"Info on Continental tactics?" Topic

Hello

While the British are well covered by "With Zeal and Bayonet" I don't know if there is bibliography covering the subject of tactics for their opponents. I am particularly interested in learning how Americans adapted -if they did- European warfare tactics to the particulars of warfare in America.

Thanks in advance!

If conventional wisdom is to be believed, they all hid behind trees and shot British officers (clad in foolish brilliant scarlet of course) with Old Betsy.

While I have no good books to direct to you most of the American officers of higher rank would have European books on tactics for use. And then along came Steuben at Valley Forge – and the tactics were changed. So, I'd look for works that cover before Steuben and after Steuben, at least for that northern and central theaters. In the south, I'd look for books on Nathaniel Greene and his tactics as well as the varied partizan leaders like The Gamecock and The Swampfox. You might not find too many specific books on the tactics but you will certainly find books that discuss the tactics. The war lasted from 1775 to the end of 1781 (with minor stuff after) so you can bet a lot of change occurred over so long a time span – even in the 18th century.

the British actually adapted to the Americans in some ways. specifically the adopted the more open order, 2 rank deep formations that continentals were using, as it suited the terrain better.

of course, Von Steuben trained them to fight in the proper European fashion, which helped tremendously.

unfortunately, I can think of any books. I somehow came across a modern copy Von Stuben's manual, which im sure is not hard to find. inside, you get everything you'd expect. the American drills were simpler and quicker to learn than the British, but the ideas were the same.

I believe, on a wargames level, the pre Valley forge continentals are usually rated a less trained and disciplined than those afterwards. but there were always exceptions of continental units performing with great discipline.

This books covers the military aspects of both sides:

link

Would it be broadly true to say that a difference was that most Continental infantry preferred shooting, whereas British regulars relied more on closing to use bayonets?
If so, which category fits the bulk of trained Loyalist infantry?

If so, which category fits the bulk of trained Loyalist infantry?

That would depend on who trained them …

"This books covers the military aspects of both sides:"

According to the reviews of those who have read it, no it doesn't

You are assuming there are major differences. The challenge to the Continentals were integrating militia and less trained troops into their ranks throughout the war. They used the two ranks, open order at times, charged bayonets at times, etc. They also fought more defensively, so their tactics were limited by that as well.

Historygamer

In order to assume that there were major differences I should be more knowledgable than I am. The truth is that while I have a relatively good grasp of the social, economic, political and the overall narrative of the American War of Independence, I am sorely lacking on knowledge about the specifics, particularly how the armies actually fought. Spring's "With Zeal and with Bayonets only" was an eye-opener to me; I realized how much I was extrapolating of what I knew about how armies fought in Europe to the particular conditions of the war in America.

I tried to find some book that would do the same for the Americans, but to my surprise I couldn't find anyone. Now, I am assuming (being "assume" the operative word) how the Americans fought, but I have not proof that they actually did it like I am imagining they did! You make some good points: how did they integrated the militias on their battle plans? Were the Militias actually the untrained, week-end soldiers of the usual narrative? Or there were exceptions? Did the Continentals that left for their homes in January 1777, after their enlistments expired, continue to contribute to the war effort through the Militia system in their native states? Or did they not? How the supply status of the Continental army influenced how American generals fought? A constant trope is that the Americans were afraid of the bayonet charges of the British; is it that true? Or is it part of a carefully nurtured myth, created during the war itself, to emphazised the civilian nature of the American army in contrast with the professionalism of the British and Hessians?

Best

Complicated questions not covered by any one book that I am aware of.

The Americans struggled with a lack of a commonly used drill manual unitl von Steuben came along. The Americans used very similar tactics to the British, though obviously with units coming and going throughout the war, the ability and reliability of American units varied greatly.

Without going into too much detail here – you'd really have to read a number of books to capture the info you are interested in – as there is no one book (yet) that is the equivelent of Spring's book.

Another thing to consider--the army that was raised for 1775-6 was very different from the 1777-83 Army.

And as HG points out, there was an ongoing lack of consistency with the Americans--I asked a very knowledgeable individual about the Americans and use of open order, and he answered he had never found any support for it! But with the constant turnover, different regions--it's hard to nail down anything form a single source.

There's a quote from an officer of Wayne's Pennsylvania Bgde about the battle of Green Spring, VA in 1781, that the Continentals were increasingly using the "stiff German" formations whilst the British were becoming more "open". I have not been able to find WHEN this quote was made, but I suspect it was somewhat retrospective (and hence is muddled as to the contemporary evolution of the two armies) and is quite possibly also a dig at Steuben's influence over the Continental army, as the latter was very unpopular in some circles within the Continental officer corps.

the British actually adapted to the Americans in some ways. specifically the adopted the more open order, 2 rank deep formations that continentals were using, as it suited the terrain better.

Sorry, but this is more or less the complete opposite of what actually happened. Several pre-AWI drill manuals (bear in mind none were "official" until the 1790s) make allowance for dropping to two ranks due to reduced manpower – which was done by at least one unit at Quebec in 1759 – and the tactical modifications in the field during the F&IW extended this to operating in difficult terrain and/or against a more numerous/extended enemy.

of course, Von Steuben trained them to fight in the proper European fashion, which helped tremendously.

Again, no, this was already happening – Timothy Pickering produced a composite manual at the start of the war, based on the "Discipline of the Norfolk Militia" of 1759 and the 1764 "Manual of Arms", which was used by almost all of the New England contingents. Infantry from other states used their own interpretation of existing drill books; the other arms were mainly trained by the French. All Steuben did was to further consolidate (and simplify) the drills of all 13 State Lines into one common version.

I believe, on a wargames level, the pre Valley forge continentals are usually rated a less trained and disciplined than those afterwards. but there were always exceptions of continental units performing with great discipline.

They do, and they really should not. The fighting ability of the Continental infantry – aside from a few individual units (mainly with pre-war militia traditions to uphold) – was improved before Steuben arrived by the introduction of three-year enlistments in 1777, and by the re-enlistees of 1776 (the first full year of campaigning). Look at accounts of the Saratoga and Philadelphia campaigns and you find the general mass of the Continental infantry putting up a much better show than they did in 1776 or the early fighting in 1777. There were still weaknesses, but the fighting spirit of the troops at Bemis Heights and Germantown was what prompted the French (and other European nations) to sit up and take notice, and see the possibility of a different outcome.

It is unfortunate that, after Steuben had ironed out the wrinkles, poor generalship led to a stalemate (and grand-tactical failure) at Monmouth, and other strategic factors (such as the mass migration of Clinton's army to the Caribbean and the consequent reduction in aggressive moves by the Crown forces) prevented the Continentals from proving their worth again until late 1780.

how did they integrated the militias on their battle plans? Were the Militias actually the untrained, week-end soldiers of the usual narrative? Or there were exceptions? Did the Continentals that left for their homes in January 1777, after their enlistments expired, continue to contribute to the war effort through the Militia system in their native states? Or did they not?

This could probably be its own thread. The short answer to many of these would be "It depends on the time, theatre, unit and commander".

One point some will use to explain better militia performance at some engagement is to claim the unit contained ex-continentals. There are instances of former continentals serving in the militia after their enlistments expired. However the numbers do not appear large.

Were the continentals better supplied with bayonets later in the war or is that just a myth? I would imagine that would impact performance if true.

Yes they were. The flow of French arms through the Caribbean ensured that, but it took time.