"Wars of Revolution v Napoleonic" Topic

What would be the differences in doctrine, organization and tactics between the wars of Revolutionary France and the Napoleonic Wars? What game rules would be better "feel" for the earlier wars, and which would be inappropriate ?

What books are recommended?

It evolved from 92 till 1801.
Everybody is more linear than later.
Battles tend to take a lot of space, fought in cut up country ( I tried to visit some sites).
French started to use the mass badly trained ( over) enthousiastic skirmishers to overwhelm the ennemy who did have good ones but often grouped…
This is a vast question.
You might want to ferret in napoleon series discussion or similar places.
Good books to read you will find here on the numerous passionate and ferocely interesting threads on tactics.

As for game rules? The scope of your fights? 10-20 bns a side or the whole of Hohenlinden?
Certainly not sYw rules if that was the hint.

jc, Up front I was not meaning to bias a discussion with my own opinions. If only because more numerous units per side ovewhelm me, a dozen battalions per command is about what I was thinking. Simplifying command, combat and morale mechanisms would permit more, but some amount of fiddly detail appeals to me. But not everyone likes this.

Is the Revolutionary period better addressed with Napoleonic rules that restrict anachronistic tactics and organization , rather than mid 18th C rules? Is everything so much transformed and distinct from the SYW? Would the changes apply to command organisation and leadership above brigade level; tactics for light infantry, artillery, cavalry, or some other features ?

I would think that Napoleonic rules would better suit. The changes in tactics and organization, just from 1763 and 1789 was fairly dramatic, regardless of whether the troops fought in line or column. Some, like the British continued to during the entire period and seem to have done just fine, but no one would suggest they were just using 18th Century tactics.

For instance, by 1789 every European army had regular light troops, at least 12 or more battalions.

A couple of good books on your subject are:

Bayonets of the Republic by John Lynn

The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789-1802 by Paddy Griffith.

I wouldn't get Osprey's book on French Tactics by Paddy. It was not very well done. I was surprised he put his name to it.

Ok 10-20 units.
Napo rules.

They had mixed divisions with cavalry in the same command as infantry, quite often.
Batteries often in tiny bits, everyone else but the French used bataillon guns.
French ti y bits of mixed caliber artillery could be united if needs be by superior commanders.

Till say 1796 Or even later French cavalry should be inferior to the coalisés.

You might want to have enthousiastic, high morale troops with tactical competence not on a par. (Fr)
Separate morale, formation changes and competency. Works too for skirmishers.
As Mcladdie said relentlessly, everyone did skirmishers, don't fall into the last century wargamers trap.

Many Austrians were quite lethargic.
You could look at Le Feu sacré ruleset from 2 fatlardies, spot on for your engagement size and has quite well sorted out stuff for this period.

French did have battalion guns, but they tended to be used as fixed support rather than attached to the infantry. French horse artillery was a more professional arm during the revolutionary period and provided mobile support to the infantry. I believe the foot artillery did not reach the same level of support and training until later in the period.

Napoleonic rules should work quite well. Pretty much all Napoleonic tactics were used in this era. You get less uniformity in tactical doctrines as each side developed their methods. In 1799 and 1800 you will see Austrians at their most energetic! Really much harder to generalise in this era. The French had more semi-trained conscripts than later; the coalition forces had fewer.

Revolutionary period is certainly more interesting, possibly because so much of it is yet to be properly explored. I keep getting sucked into different areas of this conflict after starting at Marengo, which to me is the end of the Revolutionary period. I've looked at Piedmont, then Venice, tried to find out about the armies/regiments of Lucca and Parma, and just recently been thinking about the Papal States and then the Austrian Netherland vs Belgian Republic… none of which we can get miniatures for, never mind rules. I sometimes wonder if the period is due its own board, sandwiched inbetween 18th Century and Napoleonic, just to see how much actual interest there is.

I would restrict all other then French forces for linear tactics on the table top, columns only for approach, but no tactical fighting formations, skirmishers were used by all participants, battlion guns as well.

About how the French used their battlion guns, it is debatable – certainly there was no general rule that they were used in batteries, Prussians – could also and did also use battlion guns in batteries.

Austrians could fight in two ranks as well, Prussian fusiliers did fight in two ranks.

The Prussian line troops also fought in two ranks during the Revolutionary wars in several instances, with the third rank acting as a reserve or skirmishers. Scharnhorst comments on this more than once. Not surprising when Brunswick, their commander, wrote instructions for that in 1791, which were later used almost verbatim in the post-1807 reforms.

My comment on French battalion guns was based on my reading of Lynn and Griffiths. If I remember correctly, the crews were not trained artillery personnel and as a result were not keen on supporting the advance of the infantry. This role was taken up by the horse artillery. As a result they were rather used as defensive support in the event that the infantry were repulsed. Again if I remember correctly, the focus on training and recruitment was with the horse artillery.

I suspect there was more tactical innovation amongst the coalition armies than many allow. Certainly I think the Austrians deployed skirmishers from the line regiments in broken terrain such as that which was prevalent in Italy. But the preference for linear tactics is also clear. Not unlike the British in the Napoleonic period.

I have read that the Russians often used columnar tactics, but I'm not sure if the source was very authoritative.

I would close the era at Hohenlinden – a battle that I have not yet tried to recreate!

I sometimes wonder if the period is due its own board, sandwiched inbetween 18th Century and Napoleonic, just to see how much actual interest there is.

Excellent idea and I agree wholeheartedly with this suggestion.

The War of the American Revolution has been given its own forum within the 18th Century topic, so the French Revolutionary Wars certainly deserves its own also.

The material is very rich to discuss with the French coming off their reform period (1763-1789) and putting their experiments and reforms into practice and the allied reaction to it.

And the period saw, among other things, the development of the horse artillery arm in both Great Britain and France.

What books are recommended?

In addition to the two already recommended, the following might be of great use:

-The Background of Napoleonic Warfare by Robert Quimby.

-The Armies of the First French Republic by Ramsay Phipps.

-The New Use of Artillery in Field Wars: Necessary Knowledge which is a modern translation of Jean du Teil's 'Usage.' Written in 1778 by a French artillery officer, it was the French artillery doctrine of the period and the only artillery manual that dealt with field artillery above the battery/company level. It was translated by Charles Shawcross and is available from George Nafziger.

For the Austrians Napoleon's Great Adversary by Gunther Rothenberg is very useful.

For the Russians, Russia's Military Way to the West by Christopher Duffy covers the Russian Army from 1700-1800. Soldiers of the Tsar by John Keep also has useful information for the period.

Patrick Speelman's Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth Century Europe is useful, as is Lee Eysturlid's The Formative Influences, Theories, and Campaigns of the Archduke Carl of Austria.

Alan Forrest's Soldiers of the French Revolution is excellent, as are the first two chapters of John Elting's Swords Around A Throne which cover the Royal Army and the armies of the Revolution.

Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 has useful information on the period and William Shanahan's Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 is excellent.

Ancillary information can be found in Christopher Duffy's The Military Experience in the Age of Reason as well as 1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the Nation by Dave Palmer which includes excellent information on Anthony Wayne's Legion of the United States, which was in fact an all arms division on the French model, adopted by the United States before Austria, Russia, Prussia, or Great Britain.

The Politics of the Prussian Army by Gordon Craig also contains useful information for the period.

I did not run accorss references that the Russians did use tactical columnar formation in the Revolutionary wars, they certainly used skirmishers to good effect.

Hohenlingen, yes, an outstanding victory of Moreau, a general who unlike Boney had civisme

Moreau was bullied by his wife, could not reconcile himself to Napoleon as First Consul, was disgraced because of his lack of character and ended up supporting the allies and was mortally wounded by French artillery fire at Dresden in 1813.

He was not the best of the Rhine generals, Desaix was more skilled and aggressive and exercised better judgment.

Hohenlinden, was a great French victory, but Moreau was lucky to have aggressive subordinate commanders who won the battle for him-Richpanse, Ney, and Grouchy.

Duhesme's comments on Russian jagers of the period after seeing them in action:

'The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their fron or flanks did not know how to spread out or maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol.'

The following comment is by the British light infantryman remarked that:

'Their riflemen were shod with boots very much resembling those of our fishermen, coming up considerably higher than the knee; thus rendering them…incapable of celerity of movement, one of the chief requisites of a rifle corps…'

'The skirmish lines that they occasionally tried to deploy in their fron or flanks did not know how to spread out or maintain proper direction. The majority of their NCOs are not capable of fending for themselves, and there are few who understand how to lead even a small patrol.'

Keep in mind that Duhesme's comments are from specific campaigns during the period of the Revolutionary wars. However, the description could be of many French skirmishers during early years of the Revolutionary Wars.

Irregardless, there is no question that the quality of skirmishers varied just as did the quality of the line soldiers. Even so, the Russians obviously did deploy skirmishers.

Of course did the Russian used skirmishers in the Revolutionary wars, here for example an eye witness about the advance against the St. Gotthard in 1799

"Der den Berg hinaufführende sehr schmale, kaum für 3 Mann breite, sehr steile Weg war vom Feinde von beiden Seiten besetzt. Diesen zu vertreiben und den Weg zu eröffnen, ward ich und der Obrist Schuwalow, später Generaladjutant, mit einer starken Zahl Tirailleure vorausgeschickt. Dieses glückte uns unter heftigem Feuer und einigem Menschenverlust, bei welcher Gelegenheit Graf Schuwalow selbst ziemlich schwer verwundet ward. Der Feind, der von seiner hohen Stellung das schnelle Vorrücken unserer Truppen übersehen konnte, trat den Rückzug an und so ward von unserer Seite in fortwährendem Tirailliren rasch vorgerückt, "

To sum up the Russians attacked with a strong number of skirmishers under Schuwalow – the enemy (the French) had to retreat due to the fast advance of the Russian units and the Russians continued to advance rapidly skirmishing continously.

So in this occasion – Russian skirmishers attacked rapidly in great numbers and forced the French to withdraw.

brech doesn't understand any context about this topic.

And Duhesme :

"1) Duhesme (p. 102) gives a description of this tactic as it was experienced by the 'receiving side': "In spring 1794, as already said, the Austrians opened the campaign in the north with the siege of Landrecies, they put up measures, which were suitable to weaken and to exhaust the French élan, which had been so disastrous for them in the past. They concentrated the observation army around that place, put into fortifications, placed big reserves and advanced the advance guards as far as possible. These well commanded advance guards did contest the terrain only as long as possible to inflict losses in time and tirailleurs. By that they drew us from one position to the other till to those they really intended to defend. Then they let us disperse our last battalions and let us exhaust ourselves, whose fire was broken by their fortified lines. Fresh troops emerged in most splendid order from them, placed themselves tirailleurs into our flanks, and attacked as such with big advantage our disordered and exhausted soldiers and disarrayed units of whose majority couldn't even rally around their colours. Fortunate for those divisions, where a cautious general had retained a reserve which was able to cover the retreat and to prevent a rout."
© Geert van Uythoven"

and to throw in some other quotes from Duhesme which brech contiously ignores :

"[1864 reprint of Duheme's Essai historique sur l'Infantrerie Legere page 72.] Duheme was present in Flanders during this time and has a great deal to say about the Austrians:
"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men.
Sounds like your description: "the employment of skirmishers/troops in open order as the fire support element of an attack, forming a defensive line, or as a main maneuver unit" and this is in 1794 flanders.
Duhesme later in his work writes,
"We did not have other light infantry only the 12 battalions of foot chasseurs. The Austrians approached with more, more skilful and more tested light troops. The panic, fear and the routs of our troops left the columns of Valencians and Lille to address [the Austrians] as they slipped to the sides of these columns. Their riflemen, hidden behind shrubs, in ditches, afflicted our battalions, which, bravely in line, suffered ten-per-cent loses without seeing their enemy. "(p. 85)
Duhesme (p. 102) gives a graphic description of the Austrian light infantry tactics as it was experienced by him':
"In spring 1794, as already said, the Austrians opened the campaign in the north with the siege of Landrecies, they put up measures, which were suitable to weaken and to exhaust the French élan, which had been so disastrous for them in the past. They concentrated the observation army around that place, put into fortifications, placed big reserves and advanced the advance guards as far as possible. These well commanded advance guards did contest the terrain only as long as possible to inflict losses in time and tirailleurs. By that they drew us from one position to the other till to those they really intended to defend. Then they let us disperse our last battalions and let us exhaust ourselves, whose fire was broken by their fortified lines. Fresh troops emerged in most splendid order from them, placed themselves as tirailleurs into our flanks, and attacked as such with big advantage our disordered and exhausted soldiers and disarrayed units of whose majority couldn't even rally around their colours. Fortunate for those divisions, where a cautious general had retained a reserve which was able to cover the retreat and to prevent a rout."
And then there are the Austrian reports:
"Hauptdisposition, fur die verschiedene Armee-theile."
Hauptquartier Valenciennes, den 1ten April 1794."
"Because the enemy is very easy being pushed back, when we can advance into his flanks or in the back, each column reserves 200 volunteers at the start [of the fighting/attack], each hundred with a captain and 2 officers, which have to be bold and determined men. These men are destined, together with the light infantry and to support these, left and right from the road [formed movement was mostly only possible along the roads, see former messages], to turn the wings and flanks, [of] the enemy troops, positions and post, to facilitate the advance of the columns, or to turn, or storm, the enemy entrenchments when present."
[signed] Prinz Coburg, F.M."

I have always thought that the bad reputation that Russian scrimmishers seem to get labeled with was unfair. I think it was based upon some British observers with the Russian army during the initial French invasion.(writing in English- and hence one of the few sources available in the west). I think they observed recently minted light battalions, just converted from line troops with the bandbox type central Russian forces. The real experts were fighting the Swedes in the forests of Finland or dealing with the fluid fighting Turks in the Balkans or were Cossacks (foot and mounted) from the frontiers. Rural peasants who lived close to nature and then became 30 year-men soldiers should make good light troops.

McLaddie expressed it already well, you could have superb units and novice units not up to the French skill.

Lieven also touches this topic in his epic work Russia against Napoleon.

The Swiss fighting at the Beresina where deeply impressed by the accurary of the Russian skirmishers opposed to them.

Considering that the wars went on for twenty+ years, particularly with the Turks, and that Russia had a large army spread over a very large area, troops quality and experience could vary widely. But of course, that could apply to any army of the period, even the British. Costello of the 95th mentions seeing bodies of the 92th regiment [IIRC] lying about after skirmishing at Fruentes de Orono and noting that they obviously didn't know how to skirmish because they were cut down standing in the open rather than using the buildings and walls for cover.

Leiven in his book "Russia Against Napoleon" comments on a experience mentioned by a Saxon officer in 1812. The first Russian skirmishers they meet are pushovers. The second time they run into skirmishers, he admits his troops were outclassed in every way.

I sometimes think of military units as being very like a football (soccer) team in that their quality is variable depending on who they are up against, previous results, how they are coached, whether they are carrying injuries etc. It must be hard to compare how one unit of skirmishers compares to another without knowing the full circumstances of the lead up to the action they take part in. If we have an historical commentary stating that a certain unit didn't perform very well, that doesn't necessarily mean that on a different day they may have been excellent.

Millwall comes to mind…

+1 to 1968billsfan for the 'Millwall' comment , although I suspect one may have to be British to fully understand…

I was unaware that the Russians had a bad or low reputation concerning their skirmishing abilities. I always believed that the French were just better at it, at least until after 1807. But the fact that historians describe the Russians as having poor skirmishing skills suggests that something, their past or early combat record, may have led them to believe it so.

'…as the Russians never excelled at skirmish tactics, and no manual for such duties existed until 1818: the mass attack with the bayonet remained the advocated and 'traditional' Russian tactic.' (The Napoleonic Source Book by Philip Haythornthwaite: page 273)

'The ability to skirmish was far below that of the French, and many Jagers deployed at Borodino performed remarkably badly.' ( The Russian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (1) Infantry 1799-1814 by Philip Haythornthwaite: page 13)

However, as someone suggested above, perhaps bad skirmishing related to some Russian units but not to all of them. Mud sticks, so to speak, so they have all been unfairly tarred with the same brush.

The Russians certainly employed skirmishing in the 1790's and it was even used by Suvorov, although such tactics went against his usual combat doctrine of mass attack.

'More striking still was the extent to which Suvorov was willing to see tight formations of any kind broken up in favour of mass skirmishing by battalions or regiments, and an entire corps dispersed in penny packets.'(Eagles Over The Alps by Christopher Duffy: page 33)

So, Duffy is suggesting that the Russians or at least Suvorov, was open to mass skirmishing, should the occasion arise and did not object to copying French Revolutionary tactics.

'In reality all of Suvorov's infantry in 1799 were capable of doing any task which might be allotted to them. Four men in every corporal's command of musketeers were designated as marksmen, and given the freedom to run out ahead of the line battle and skirmish with the enemy.' (Eagles Over the Alps: page 29)

Saying that, Suvorov criticized one of his commanders for using 'penny packets'.

'You should have been duty bound, Jakov Ivanovich, to continue with the whole column and go straight into action. Instead, you bought the column to a halt, and appeared with just a penny packet of your troops on the scene of the fighting' (Eagles Over the Alps: page 60)

Perhaps Ivanovich wanted to check out the area first before committing to charging with his column, and Suvorov was not really a fan of reconnaissances.

'What-reconnaissances? Not for me! Only timorous people believe in reconnaissance, and the only result is to warn the enemy. You can always find the enemy if you really want to. Columns, bayonets, cold steel, attacking and hacking into the enemy – those are my reconnaissances! (Eagles Over The Alps: page 36)

Perhaps Suvorov's preference to 'cold steel' tactics convinced historians that the Russians may not have favoured skirmishing or taken such tactics as seriously as the French, at least early on. His admiration for Napoleon is perhaps also connected to such tactics.

'That young Bonaparte, how he moves! He is a hero, a giant, a magician. He overcomes nature and he overcomes men. He turned the Alps as if they did not exist….the enemy scarcely catches sight his soldiers before he throws his troops at them like a thunderbolt from Jupiter…he knows that shock is irresistible-and that says it all.' (Eagles Over The Alps: page 269)

However, there does seem to have been some development in training for skirmishing, as time went by, but perhaps not enough.

'The following improvements were made: In 1802 Tsar Alexander issued a decree that soldiers should be trained in aimed fire but only three rounds for infantry and six rounds for Jager were issued (in 1805 increased to 9 live rounds). Although used bullets were melted and reformed up to ten times. This certainly was not sufficient for training. (The Battle of Friedland 1807 by Major Archibald F. Becke and Dr. Stephen Summerfield: page 72)

'Russian commanders usually preferred not to engage in a prolonged firefight with the French, but to attack them with the bayonet.' (The Battle of Friedland 1807: page 73)

There's the suggestion of a preference for'cold steel' tactics again?

'A whole platoon or company was sent to skirmish, a system which persisted into 1812. This broke the internal structure of the battalion, so that it was impossible to form battalion properly into column and, more importantly, into square.' (The Battle of Friedland 1807:page 73)

'The skirmish tactics were developed further during the Russo-Swedish War in 1808-09…' (The Battle of Friedland 1807: page 73)

'Jager were the only infantry trained to fight in skirmish order and in aimed fire to some degree.' (The Battle of Friedland: page 75)

There is a suggestion that the Russians did improve in the art of skirmishing, although perhaps not their reputation of doing so.

'General Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky, an aide-de-camp to Alexander 1 in 1814, wrote in History of the Campaign in France – In the course of their numerous campaigns our troops had acquired singular perfection in skirmishing, and proved the injustice of the charge so often made of their inferiority as marksmen to the sharpshooters of foreign armies.' (Russian Grenadiers and Infantry 1799-1815. Laurence Spring: page 47)

So, there we have it, right from the horse's mouth, the Russians were perfect at skirmishing! LOL

I suspect the changes between the periods may be more related to how the troops were used and also ratios of cavalry, artillery and infantry. I suppose one classic change was the use of regimental guns, which by 1809 has was becoming very uncommon. The other was the adoption of the corps system.

French skirmishing in the early period may be more to do with necessity than specific tactics, but there is no doubt by 1806 French skirmish doctrine was superior. In 1806 the Prussian line was peppered with skirmish fire for 2 hours while the fusiliers, the bulk of the Prussian skirmish trained troops, were concentrated and in another part of the battlefield. The result was the line collapsed. The British learned this lesson in the America's.

The Russians seemed not to be as affected by French skirmish fire, even though their early skirmish capacity was not great. I am uncertain why, but skirmish fire has an effect when the target takes a couple of hours to form up its nice neat lines and columns. The Prussians in 1806 took 2 hours to form up their attack and the French 3rd corps took 2-3 hours to form up its attack at Wagram against the Austrian 4th corps. If you just attack the skirmishers run away.

We can say when Austrian was defeated in 1805 they implemented a lot of doctrine changes, the same with the Prussians after 1806. I am uncertain about the Russians or the British, but the British certainly fought a lot better after 1809/08 then before, but I suspect that may be to do with experience.

In 1806 the Prussian line was peppered with skirmish fire for 2 hours while the fusiliers, the bulk of the Prussian skirmish trained troops, were concentrated and in another part of the battlefield. The result was the line collapsed.

Please, could you explain when and where did the Prussian line collapse due to skirmish fire?

We can say when Austrian was defeated in 1805 they implemented a lot of doctrine changes, the same with the Prussians after 1806. I am uncertain about the Russians or the British, but the British certainly fought a lot better after 1809/08 then before, but I suspect that may be to do with experience.

The Austrians were mainly defeated in 1805 due to bad leadership. The Austrian army in Italy, commanded by Archduke Charles, fought well, but its strategic situation was untenable due to Austrian failures in Germany.

The Prussians in 1806 were defeated due to bad leadership, not due to tactical doctrines or bad troops. That bad Prussian leadership implied operational failures: disorganised and uncoordinated command, lack of clear strategic aims, absurd distribution of troops, and so on.

Bad leadership also caused disastrous tactical decisions, command decisions, such as the absurd situation and deployment of Prussian divisions at Jena. Even the decision to give battle at Jena was an absurdity. At Auerstadt, after the loss of the Duke of Brunswick, there was no leadership, and the Prussian command decisions were absurd, or there were no logical command decisions.

If the Duke of Wellington had been mortally wounded at the beginning of the battle of Waterloo, the allied army would have been completely defeated.

So, it had nothing to do with tactical doctrines or bad troops. Leadership is everything. A good army with bad commanders can be easily defeated. A bad army with good commanders can win battles.

Suvorov's Russians in 1799 fought better than the Russian army in 1812-14. It is not a question of "tactical evolution", but of leadership.

By the way, the British won at Maida in 1806.

Please, could you explain when and where did the Prussian line collapse due to skirmish fire?

While the Prussians were forming up for their attack against the French at Auerstedt they were affected by French skirmish fire. When they did attack, starting with the cavalry, after a setback, the infantry fell back. When Brunswick was wounded and the king took over Davout saw the Prussians were wavering and attacked. The rest is history. Its unlikely the Prussian foot would have broken so easily if they had not been so affected by skirmish fire earlier, as this quote from a Prussian office implies.

A Prussian officer described the French tirailleurs and their methods of skirmish combat (1806): "However, from a great distance, the bullets of French skirmishers already reached us; they were placed formidably in the front of us laying in the field and bushes; we were unacquainted with such tactics; the bullets appeared to come from the air. To be under such fire without seeing the enemy made a bad impression of our soldiers. Then, because of the unfamiliarity with this sort of fighting, they lost confidence in their muskets and immediately felt the superiority of the adversary. They therefore suffered, already being in a critical position, very quickly in bravery, endurance and calmness and could not wait for the time to fire themselves which soon proved to be to our disadvantage."
link

It was only a factor in the defeat, but when the French 3rd Corps at Wagram spent almost 3 hours forming up for their attack against the Austrian left wing, they were protected from the Austrian skirmishers by their own. As a result they did not experience any negative impact, as they managed to defeat an equal number of Austrians in a defensive position.

The Prussians in 1806 were defeated due to bad leadership, not due to tactical doctrines or bad troops.

You are correct, although the French did outnumber the Prussians so would be expected to prevail eventually. But even with their poor leadership, if Brunswick was not wounded they may have prevailed against the French; after all they did outnumber the French considerably at Auerstedt.

At Jena the story was different, considering how much the Prussians were outnumbered by the French they performed rather well. As the Prussians were defending, skirmish fire by the French was not a major issue.

To answer the original question,

‘Bataille Empire' rules are designed for a game the size you are interested in. It covers the French Revolution and gives extensive army lists by period, nationality, and campaign. The army list are what impressed me the most.

I read the rules but have not played yet. Rules look good, though of moderate complexity compared to rules like Shako or Black Powder. Simple it is not.

These rules come to mind because they acknowledge skirmish capabilities as debated above, but there are different grades based on the army and campaign fought. So the Prussians may have skirmish capability for a particular year, but the French may have a higher rating that minimizes or negates their effect.

So the Prussians may have skirmish capability for a particular year, but the French may have a higher rating that minimizes or negates their effect.

The topic of light troops is, to put it mildly, a complex one, I suspect due to a lack of detailed sources on their effect, but in principal a system like this is reasonable. The only comment I can make is the effect of skirmishers seems too occurred after about an hour or two of skirmishing. Most rules which use skirmishers elements normally have a game-turn scale which makes it difficult to reflect their morale effect within a game.

Higher scale rules reflect there effect in an abstract manner, such as DBN, Empire 3rd edition, Age of eagles and BBNB. I am uncertain what the game-turn scale of Bataille Empire is, but they certainly look like a labour of love and one player has indicated they could be used to refight Quatre Bras, so this may not be an issue.

The rules do look very interesting.

Skirmishers on the battle field have to be seen in two context, in the petite guerre and at the battle field – especially for 1806 – Prussians a good start to read would be

Weiss, Hans – Karl : The Prussian Light Infantry in 1806, in

Glory is Fleeting

Organistation, Uniforms, armament, training and battle reports about Jäger, Füsiliere and Schützen.

And I agree with pfmodel and Ruchel (but Auerstedt please)

Answering a 1000 book open question over 7 years old, when the OP hasnt even been here since 2017… pfft.
And based on a comment (no doubt drunken one…) on soccer…

And citing <<I was unaware that the Russians had a bad or low reputation concerning their skirmishing abilities.>>

Must not have read any/ all the rules written in the previous 40 years then, as no-one gets a chance except the frenchies and those green bods.

Citing Haythornthwaite: his comments on tactics no better than his off hand knowledge of colours and 'uniforms' appear to be. Who is he, anyone ever see him? Or is he another editors fantasy nom-de-plume because really, the churning abyss of poor material is growing still. I'll never buy another book 'authored' by such. Another on the Black List-:

There is a massive turnaround in the actual research of subjects now compared with the English 'copyists' style of 'acacdemic' writings of the 70-80s that trotted out so much flavour, but little substance.

d

And this diatribe helps the discussion how? Perhaps you would like to make a contribution that relates to the original question?

SHaT1984

I wouldn't base my own opinion of the skirmishing abilities of any nation from wargame rules alone, no matter how well researched they may claim to be. Perhaps you do?

I prefer to base my opinion on what evidence, either way, that is offered by historians and authors and what can be observed in regimental and military records and accounts and memoirs.

In the accounts and memoirs I have read over the years it was not straightforward, in that every time two opposing armies were skirmishing against each other, only one side was always better than the other. Although the French appeared better at it, most of the time, up until 1809 at least, it does not mean they were always the best or always victorious in that activity. As someone mentioned above, the result could depend on who was skirmishing with who and when. Veterans could have been skirmishing with raw troops for example, so you could not say that the nation who employed veterans against raw troops were better at skirmishing. The veterans of one nation may not have been victorious when skirmishing against veterans of another nation.

It is the same principle with battles. Winning one battle does not automatically make the winning army better than their opponents.

I think which rules are best is a very touchy subject. People often disagree with certain rules. They may feel they have legitimate reasons for disagreeing with them. A bit like people's opinions on historians and skirmishing! LOL

Gazzola: I certainly agree. Questions like this always bring out strong opinions.

However, we can answer some of the objective questions:

Rules not overly simplistic, a dozen battalions per side, etc…

Based on that criteria you can rule out, for example, Napoleon's Battles or Age of Eagles, or any other big battle set focused on brigades.