(Battle 1 here
TMP link
)
With the Union retiring, Sherratt took the opportunity to reform behind the newly arrived Division of Bush. While Bush followed the retreating Union troop, Sherratt moved his brigades across the river, first Collen, then Harris. The 1st, 5th and 6th Milledgeville regiments of Emlyn, hardly touched followed, though the brigade was now half strength with the flight of 1st and 2nd Savannah, and 1st Mobile. Once readied they advanced north parallel and a mile east of Bush
Knapp formed his men in the Cratchett Farm. Owned by Jurisprudences Mayor Ebeneezer Cratchett, the farm had been built by his Great-Great-Great Grandfather Kermit Cratchett just after the Revolutionary war. It had been based on the European pattern, and the main yard was enclosed by three brick and stone walls. The west end was open, and the north and south walls ended here with two story buildings. To the west the pasture was fenced in by rail fences which offered little protection, but would slow down any advance. In here the battered 1st Brigade occupied the walled enclosure, while the 2nd Brigade were in line in the pasture.
Bush formed up with Trump on his left (west), with Cruz behind. Walker held Cratchett hill in the centre, and Christie on the right. Trump was to overwhelm the outnumbered forces of Richardson, with Cruz providing the coup de grace, and to turn the Union right. Walker and Christie were to threaten the compound, for although they were unlikely to be successful in any attack across the stone wall, as Collen had found out two hours earlier, their presence was to pin half the division in place.
Claustwitz's ‘Friction' immediately took hold. Trump moved forward as planned, but his supports did not. Col Paul, commanding the artillery moved them at a leisurely place, believing the horses were unable to maintain much more than one mile an hour off the road. It took Bush sending a major with the list of official movement rates to persuade him faster was possible, a fact that Paul admitted came as a pleasant surprise. Thus the cannon were late in deploying, lessening the bombardment Bush had desired.
More problematically old rivalries between Trump and Cruz seem to have flared up, as Cruz brigade was tardy in moving in support.
Trump was a brash general, prone to criticising his fellow generals, and making outrageous comments. He had inherited his father's fortune and land business, and was used to being obeyed. At the start of the war raised and equipped his own regiment in the fanciest of European style uniforms. His brashness had earned a reputation as a bold initiative taker early on, though his critics characterised this as knee-jerk decisions, ordering the first thing into his head; it is true that he gained a reputation for giving confusing and contradictory orders because he hadn't formulated them properly.
However this brashness made him ideal to lead Bush's attack on the left – he could be relied upon to get his men moving. Later Richardson, the union brigadier who would bear the brunt of the attack would write the panic that spread through his troops when they saw Trump and Cruz form up, three regiments wide, four deep. Unfortunately the same brashness that meant he could be relied on to attack, also meant Bush's plan started to unravel.
As noted, Paul, in charge of the artillery was slow to get into position. This meant that they fired for only a few minutes before Trumps men obscured their line of sight to the Union right. Trump pushed on, even when it was obvious he would outdistance the guns, rather than wait for the preparatory bombardment. His ability to annoy his equals has been blamed on Cruz's brigades tardy movement: While Trump's men strode forward confidently, Cruz's brigade crept forward, leaving them too far back to support. Cruz would later angrily deny this, asserting he was following his orders to allow the bombardment to take place; Trump would point to the line that told him to press the enemy closely.
Meanwhile Knapp had stripped much of his left to re-enforce Richardson on the right. However he had had to leave half of 1 brigade in position to counter the threat of Walker and Christie on the eastern portion of the field. While Walker in the centre hung back to stay at long range from the combined battery Knapp had formed, it was unquestionable that any abandonment of the stone walls would allow Walker and Christie to roll the US forces up from their left.
On the far right Christie seized the initiative, and started to envelope the Union left, a regiment moving round to the north of the compound. An indecisive firefight broke out – the Union having too few muskets in that area to inflict significant casualties, but avoiding defeat behind the compound walls. However Walker and Christie were doing their job, they were keeping Knapp from opposing the main attack with equal numbers.
Unfortunately for Bush, the main attack was breaking down. Cruz's tardiness and lack of support of Trump meant that there were no re-enforcements to exploit successes: Union forces were fighting bravely, but numbers would soon tell. By 2:15 it became clear one big push would sweep the remaining units from the field. Trump's rashness in speaking had already caused problems, he had given an order that sounded like he wanted the brigade to shift to its left, so loosely was it worded. If Cruz had been close behind, it would have seemed a sensible move, allowing space for the fresh troops to become engaged. As it was it just delayed Trump closing. In the meantime the defenders blunted the force opposing. 1st Jackson regiment, noted for its bravery and its refusal to yield, had already retired extremely shaken under the combination of musketry and cannon fire from the North. Trump was running out of regiments fresh enough to continue, and Cruz was still a third of a mile behind, in no position to engage. Whatever the textbooks may have said about correct spacing to prevent casualties form overshoots, the fact is that Cruz was too far back to affect the Union forces.
Trump pulled his men back, his Brigade near breaking point. On the right an attack across the stone walls of the farm was obviously not feasible without the open right side of the Union being threatened. Again Knapp pulled his battered troops out by the skin of their teeth.
