"When did the skirmish line disappear?" Topic

I was talking to a friend the other day about the Skirmish line in the Napoleonic period and he asked me why there wasn't such a thing in the American Civil War. I didn't have an answer but it did make me think.

Does anyone know why the Skirmish line dissapeared by the time of the ACW?

The skirmish line was an important and integral part of ACW tactics. Skirmishers did not disappear in the ACW.

Your friend has it wrong. They may not appear on the maps in the history books, but contemporary accounts confirm that skirmishers were ubiquitous throughout the war. If anything, the skirmish line, in a wide range of densities, and open order lines steadily grew in importance from 1863 or so. There are some well known remarks on this point attributed to no less a personage than W T Sherman.

B

Yes, there were absolutely lots of skirmishers during the ACW. Can't imagine where your friend got that idea.

Was just reading a book on Kennsaw and skirmish lines were very important.

Didn't we have a picture posted up here within the past couple months showing a French skirmish line in the Franco-Prussian war?

it would not even be correct to say the skirmish line disappeared. More like the formations of units in general became more like the skirmish line.

I imagine the skirmish line stopped when soldiers stopped standing shoulder to shoulder (more or less). Early 1900s?

We both knew that skirmishers were an important part of the war, we didn't think they were used the same way as in the Napoleonic wars though. I'm fairly ignorant of their use though so the comments are really useful

During the ACW, by my reading, skirmishers operated more as a tripwire – they were the eyes and ears of the outfit so to speak. So their role was changing and evolving. But yes, the skirmish line never went away, it was really the formed infantry line that did….

I have an US Army manual from 1911. They are still describing the use of a skirmish line in it.

skirmish lines disappear when approached by cavalry!

As part of manual of instructions for companies deployed as skirmishers, defense against Cavalry was prescribed by comrades, platoons, and sections.

The 1914 prescribed formations of firing line, supports and reserves could have been describing Napoleonic ones. The chaps just stood/laid a bit further apart.

Formal battalion skirmish lines only really disappeared when units became so dispersed that the basic tactical unit became the platoon rather than the battalion. Some time around 1916/17/18. Depending which army you were in.

'A Platoon Commanders War' and all that.

As I understand it, Custer threw out a skirmish line in initial defensive phase of LBH. That was 11 years post acw.
Indicative of the idea that skirmish lines were still a basic facet of tactics in the day…

Yes, there were absolutely lots of skirmishers during the ACW. Can't imagine where your friend got that idea.

Fire and Fury and other ACW games of the same scale?

At the end of the Civil War, Sherman said that 'all infantry combat in the future will be skirmish combat.'

I was talking to a friend the other day about the Skirmish line in the Napoleonic period and he asked me why there wasn't such a thing in the American Civil War.

Might interest your friend to know that not only were Skirmishers still important in the Civil War but also forming square was still a drill book item!

Fire and Fury and other ACW games of the same scale?

Interesting point that, considering skirmishers were routinely put out in front of Brigades by both sides!

it would not even be correct to say the skirmish line disappeared. More like the formations of units in general became more like the skirmish line.

Well said! When mass infantry formations became impractical because of longer ranged infantry weapons, explosive shells and machine guns, they essentially morphed into skirmish lines. Most modern infantry tactics could be described as being very sophisticated skirmish tactics.

Typically, there was a main body and a forward skirmish line. The skirmishers did much of the fighting and would fall back as the enemy attack pressed forward. Then the enemy would, in theory, it a well formed main body.

But, like others say, skirmishers never left the ACW. They are an integral part of fighting.

Skirmishers played a bigger role in the Napoleonic period than they did in the Civil War due to several factors (1) there were specific companies in each battalion specifically equipped and trained for that function, (2) they were used in larger numbers, and (3) the French had a significant advantage over most of their opponents in this area, except possibly the British. In the Civil War, both sides used the same drill and tactical doctrine, and the skirmishers of the two sides tended to cancel each other out. They were usually withdrawn as soon as the two sides' main battle lines came within musketry range of each other. This happened somewhat sooner given the use of rifle muskets that it did back in the days of the smoothbores.

Thanks for all of the responses, my friend and I appreciate it!

I think Okiegamer is saying here
" Skirmishers played a bigger role in the Napoleonic period than they did in the Civil War due to several factors"
Is it played a more significant factor in the initial contact of the two formed forces so it is represented in Napoleonic games, and would not in ACW games, due to these factors…

If this makes more sense and prevents "attacks" upon his reply.

MG
MG

They were usually withdrawn as soon as the two sides' main battle lines came within musketry range of each other.This happened somewhat sooner given the use of rifle muskets that it did back in the days of the smoothbores.

Hess's study of skirmisher's could offer an alternative interpretation that shows the lines could be further out than in the Napoleonic period to begin with (lack of cavalry in most cases making it a safer job) so they fell back sooner when pushed.

Of course this distance from the main line varied, so 40 – 150 yards in The Wilderness to a half mile at Kennesaw Mountain, for example.

Fire between skirmish lines also varied a lot. Sometimes at as little as 50 – 60 yards other times 300 – 400.

"A skirmish line was only used to make
contact with the enemy, not fight him."

Skirmishers would be used to probe for the enemy position in both attack and defense, especially in obscured terrain. They may engage enemy skirmishers and attempt to drive them off, but as the main bodies approached each other they would fall back to the formed units before the main fighting began.

Kim

Hi,
Trajanus mentions drill book Squares but I seem to have read that some Rebel units being faced off by Cavalry of Gen Buford on day two of Gettysburg actually used square ??
Cheers G

Skirmishers were used by the Mahdists at Omdurman, it can be said that the scouts sent out by modern forces to recce enemy positions are our equivalent of the skirmish line?

Heck yeah there are skirmish formations in the ACW. Anyone who has played JR or any regimental game knows that. The Skirmish line never really disappeared. In fact it went the other way. Units got more and more spread out. By the ACW every unit could skirmish, not just special light units.

This was a result of weapon technology. The question to ask is; when did linear formations BEGIN to disappear on the battlefield? I have always maintained it was sometime in late 1914 or early 1915.

For the British it was the Boer War that begin the move away from linear formations.

In 1870-71 during the FPW all infantry could go to a skirmish formation. There were still light units but because of the advance weapons being used, all infantry would mostly stay in skirmish formation all the time.

During a charge a unit may start spread out in skirmish and then would form up in close order just before they made physical contact with the enemy.

Skirmishers played a bigger role in the Napoleonic period than they did in the Civil War due to several factors
(1) there were specific companies in each battalion specifically equipped and trained for that function,

In Civil War regiments, one or usually two companies were designated as skirmisher companies, trained for that function and routinely sent out as skirmishers. It's in Casey, Hardy, Scott's and other treatises and manuals used during the war.

(2) they were used in larger numbers, and

Whole regiments and brigades were deployed as skirmishers during the war. Rosecrans deployed an entire brigade on his right flank at Stone's River 1862 in prelude to his attack on the first day. Hess in his book on Civil War Tactics provides a number of examples of large scale deployments.

(3) the French had a significant advantage over most of their opponents in this area, except possibly the British. In the Civil War, both sides used the same drill and tactical doctrine.

All the more reason for Civil War armies to deploy similar numbers of skirmishers.

Hi,
Trajanus mentions drill book Squares but I seem to have read that some Rebel units being faced off by Cavalry of Gen Buford on day two of Gettysburg actually used square ??
Cheers G

No, because most of the cavalry fought dismounted. Only a few troops remained mounted as a fast-moving reserve.

52nd North Carolina, Pettigrew' Brigade, Heth's Division, were supposed to have briefly formed square on July 1st. In response to some of Buford's cavalry.

The 37th USCT formed square in October 1864 during operations North of the James River and Walker's entire Union Brigade were put in square at Stones River after a report of nearby Confederate cavalry.

If it was in the book, someone, somewhere, did it! :o)

Yes, a brigade of Confederates did form square on July 1. This was later in the day when the Union line began to collapse. Buford's men were mounted again by then and they made some threatening moves to cover the I Corps' retreat and the Confederates responded exactly as Buford hoped.

As for the evolution of infantry tactics after the Civil War, I wish I could post a research paper I did in graduate school on that very topic. It was a fascinating period where every army was struggling to come to terms with the fact that close-order formations just couldn't work anymore and the basic tactical unit was shifting from the battalion to smaller and smaller formations.

It was a fascinating period where every army was struggling to come to terms with the fact that close-order formations just couldn't work anymore and the basic tactical unit was shifting from the battalion to smaller and smaller formations.

Scott:
Could you elaborate more?

Here's a good treatment of the Confederate squares (both the documented one and an unconfirmed one) on day one of Gettysburg:

civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3578

McLaddie:

Okay a VERY brief summary:

The major issue of the period among tactical thinkers was the fact that the increased firepower of breech-loading rifles forced the troops to spread out. Prior to the Franco-Prussian War the fundamental tactical unit was the battalion. Tactical decision-making, for the most part, stopped at the battalion level. Smaller units (companies, platoons) were just cogs in the larger machine of the battalion. With the exception of detached skirmisher companies captains and lieutenants were not making any real decisions. They just played their prescribed part in battalion maneuvers.

But when the troops were forced to spread out it became impossible for a battalion commander to control all his men personally. Tactical decision-making had to start going down to lower levels of organization. First the company and then the platoon, junior officers started making decisions. But it stuck there for a long time because NO ONE was willing to admit that NCOs were capable of actually leading the men in combat. After all, enlisted men are stupid--it actually said so right in the Army Regulations! ("Enlisted men are stupid, but they are cunning and must be closely supervised at all times.")

So it hung at the company/platoon level right up to World War I. Sergeants and corporals were given more responsibility, but it was still doctrine that every body of men must be commanded directly by an officer. It wasn't until later in WWI when people realized that this just didn't work any more. At that point the squad became the basic tactical unit.

The Franco-Prussian War was the main influence on infantry tactics up until WWI. In the FPW the tactics started out very Napoleonic. Attack columns protected by skirmishers were the preferred attack formation. But with the very flat trajectories of the new rifles, it was quickly discovered that the skirmishers could not screen the columns. The bullets went right on past the skirmishers and still hit the columns. The columns went to ground under the heavy fire (or got annihilated if they refused to go to ground as happened to the Prussian Guards). The skirmishers engaged the enemy line and the boldest men in the pinned down columns would make their way forward to join the skirmish line. Often the arrival of these reinforcements would push the skirmish line forward 40 or 50 yards. If the attacker could keep feeding fresh men forward into the skirmish line it could sometimes force the defenders back as they became fatigued or low on ammunition. However, if the defenders had reserves of their own to feed into the line they could usually hold.

After the war, the idea of a continually reinforced skirmish line became the standard practice of all the European armies and the Americans copied it. By the time the 1891 Drill Regulations were adopted, the whole thing had become very well defined, with a forward 'fighting line', a support line, and a reserve. The fighting line would engage, helped by the support. If there was a flank which could be turned, the reserve would go for that (very much like the 'holding attack' which became the standard US tactic in WWII). If there was no flank, then the reserve would assist the fighting line.

By the 1904 Infantry Drill Regulations, the Americans had gone to ridiculous lengths in regulating this. There were step by step procedures for exactly when to adopt skirmish formation, when to halt and fire. How many vollies (yes, in 1904, the American army was still using volley fire) to fire, when the reserve should move forward to assist the firing line, etc. etc.

Interestingly, as the lessons of the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War started to be absorbed, things got very much looser. By the 1911 IDR, all the strictly regulated movements were abandoned and the men at the sharp end were given much more freedom in how to attack. The introduction noted that the procedures described in the manual should just be considered guidelines and that it should never be forgotten that the ultimate goal was victory, not blindly following the manual—quite a change!

Of course attack was what everyone wanted to do. Every army realized that the advantage was shifting to the defense with machine guns and barbed wire, but it was universally accepted that well-trained, high-spirited troops could still prevail. WWI proved them wrong.

Note that I am writing about the doctrine of the American army. There were some variations among European armies, but this is still a fair summary of the situation.

Well said, Scott. The only thing I could offer is to mention that Balck's "Infantry Tactics" is a very good professional contemporary reference source on late 19th century tactics and their evolution.

B

Scot:

Wow. That's lots more than I was asking for. Thank you.I I agree that was the general progression in the latter half of the 19th Century.

The Franco-Prussian War was the main influence on infantry tactics up until WWI. In the FPW the tactics started out very Napoleonic. Attack columns protected by skirmishers were the preferred attack formation.

And

After the war, the idea of a continually reinforced skirmish line became the standard practice of all the European armies and the Americans copied it.

The Prussian doctrine before 1870 was that continually reinforced skirmish line… Not that far from some French practices during the Napoleonic Wars or the Civil War at times. The reinforced skirmish line by the Prussians was seen in the 1866 war too, though applied hit-or-miss, much like the Artillery doctrine not being used for commanders' fear of losing guns using the aggressive new doctrine.

Captain May, in his critiques [1867-8] of 1866 Tactics says much the same thing, suggesting an even more radical change b because columns are entirely useless in combat, where von Moltke through a staff officer of his disagreed in a series of rebuttals.

However, any number of Prussian generals did not follow that practice in the 1870 War. The Guard's Attack at St. Privat is a good example. A very ACW style attack. Because of the Prussian successes, the doctrine was picked up by other nations.

So, I do agree with all that you've written with that small caveat. A matter of what was a new, 'untested' Prussian doctrine vs what was actually done on the battlefield by older commanders.

I read a lot of translated 1880s articles by German generals who had been captains and majors in 1870 and they are quite interesting. Some are even amusing. I remember one which presented lengthy evidence proving that the role of heavy battlefield cavalry was at an end, but in his conclusion he makes exactly the opposite argument! I did some research and apparently he was under tremendous pressure by older (and higher ranking) cavalry generals to NOT present the obvious conclusion! Not everyone was willing to learn the lessons.

In 1914, didn't the Germans initially used close order formations? I thought I had read that at Mons the Germans came on in close line formations and were repulsed by heavy fire, mostly rifles, of the British.

They retreated but came back again with much the same result. Finally they went to skirmish open formations.

By the start of WWI most armies had abandoned the continually reinforced skirmish line concept. The standard attack formation had become a series of single lines with about one man per yard, preceded by a thin line of scouts. Not exactly close order, but almost.

The Napoleonic skirmish line DID disappear. That type of skirmisher was used to screen the close order (25" between files) troops from musket fire. Hold the enemy to outside of smoothbore musket range and also physically and visually screen the formed troops.

With the longer range rifled musket, this did not work in the ACW. It was replaced by skirmish lines of a variety of densities, with the formed troops adopting many features of the skirmishers- such as taking cover, building cover, operating in clumps, and spreading out whenever possible. The "formed unit" took on many of the features of a grande bandes or of a shifting-density thick skirmish line by the end of the ACW with veteran units.

The Napoleonic skirmish line DID disappear. That type of skirmisher was used to screen the close order (25" between files) troops from musket fire. Hold the enemy to outside of smoothbore musket range and also physically and visually screen the formed troops.

That was only one role that skirmishers carried out during the Napoleonic wars and certainly, in the ACW and later wars skirmishers continued to act as a screen for formed troops.

Despite popular mythology, the British army had moved away from 'linear formations' several years prior to the Boer War. British army infantry tactics evolved at a great pace in the 1880s and 1890s and were recognisably 'modern' by 1899 – the forward echelon of a standard battalion attack could be considered 'skirmishers' to a large extent, with the support / reserve lines feeding them as required.

Doctrine dictated that ‘as many rifles [in the first echelon] as possible are to be engaged at once as skirmishers, and the losses of men in the skirmishing line are to be made good from the supports'. Far from being a 'line' the forward echelon could be up to 400 yards deep.

I think RavenscraftCybernetics wins the thread!

Was going to say that it wasn't the skirmish line going away, but the close-order line that went away after the ACW.

In the Zulu War of 1879, the British actually abandoned the skirmish line and moved back to forming squares!

Yes they did-after the disaster at Islandwana

Please read the book Shock Troops of the Confederacy (The Sharpshooter Battalions of the Army of Northern Virginia) by Fred Ray, CFS Press 2006.
Despite its limiting title, it is the single most indispensable study of civil war tactics.

Let me second Tricorne's recommendation of Ray's book. A good summary of it can be seen here:

link