"Siege Warfare during the Peninsular War." Topic

Yesterday, Kevin posted a list of French and British sieges during the Peninsular war. Here it is again:

British and French Sieges in Portugal and Spain 1808-1814:

French Successes:

Roses: 6 November-5 December 1808.
Saragossa: 20 December 1808-20 February 1809.
Gerona: 6 May-12 December 1809.
Lerida: 23 April-14 May 1810.
Astorga: 21 March-22 April 1810.
Ciudad Rodrigo: 26 April-10 July 1810.
Almeida: 25 July-27 August 1810.
Tortosa: 16 December 1810-2 January 1811.
Olivenza: 19-22 January 1811.
Badajoz: January-March 1811.
Campo Mayor: 14-21 March 1811.
Tarragona: 5 May-21 June 1811.
Saguntum: 23 september-26 October 1811.
Valencia: 28 December 1811-9 January 1812.
Burgos: 19 September-21 October 1812.

French Failures:

Gerona: 24 July-16 August 1808.
Saragossa: 15 June-14 August 1808.
Cadiz: 5 February 1810-24 August 1812.

British Successes:

Tarifa: 23 December 1811-4 January 1812.
Ciudad Rodrigo: 8-19 January 1812.
Badajoz: 16 March-6 April 1812.
San Sebastien: 6 August-8 September 1813.

British Failures:

Badajoz: 8-15 May 1811.
Badajoz: 19 May-10 June 1811.
Tarragona: 3-11 June 1813.
San Sebastien: 11-25 July 1813.

So, based on this list the French had a success rate of 83% and the British one of 50%.

I have no problem with these figures. I would not include
the 2.5 year French "siege" of Cadiz as a failure, but rather a partially successful blockade, but i am happy to let the figures stand.

When I made my own list, years ago, I included all French, English and Spanish victories in both defense and attack, including Gerona1 & 2, Saragossa 1, Asrtorga2 and Cheves2 as Spanish victories, but here, the issue is how successful French as opposed to British sieges were.

And immediately we have a historical problem. Both the French and British put enough importance in the successful siege of strategic forts and towns (and as we may discuss later, strategic importance differed between the two armies) to spend large amounts of time, men and materiel on such sieges and even risked being defeated in battle, as in St Christoval 1 (in my Anglocentric way, I consider the two failed sieges of that fortress to be British failures).

However, despite the greater number of French successes in siege warfare, they were driven out of the Peninsula by the Brits by 1814.

Part of the answer to this, I think, lies in the dates of the French and British successes. For example, the French succeeded at Badajoz in the winter of 1811, and the Brits failed twice, in the spring and summer of 1811, but they won the last siege of this contest between March and April of 1812 and did so rather more quickly than the French in 1811. Similarly, though it took the French about 75 days to take Ciudad Rodrigo in 1811, the Brits took it back in January 1812 in 11 days, which is why i said that the Brits did pretty well in an earlier thread.

There, though, I was looking at raw figures rather than the reasons for them, and I trust that other folks will give their perspectives on these outcomes.

My own thought, which I shall have to develop later* is that while the importance of the engineering arm was significant, the problems of transporting materiel for both armies, the artillery and the threat of counter attack were at least equally so, and I look forward to an amicable and interesting discussion of these factors

* I expect my contributions to be limited during the next week or so. On the 24th, hoards of heavy-drinking adults and frisky kids will descend on the three family houses, and I am cooking about 40 lbs of comfort food for the masses. Did the chili today, beef stew tomorrow! Writing these posts is my "time off for good behavior".

Cheers,
Phil

Why is this on the Napoleonic Media Board? It should be on the Napoleonic Discussion Board.

However, despite the greater number of French successes in siege warfare, they were driven out of the Peninsula by the Brits by 1814.

The French were driven out of the Peninsula because the British defeated the French field armies in major battle.

Yes, you can win all the sieges you like, but if your field army is defeated, you are stuffed.

Marlborough figured that out in the early eighteenth century.

Why is this on the Napoleonic Media Board? It should be on the Napoleonic Discussion Board.

As this follows from some of the postings in the Copenhagen threads, seems to me that it is logical to put it here.

However, to make it 'legitimate', perhaps three books on the subject will be helpful:

-Wellington's Engineers by Mark Thompson.

-Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military Engineering from Vauban to the revolution by Janis Langins.

-The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850.

The first gives an excellent viewpoint on the Royal Engineers, strengths and weaknesses and provides an excellent explanation why British sieges in the Peninsula either didn't go too well or the British infantry suffered such heavy casualties at Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and San Sebastien.

The second gives an excellent background to French military engineering from its beginning under Marshal Vauban and how it developed up to the Revolution.

The third demonstrates the development of technical schools and education in France and why they were copied as much as possible throughout Europe. The first French artillery school, for example, was at Douai from 1679. The British and Austrian artillery and technical schools followed that example. The Russians followed a somewhat different, and less competent route, and the Prussians didn't have an artillery school established until 1791.

All three of these books are highly recommended if anyone has interest in the subject.

It should be noted that Wellington and other British commanders failed more than once in sieges, and the absence of any engineer troops until 1813, along with substandard technical education of the British engineer officers, went a long way in aiding in those failures.

Yes, you can win all the sieges you like, but if your field army is defeated, you are stuffed.

Actually, that is not always true.

Greene failed in his one siege and tactically lost all three major battles he engaged in during the southern campaigns in 1780-1781 during the War of the Revolution. In the process he ruined three British field armies and drove them back under the protection of the Royal Navy in Charleston and Savannah. Cornwallis was so beat up after Guilford Courthouse that he retired into Virginia, abandoning the Carolinas, and we all know how that ended.

Suchet in eastern Spain, whose operations are usually overlooked, had a string of successes in siege and battle, and two British amphibious expeditions from Sicily were driven off, even though Suchet lost one battle to the British.

Tactical successes are a definite plus, but if you cannot use them to win campaigns, then they are for nothing. Wellington was a good enough general to be able to combine tactical success eventually with strategic success.

And it should be noted that the British position is Spain was in doubt until the victory of Vittoria in 1813. Further, Napoleon was pulling out his best units from Spain beginning in 1811 in anticipation for the invasion of Russia. This practice continued through 1813-1814.

Actually, that is not always true.

Greene failed in his one siege and tactically lost all three major battles he engaged in during the southern campaigns in 1780-1781 during the War of the Revolution. In the process he ruined three British field armies and drove them back under the protection of the Royal Navy in Charleston and Savannah. Cornwallis was so beat up after Guilford Courthouse that he retired into Virginia, abandoning the Carolinas, and we all know how that ended.

There is a difference between being tactically defeated and being strategically defeated.

Yes, there is. And that was the point of the posting. You can lose battles and still win strategically.

And noting that the British position in Spain was still 'iffy' until Vittoria, demonstrates that Wellington was not always victorious strategically. That is generally overlooked on the forums.

@PhilinYuma,

But surely one key point is that the French and British were fighting different enemies? Thus the comparison is not really like for like.

And noting that the British position in Spain was still 'iffy' until Vittoria, demonstrates that Wellington was not always victorious strategically. That is generally overlooked on the forums.

Surely all that shows is that Napoleon committed hundreds of thousands more troops to the Peninsular than Britain did? It doesn't in itself show that Wellington was victorious strategically or not.

And immediately we have a historical problem. Both the French and British put enough importance in the successful siege of strategic forts and towns (and as we may discuss later, strategic importance differed between the two armies) to spend large amounts of time, men and materiel on such sieges and even risked being defeated in battle, as in St Christoval 1 (in my Anglocentric way, I consider the two failed sieges of that fortress to be British failures).
However, despite the greater number of French successes in siege warfare, they were driven out of the Peninsula by the Brits by 1814.

Siege warfare no longer held the primary place in European warfare that it did before the Seven Years' War. That being said, because of the poor road network in Spain, however, the importance of strategic fortresses were usually along lines of communication or routes necessary to control in order to successfully conduct field operations. So the importance of holding strategic cities/fortresses was much more important in Spain than in central Europe. And the initiative permanently shifted to Wellington after Vittoria in 1813.

Part of the answer to this, I think, lies in the dates of the French and British successes. For example, the French succeeded at Badajoz in the winter of 1811, and the Brits failed twice, in the spring and summer of 1811, but they won the last siege of this contest between March and April of 1812 and did so rather more quickly than the French in 1811. Similarly, though it took the French about 75 days to take Ciudad Rodrigo in 1811, the Brits took it back in January 1812 in 11 days, which is why i said that the Brits did pretty well in an earlier thread.

With the lack of an effective engineer arm, Wellington had to besiege and take a place somewhat quickly. And the tactic he resorted to at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastien were infantry assaults after the artillery had successfully breached the walls, and that the breach was able to be assaulted by the infantry. Wellington was lucky in his artillery commander, Alexander Dickson, who was the outstanding British artilleryman of the period.

The French were much more skilled in siege warfare than the British. The French engineer arm was expert in all aspects of their profession and they were recognized the best in Europe at least as far back as 1789. And it was the French, namely Gribeauval, that built and trained the Austrian engineer arm while he was seconded to the Austrian army in the Seven Years' War.

My own thought, which I shall have to develop later* is that while the importance of the engineering arm was significant, the problems of transporting materiel for both armies, the artillery and the threat of counter attack were at least equally so, and I look forward to an amicable and interesting discussion of these factors

Logistics is always a question that has to be solved/answered in any large-scale military operation. That being said, not having the expertise in one of the military technical fields, in this case the engineering arm, will severely hamper operations which call for expertise in that field.

No matter how proficient and expert your logistics operations are, without skilled officers and dedicated engineer units, there will be major problems conducting siege operations.

Wellington had to besiege and take a place somewhat quickly. And the tactic he resorted to at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastien were infantry assaults after the artillery had successfully breached the walls, and that the breach was able to be assaulted by the infantry.

But that was the standard way of attacking a fortress. And the engineers would have been involved in building the field fortifications (saps and gun batteries) necessary to get the guns to where they could breach the walls in the first place. And that's pretty close.

Compare the siege 'procedures' employed at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and San Sebastien with those employed by Lannes and his engineers at the second siege of Saragossa and there is a marked difference in the 'technique'. It should be noted that Saragossa surrendered to Lannes and was not taken by storm.

Another failed siege of the period was the siege of Fort Erie on the Niagara in 1814. Another British assault was bloodily defeated and repulsed with heavy loss and the British were hit with a successful sortie by the garrison and finally lifted the siege and withdrew.

The lack of trained and skilled engineer officers, which the Royal Engineers were not, as well as dedicated and trained miners and combat engineer troops greatly hampered Wellington and it was to his urging that the British finally organized and trained dedicated engineer troops by 1813.

I would highly recommend Wellington's Engineers by Mark Thompson to get an excellent viewpoint on the problems Wellington had in the Peninsula lacking a competent engineer arm for much of the war.

I've posted the following before from that volume, but perhaps it will help here:

The following is an assessment of the British Royal Engineer arm during the Napoleonic period by an officer of that arm, Charles William Pasley. It is taken from Wellington's Engineers by Mark Thompson and is prefaced by a short assessment by the author:

'In most (if not all) cases, the [Royal Engineer] officers themselves complained bitterly about their training and their experiences. One only has to look at the campaigns in which they fought in the period from 1793 to 1810 to realize that they had almost all had nothing but bad experiences at Alexandria, Buenos Ayres, Copenhagen and Walcheren. There was a constant theme of the lack of training engineer officers had received in the practical aspects of their work.'-246-247.

'I should have suggested several improvements that appeared to me from my own experience and reflection to be essential…I considered the British Army…to be incapable of succeeding in a siege…without either having recourse to the barbarous measure in incendiary bombardment, or without an enormous sacrifice of the lives…in sanguinary assaults…which might be rendered unnecessary by a more efficient organization of the Royal Engineer department, and especially by forming a well-instructed and well-disciplined body of engineer soldiers…The better instruction of junior officers of the Royal Engineers appeared no less essential, for at that time they were not even taught the theory of the attack of fortresses…and the examinations for commissions were merely a matter of form, and no genuine test for proficiency. As for practical instruction, they had none, for they were sent on service without ever having seen a fascine or gabion, without the smallest knowledge of the military passage of rivers, of military mining, or any other operation of a siege, excepting what they may pick up from French writers, of which a striking proof occurred in Sir John Moore's retreat, when all attempts to blow up stone bridges…made by officers of the Corps, myself amongst others, failed…with the exception of only one, which Lieutenant Davy, a very promising young officer, succeeded in completely destroying, but at the expense of his own life, which he lost from not understanding the very simple precautions necessary to insure the safety of the person who fires the train of the mine. For my part, I should not have even known how to make a battery in the attack on Copenhagen, the first siege in which I was employed, but from the information derived from a book on the subject.'-Pasley, 247.

It is also interesting to note that he describes the British operations against Copenhagen as a 'siege.'

Compare the above with the French engineer arm and the work they did in the Peninsula and elsewhere during the period.

The French engineer arm began as an organization of officers only, but were converted into a combat arm in 1793 by the organization and activation of several battalions of sapeurs du genie (combat engineers) and the miner companies that then belonged to the artillery were transferred to the engineers. The miners were the elite of the arm. Napoleon later created an engineer train for the line as well as an engineer company, later increased to a battalion, in the Imperial Guard, along with their own engineer train troops.

I considered the British Army…to be incapable of succeeding in a siege…without either having recourse to the barbarous measure in incendiary bombardment, or without an enormous sacrifice of the lives…in sanguinary assaults…which might be rendered unnecessary by a more efficient organization of the Royal Engineer department, and especially by forming a well-instructed and well-disciplined body of engineer soldiers…

The problem was not that the British army didn't have efficient engineers. What they had was good enough to get the artillery to a position where they could breach the walls.

No, the problem was that the French refused to surrender once a practical breach had been made, thus forcing the British to have to resort to a sanguinary assault in order to capture the place.

The problem of unskilled engineers and the lack of actual combat engineer troops was exactly the problem with the British Army for conducting sieges and the evidence has been provided to you.

Again, I highly recommend that you read the material that has been listed in this thread for a much better understanding of the problems Wellington had in the Peninsula and the British Army had elsewhere conducting sieges during the period. The situation only began to improve after Wellington's continued asking for trained engineer troops which finally began arriving in Spain in 1813.

The Royal Engineer officers were not trained in siege warfare and without the skilled Royal Artillery the sieges conducted would never have been successful. And please note the differences in both the number and percentage of successful British sieges in the Peninsula especially compared with the French record.

And please note the differences in both the number and percentage of successful British sieges in the Peninsula especially compared with the French record.

In all the cases mentioned as British failures, the British abandoned the siege because of the approach of the relieving force. I'm not sure that that says anything good or bad about the quality of British military engineering at the time.

And I'll make the same point as before:

But surely one key point is that the French and British were fighting different enemies? Thus the comparison is not really like for like

In all the cases mentioned as British failures, the British abandoned the siege because of the approach of the relieving force. I'm not sure that that says anything good or bad about the quality of British military engineering at the time.

While that is the case for the first siege of Badajoz, and the lifting of the siege resulted in the Battle of Albuera, that is not the case for the other three.

At the second siege the two assaults launched by the British against the defenses failed and Wellington made the decision to withdraw. While the approach of Marmont's Army of Portugal did influence Wellington's decision, the failure of British siege operations were the deciding factor in the lifting of the siege.

The first siege of San Sebastien failed because the main assault on the fortress failed. There was no French relieving force in the vicinity. A blockade was maintained by the British, but the siege artillery was withdrawn.

Tarragona failed because the British commander, Murray, was incompetent and although he outnumbered the defenders substantially, he withdrew because of a botched operation and rumors that Suchet was advancing. His subordinates were infuriated and Murray was relieved for incompetence and court-martialed.

In addition to the references already mentioned, Lipscombe's Peninsular War Atlas, Dickson's Manuscripts, and Jones' Journal of Sieges are highly recommended.

As a footnote, the failure of two assaults during the second siege of Badajoz and the main assault in the first siege of San Sebastien tends to lend credence to Pasley's statement of the lacking of training and skill of the Royal Engineers…

While the approach of Marmont's Army of Portugal did influence Wellington's decision, the failure of British siege operations were the deciding factor in the lifting of the siege.

Is that your interpretation or is that supported by the documentary evidence? I mean, is that what Wellington said?

The first siege of San Sebastien failed because the main assault on the fortress failed. There was no French relieving force in the vicinity. A blockade was maintained by the British, but the siege artillery was withdrawn.

I thought the British stopped siege operations because Soult had launched his counter-offensive? Which led to Roncesvalles, Maya, Sorauren etc.

Tarragona failed because the British commander, Murray, was incompetent and although he outnumbered the defenders substantially, he withdrew because of a botched operation and rumors that Suchet was advancing. His subordinates were infuriated and Murray was relieved for incompetence and court-martialed.

Well again, that rather sounds like it was because he thought Suchet's relief force was approaching.

As a footnote, the failure of two assaults during the second siege of Badajoz and the main assault in the first siege of San Sebastien tends to lend credence to Pasley's statement of the lacking of training and skill of the Royal Engineers…

Okay. But does that mean that the numerous failed French assaults at Rosas, Gerona and Zaragoza indicate an equal lack of engineering skill?

The problem of unskilled engineers and the lack of actual combat engineer troops was exactly the problem with the British Army for conducting sieges and the evidence has been provided to you.

If, as you continue to maintain, there was a problem with a lack of skilled engineers, then please explain what you think engineers actually do during a siege.

From All for the King's Shilling by Edward Coss, 212:

‘Once the artillery was in place, a bombardment began. The effectiveness of the artillery salvos was dependent on time, the caliber and numbers of available cannon, ammunition supplies, weather, and the degree to which the enemy put up on active defense. This could include lively small arms and counterbattery fire against the besieging artillery, defensive sorties, and relieving forces. Adding to Wellington's challenges was having a proper siege train in hand when he needed it. He lacked this fundamental resource at the first siege of Badajoz in 1811 and at Burgos in 1812, being short of large-caliber artillery. To compound difficulties, Wellington was also without a fully functional corps of engineers. This meant that it often took longer to create a breach than he preferred. In addition, when it was made, the opening was often smaller than desired by Wellington and the soldiers leading the assault. It may have been the quality of the breaches that caused the governors in charge of Christoval, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos, and San Sebastien to hesitate when making their decisions regarding surrender after the initial breaches were made.'

If, as you continue to maintain, there was a problem with a lack of skilled engineers, then please explain what you think engineers actually do during a siege.

Did you not read Pasley's commentary on the Royal Engineers, and he being a Royal Engineer officer in the Peninsula himself?

Have you not, or do you not have in your possession, the references posted? I would think that you would at least have one or two…

If you would actually like to research what engineers do during a siege, and those are skills the Royal Engineers lacked according to Pasley and others, perhaps you should research and study period and modern studies that have been done on the subject.

Engineers oversaw and directed the construction of siegeworks, along with the artillery sited and emplaced the artillery batteries needed for the necessary bombardment, and surveyed the best way to attack the place being invested. That's a minimum of what they would do. Engineer troops would construct the siege works and in many cases would be engaged in the assaults if necessary. Miners would construct mines under the walls of a fortress in order to aid in effecting a breach in the walls. This is a brief summary of what engineers would do without going into the technical data involved in this work.

Louis de Tousard's American Artillerist's Companion has much in the two volumes of text on sieges, batteries, mines and countermines that will be helpful in your study of this aspect of military operations.

Without skilled engineer officers, and the engineer troops to support a siege, many things can, and did for Wellington's army, go wrong forcing the commander to engage in expensive and bloody infantry assaults which did not always work.

Is that your interpretation or is that supported by the documentary evidence?

You can find the material I used for reference in the Lipscombe Atlas and in Oman's History of the Peninsular War.

But does that mean that the numerous failed French assaults at Rosas, Gerona and Zaragoza indicate an equal lack of engineering skill?

I would think it was the lack of engineer support. The forces that conducted sieges in the first, and unsuccessful, French invasion of Spain. In the second, led by Napoleon, the veteran French units were accompanied by strong contingents of engineer troops in order to conduct the necessary sieges.

From the American Artillerist's Companion by Louis de Tousard, Volume II, 426:

‘The study of fortification is connected with a great many of the arts and sciences. The preliminary branches of knowledge which are indispensable in its pursuit, are arithmetic, algebra, geometry, mechanics, hydrodynamics, fluxions, stereotomy, surveying, geography, natural philosophy, and drawing. Besides which, an acquaintance with the art of war in general is absolutely necessary.'

‘Edifices for civil purposes have usually to resist only time and the elements; military buildings must besides be calculated to resist the effects of the engines of war.'

‘As to the art of war in general, or grand tactics, the necessity of an engineer's acquaintance with it is evident, even from a view of the simple combinations which we have laid before our readers in explaining to them the uses of fortifications.'

‘Lastly, the machines and engines used in the service of artillery and in the navy, serving both in the attack and defense of fortifications, their form and effects are indispensable data in the construction and establishment of works.'

Engineers oversaw and directed the construction of siegeworks, along with the artillery sited and emplaced the artillery batteries needed for the necessary bombardment, and surveyed the best way to attack the place being invested.

Yeah, that's what I thought. Please explain why and how that didn't happen at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz?

That's a minimum of what they would do. Engineer troops would construct the siege works and in many cases would be engaged in the assaults if necessary.

Well, correct me if I am wrong, but I was under the impression that all the spadework was done by the infantry under the direction of an engineeer officer?

As for taking part in the actual assaults, why would an engineer officer do that – risking his life and thus possibly not being available to Wellington at the NEXT siege?

Miners would construct mines under the walls of a fortress in order to aid in effecting a breach in the walls.

On this one you might have a point, although I'm not sure if the lack of mining operations during sieges in the Peninsula was due to the lack of miners (who would normally be contractors and not troops in the army) or whether it was because the terain was not suitable for mining (as at Badajoz for example)?

many things can, and did for Wellington's army, go wrong forcing the commander to engage in expensive and bloody infantry assaults which did not always work.

The ONLY thing that forced Wellington to engage in expensive and bloody assaults was that the French did not surrender as they should have done once a practicable breach had been effected.

Here is a link to Oman agreeing with Kevin about the poor performance of British engineers at Badajoz(for anyone following this): link

And here is a link to Wellington making explicit before the siege that he would be raising it as soon as he thought the French were coming: link

The ONLY thing that forced Wellington to engage in expensive and bloody assaults was that the French did not surrender as they should have done once a practicable breach had been effected.

That is an incorrect assessment as has already been clearly demonstrated with both primary and secondary evidence.

You are wrong in your 'assessment.'

Well, correct me if I am wrong, but I was under the impression that all the spadework was done by the infantry under the direction of an engineeer officer?

That's what the British did as they had no actual engineer combat troops until 1813.

And as the British engineer officers were not trained in siege operations, that is a double problem.

As for taking part in the actual assaults, why would an engineer officer do that – risking his life and thus possibly not being available to Wellington at the NEXT siege?

For example, two British engineer officers, Captain MacLeod and Lieutenant Thompson, took part in the assault on Ciudad Rodrigo leading, along with Captain Thompson of the 74th Foot, a 150-man detachment equipped with scaling ladders and bags filled with hay, the latter to be used to throw into the breach.

Did you think that engineers were immune or excused from combat?

And here is a link to Wellington making explicit before the siege that he would be raising it as soon as he thought the French were coming…

That is true, as already posted, for the first siege. For the second the British had also failed in two assaults on the breaches which was the main factor in lifting the siege.

That is an incorrect assessment as has already been clearly demonstrated with both primary and secondary evidence.

You are wrong in your 'assessment.'

To which assessment are you referring?

To which assessment are you referring?

This one by Major B:

The ONLY thing that forced Wellington to engage in expensive and bloody assaults was that the French did not surrender as they should have done once a practicable breach had been effected.

I posted my answer where I believed it would be immediately below Major B's posting, unaware that another posting was already there.

Sorry for the confusion.

And the reasoning for the abandonment of the siege on 10th June 1811: link

The ONLY thing that forced Wellington to engage in expensive and bloody assaults was that the French did not surrender as they should have done once a practicable breach had been effected.

There is nothing that dictates the defenders 'should' surrender after a breach had been effected. This wasn't the 16th or 17th centuries.

Did you not see the quotation from Coss?

And the reasoning for the abandonment of the siege on 10th June 1811

Have I not already addressed all of the reasons for the four British sieges failing?

Perhaps you should read the entire thread?

And the Lipscombe Atlas is an excellent reference and states that two British major assaults at Badajoz during the second siege failed before the decision to withdraw was made.

And for some balance, with French Engineers being found wanting: link

And the Lipscombe Atlas is an excellent reference and states that two British major assaults at Badajoz during the second siege failed before the decision to withdraw was made.

It is an excellent reference. But failed assaults during a siege are not necessarily the reason for the failure of the siege as a whole. There are many examples of this in French sieges too.

And for some balance, with French Engineers being found wanting

Was this not during the first French invasion before the introduction into Spain of large numbers of French engineer troops added for the express purpose of conducting sieges?

But failed assaults during a siege are not necessarily the reason for the failure of the siege as a whole. There are many examples of this in French sieges too.

You're correct-they are not.

But in the case of the second British siege of Badajoz it was one of the two reasons the siege was lifted and it was the main reason the first siege of San Sebastien was raised.

The ONLY thing that forced Wellington to engage in expensive and bloody assaults was that the French did not surrender as they should have done once a practicable breach had been effected.

That is an incorrect assessment as has already been clearly demonstrated with both primary and secondary evidence.

You are wrong in your 'assessment.'

Ciudad Rodrigo – 2 effective breaches made by the artillery. No French surrender. Wellington has to order an assault.

Badajoz – 2 effective breaches made by the artillery. No French surrender. Wellington has to order an assault.

Anyone see the pattern here?

Well, correct me if I am wrong, but I was under the impression that all the spadework was done by the infantry under the direction of an engineeer officer?

That's what the British did as they had no actual engineer combat troops until 1813.

So who did have actual engineer combat troops? The French? The Spanish?

And as the British engineer officers were not trained in siege operations, that is a double problem.

So what did they do wrong?

Would you quit? Any commander worthy of that name and position would defend his post to the best of his ability.

You don't quit when it becomes difficult. If you do, then its time for you to hang it up and just go home.

The second siege of Badajoz-breach made, assaults failed, position held, siege lifted.

The first siege of San Sebastien-breach made, assault failed, siege lifted and siege artillery reembarked.

'People who think of retreating before a battle has been fought ought to have stayed home.'-Michel Ney

There is nothing that dictates the defenders 'should' surrender after a breach had been effected. This wasn't the 16th or 17th centuries.

Did you not see the quotation from Coss?

Well it was certainly expected in the 18th century.

The quote from Coss:
'It may have been the quality of the breaches that caused the governors in charge of Christoval, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos, and San Sebastien to hesitate when making their decisions regarding surrender after the initial breaches were made.'

Surely the fact that they even considered surrender after a practicable breach had been made indicates that they were still thinking in 18th century terms?

Would you quit? Any commander worthy of that name and position would defend his post to the best of his ability.

You don't quit when it becomes difficult. If you do, then its time for you to hang it up and just go home.

'People who think of retreating before a battle has been fought ought to have stayed home.'-Michel Ney

Who said anything about quitting?

Would you quit? Any commander worthy of that name and position would defend his post to the best of his ability.

I thought Napoleon had threatened any commandant who surrendered before resisting at least one assault should be court-martialled – this being an innovation at the time.

Oman on the failings of British military engineering at San Sebastian: link and link

In the case of San Sebastian, it was definitely the approach of Soult which led to the temporary cessation of the siege: link