"Open order in the AR; closed order in the ACW?" Topic

From what I have gleaned from comments on other threads it seems that for most of the American Revolution the majority of troops fought in open order and the reason for this is generally ascribed to the nature of the terrain. However, by the time of the Civil War (and perhaps even by the time of the War of 1812?) troops seem to have reverted to fighting in closed order even though the terrain they were fighting over was presumably much the same (in the Eastern Theatre at least).

Does anyone care to speculate on the reasons for this? (Or even just want to tell me that I have got my assumptions totally wrong in the first place?)

I did attempt to crosspost to the 1812 and ACW boards but got 'timed out'.

However, by the time of the Civil War (and perhaps even by the time of the War of 1812?) troops seem to have reverted to fighting in closed order even though the terrain they were fighting over was presumably much the same (in the Eastern Theatre at least).

I am not aware of any evidence to support this view. Infantry formations in the Civil War could adapt to the terrain and conditions just as they could in the American Revolution.

I would give approximately three reasons…

1: Command and control: True it breaks down after about volley #4 or 5, but keeping the troops in close order was better for communications and knowing where your lines were supposed to be….

2: Effectiveness of fires. 3 companies firing in close order on line is a lot easier to manage and more effective than open order.

3: Increased availability of rifled musket and reliability of the percussion cap, allowed for more effective fire.

Much larger armies in the ACW fighting in approximately the same area.

American Civil War armies overwhelmingly fought in close order formation, due to the sheer size of the forces involved as well as the tactics.

While it is true that a looser skirmish type formation was used in some situations and in some terrain, it would be incorrect to say that armies "reverted back" from the AWI. It wasn't as clear cut as that or linear as that.

The armies of North America in 1861 fought in the same type of formations that were being used around the world and by the major European powers.

Both sides used a tight two-rank formation for regiments with one or two companies of skirmishers out in front.

As volley firing degenerated into independent fire and from casualties dropping from the line, battle lines would tend to "drift" and "get looser" just by the nature of men shuffling and shifting during firing. And of course many mass charges which began as textbook tight formations began to loosen and lose their form as they neared their intended target or goal.

Another topic which is relevant to the kinds of formations they used is the topic and myth of entrenching – i.e. that Civil War armies "gradually adopted" entrenching more as they "learned" of the rifle musket's power and accuracy. Nonsense. Entrenchments and earth works were not new to 19th century warfare or 18th Century warfare. The American Revolution saw the building of extensive earthworks and redoubts, Saratoga is a great example. They didn't build them because of fear of the flintlock, they built them because entrenched and fortified armies are more difficult to assault and are made more defendable the better their works are. American Civil armies used entrenchments and earthworks way before Petersburg in 1864. Works appeared around Manassas in 1861, and of course Washington D.C. was completely ringed by forts and works practically from the outset of the war.

But one thing that must be clarified about the American Civil War is that it most certainly was not the "first modern war" as it is so often portrayed. It was in truth one of the last of the great Napoleonic-type wars, and it came very late in the era.

The reason why Pickett's Charge stepped off elbow to elbow wasn't because commanders were still dumb to the fact of the rifle musket or because they "hand't adapted" to new weaponry, that's all nonsense. The reason why the Union assault at Fredericksburg stepped off elbow to elbow wasn't because the "weapons were ahead of the tactics". The rifle musket wasn't the miracle weapon as it had been mythologized as(but that's a topic for another thread).

Civil War armies fought with rifle muskets, but they largely fought their battles AS IF they were still armed with smoothbores in terms of ranges. The best way to sum up the Civil War was that it was 1861 armies still using 1812-1815 formations in terms of density, and equally important they still used their newer weapons as if they were fighting in 1812-1815 – i.e. smoothbores.

Because of that, and because statistically artillery accounted for an astonishingly tiny percentage of the overall casualties(about 93-95% from minie balls, about 5-7% from artillery balls/shells/canister), armies massed up, got in close, and delivered fire at smoothbore ranges. The high casualty rates in the Civil War were not because of the rifle musket. It was because when formations are elbow to elbow and shooting at each other at 50-75 yards or less, people are going to be hit, regardless of the weapons used.

And lastly – do not forget, that despite Civil War armies using elbow to elbow linear formations and firing at close ranges, the hit ratio was STILL only about 5%(Took about 100 minie balls being fired for 5 men to be hit). That's astonishing.

Interesting question. I know in his book With Zeal and With Bayonets Only (2010) Matthew Spring has clearly pointed out that during the AWI the British primarily fought in open order. Was this also applicable to the Americans using Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States?

In Under the Shadow of Napoleon: French Influence on the American Way of Warfare from the War of 1812 to the Outbreak of WWII (2012) Michael Bonura states that the American Army continued to use Steuben's drill and tactics at least until the War of 1812. The US Army adopted French tactical practices when they were introduced by Alexander Smyth, William Duane and Winfield Scott in the period from 1812 to 1814.

Subsequent American drill and tactics were based on the French model until at least after the Civil war.

Thank you for the replies everyone. On a related subject, how did the doctrine for infantry defending against cavalry change over the time in question? I know cavalry were rarely present in significant numbers on American battlefields but I would have thought open order infantry in two ranks would have been particularly vulnerable.

So tell me when infantry faced charging cavalry during this war? I can only think of a few instances, and time the cavarly came out on the short end of the stick. No record of square used, that I know of.

The instances of cavalry charging infantry that I recall off the top of my head – 16th LD charging at Monmouth – recoiled from the musket fire.

Tarelton charging largely unarmed recruits who thought he was on their side – slaughtered infantry.

American cavalry charging infantry at GCH – I believe they retreated.

Two more:-

Continental cavalry rode too close to the British flank companies at Eutaw and got badly shot up.

British Legion shot up at Cowpens.

The rifle musket wasn't the miracle weapon as it had been mythologized as…

Tell that to Sedgewick….

In the Southern campaign there were a number of instances of mounted troops (cavalry might be a stretch for some of these) attacking infantry. Sometimes those charges were successful. Sometimes they were not. Probably the ultimate example of a successful cavalry attack was at Waxhaws.

Perhaps one reason why you don't read of cavalry successes attacking the looser infantry formations in the AWI was because there was not that much cavalry. You commit your handful of cavalry to a charge which breaks the enemy front line, but then what? You don't have the second and third waves of horse that could follow up and deal with the enemy's second line and conduct a pursuit. If Babbits is correct at Cowpens Washington's horse may have launched three different charges during a fairly short time period. I imagine this would not have been done if Morgan had more than a handful of cavalry.

@Baranovich-One thing which is important is to look at the circumstance when casualties were being inflicted. For example, if you had a unit that stalled out in an attack and command control broke down, the unit was likely to suffer severe casualties. However those inflicting them might be firing many more shots so accuracy would go down.

Thanks for the replies. I guess it comes down to the fact that you don't have to worry too much about cavalry if there are only ever a handful of them on the battlefield.

Back on the point of open order versus close order: what did the armies do in the War of 1812? I assume the British were generally two ranks deep and in close order as they had been in the Peninsula? Did the Americans do the same or were they using three ranks like most European armies?

Cavalry was expensive to raise and maintain and the legion concept was all the rage – meaning some of the cav ended up on foot. The British seemed to rely on mounted units of Loyalists as the war went on, sending the 16th LD home only keeping the 17th LD.

Howe succeeded killing off most of the horses for the Philly campaign of 1777 with an overly long sea voyage, thus negating them for the campaign. The Continental horse commanders never got along with each other, and succeeded in neutralizing themselves for the Monmouth battles when the ran Pulaski out of command of the combined American horse.

Links to a number of skirmishes involving cavalry, and engagements typical of the tactics employed in the war's 'Le Petitte Guerre':

Examples: Spencer's Ordinary

link

Indian Field:

link

The Hook, Gloucester Point:

link

These accounts give a good view of how cavalry was used throughout the war in small unit actions.

FlyXwire, thanks for those. They were really interesting accounts. It is great to see maps drawn by men in the field as well.

I love these maps too SJ (Simcoe's and Ewald's are so tactically detailed)!

Something to emphasize perhaps is that the tactics could be significantly different between those used during the pitched battles, and those available "out on the lines". Not having to face artillery or supported/reinforced infantry formations, cavalry could be more widely utilized in these types of small unit encounters against the enemy.