"T-64 - a failed tank?" Topic

In the context of the 'imminent' Battlefront Team Yankee release, there has been a lot of chatter on this and other fora about why no T-64s are mentioned in the initial release. Some of us have pointed out that the reason is simply that the eponymous Team Yankee never came across any in their adventures in the novel.

Nevertheless there has been persistent interest in this AFV from Cold War Warriors, so I have been looking forward to Steven Zaloga's 'T-64 Battle Tank'' (Osprey New Vanguard 223) with avid interest. Was this tank the expensive failure I was told it was at the time, barely able to move from hard standing with its poorly designed but innovative suspension and weak and unreliable engine? Or was it indeed a major step forward in capability from the T-55 T-62 model that justified its astronomical expense?

Most of the book concerns itself with the Byzantine political shenaniggans that went on around this tank, and its rivals, but a few choice quotes for you to put into context for Team Yankee, which remember, is set in 1985 in the Southern, CENTAG, region:

The T-64A was deployed primarily with the Soviet Tank units in the northern regions of East Germany with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, 3rd Shock Army, and 20th Guards Army. Its primacy in the GSFG was short lived. The new T-80A tank began arriving in Germany in April 1983, initially re-equipping the field armies in the southern sectors of East Germany. However, before the withdrawal of the GSFG, the T-80 had begun to replace the T-64A and B in the three northern armies as well.

Page 42.

The T-64 offered the firepower, armor, and mobility of the NATO tanks, but it came at a price. The T-64 was inevitably quite small to keep its weight under the heavy tank threshold. Its cramped interior limited its modernization potential, as did its lightweight and fragile suspension. Instead of simply abandoning the T-64 paradigm, the Soviet industry trapped itself in the straitjacket of the T-64's small size for a variety of complicated political and economic reasons

Page 45.

The Soviet army's own assessment of the T-64B's comparative military technical co-efficient for the mid 1980s was 1.1, compared to 1.13 for the T-80U, and 1.56 for the M1A1. (Page 45)

So a failed tank? A tough question, and not one I am qualified to answer. I do know that a successful tank is measured on the longevity of its service life, which for the T-64 could be said, by the time it was eventually accepted into service in 1971, and a few were seen in service with the Ukrainians in 2014 – 43 years. The T-54/55 series, by contrast, soldiers on around the world after having entered service in 1947 – 67 years!

As the roll over my Chieftans, Leos and M60s in my 1981 "Cold War gone hot", they certainly don't seem failed!

I'm not aware of anyone advocating for the T64 on the basis of it being a great tank, more to do with it being faithful to actual deployment within soviet forces.

AFAIK the engine was swapped out by the mid 80s…hence the T64r.

But again, we shouldn't get our knickers in a knot about it not featuring in the initial TY releases. If the game sells, we're going to see it purely from a product economics view alone.

Being the main cold war soviet battle tank for the main armoured formations, replacing the t62, I'm astounded it isn't in the initial releases. It was frontline kit during the most critical years. By all accounts it's main failing, once the suspension problems had been fixed, was the poor crew ergonomics, limiting deployment duration effectiveness. how important that would be when doctrine was for significant losses.. anybody's guess. on the plus side, it was very low profile, fast, well armoured and carried a decent gun. the t64 optics and other targetting systems were also supposed to be significantly better than predecessors and the export model t72.

It was the tank that was there as the main MBT in GSFG, also equipping some units in CGF and Hungary from which it was observed being returned to the Soviet Union in the 90s. At the time there was plenty of coverage of 3SA carrying out training and exercises both open source and classified with no mention that it was barely able to move under it's own steam.

Not forgetting initial teething problems with the T-80 and it's complex gas turbine engine which also required larger Kraz tanker trucks because of the high fuel consumption.

The cramped interior is common with all of the new tanks, T-64, 72 and 80.

Tally Ho!

Most definitely not a failed tank. Compare it to the M60… in 1978.

Stabilized gun.
125mm Smoothbore.
350mm of frontal armor.
Armor was steel ceramic.
Tank was fast.

The reason it is not used around the world is that the Sovs didn't export it.

Joe Collins

Top of the line kit from start to finish.

Maybe you should do some light reading on maintainance of the Chieftan engine and transmission. I don't recall the |Soviets having to assign an extra recovery vehicle to each company level tank unit like the BAOR did.

Some great points, thanks guys:

I'm not aware of anyone advocating for the T64 on the basis of it being a great tank

Nor am I…

It was the tank that was there as the main MBT in GSFG

Being the main cold war soviet battle tank for the main armoured formations, replacing the t62, I'm astounded it isn't in the initial releases.

"The first new generation tank is the T-64: this represents about 18 per cent of the Soviet inventory" (Steven Zaloga – Tank War – Osprey Elite 26, 1989)

Top of the line kit from start to finish.

Well it was on paper, and that was certainly the fear at the time. The practical reality is that whilst the engine was eventually sorted out, similar to the dear old Chieftain, little could be done to improve the quality and consistency of actually mass producing the materials involved in the innovative suspension, and the internal volume made operating and modernising the AFV problematic.

As you say above, it wasn't exported to the Warsaw Pact nations, which reduces its proportion of the overall WP tank fleet. Incredibly, during our period of interest the Soviets were producing and supporting 3 distinct third generation MBTs, the T-72 and T-80 as well as the T-64, so I don't think one can really speak of 'main MBT'

Of course for a brief period it was concentrated in the northern sector, opposite the British sector, but even there my understanding is that it was never more than a third of the tank strength in terms of actual runners.

Of course a lot of the reality only emerged after the event, so I guess the real question is: do you represent the Soviets as they presented themselves to the outside world, or as they really were?

Whatever nick says…I'd be foolish to ignore the knowledge and expertise of someone who was there and tasked with knowing these things.

Shame Allen C passed, he was also a great source of first hand knowledge from the US side. Be wary of crediting BF with having done deep research on the subject. Saying that, I think you've raised some very good points.

The debacle of US intelligence sources and the T64 is illustrative of the entire period. To this day we have folks convinced that the T72 was the main Soviet battle tank that would have been faced in Germany.

We basically got caught by our own post WW2 propaganda. This lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of Soviet equipment and Soviet tactics. Only in the mid-80s did we start to get it sorted.

Joe Collins

The T64 was a failure in that it was expensive to build.

It's a pretty capable tank, since it's still in service in the Ukraine.

Some of us have pointed out that the reason is simply that the eponymous Team Yankee never came across any in their adventures in the novel.

Which is the kind of argument that gets Flames of War called "World War II: The Movie: The Game". I'd rather have a Cold War game by Battlefront that was updated to what we know now about Soviet equipment and deployment rather than "Team Yankee: The Book: The Game".

And honestly I think it is more Battlefront hedging their bets as T-72 models can be re-used for other historical conflicts. See for example that T-62s are absent despite the Team encountering them.

Not a failed tank after the first few years at any rate- but like all cold war Soviet tanks it was trapped in a basic evolutionary cul de sac based on an obsession with heavy armament, heavy armour (in places), high speed and light weight. The extra special feature of the T64 was that in addition to the above miracles, it managed to squeeze in all manner of additional ostensibly quite refined equipment.

As Zaloga and others have pointed out in detail, and the fate of thousands of Soviet tanks in wars around the world illustrates, this was all bought (for the 55, 62, 64 72, 80 etc) at the cost of design compromises which made Sov MBTs extremely vulnerable to catastrophic explosion when penetrated, difficult to add upgrades of extra kit internally, and prey to the woefully poor build quality of advanced components.

Many in the West at the time fell for the delusion that the Sovs had somehow been able to achieve what other tank designers found impossible- getting all that capability into a very small platform without major compromise. Turned out of course that the Sovs were no more able to insert a quart into a pint pot than anyone else had been.

After the first few years in service I'd say the 64 was by Soviet standards a good tank. It was unlikely to have been retained as the key piece of equipment of front line units assigned the toughest war task otherwise- even if their deployment to the prestige GSFG may have been partly influenced by politicking between the tank design bureaux.

I'd say though that the benefits of the T64's advanced features were to some extent nullified by by the typically poor build quality, and the extra demands the complexity placed upon support services.

As an intelligence officer, my professional opinion is/was that the T-55 is the most successful post WWII Soviet/Russian tank given the quantity produced, it's length of time in service in substantial quantity & the number of nations that employed it (the T-62 was significantly less successful as it represented a significant cost increase for only a modest increase in capability – which is why it wasn't employed by the WP nations despite being available to all client states but only purchased by some of the Arab countries) – while the T-64 was an important advance that impacted all following designs – it was less successful than the T-72 & T-80 series & is considered a failed design despite the advances incorporated in later design families

@ Senefffe and DS Frank – Absolutely chaps – my assessment exactly!

This lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of Soviet equipment and Soviet tactics. Only in the mid-80s did we start to get it sorted.

In the mid-80s there was a fundamental misunderstanding of Soviet equipment and Soviet tactics. Only post 1990s did we start to get it sorted.

Fixed that for you :-)

Which is the kind of argument that gets Flames of War called "World War II: The Movie: The Game". I'd rather have a Cold War game by Battlefront that was updated to what we know now about Soviet equipment and deployment rather than "Team Yankee: The Book: The Game".

Well you've hit the nail on the head, despite missing my point about the novel being used to raise awareness and interest in the game other than from those who were there – - who on earth would want to play the Soviets if the stats reflected what we know now of their low training levels, poor discipline and mixed capability!

Because quantity has a quality all of its own.

But also I don't think they were as rubbish as some suggest, and I don't consider the NATO side as capable as some suggest!

Anyone have a link to info about the Soviet "Battle Computer" from the era? It's mentioned in Red Army, but I'd like to get more info on it. No, it wasn't an actual computer as we know it.

Not a failed tank, any more than Panther or Tiger were IMO. They also had reliability issues that got sorted…

who on earth would want to play the Soviets if the stats reflected what we know now of their low training levels, poor discipline and mixed capability!

I'd argue we have a more balanced view of the Soviets capabilities than Coyle did when he wrote Team Yankee.

How many battalions of Soviet tanks did TY kill with two platoons of M1s? If I recall it put even the fantasies of Mr Clancy to shame.

Most of the Soviet company and battalion commanders in TY are complete dunderheads. If TY had gone up against one of the commanders from 'Red Army' it would have been wiped out.

The T64 was designed as another one of those projects that would shower glory over the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution in highlighting all of its' technological leaps and bounds of advances.

It had development problems due to the rush to get it into service for certain. However, it faired no better or worse than many other contemporary projects. I would say the chieftan even suffered through a more problematic experience. The British Army changed the squadron organization to add another recovery vehicle to each tank squadron! The MBT70 did not even make it to production. American servicemen still loathe the time spent servicing their M60A2s.

The T64 was prodiced in numbers. In comparison seven thousand Leopard ones is what, half or less than the T64 production run?

No it was not used by other Warsaw Pact allies. After events like Hungary in '56, Czeckoslovakia in '68 and Warsaw in '80 they would have been reluctant to update them with their top technology. Nevermind that the Warsaw Pact countries would have balked at the cost of buying the T64, when they could cheaply produce their own T55s.

After the '67 debacle the Soviets highly questioned giving or selling any technology to any arab state. Especially between the nature of maintainance and given the level of education and training.

You can't really compare it to today where they will seel for reasons of making money or keeping production lines open.

Was it cramped? Sure but no less than any T72 or T80.

While it was not produced in a free market capitalist economy, production was still limited by the cost of the technology that went into it. Laser range finders, image intensifiers, thermal vision, optical sights and multi-fuel engines are expensive. Proportionally, probably more so in the '60s and '70s than today.

As costs for these items went down and production and availabilty went up, suddenly you find all these items starting to appear in T80s and even T72s.

You might be forgetting too how these were to be used.
There is valid reason why these were concentrated against the Northern plain and especially against the BAOR.

All in all not too shabby at all.
Don't inder estimate it.

A friend often got into asking me which model of T72 was best. I told him the model was immaterial. The ones crewed by professionals would be best. He got all excited expecting I would answer soviet or East german over something like Syrian or Iraqui. "No", I told him, "Indian Army in all likelihood". A professional army where they are trained to operate and maintain the kit, are aggressive and have an average of ten to fifteen years experience. My friend had to think about this long and hard and eventually agreed with me.

Yeah, do not under estimate the T64.

My apologies for being so long winded and the typos, my vision is poor of late.

Don't apologise mate, a useful and thoughtful response. And your comments about the long service Indian army actually crystallize my thoughts about the usefulness of complex MBTs crewed by 2 year conscripts without the benefit of long-service SNCOs. It does put my obsession about the strengths and weaknesses of the T-64 compared to the T-55 into perspective!

The point about professionals is highly relevant- especially the NCO cadre I would suggest.

The real enemy of a proper objective appreciation of military capabilities is reducing analysis to crude 'top trumps' comparison of headline characteristics of individual pieces of equipment.

This is one of the reasons the Soviet military of the late cold war is so consistently overrated. What also needs to be considered is-

a) The professional competence of the troops charged with operating the equipment, as mentioned by Troopwo above.

b) Also- ACTUALLY how well the kit worked as combat systems, So- NOT the top trumps card gun calibre/max speed, etc, etc comparison. Also, NOT a simple evaluation of the most basic mechanical elements of reliability- ie how well does it keep going as a piece of moving machinery- where the Sovs generally score very well. Combat reliability is quite a bit more than that- how well does the sight, laser rangefinder, autoloader, turret race, radio, compass, propellant fill on the main armament rounds, etc etc work? In the Sov case- often not very well at all as it turned out. I've had former GSFG folks tell me that many AFVs were signed off as serviceable in a basic sense but were entirely unfit for combat because one or the other key system had failed.

The real heart of the problem of Sov kit in general (apart from building in so many design compromises) lies in the shortcomings of Soviet industry as advanced technology began to be needed on a really large scale in the 1980s.

Partly because it lacked the civilian consumer demand element present in the West, which sustained and accelerated the development of reliable mass produced miniaturised (enough to fit in a tank anyway!) advanced componentry (eg microcomputers, small lasers, digital optics etc etc), in the late 1970s-1980s Soviet industry fell behind the West rapidly and decisively in the capability it could realistically give to its conventional forces on land, sea and air.

What was needed was mass produced, reliable, advanced kit. There are certainly many Western weapons and systems which fell foul of this, but in the Soviet case this became an absolutely systemic problem across the board. Soviet industry was just never able to master all three elements. In short the Sovs and their allies could have could have military kit that was-

- mass produced and reliable, but not advanced,

- advanced and reliable, but not mass produced,

or- advanced and mass produced- but not reliable.

My turn for apology- a little broader than the original topic by the end!

I have heard stories about soviet generals breaking down in tears as they watched US exercises at the National Training Center.

Usually they were heard to mutter about,"that is how we taught it to be done", as they watched the enemy force in how they put soviet combat theory into practice with every exercise.

We always said the best trained regiment in the Red Army was stationed at the NTC.

Having been B-slapped around the high desert on several occasions by OPFOR, I can definitely agree…

who on earth would want to play the Soviets if the stats reflected what we know now of their low training levels, poor discipline and mixed capability!

Well, that's not the whole picture. Some of the real stats re: their equipment (specifically their AT rounds) stunned a whole lot of people. The assumptions pre-'fall of the wall' were off by a very uncomfortable amount. Seems the Sovs kept the good stuff home and imported the lesser stuff.

Seneffe- Spot on analysis.

No matter how they were perceived it was always fun to throw in a bit of a wobbler during a CPX/CAST ex when acting as the enemy, just to push a C/O out of his comfort zone!

Tally Ho!

Nick, back in the day at work what was the vibe about Soviets being able to pull off a win? You would have played around with a number of scenarios, how they end up?

Nick, back in the day at work what was the vibe about Soviets being able to pull off a win? You would have played around with a number of scenarios, how they end up?

While we wait for Nick's thoughts, I can tell you at the School of Infantry in 1985 the thinking was that NATO would do well to hold out for a week with 'forward defence' without going nuclear…I don't think there was enough ammunition stockpiled for much more than that…

There was an inherent tension in NATO between the Germans wanting forward defence and the Brits and US wanting to trade space for time…

Trading space for time is an easier decision when its not your front yard!

Of course, but you'd think at the same time they would want to delay the use of tactical nukes for as long as possible – tough choices – thank God it never happened I suppose.

I think the term "failed tank" is too harsh, since clearly it was a forerunner of the much more modern designs we see today.

It appears they've kept the same general shape, gun, advanced fire control, etc., etc., as one would expect, in the follow-on models.

It is interesting to note that they've appeared to have ditched the T-64's very small road wheels and suspension, in favor of what appears to me to be the more traditional Christie-type suspension, from WWII.

Mc Wong, most exercises would end with the inevitable bucket of instant sunshine! The intent was generally to try and hold the first waves until reinforcements and the French arrived, whilst disrupting follow on forces and the logistics trail. If we were successful with our defence in depth the Sovs and allies (if they joined in) would hopefully get rather jammed up. Sometimes it all felt rather optimistic!

They would have probably used airborne/heliborne assaults to seize crossings at the various water features. Much use would have been made of Chemical both persistent and nonpersistent to disrupt our lines and protect their flanks. I don't think we lost any of our exercises, but remember some very close calls and casualty prediction was pretty harsh.

And as Bruce says the Germans were in favour of forwards defence.

Tally Ho!

Cheers!

Yes Mako concur – nothing wrong with the turret or chassis, or even the engine 'back aft' of the T64 – eventually – its just that the suspension was just a little bit too far ahead of its time = maybe about 200 years…As insufferable as that Christie bloke was, his suspension, or the Horst type suspension, really are the only players in town for the foreseeable…I think we'll be seeing hover tanks before we see tanks running x country on wheels made of china clay…

The suspension was advanced and more expensive to make and keep running. I suspect that the most basic reason for abandoning that style was losing the Kharkov plant to an independant Ukraine, so loss of spare parts, the design team and a cash only operation.

I don't know what year they stopped making them, but Ukraine still runs them. I would be curious to know who else has them or keeps them in stores?

According Zaloga's recent Vanguard on the T-64, only the Mojos as you say and the Donetsk separatist rebels they were fighting in 2014…But interestingly no suggestion that their T-64s and Bulats (recent upgraded T-64) are duds or anything….in fact he shows a photo of a knocked out T-64 which survived 5 RPG hits and remained in the fight, and whose crew survived a further 3 hits before the suspension and autoloader packed up and forced the crew to draw stumps…

Also a few used by Pridnestrian Moldovan Republic against Moldovian forces in the Transinistran breakaway apparently, one knocked out by a 100mm AT gun…doesn't state what the range was though, might have been a lucky shot.

Those smooth nore 100mm AT guns are nothing to sneeze at.
Pretty amazing I'ld say.
They would give an M1 or a Challenger a hard time.

Surprised to hear about taking so many RPG hits though!
Certainly tougher than expected.

Yes, and so far neglected in 20mm and an important part of any Soviet defence/flank protection, not forgetting to add blades to your MTLBs!

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Tally Ho!

How very old school! Still, the Soviets never threw anything away…

Yes, still going strong in the late 80s, here is the A/Tks shed with the BMP MRR:

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Tally Ho!

T-64 suspension was not "fragile" but there was an issue with top speed performance which was sorted out later on.

I just wanted to add, people get caught up in comparisons to other T series. Don't do that. Compare years not models.
When T-64 came out it was years ahead to to the optics targeting system and integrated laser rangefinder later on.
Meanwhile the T-72 had a stereoscopic rangefinder which pretty much meant the T-72 had to stop and stay still and hope that his target did too and manually enter the numbers.

Later upgrades were made to T-72 to make optics less aweful and other improvements.
T-64 wanst a bad tank, in many respects it was like the Abramas in respect to maintenance. It had to be maintained by well trained and motivated people.
That did not work well with some conscript who didnt even speak russian was from buminstan.

I think that the T-64 was, for a late 1960s design, a very good Soviet-style tank. By "Soviet-style", I mean it was characterized by extreme sacrifices in many areas including habitability to ferociously optimize armament and frontal armor protection. Other than a hard to maintain suspension, its flaws were common to the T-72 and T-80 (and in some cases to the T-62).

The real problem with the T-64 was that while it represented a significant improvement over the T-62 and T-54/55, it was very expensive. And the later T-72 was more or less functionally equivalent, yet significantly cheaper. Once the T-72 came along, there was no compelling military reason to continue producing the T-64. However, Soviet production was not particularly rational; it was bureaucratically impossible to cancel the T-64, so it remained in production.

Joe Collins said "Most definitely not a failed tank. Compare it to the M60… in 1978."

Here's the Fistful of TOWs 3 breakdown (T-64A/M60A1):

Move: 9 vs 7 -- T64 wins

KE Armor: 10 vs 9 -- T64 wins

HEAT Armor: 11 vs 9 -- T64 wins, but both tanks highly vulnerable to ATGMs of the day.

KE Penetration (1978) -- 13 vs 11 -- T64 wins big.
HEAT Penetration (1978) -- 12 vs 11 -- T64 wins.

KE Penetration (1979-82) -- 14 vs 13 -- T64 wins, but not a big deal as both tanks have a high probability of destroying the other if hit is scored.
HEAT Penetration (1978) -- 13 vs 11 -- T64 wins, but KE will be used at effective and short range.

Effective Range -- 1200m vs 1600m -- advantage M60A1.
Long Range -- 1800m vs 2400m -- advantage M60A1

Rate of fire -- 2 vs 3 -- advantage M60A1.

Point Value (1978) -- 197 vs 202 -- effectively the same.

Point Value (1979) -- 202 vs 214 -- effectively the same.

So…in a "fair fight", the tanks are roughly comparable. The T64 has better mobility, armor and penetration while the M60A1 has longer range and higher rate of fire.

Of course, the Soviets planned to heavily outnumber enemy forces on key axes of advance. The Americans planned to fight "outnumbered 3 to 1 and win". It's interesting that each nation's tank is more optimized for that nation's doctrine.

One thing is clear -- in the late 1970s, the American tanks were equal to the best Soviet tanks, but definitely not superior. If the Americans were gonna win, they would need to leverage other capabilities.

In hardware, the Americans were lavishly equipped with ATGMs and over a thousand AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters.

In addition, American artillery was *at least* a generation ahead of Soviet artillery in responsiveness and command/control. And the Americans had plenty of it.

The Americans could reasonably expect to achieve and maintain air superiority over CENTAG with several hundred F-15s and over a thousand late model F-4 Phantoms vs MiG-23 and MiG-21s. The A-10 was also coming into service, but only ~50 were available in 1978. American deep strike/interdiction capabilities were extremely advanced with almost 300 F-111 tactical bombers and limited quantities of first generation smart weapons that had been shown in Vietnam to be quite good.

In 1978, the US Army and Marines had many thousands of men with combat experience. While Vietnam was not the same as West Germany, this was still a significant advantage. Against that are drug and morale problems that, while declining by 1978, were still a problem. Of course, far worse problems existed in the Soviet Army at the time.

It would have been a helluva fight…

By the way, people forget once T-72 was brought up to modenr satandards with integrated fire control system laser range finder thermals and night vision like it is now there is not much appreciable cost difference…

The reason original T-72's were so cheap is because they had good old glass optics with a coincidence angle rangefinder.

@ Petrov,

My friend to summarise, would it be fair to say that you think by 1985 the T-64 had all of its problems sorted out and was mechanically reliable and its suspension was up to the standard required. In other words the Army was totally happy with it, including in service maintenance, driving and gunnery skills of its crews?

Did you serve in the Soviet forces at the time? – all this would be really valuable information…

Yes. But we have to look at things through a prism to split the machine from the Soviet Military.

T-64 was a good tank. The problem was the maintenance.
It was maintained by conscripts who did not give a and did not want to be there.
The tank needs dedicated professionals who know what they are doing to keep it running. (i.e. M1 Abrams with enlisted troops).

Suspension was up to the standard from day one, the crews and the maintenance troops did not know how to maintain it in the first place. Yes it was more complex, no it wasnt "too complex". Factory workers in semi permanent positions made sure that Ivan the conscript did not shove a square peg into a round hole.

No the Soviet Army was not happy with the T-64, they had conscripts to work with, that did not bode well for maintenance of the tank and especially the opposed cylinder engine which was absued and beat to death.

The V-12 of the T-72 was basically an upgraded WW2 design, it was very much conscript resistant, same story with the suspension which was brutal on crew compared to the T-64.

T-64 wound up being a very good tank, too good for the Soviets.

My whole entire family is a long line of engineers who worked for the soviet defenses industry.

My great grandfather was the head engineer on the Soviet Union defense council and made decisions about what to develop and adopt. Conveniently my grandpa developed a long lines of 2 stroke diesels in 1948 for which he got the Stalins Award.

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