 6 companies. And this was originally designed with reenactors in mind and their battalions rarely have 10 companies.

Guys, just a question on Moving by the Flank while I think of it.

Let's say just to make it simple I'm moving forward by the Right.

Would I need to halt and face into Line, before forming column of companies, by wheeling. Or would be possible to form column by files with each successive company closing up from the rear?

Hope I've explained that right!

Trajanus,

If you are talking about marching forward in a column of fours (marching by the flank, but moving towards the enemy), then the Colonel can simply give the order "By company, into line…MARCH" then men automatically move their weapons into the position of "Right Shoulder, shift" and at the double, swing up and into line. It's sort of an organized mob chaos movement, but when every man knows his place in the company, it works well, and quickly.

What you then end up with is a column of companies in line, stacked one behind the other, at full interval.

From this point, you can move to either a column of divisions, or remain in a column of companies, and with either one, close the interval if you see fit.

You can also move into line through oblique movement. If you need to form line facing to the right, you can wheel each company into position, the rear companies marching forward and wheeling as the one in front of them clears.

To form line to the left, just left wheel every company together.

There's other methods, and I might have gotten the actual words of the commands wrong, but you get the drift. I hope…….

Anyone interested in the Horse and Musket period should IMHO avail themselves of a copy of George Jeffrey's VLB (Various Length Bound) rules ….. not necessarily to play them (the mechanics are an intellectual challenge indeed) but to benefit from the tremendous amount of valuable analyses and insights they contain.

An adjunct publication I found useful in understanding tactical evolutions of the period is George Jeffrey's "Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars" (edited by Ned Zuparko), which describes evolutions in some detail and includes a guide to expected elapsed times to completion. It proved very useful in appreciating the differences between traditional European evolutions and the new French method.

IIRC, to march a close order line by the flank, individual four man sub-elements of the line would wheel L or R to form a column of fours, move a desired distance, then re-deploy as desired.

As to the relationship between the drill manuals and fighting tactics on the battlefield, I agree that the manuals dictated methods in the early period of the war during which a significant number of smoothbore muskets were in use and in the Eastern theater which featured more cleared terrain. However, in the Western theater, my sense is that its more difficult, heavily wooded terrain encouraged a movement toward more open order tactics; Sherman's writing certainly gives this impression. It is a practical impossibility to maneuver in a close order line at 28in frontages in swamps or terrain like the Wilderness.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

Blutarski,

FWIW, in the eastern theater,it wasn't until the start of the overland campaign in May of 1864 that the AoP and other field units were completely armed with rifled weapons. Even at Gettysburg, there were at least 40 federal regiments still armed with muskets. Even Lee's army had a higher proportion of rifled weapons than Meade's at Gettysburg.

Queen C: stuff like that would mostly depend on things like: how well are the regiments drilled? how experienced in battle? how well commanded? how well placed by higher-ups? (did someone stick them in a blind spot? with no supports?)

"Even at Gettysburg, there were at least 40 federal regiments still armed with muskets."

TK – Does your use of the term "muskets" imply smoothbores? Or are you including converted rifled muskets in your calculus? Based upon what I have read in Fuller ("The Rifled Musket"), converted rifled muskets were distinctly superior to smoothbores at typical battle ranges although they lacked the performance of minie rifles at long ranges.

According to Busey & Martin, of 242 Union regiments listed in the 30 June 1863 ordnance returns, the following were identified as armed wholly or in part with smoothbores:

RMs = rifles (Springfields, Enfields)
CMs = converted rifled muskets.
BLRs = breech-loading rifles

88 PA – Mixed RMs + SBs.
81 PA – Mixed CMs + SBs.
63 NY – SBs.
69 NY – SBs.
88 NY – SBs.
116 PA – SBs.
145 PA – SBs.
1 MN – Mixed RMs + Sharps + CMs + SBs.
82 NY – Mixed RMs + SBs.
106 PA – Mixed RMs + SBs.
4 OH – Mixed RMs + SBs.
8 OH – Mixed RMs + SBs.
10 NY – Mixed RMs + less than 10 SBs.
12 NJ – SBs.
11 MA – SBs.
11 NJ – Mixed RMs + CMs + SBs.
12 NH – Mixed RMs + SBs.
7 NJ – Mixed RMs + SBs.
9 MA – Mixed CMs + SBs.
155 PA – SBs.
13 PA Res – Mixed RMs + BLRs + SBs.
5 PA Res – SBs.
9 PA Res – SBs.
3 NJ – Mixed RMs + SBs.
93 PA – Mixed CMs + SBs.
102 PA – Mixed RMs + SBs.
27 PA – Mixed RMs + SBs.

Of 242 Union infantry regiments listed -

214 regiments were listed as armed with rifled and/or converted rifled muskets)

18 regiments were listed with a mix of rifles, converted rifled muskets and smoothbores.

10 regiments were listed as armed solely with smoothbores.

- – -

The inference to be drawn (even assuming that only the flank companies of the regiments listed with mixed arms were carrying rifled weapons) is that more than 90 percent of the infantrymen of Union army were carrying rifled long arms by mid-1863.

FWIW.

B

Queen Catherine,

I would urge you to look at "Grandeur" which is a Napoleonic era expansion for "Impetus". In Grandeur, each base represents 1 brigade. Skirmishers aren't represented on the table, as they are blended in with the brigade strengths.

I've been playing around with using this system for the ACW,as I am a great fan of Impetus itself (an ancients period system).

For 10mm & 6mm minis, the authors suggest 60mm frontage. The number of minis you choose to use is entirely up to you.

Considering what you want, you might have a look at "Grandeur"

Free .pdf download here:

link

Thanks Tim,

I note your:

If you are talking about marching forward in a column of fours (marching by the flank, but moving towards the enemy)

Yes I was, but I see "column of fours" I haven't had chance to check the drill books after Scott's comment on Hess but is this the crux of the matter?

Hess assuming column by two ranks and the true formation for marching by the flank being fours?

Marching by the flank was habitually in fours. You could do it in twos if you really wanted to (or if the way was so narrow that fours wouldn't fit) but it was not a good thing to do. When a battle line faced by the flank and went from two ranks to four, it eliminated half the files and opened up enough space between the fours that they could march comfortably. If you do it in twos, each man is so close to the man in front it is inevitable that a great stretching out of the formation takes place. Each man hesitates a moment to let the man in front take a step before he follows. So a regiment will stretch out to twice its original length. The head of this column of twos would start marching and it might be a minute or more before the tail of the column would begin to move. And when the head of the column stopped it could take another minute to squeeze all the 'air' out of the column. Not a good thing in combat.

QC,

Here is a "Real Life" example of a Harland's Brigade at Antietam in a similar situation of events as to what you want to model.

link

I believe you are trying to overthink the reality of what occurs at the brigade level as there is much the individual regiments within that brigade are doing (and well within the time of your game) that simply cannot (nor is it important to) be modeled given the scale of your game.

A brigade being flanked by an advance of a known enemy will be able to get 1 or 2 regiments turned to face the threat. Unless a brigade is caught totally be surprise, at very short distance, it can react to such threats in short order.

Trying to include a lot of extra dice rolling, die modifiers, inane command control rules, and other minutia at this level detracts from the basic concept of doing a game at the brigade level.

More important at this level is the size and freshness of the troops, the timing of their commitment to the fight, the staying power of the unit, and the cooperation with nearby formations.

One reason I quit using most published rules and use my own was way too much deviation from reality and real life maneuver as Scott and Tim have already expressed, and the inclusion of too many Mickey Mouse rules and modifiers that have little bearing on a battle involving thousands of men and hundreds of artillery pieces in a large engagement often fought over multiple days.

FWIW also, brigades of 2,000 are pretty rare except early in the war. 1500 men plus or minus a couple hundred would be more typical. Some brigades (such as the Irish Brigade at Gettysburg) were smaller that a lot of individual regiments.

Kim

Thanks Scott,

Just finished looking at the drill book and there's your reply!

Would I be correct in thinking that if you moved by twos you risked forming line with your ranks inverted, if attacked from the flank? Depending which side the attack came from, obviously!

Blutarski,

It's not just a matter of regiments, the number of men matters too. It's a more realistic idea of non rifle use.

For example, the Irish Brigade's units quite correctly show on the list but they totalled a little over 500 men and that includes officers etc who didn't have muskets of any kind.

QC,

I would highly recommend Bradley M. Gottfried's book "Brigades of Gettysburg" to give you the kind of insight of combat focused at the brigade level. His companion book, "Maps of Gettysburg" will give a visual reference of their actions.

These two books give great insight to how brigades fought and were handled by there commanders.

Kim

Hi Trajanus – I do agree with your point, but counting heads by individual regiments posed a much bigger task than I wanted to undertake.

B

QC -

As you are interested in the brigade level, I highly recommend the first two volumes of a trilogy on the Chickamauga Campaign. The titles are The Chickamauga Campaign: A Mad Irregular Battle and The Chickamauga Campaign: Glory or the Grave. These are by David A Powell. There's also an associated book titled The Maps of Chickamauga also by David A. Powell. This volume is similar to the Maps of Gettysburg volume mentioned in a previous post and contains all the maps in the two volumes, but in a more readable format.

So why do I recommend these books? The Union and the Confederates used different brigade level formations during the battle and these differences played a large role in some of the specific actions.

The Union typically deployed in two lines of regiments. As most of their brigades had 4 regiments, the formation often was two up and two back. These were pretty maneuverable, but had shorty frontages and were prone to being flanked.

The Confederates deployed all the regiments in a single line, but would stack brigade lines behind brigade lines. As some of the brigades contained 6 or more regiments, a single line deployment produced a long front and command difficulties.

The type of situation you postulated several posts back did occur during this battle. IF the brigade or division commander could see the enemy units, the Union brigades could readily change fronts (or the rear line would). The Confederate brigades, not so much.

I learned much more about how brigades were handled and what could befall them by reading these two volumes than the various texts you've mentioned (Nosworthy, Hess, and others). If you are truly interested in better understanding brigade formations and maneuvering, these are must read books.

Talking about tactical studies, I ran across the following in my library – very much a microscopic view –

"The Struggle for the Bliss Farm at Gettysburg", by Elwood Christ.

B

I second, "Antietam: The Soldier's Battle" by JM Priest. Great book for planning scenarios.

Scott: Thank you very much for the pdf link, I will try to get a hold of that. John Miller

The Griffith haters out there (of which there are still quite a few) might do well to read an American confirmation of what he said almost 30 years ago!

NJH: Logic would dictate that confirmation occurs after an assertion, not before it. Therefore, it is more rightly that Griffith seeks to confirm what has come before.

I'm not convinced that Griffith is correct in all his assertions. I have read Griffith and Hess and "The Civil War Diary of Allen Morgan Geer," which Hess references in his book. And, innumerable books about the ACW including Hardees' Light Infantry Tactics.

I do have a couple of thoughts:
1. The main argument of Griffith seems to stand upon the foundation that the ACW tactics were little changed since Napoleon. If that were true then why would Hardee and Casey be so important? Why didn't both armies just use Napoleonic tactics? Why the need to codify something already codified?

2. Griffith et al seem to be advocates of the idea that the Officers and NCOs of the ACW exercised slavish obedience to Napoleonic tactics. However, several posts here would suggest that Hardee and Casey were used in concert with pragmatic lessons learned in early campaigning, which would indicate that Hardee and Casey were more a baseline than a "bible" for tactics.

3. So, let's say Hardee and Casey are baselines with the practicalities of actual combat and maneuvering used to implement the tactical intentions of commanders. If true, then the actual tactics can hardly be said to be Napoleonic with such departures.

Just some random thoughts.

I am surprised nobody mentioned Noseworthy's book On the ACW 'Bloody Crucible of Courage'.

Dantheman

I guess Noseworthy's book is where the thread started.

However, I was surprised that "The Quest For Annihilation"
by Christopher Perello hasn't been mentioned. This is very much a nuts and bolts examination of civil war tactics, and illustrates each point with very detailed examples of how the theory worked out in practice.

GaT