"The Effectiveness of 18th Century Musketry " Topic

Interesting…

link

Amicalement
Armand

Rather concerned at how dismissive the writer of a set of rules is concerning the training of conscripts "who barely knew which end to load the weapon that (let?) alone how to aim and fire a live round." I suspect – like many wargamers – the author(s) have been duped by the usual mis-reading of the usual summaries of the Peninsula that turn out to give only half the picture. There were many occasions when veteran French/Allied infantry gave as good as they got in a straight firefight (eg Albuhera, or Barrosa).

Whilst I can appreciate that there were rare occasions when a "recruit" was simply impressed into the ranks, especially in the poorer armies such as Spain, for the most part I find it hard to believe that the vast majority had so little knowledge of the primary tool of their trade. What else did they do all day in the weeks and months spent at their regimental depots before being despatched into the field? Was basic training really that different for a Bavarian, Italian, or Russian than it was for a British recruit?

I feel that more damage was done due to the distraction of the fire on the attention of the men and it's result on unit cohesion than the effect of casualties. As the test showed, results are not linear as expected (the 75 yard was the exception). Yet, it creates a challenge for the unit's leadership to maintain the men's attention (and therefore control) over the men. Add in screams, more noise, the tention of being fired at, etc. and thee are many distractions that takes it's toll on a unit's ability to function.

This video shows that trained troops (which these reinactors were presented as) might be able to maintain cohesion longer, but not necessarily out-shoot (effectiveness) anyone else.

The casualty as a value set to determine unit effectiveness is like judging a car by it's color. The ability of unit leadership to maintain control over the actions of the men, in stressful situations, is a better value set to base games upon? Not many games test (with modifiers/factors that influence) their degree of success in keeping the unit acting as a unit for the time period that the turn represents.

An interesting study. I would take these scores as being in the upper bound area of generic musketry.
The human factors side was touched on early about the weight of the musket. It is known from sports science that short athletes need greater power to body weight than taller athletes to achieve the same performance. The optimum height is 5'11". There was a high proportion of short and very short soldiers in these armies. I doubt they could achieve the same physical performance as in the video.

Very interesting, thanks for posting!

One more thought….One should not ignore the historical record. Look at the number of small arms expended at a particular battle and compare the casualties produced. The video supports the fact that smoothbore small arms were not particularly effective casualty producing weapons systems. Most casualties were sustained by artillry fire, but even ignoring that fact, casualties produced divided by small arms fired will yield how many shots it took to produce just one casualty.

My conclusion can only be that casualties played only a miniscule part in how battles were fought. The main indicator has to be found somewhere else. I have changed the value system used to determine how well a unit performs from a casualty based value set to the effects produced upon a unit's ability to remain functioning as a unit. I now am more focused upon the success (or failure) of the counter effects put into place by the unit's leadership to keep the men on line. Instead of a "morale check" I have adopted a "Unit Cohesion Check".

Factors considered are not based upon what techniques are being used, but rather, how successful the effects are upon the unit as a whole. Most gamers probably do not know too many of those techniques that could possibly be used, so in a game, such granular details have no special impact other than leaving us in want of knowing what effect they had on the unit, anyway. So skip to the results expressed in terms of effect on the unit's existing capability is the most direct approach to the design. Results can vary from no change (as we know how bad the unit's shape is in at the end of the turn- My cohesion checks are performed at the end of the turn) to being successful enough to see capability regained by one incriment to change the unit's capability from what state it is in at the end of the turn when we check. This concept accounts for the efforts of the unit leadership's ability to maintain control over the men and to what degree.

Would appreciate if a few of you could mull over what I just posted here on the subject. Since small arms fire is so inaccurate, to try and count casualties seems not only un-historical, but shifts away from why we see units run at the first shot while others can stand till nearly the end.

Remember, engaged commanders act upon their perception of their chances of winning a battle, the consequences of having to answer for losing so much of their country's resources and not making that decision based upon non-existant casualty reports at the time a decision needs to be made. Remaining capability and placement of fresh units, time and distance and importance of why the battle is being fought (objectives) are more deciding factors than raw numbers alone. Why should our games provide more information to the playing commander than he would have had access to for the real life one?

Thanks for reading.

v/r
Tom

Dye4,
Tom, your approach makes a lot of sense, and to me, it's a refreshing change and new way to look at things. I'm curious- What kind of factors do you consider when assessing a unit commander's ability to pass a cohesion check? Physical factors like casualties, lack of cover/concealment, officers and NCOs still fighting, apparent number disparity, or other ideas? Or do you consider more abstract factors, like growing unease in the ranks, state of training and experience of the force, reputation of the enemy, etc.? It's got me thinking a little bit. Thanks for the nudge. Tom

Tom. Thanks you for your comments!! Plase PM me your phone number and I will call you.

v/r
Tom

That's why I believe the casualty matrix in black powder is the win win assessment at this time. It's not so much "putting a goolie in'im" as much as it is everything else going on, keep in mind we are also talking about battalions "going in with what, 40 cartridges? Quick sprints under fire even ten yards at a time (modern practice) is exhausting, trust me. Adrenaline pouring thru your system and not exactly just fear but also "hurrah". Will drain a man in 30 minutes to exhaustion

That's why drill was soooooooo important and vital! ………from Tom Dye……..Factors considered are not based upon what techniques are being used, but rather, how successful the effects are upon the unit as a whole. Most gamers probably do not know too many of those techniques that could possibly be used, so in a game, such granular details have no special impact other than leaving us in want of knowing what effect they had on the unit, anyway. So skip to the results expressed in terms of effect on the unit's existing capability is the most direct approach to the design. Results can vary from no change (as we know how bad the unit's shape is in at the end of the turn- My cohesion checks are performed at the end of the turn) to being successful enough to see capability regained by one incriment to change the unit's capability from what state it is in at the end of the turn when we check. This concept accounts for the efforts of the unit leadership's ability to maintain control over the men and to what degree……..

Glad you like it my friend!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Tom – It was very noticeable that the best units of the AWI were those which had high (or should that be low?) command:commanded ratios. The war began with the same large units that you had in European conflicts with 600-900 R&F, but – for various reasons – moved quite quickly to corps with much lower numbers of R&F yet the same number of officers and sergeants.

As the war progressed, 2-3 officers and 2-4 sergeants were common for companies of 20-40 men in both the British and Continental services, giving a ratio of anything from 1:10 (rare) down to as little as 1:5 (much more common). As an example, when the Composite Brigade of Foot Guards arrived in North America, the officers complained that Howe's "new" drill would be impossible to implement with just 3 officers and 3 sergeants to almost 90 R&F.

Yes, Super, I quite agree. Looking at the Napoleonic period, the Osbreys do a pretty good job itemizing the compositions of units in their MAA series. It is also interesting to note that the British and French (and most of their COR allies) had a higher ratio of "leaders" to men. It mirrors how well those armies also performed as well.

It seems to be a rule of thumb (in military and civilian circles) that the upper limit of how many people one person can directly control/supervise is 10. When you consider that a battalion in the SYW or Nap period has 6-8 companies, that's 6-8 company commanders the Battalion Commander directly controls. Add in someone to manage logistical concerns, medical, train, etc. it's easy to see where the second in command has a few of those directly under him thus taking some of the burden off the commander.

In some countries, there simply weren't enough competent (or trusted) subordinates to fill those positions which resulted in the commander having to take more time to closely oversee the efforts of some of his staff. Time that could have been better used to benefit the whole if he only had better material to work with. Here is where we see doctrine come into play with more meaning than we normally give thought to.

v/r
Tom

I want to answer Tom Molon's question here by the rate that Tango posts, it may not be visible tomorrow! I will start a new thread and refernce this one. I sure hope that TMP v.4 will allow visibility of chosen posts on one's opening page.

v/r
Tom

It seems to me Tom there are a variety of factors which affected unit performance, and you are simply replacing one element with another. Unit cohesion seems to be looking at whether the unit is still functioning at that particular moment. It does not take into consideration the unit's theoretical ability to inflict damage, which is dependent in part on the unit's size. It also does not take into consideration whether the unit is becoming more brittle, and therefore more vulnerable to breaking up if it experiences shocks.

No, Bill, I am not replacing one elemnt for another, I am replacing one element with a results based system that incorporates the effects of many elements.

"Unit cohesion seems to be looking at whether the unit is still functioning at that particular moment." Yes, that is correct. When we are playing a game, are we not interested in what is happening with that unit during the turn we are on?

"It does not take into consideration the unit's theoretical ability to inflict damage, which is dependent in part on the unit's size." Again correct! It does not really matter the number of tubes firing downrange- it's how many it takes to achieve a desired effect and how long does it take to achieve that desired effect. It's the effect of the firing upon the performance of the unit we are interested in. Only in "games" do numbers really matter. Why not model reality? Again, I point to my post that encourages folks to compare the number of rounds fired during a battle with the number of casualties they produced. You might be surprised to discover that even though a unit might be larger does not mean it will always inflict more casualties. Besides, isn't it the effect of those casualties that we want to capture? To ignore the efforts of the internal workings of the unit to counter those effects keeps the status quo of rules only interested in making that determination soley on numbers and ignores the human side. Units are made up of men- no two the same. therefore, to say each figure firing fires the same is not rooted in reality. We seem to have been stuck on believing that all line is line, elites elites, etc. except that life is not that consistant. Therefore, this is why I feel we need to shift to results oriented games and ditch the numbers game."yes, I know I took 3 casting casualties, but what does that mean? That my unit lost 180 men in one 15 minute turn? At a scale of 1=60, that would be 180 men! How many games have you played in where you have lost 50% or more of a unit's strength in one game? Is that realistic?

But that being said, not everyone is inclied to give it the same amount of thought as to what we are modelling in our games and how well those mechanics capture (or simulate) the same effects of the historical record. Any weapons system is only as good as the man pulling the trigger in it's effective use. So why not look harder at the "man"? All wars to date have been fought by men. Guns don't kill, men do.But more importantly, what do men do to cope with the stress in the heat of the moment? (There are many things that were doen to keep the men focused upon their tasks and remain functioning as a unit.) (Threats, praise, drinking water, etc. are a small sampling here.)

"It also does not take into consideration whether the unit is becoming more brittle, and therefore more vulnerable to breaking up if it experiences shocks." This is not correct. Unit cohesion tries to account for results of the efforts by the unit's leadership, to mitigate the effects of such "shocks" to the unit, expressed in current capability after we have applied these results. Combat results vary in a non-linear way. (Just because you roll high does not mean you will do more damage and conversely low=less which is a linear system.) Combat results are distributed in a random way within each current capability range on the chart. What is measured is the EFFECT the exchange has upon the target unit. Each "hit" represents a loss of 25% of total unit cohesion. A "Miss" is simply a loss of cohesion less than 25% and the "threat" was easily enough to be overcome by unit leadership to be negligible. Cohesion can be lost and regained over time. How easy or hard it is to recover has been determined by training and experience of the men and their leaders and how long they have been together as a "unit".

In play, that starts with what is recorded on the bottom of the unit's command stand before the game,and is based upon the rolling of training and experience of the men, training and experience of their leaders and more importantly, how long have they been together as a unit. Each hit takes a factor of 1 away from that number and it is that number (level) the unit is currently functioning at. (Say "5" is the modified value after current cohesion status is determined. It will perform across the '5" line on the combat chart. To perform a cohesion check, if the player rolls a 5 or less on a 1D10, the unit leadership has succeeded in raising the units efficient by "1" (25%) during the time a turn represents. Over? Well they were NOT successful this turn in completing that task. Nothing "worse" happens since the cohesion check only accounts for the resuots of their efforts- we already know before we roll how bad they are. It really takes longer to explain it than play it!

So, Bill. I hope I have addressed your concerns. By all means, I advocate in playing those rules you enjoy most. I just ask that everyone keep an open mind to the possibility that there could be other rules with concepts that may challenge the way we have traditionally played and could possibly offer results more closely aligned to the historical record. Then we can focus upon what "we" would have done to re-fight the battle and not the rules!

v/r
Tom

You may not be concerned with what is happening in a particular unit at a particular moment. I am Tom. Perhaps that is the difference in our views on these points. To me victory or defeat is as much the cumulative right or wrong actions by troops or lower level commanders as it is the result of how the overall commander plans and reacts to those actions. With this view it is only natural I would want a game system that forced the players to have to make the decisions lower level officers would make. Of course this game system would make it difficult for me to play Malplaquet with two players in an afternoon so I understand why others may prefer a different system. Te each his own.

However the point I was taking issue with was not whether the inner workings of lower level units should be reflected in the overall rules. It was whether unit cohesion was actually the standard by which unit effectiveness should be judged, and whether casualties should be ignored in evaluating unit effectiveness.

I am sorry but I do not accept many of your propositions. In the horse and musket era numbers, to a point, do matter. ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL units the RIGHT SIZE were more likely to achieve their desired effect and to inflict greater casualties than undersized units. (Note the two caveats.) Having a few less muskets firing downrange might not make much of a difference, but that is only true up to a point. Casualties affect this, as they also affect the likelihood that a unit might break or fail.

I agree that it is the effect of the casualties that we should be trying to reproduce in our games. I just don't agree that those effects are as limited as you suggest. I suppose it doesn't make much difference whether "moral breaks" or whether "unit cohesion fails" when explaining a unit breaking. However units that have suffered significant casualties are not going to be able to produce the same volume of firepower. They are not going to be able to occupy the same frontage at the same depth. For someone whose focus is where mine is, being able to reproduce those problems and force the player to deal with them is desirable.

Hi, Bill. Fair dinkum. I was once embedded with the same points of view as you now have. Then I realized that I would rather play Gen. Patton rather than Sgt. Rock. I began to research in to why games were taking so long to play- they were taking the "scenic trip" with all the possible modifiers the designer could imagine. When playing with lots of toys on the table, there had to be a better way to speed up play and not end up with spending more time trying to figure out firings, morale checks and end up with a game that did not refelct the feel for the period (Not even mentioning the cringing of figureing out a melee!)

In THEORY, the more tubes shooting downrange SHOULD produce more if ALL things were EQUAL. There in and of itself is where it goes wrong! Units are never equal! Terrain is never equal. Weather is never the same. The men are NEVER equal. Units are comprised of men- each is an individual and brings varied level of skills to the equation. The historical records even prove that. The fact remains that records exist where smaller units outfought larger ones. If your premise was true, can you explain why the larger Austrian and Prussion battalions didn't always defeat the smaller French ones in the Napoleonic era?

Those caveats you recognized are why counting casualties is such a poor value system to base things off of. Things are seldom "equal". Most of those "things" relate to the abilities of men. That's MY conclusion as to why it took so many rounds expended to produce such a low volume of casualties. (and even then, most of the reported casualties were actually created by the artillery- which makes small arms casualty totals actually even lower!) But if it's only a game you are after, then fine.

But gaming since I owned the first edition of Tactics II (1957 edition) (and I'm 63 now), I am trying to share where most game designs seem to fall short with the historical record- the use of the wrong value system to base mechanics off of. Now I don't claim to know it all, but what I have set forth here is based upon years of research and countless game systems over the years. I am constantly trying to discover even more on what I have thrown out here. Best way to share is thru discussion and hopefully, a nice discussion ensues like you are offering.

Best I am hoping for is that some of the readers will follow up on what I have put out here and either verify or disprove the concept. It is NOT arguable that war is waged by man USING technology. Not everyone has the necessary skills (or better stated(?)- the opportunity to hone those skills to use the existing technology of the time to perfection. Therefore, numbers mean less when taken at face value. They are merely the part of the iceberg that is above the water, but there is a lot more underneath that water.

In my eyes, you have every right to disagree with my views as I have to present them. Some people spend time enjoying the scenery as they go to their vacation destination while other prefer to get the the fastest and spending more of their time enjoying the destination. Both views are right for each person. I'm just one who now would rather spend more time at the destination than spending more time getting there.

Really, thanks for your input, Bill. We may agree to disagree, but we both will truly enjoy this hobby in our own way, and THAT we can agree upon!

Best
Tom

Tom, case in point, The entire Mexican war----- In THEORY, the more tubes shooting downrange SHOULD produce more if ALL things were EQUAL. There in and of itself is where it goes wrong! Units are never equal! Terrain is never equal. Weather is never the same. The men are NEVER equal. Units are comprised of men- each is an individual and brings varied level of skills to the equation. The historical records even prove that. The fact remains that records exist where smaller units outfought larger ones. If your premise was true, can you explain why the larger Austrian and Prussion battalions didn't always defeat the smaller French ones in the Napoleonic era?

Hear Here, Clay! Right on! Good example.

Tom

"If your premise was true, can you explain why the larger Austrian and Prussion battalions didn't always defeat the smaller French ones in the Napoleonic era?"

Not entirely correct – in the French Revolution the Austrians had a much lower infantry ratio than the French they had to employ them in two ranks to from a third "reserve" battalion, in 1806 a Prussian infantry battalion was much smaller that a French (which had a 9 company / battalion or 9 peloton / battalion ratio)

When the French battalions got rediculously small (4 center companies, elite companies detached) the French get one drubbing after the other and loosing all campaigns from 1812 onwards.

The number of "tubes" difficult to asses, usually third rank did not fire as well, here some quote to refelct on .

This source is form Demian an Austrian officer who published a three volume work for his officers, a sort of handbook about arms, tactics, how to produce arms, black powder etc.
Though not everything can be applied for the French soldier the trend would be the same.

Demian : Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militärischen Wissenschaft. Für Offiziere der k.k. österreichischen Armee, Erster Theil : Wafenlehre, Wien 1807

„ If one is looking into the usual instruction of the firing and its true purpose, which should be to hit an hostile item, one finds that these instructions are teaching precisely the non hitting, because :

1. Up to now the line infantry was not trained to fire at an aim. And still aiming is an art, which like others has to be learned and practised; if this is not the case then hitting would be at random. The line infantry man therefore must be taught and must practise when his shots should hit.
2. One is aiming (technically joue, schlagt an, in English maybe arm) always at the half man, without taking into account the different distances and terrain, despite according to the closer or farer distances, also the difference in terrain, demands a higher or lower aiming.
3. The man is pushed for quickness. One has tried to increase with the number of shots also the effect of the fire, and one was giving a lot effort to make the soldier fire seven to ten times per minute. However the experience teaches us that the soldier is shooting worse the quicker he loads, and that all speed and skill in loading is useless without proper aiming. Because not the skill [in loading Vw] but the hitting makes the firing effective. The push for speed at aiming means to train them and use them to shot in the air. And to that already wrong instruction for firing one has to add the natural fear of the man, by which aiming in the heat of battle is almost impossible. Who was in a fire fight without noticing that in this moment the soldier is acting as a machine, that means he loads his gun, shots in the air, loads again and thinks less to damage the enemy than more to distract himself by the work to ban all thought of fear which are surrounding him in this moment. As soon as the soldier is seeing the enemy he wants to start to shoot being afraid that the other will overtake him in that and only few officers have the power to restrain their soldiers, or when they are able to do this they have not the knowledge about the shooting distance of the gun or to judge the distances. In case however the soldier is not lacking in cold blood and deliberation in a serious fire fight, and he is not acting as a machine, so alone because of the disorder and pushing for quickness, which is usual in a fire fight, is preventing to let him think about aiming. The experience teaches that the soldier is hardly listening at the commands of his officer in this critical moment and that every body as soon as he finished loading wants to shot. When one is closing the pan, the other is working with the ramrod, the third is making ready, the forth is arming and the fifth pulls the trigger. Is one taking into account the disorder which is caused by the falling of the dead, and the retreat of the wounded, as the quite dense smoke of powder which is enveloping the men, so it is impossible to expect that a sure shot can happen. Yes, even the best Jäger (marksmen, sharp shooters expert to hit with a shot, so to speak Hessian, Austrain, Prussian Jäger units) as soon as they would have to fire in rank and file, they would not hit better by the ruling cconstriction and disorder than the usual line infantry man."

Demain page 34 to 37

Just some comments, about the rate of fire, Demian mentions seven to ten shots per minute. These are no actual shots but made on the drill ground not using black powder and just doing the manuals. The old Austrian pre 1801 model of musket had a self priming pan and a cylindrical ramrod, so the loading was simplified and could be fairly quick when not using powder.
However Demain points rightly out how useless a quick fire is because it is not aimed.
Volley firing is even worse because nobody would have nay time to aim or to point his gun out of the fear he would be the last to pull the trigger.
As I know in the French army soldier were trained at least partially for firing and each unit had a black powder and lead allowance for each year and Martin knows about training to aim, shooting competitions for light companies, there must have been some instructions.
But as Demian points it well out this would be difficult to use in close order.
In skirmishing this is however different, you would chose your own rate of fire and indeed have time if needed to aim, in case that you would do other firing than harassment firing.
And French skirmishers fired form great distances up to 600 and more paces and hit.
One Prussian unit at Jena thought the bullets rained form the air.
Again also Demian comes to the conclusion (derived form personal experience, which we all lack) that the command structure so well preserved on the drill ground is breaking down under the mental stress and physical constriction in combat. The regular automat like volleys which impressed so much the onlooker at the battle of Mollwitz in the first Silesian War, were impressive not only because their fastness but because of the control of officers and men. But already in the 7 YW, when heavy casualties were taken the Prussian could not continue with this clockwork precision.

An old Prussian Officer writes about the Prussians in the 7YW :

One started to fire with pelotons, two, three fired well, but then a common burning started and the usual fire where each who finished loading pulls the trigger, files and ranks are intermingling, the front rank is not even able to kneel down, even if they intended to, and the officers from below up to the generals cannot do anything any longer with this mass, but have to wait till they will move forward or backwards.
(Jany, page 47)

Gaudi, another eye witness writes about the Prussians of the 7YW :

Who will think back will have difficulties to remember that in a battle or action to have witnessed that at firing the first rank will have knelt down or did do this constantly, despite such a thing happens constantly on the drill ground, but they kept standing as the rear ranks. There one witnessed this at those troops who rightly were classed as being the best taught and disciplined, so the thought to kneel down in action must be un natural.
(Jany, page 47)

Tempelhoff another veteran writes :

The Bataillenfeuer (feux de bataille) as the fire at will was typically was called replaced in the hitherto battle in the end the drilled art. Then everybody fired who could fire and wanted to and everybody as often as he was capable without giving a damn about his neighbour or front man.
(Jany page 46 / 47)

Ein Veteran des Siebenjährigen Krieges , General v. Tempelhoff, bemerkt darüber : „Man feuert in einer Schlacht ganz anders als auf dem Exerzierplatz; denn die anrückende Infanterie fängt trotz allem dem, was man auf dem Exerzierplatze gelehrt und eingeprägt wird, oft schon auf 800 Schritt vom Feinde an zu feuern; doch wenigstens auf 600. Gewöhnlich glaubt man, daß ein solches Feuer nichts thut, allein hierin irrt man sich. Eine Kugel aus dem kleinen Gewehr tödet oder verwundet einen Mann, wenn sie nur trifft, ebenso gut, sie mag aus in einem Bogen oder horizontal abgeschossen werden.
(Jany, p. 38/39 (Gedanken des Generals v. Tempelhoff vom 11. April 1802, Beilage 13 zu Band II der Massenbachschen Memoiren, Amsterdamm 1809, S. 504)

A veteran of the 7YW, General v. Tempelhoff notices about (range of firing and hitting HKW) ; "One is firing total differently in a battle than on the drill ground, despite what was learned and taught on the drill ground – the advancing infantry often opens fire at 800 paces distance from the enemy – at least however at 600. Usually it is believed that such a fire is useless, however this is an error. A small arms ball kills or wounded a man as long as it hits regardless of being short in an arc or horizontally.
(Jany, p. 38/39 (Gedanken des Generals v. Tempelhoff vom 11. April 1802, Beilage 13 zu Band II der Massenbachschen Memoiren, Amsterdamm 1809, S. 504)

Quite interesting Von Winterfeldt… thanks for share! (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

I have followed the cohesion discussion elsewhere (on YG VLB).

From a modeling perspective, cohesion is an artificial concept. It is not a physical property and it is not measurable, because there isn't a unit of measure or formal set of states.

And because it lacks a tight definition, how can anyone model it? So it is a bit of a blind alley.

In the modeling world, these problems are known as "soft" and there are "soft systems methodologies" that try to build some sort of model of a system.

On the other hand, firepower, casualty rates, unit manpower strength etc are all hard facts, which can be measured. A different type of modeling methodology is used to create system models, based on hard science. There are mathematical models of shooting in existence which can be adapted to musketry. I saw a new book recently that had quite a few equations for various shooting situations (20th C).

But the problems are well known, mainly that proving ground scores don't stack up against battlefield performance and no-one has quantified why. Offered explanation – yes. Quantified – no.

In the modeling world, nothing is an "either or". Models are produced to understand and further refine understanding of a human system. Modelers often work with multiple models of the same problem situation.

From a wargaming perspective, having multiple models in a rules set probably won't work. But the thing is that wargames are games and the models in the rules are abstractions of reality ….. geared towards an enjoyable, immersive, flowing game.

Even if cohesion was shown to be the answer, I would still want to blow the bleep out of the enemy and permanently destroy their forces. Causing a cohesion loss in their ranks just doesn't sound as much fun. I also want to know if my troops fought well or poorly. Was luck on their side? Did their first volley scatter the enemy? I want to visually see units shrink in size and so on. Even down to seeing if the figure with a bent bayonet can not get killed in hand-to-hand for the first time ever.

So the debating model v model is largely a waste of time. It is far more productive to build them, because the process of building the model provides a lot of the answers and increases understanding of the problem situation.

…files and ranks are intermingling, the front rank is not even able to kneel down, even if they intended to, and the officers from below up to the generals cannot do anything any longer with this mass…

Who will think back will have difficulties to remember that in a battle or action to have witnessed that at firing the first rank will have knelt down or did do this constantly, despite such a thing happens constantly on the drill ground, but they kept standing as the rear ranks.

These two quotes reminded me of a section of "Warfare in the Age of Reason" by Duffy, in which he mentions that a French officer noted during the WAS that once troops knelt down it was hard to get them to stand up again – and move forward. He (the Frenchman) recommended using only the first two ranks to fire, with the third in reserve/helping to load. Rochambeau, in his instructions to his corps in N America, did exactly the same with the front two ranks firing and the third assisting in loading.

Interesting to see the red soldiers represented by lean young men, for a change. The teeth might be in rather too good condition, though..

well,no one of us actually experimented (luckily) the battlefield of that epoch. Out of personal experience I can confirm that being under stress of real fighting practically destroys you in less than 5 minutes. It is also real that a unit was involved for a maximum of 15/30 minutes in the very core of the fighting, then there was a rest.
Under a wargame perspective the problem morale vs cohesion is not solvable with ratio 1:50 and so on.
I actually avoid in playing the use of the dice and the presence of Officers, NCO and flags (personalities) do affect the morale of a unit making stronger its cohesion. So I gave a scale of values to every unit as cohesion and than I multiple this value to the morale, changed by the presence of officers NCO etc. plus some other factors.
It is absolutely true that unit were different and the problem is this in wargaming: a too strong standardization of the units: playing with a ratio 1:1 allows to differentiate a unit from another just because it has 10 men more, 2 officers more than its twin unit; I use also not just morale mixed with cohesion but also the level of tiredness of the unit in the fighting, as well as other factors that make all together one unit practically unique on the board-game.
For instance, each unit can shoot at a determinate distance causing 6%, 7% etc of losses according to its distance from the target; also the number of enemy that one unit eliminates affects – in positive – the morale/cohesion of that unit

Glad you enjoyed the article boys!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand