"Bills and Halberds repelling cavalry" Topic

Bills and halberds were apparently pretty popular during the late medieval and early renaissance period among dismounted knights and heavy infantry.

I would assume the halberd, as a weapon, was just as effective as a spear in repelling cavalry charges. The spear used by the common foot soldier in massed static formations could hold off cavalry. Were dismounted knights and men-at-arms just as effective using the halberd to hold off cavalry charges or were there any formation or other tactical factors which made them more vulnerable to cavalry charges than massed, defensive foot with spears?

Thrusting spears would probably be longer than halberds and thus better for resisting cavalry.

As I recall, the effectiveness of the halberd against cavalry came from the prominent ax and spiky bits. These were used to snag the rider, allowing the infantryman to pull the cavalryman from his mount to the ground.

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I would suggest any body of closely formed foot, who hold their ground, a project a wall of spikey things in the direction of charging horses will repel them.

My thinking has always been that horses don't as a rule like running straight into things. To my mind a cavalry charge is more like a game of chicken either the infantry will break before impact (especially if poorly trained a cavalry charge is no doubt a scary thing to be facing) or the cavalry horses will pull up before impact and most likely wheel away.

I think morale is probably a bigger factory than weapons in these circumstances I'm sure others will disagree.

I would suggest – and it is only a suggestion as I haven't made a study of it – that the use of the bill or halberd would be more common where the opponent was likely to also be dismounted. Where the opponent was likely to be mounted, a spear or even a pike might be more common. Examples might be Scots spearmen (disregarding the tactical failure to respond to increased use of missile troops by the English throughout the period from Halidon Hill to Flodden) or Swiss pike, as opposed to Swiss halberdiers. The hook or spike on the bill or halberd would be a bit of a last resort.

There was an increasing tendency to field more pikes over the period you describe which corresponds to a return by mounted troops to fighting on horseback. Also, English armies went from having a proportion of spearmen to a proportion of billmen over the period from Crecy and Poitiers to the post-Agincourt occupation when the French tended to dismount to fight them.

I would suggest Sir Charles Oman, Art of Warfare in the Middle Ages, Ian Heath, Armies of the Middle Ages or Michael Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience might be helpful.

Pikes became a major part in Swiss armies after they met Burgundian and German horse on the plains. In their mountains, they were fine with Halberds.

Prince Rupert is spot-on.
22nd foot- general engagements between the Scots and the English were exceedingly rare; offhand I can only think of Culblean, Neville's Cross and another whose name escapes me between Halidon and Flodden. Of course the normal practice of Anglo-Scottish warfare (predating Halidon by a generation and more) was based firmly in heavy cavalry actions from Roslin to Redeswire.
Please, for pity's sake, ignore Oman (and those who have depended on him subsequently) in relation to medieval Scotland. he was way out of his depth and had a romantic agenda to pursue – not to mention a deal of plagiarism from Gardiner.

Oman is fine. Just supplement him with later stuff. A lot of what he said still stands, and he is good for details.

Pikes only made up less than 25% of a Swiss army in the 14th and most of the 15th centuries. They tended to hold the corners when in square, iirc. In time the pike formed more like half of the army, again, iirc. In any case, the halberd and two-handed sword guys were in the center and rear, and came out when the formation got locked in melee, to assault the flanks and get in close, etc.

Before pikes increased in number, Swiss casualties when fighting cavalry were heavier. The lances of the mounted MAAs could get in easier. Thus the transition steadily to more pike.

Dismounted MAAs could deal with pike better than cavalry. And halberd had no advantage against dismounted MAA. Then the fight became a matter of who fought hardest i.e. had the best morale. That could be a standoff. But when an outnumbered body of Swiss would fight to the last man and take double their number down, the invasion was doomed and retreat after "such a victory" (Oman) was the only option….

> retreat after "such a victory" (Oman) was the only option

Good example why "a lot of what he said still stands" is not really consense. Probably referring to that one:
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Uglyfatbloke – Are you thinking of Otterburn? Piperdean? Sark? Verneuil? (Probably not many spears present there though.)

Herkybird and Great War Ace – precisely my point on the increasing proportion and use of Swiss pike, thanks.

Great War Ace – I agree on Oman, he is very good on the Swiss wars against the Burgundians. Perhaps not for Scotland if UFB is right.

"Consense." That's a new one for me. I see that it means to form a consensus. Your Wiki link agrees with Oman. So what is your point?

Oman isn't that bad for the Scottish wars. Like I said, read Oman along with the newer seminal treatments. They all exist virtually to resist Oman, and find out things that he said that weren't quite spot on….

My old riding instructor told us. "You cannot command what you do not understand." The first six lessons were on the physiognomy, anatomy, and psychology of the horse, coupled with some very simple techniques of riding. I was able to ask him about these questions along with the idea of cavalry charging into infantry as shock. He said that it was pure fantasy, and the horse will not do it if he has the slightest chance not to, and if he doesn't he is invariably going to dig his heels in and stop, and send his rider flying head over heels to the ground in front of him.

Many times in an equestrian event I have seen a rider thrown and the horse in a panic go careening around the ring. The horse is brought under control by persons simply standing in front of the horse and waving his arms, and the horse always turns, and gradually they narrow the circle until the horse tires himself out and allows himself to be taken in hand by one of the persons and led away to his stall.

Time and again you read in the manuals by Comines and others that it is folly to charge into infantry unless they have first been "disarrayed" that is, the formation broken up.

As my instructor told me--"the pikes and halbreds were there to scare the riders- the horses were already scared by the wall of infantry.

….I think morale is probably a bigger factory than weapons in these circumstances I'm sure others will disagree….

I agree although I think sometimes morale is influenced by the weapon as well. If you think you have the right weapon, the morale is better than without the best weapon.

Grounded weapons will work just like an angled, sharpened stake: if the rider insists on putting his horse into it the animal will get impaled. In the case of pikes, even the riders can be impaled or at the very least picked of the back of the horse. The faster the momentum of the horse and rider, the greater the force of impalement. It's that simple. I doubt that it took science to understand back then. So although a horse in a dense and deep formation can be made to move forward into what it would rather not, if the riders insist, it usually did not happen, because the riders usually knew the risks they were running. The trick was to get the infantry to open up. Without that happening the cavalry was only a threat, not literally pushing home to melee at a disadvantage.

But I like my ancmed rules to have "crunch, crunch, crunch" in them. So cavalry will quite often try melee, even when stalled out in front of a phalanx. And because horses are big and threatening sometimes the cavalry manage quite well. It all depends on the situation, and the dice, of course. :)

>Your Wiki link agrees with Oman. So what is your point?

>retreat after "such a victory"

The first reaction to the battle of St Birs was for the Bernese to panic and think hard how to escape the consequences of the destruction of some of their best fighters. Defeat seemed imminent. The Dauphin used this more as a pretext to end this conflict, as any prolonged involvement into the Swiss wars was not really in his interest.
This unexpected retreat of the French from the conflict elevated the battle to an event that long defied ratio. Like Azincourt for the English longbow, or Vienna for the Polish Hussar, this battle became part of folklore.

The losses of the Armagnaks were only slightly higher then those of the Bernese, and while the Swiss certainly showed an impressive fighting ability and will, they also demonstrated a devestating lack of tactical sense.

Neither was the invasion doomed, nor was retreat after "that victory" inevitable. Oman simply errs, following the myth rather then history in his estimation.

In this case, myth and history are not far apart. If the casualties are closer to 1,200 then it is close to two invaders dead per dead Swiss fighter. A mere quibble anyway, since an assertion that this battle only gave the Armagnacs their excuse to break off the invasion is saying that the battle didn't really impress anyone till long after the fact. I doubt that very much….

Where did you get the impression that I said "LONG after the fact".

There were several reasons for France to take part in this conflict – to gain control of Basel (not a realistic goal to start with, but in war anything can happen) and to strenghten the divide within the Swiss (to start with, this was a war between Zurich and the other cantons) and between the Swiss and the Empire (at that point the Swiss still were considered part of the Empire). The main reason, however, was to get the no longer used soldiers out of France. In the years before these "Armanacs" were already sent to Alsace or Lorraine and devasted these imperial areas. They were now hired and send to relieve the siege of Zurich by the Swiss cantons. It was NEVER an invasion of the Armanacs – they were the main part of the French forces that worked in close coordination with Habsburg forces – the leader who tried to secure the ford near St. Birs was a Habsburger. A Bernese force surprised and defeated a vanguard and then forded the river – for whatever reason – and stumbled into the main army (also to the surpris of this army). They DID kill more then they lost, but were wiped out in the process. To claim that losses of 2000-4000 (the former is more likely) were substantial in French (France! Not the Armagnacs) withdrawal from that conflict is assumptious. An assumption many made AFTER France decided to jump out of the war – though "jumping" out meant: With the annihilation of this Bernese force Zurich was relieved and would not fall, the war would continue (for another two years), and mainly the Armagnacs were NOT led back to France but left to wander into Imperial territory.
It took some month of devastations near Trier, skirmishes and massive Imperial pressure for France to allow these unit to come back to French territory. Their ultimate solution was to create the Ordonnance and take the core, some 4500 infantry and 1500 lances of these, into permanent service – enough to suppress the remaining bands.

All objectives of France for their part in this war were fulfilled (save the conquest of Basel, which could have led to a major war with both the Cantons and the Empire at a time where they were nicely at war with each other). To claim that France was forced to this because the victory was too costly is, well…
I know that you and Oman and many Swiss nationalist of the 19th century think that the losses of the Armagnacs at St Birs were what saved the Swiss from the Armagnacs. Other historians tend to disagree in the importance of these losses, without a need to disparage the Swiss fighting proficieny.

It's all cool to me. The wider picture adds more details. My thanks to you for taking the time to outline those things.

History gets revised/updated every few years. If not, there would be nothing for those fresh, eager graduates with degrees to do!…

As my knowledge of horses has grown, I come to review an earlier view that medieval heavy horse would shy away from steady foot.

I'd offer up two points to consider. Firstly, I've known very aggressive horses, such as stallion that broke straight through three wooden fences (one with electrified wire) to attack another horse. It was skill at arms trained, but still a long way from a medieval destrier that was selected and trained to kick and stomp in close combat. You simply do not see such horses today because they are far too dangerous and haven't been used in this manner for centuries. I suggest that you'd have needed to be a brave lad indeed to stand in front of a destrier in action, nevermind get underneath with your dagger!

Secondly, horses have poor vision to the front, hence the aforementioned need to wave your arms to stop a loose one on the ground. This would have been compounded by the design of the eyepieces on some surviving chaffrons (head armour), which further hinder forward observation. In effect, they would have acted as reverse blinkers and reduced the likelihood of a mount from shying away.

In tight formation and with the excitement of the charge, it is not unthinkable, in my experience, that medieval heavy horse would have charged home. Hence the foot needed to be many files deep as well as tightly packed, and to break up the cavalry cohesion before they hit home.

All true enough, Janner. That's why army lists need to distinguish between the different kinds of attacks that different cavalry evinced in the original sources. A destrier was a specially bred and trained war "machine". A knight or otherwise warrior on horseback did not ride his warhorse around. That specialized, ultra expensive animal was kept for the combat only. They were a handful at the best of times.

A couple of modern examples of non warhorses crashing through things: a parade many years ago had a wagon pulled by eight draft horses, which, when pelted by candy from the crowd, got upset, turned and dragged the wagon through some six "ranks" of spectators lining the street, and ended up crashing through the plate glass window of the store behind, where, iirc, the whole menagerie finally came to a stop. And a horse training friend of mine absolutely believes in the ability of the rider to make his mount go where he wants it to. And reversely, not be able to stop the same mount from going where it wants to when spooked or determined enough. He has a personal story of his horse plunging through a thick hedge, but the reason for that madness escapes me. I'll have to ask him for a recap and then return and share. I see him in two days….

GWA; Oman is good for all sorts of things, but he's not at all a useful source for things Scottish – largely because he did not really engage with the evidence so much as pick out odd bits that suited the narrative he wanted to present.
His description of Bannockburn is an outstanding example. The sources (all of them) tell us that the Scots came down from the high ground to the hard/fry/good-going plain and attacked the English in the main engagement. That did not suit Oman(or Gardiner, whose work he copied) so he went for the English attacking across a river and then uphill across pits and caltrops against circular Scottish schiltroms. The only writer (Bower; 100-odd years later) who mentions caltrops at all tells us that they were brought by the English…he also claims they brought bombards so we maybe should n't take that too seriously.
I'm not sure if offhand if it was Oman who invented the concept of the Scottish short-bow which has been with us ever since dspite being unknown to medieval history…it might have been Gardiner?

Jagger,

Look up the Battle of Arbedo, it will answer your questions. Also in addition to having reach a pike/long spear is cheaper to produce then halberd.

@ugly: Oman might have been guilty of assuming a short/self bow for the Scots. That rings a distant bell. But not in his description of Bannockburn.

You are mistaken in your memory of his depiction of Bannockburn. No "circular schiltrons". Rather the pots dug were facing the English advance from the south. But during the night the English turned the Scottish flank by moving through the marshy ground to the east. Bruce's original line of battle was avoided. He met Henry Bohun in their famous (fatal for Bohun) single combat the day before, out in front of (or between) the hidden Scots' traps. In the morning, the Scots attacked in line and echelon. That is what caught the English before they were ready. Their archers were almost entirely massed in the rear, not even organized, when the Scots attacked. The longbow managed to get one group off to the right flank and started to shoot with effect, but the Scots cavalry drove them off. The battle began to get stiff, even with the Scots' momentum of seizing the initiative. That's when Bruce brought up his fourth schiltron and hit the English in their right flank. The Scots in the camp joined in, and, thinking that another force was arriving, the English began to break for it. But probably even without the rustics from the camp, Bruce's flank attack was what started the rout of Edward's army.

That's the Oman version. And he cited his sources and walked the battlefield himself. That hardly fits your assertion that he "…did not really engage with the evidence so much as pick out odd bits that suited the narrative he wanted to present."

The fourth Schiltrom was invented by Barbour to provide roles for James Douglas and Walter Stewart. The existence of the 'traps' at all is open to question. In order to reach any marshy ground the Scots would have had to pass through the English army; their line of advance lay to the west of the English after all. Incidentally, although (relatively) modern writers have been much taken with bogs and swamps, the only contemporary mention refers to the Bannock burn itself – Grey tells us that many were lost trying to cross it once the battle was lost, but nobody suggests that 'bad ground' was an influence on the battle.
If you're keen on this stuff I can send you a monograph by a suitably-qualified scholar which gives a detailed analysis of all the significant material.
mail me … thathistorybloke@btinternet.com

"Bad Ground" was asserted by the "old guys" IDing the battlefield and walking it. The marshes were there, so they assumed them into the battlefield narratives. That doesn't mean that the marshy bits were there at the time. Oman doesn't speak to them other than to point out that the terrain as it is now would slow down any crossing of the Bannockburn. The disorganization of the English army at the opening of the battle is thus blamed on the inordinate amount of time required to get over the stream (and marshy bits). Once over, the battle narratives apparently make no mention of the the "bad ground" because it was now off to one flank. That's what I've always assumed, anyway….

The crossing of the Bannock was more of an issue once the battle was lost- partly through disorganisation and partly because they were crossing further down the stream where the banks are softer and the immediate surroundings are rather soggy at the best of times.
'Disorganisation' of the English army at the start of the battle is more to do with posture; Edward and his officers expected to have to advance on the Scots, not to be subjected to an attack. They had formed up accordingly and had no time to re-deploy.