"Washington Naval Conference - evacuation of Siberia" Topic

The Japanese agreed to the evacuation of Siberia during this conference.

Why was the US so interested in the evacuation of Siberia? Certainly the neither the US nor Britain seem to have any love for the Soviet Union at that time.

It would seem that troops in Siberia would pit the Soviets and the Japanese against each other at some point which wouldn't necessarily be bad as the Comintern was a threat to international peace anyway. Why put yourself in the position of giving something up in exchange of pulling a potential enemy from fighting with a current annoyance.

It also seems that the more troops the Japanese have tied up in Siberia is that many that they can't send to the Philippines plus associated naval and logistical support.

Not only the US. Most of the major powers were very concerned over Japanese territorial expansion into Siberia. And the occupation of Siberia was a large drain on the Japanese economy with little to show for it and domestically unpopular. Consequently, the Japanese government came under intense external and internal pressure to withdraw. The withdrawal occurred in the same timeframe as the Washington conference but had been agreed upon on in 1920, prior to the conference.

Not to be a nag but why were they concerned about the expansion into Siberia? It seems like it would be better in Siberia than, say, the Philippines.

I can completely see why Japan would want to withdraw.

You're assuming that same conditions existed in 1920 that later existed in 1940. They did not. The militant nationalists (who were the primary element pushing for expansion) were a minority in the Japanese government and would remain so until the mid 1920s. Even after that, the main Japanese thrust was into China, not south towards the Philippines.

I'm not assuming that at all. I understand that the Japanese government had wrested control away from the military and maintained it, largely until the depression wrecked their economy.

I'm not asking about Japanese motivations at all. Like I said, I can completely see why Japan would want to withdraw.

What I'm interested in knowing is why the US would care if they did or not.

From what I've read the British didn't seem to care that much about it. It was US insistence that it be in the treaty.

The US was willing that the Japanese not ratify the treaty if them removing themselves from Siberia was not included.

It seems strange , especially given that the first Red Scare in the US had just happened. You would think that anything that would hinder the communists, or at least direct their terrorism at a different target, might be welcome.

As long as Japan occupies that ground that would be conflict between Japan and the USSR distracting both from the US.

The Western powers had pretty much agreed by then that intervention in Russia was a dead horse that was no longer in need of flogging. Previous attempts had merely made the Bolsheviks stronger and more militaristic without any noticeable, long-term success. If ALL external powers were to withdraw then it was expected that any threat from the 'new' Russia would reduce if not dissipate.

Japan had had no more success than any of the other powers but their military was stubbornly resisting the inevitable. In reality the US was insisting on what many in the Japanese government wanted. The allied nations supported the inclusion of Japan in the treaty and it is doubtful that their removal would have been popular.

Couple of theories – no evidence to back them up other than what happened later.
1. General US opposition to colonialism – any expansion by Japan would be objectionable.

2. Communist sympathisers within US policy makers. The soviets had many sympathisers around the world, many in powerful or influential positions. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that they had people whispering in the right ears in the US.

The Americans, especially President Wilson were running a policy of an Open Door in China, which necessitated ensuring the territorial integrity of China. wilson then applied this same principle to Russia, viewing Siberia as integral to Russia.

They therefore viewed Japanese actions in Siberia and Manchuria as a prelude to the Japanese establishing a new buffer state (which as noted some of the Japanese were thinking of).

Before the Allie intervened in Siberia, the Americans had been insisting it only happened necessary on the basis that the Allied cause was directly affected. Eventually they agreed.

The AER in Siberia had almost come to armed blows with the Japanese troops and their Cossack Warlord proxies (eg Semenov).

So ISTM, Pres Wilson would be taking a high minded approach, to ensure that all interventionist forces should get out of Russia. By 1920, all but the Japanese had departed, and they were also the largest interventionist force with c70,000 troops.

I think Giles has it pretty much right; a Japanese occupation or puppet state in Siberia would interfere with US policy in China and mainland Asia.

-Will