"Battle of Normandy debate" Topic

Hi all,

I am looking to bone up on the Normandy campaign. I am aware that British and American participants and historians have portrayed the campaign in quite divergent ways, particularly with ref. to the effectiveness of the British involvement – I.e., Monty's generalship, and British troops' performance, etc.

Might members be so very kind as to recommend works that would take me to the heart of the Normandy debate? For example, I'm sure I read recently of a study that graded the American troops as the most effective, followed by the Germans, then by the Brits. Anyone know who that's written by, and the title?

And if anyone can point me to particular issues of controversy, please, please do say!

Many thanks in advance, folks, for any assistance.

Yours,
Redcoat

My highest recommendation goes to Michael Reynolds "Eagles & Bulldogs in Normandy 1944: The American 29th Division from Omaha to St Lo, The British 3rd Division from Sword to Caen" Casemate, Havertown, Pa, USA, 2003.

Six Armies in Normandy by John Keegan is a good start.

For US involvement try the "Green Books" Cross Channel Attack and Breakout and Pursuit. Down to companies and Battalions, with very interesting footnotes

The Army WW2 "Green Books" are available in pdf from the US Army Center of Military History.

link

You can either read them on-line or download for later perusal.

Jim

"Decision in Normandy" by Carlo D'Este is a pretty even handed summary of what did and didn't transpire.

Much of any 'controversy' is down to Generals trying to polish their helmets, rather than the activities of troops on the ground. Add in a spot of nationalistic chest beating, and there you go.

I'll second the D'Este book. Good, evenhanded account of the campaign.

Hmm, a Brit and a Yank say D'Este's book is even-handed. Sounds good to me.

Might be easier to name a few books NOT to read for an unbiased perspective

Another vote for the Green Books. If you want to know the basic facts of the campaign, you can't do better. They are not judgmental, however, so if you want comparisons of British-vs-American performance, you'll have to look elsewhere.

Six Armies in Normandy by Keegan is a good start.

Max Haxting's Overlord while controversial provides an interesting prespective and quite different from the current trend in WWII history.

Not fond of D'Estes – very pro-allied.

Zettling's book on Normandy is essential for the German perspective but focus is on the nitty gritty not the big picture.

Caen Anvil of Victory – has some age but still a tremedous grunts eye look at the battles.

TomT

Can I recommend that whatever you choose, you also find time for Robin Neillands "Battle of Normandy 1944"? Neillands analyses a number of prevailing myths about the battle, and the evidence he cites from both the US and British perspectives is illuminating. Well worth reading in my view.

D-Day: The Battle for Normandy by Antony Beevor a must read.
L

Presumably, there are probably some German viewpoints on the subject, which may or may not be biased, but I expect they might be the most enlightening of all, since their military leaders should know.

The books by Michel Reynolds on the ss Panzer Corps and Jochen piper. By default you learn how they fought against their British and American counterparts. Not least is how many Divisions the British were against around Caan. Not easy to be effective against such opposition.

I second the recommendation for Robin Neilland's "The Battle of Normandy 1944". Very well put together arguments with convincing evidence.

Yes the late, great Robin Neilland's work is even handed, and written from the perspective of a Royal Marines Commando Major who saw active service in Korea. I was priviledged to meet the chap myself at a Royal Signals Institution lecture he gave.

His pithy analysis of the controversy centred around Montgomery's subsequent rewritings of the campaign. Unfortunately he tried to cover up his initially over optimisitic DDay+1 targets, essentially lying in the process. Whilst this naturally cast doubt on his claims that all he expected the British to do was draw all the German armoured divisions on themselves, freeing the US for an essentially unopposed advance, Robin felt that was essentially the plan from the start. However, US Generals, fresh from burying their boys from this 'unopposed' advance, naturally resented Monty telling them how easy they had had it because of British sacrifices around Caen. Robin really took it to heart the trajedy of this misunderstanding, and sought to set the record straight. The real hero in all of this was Ike, who was able to contain both Monty's ego and the crowing of some US correspondents….

I would add my vote to Six Armies in Normandy by Keegan.

Get this…

This…

And this…

Unfortunately he tried to cover up his initially over optimisitic DDay+1 targets, essentially lying in the process. Whilst this naturally cast doubt on his claims that all he expected the British to do was draw all the German armoured divisions on themselves, freeing the US for an essentially unopposed advance, Robin felt that was essentially the plan from the start.

Not only did Monty 'lie' he used a time machine to go back and plant forged documents to hide his deception

Examples:

June 11 1944.

Source: WO205/5E –
Exfor Topsec Cipher Message D18/11

From: Exfor TAC 110900B
FROM: EXFOR TAC 110900B
To: Troopers London

M15. TOPSEC. Personal for C.I.G.S. from Gen. Montgomery. First Army going well and have reached airel and Balleroy. My general policy is to pull the enemy on to Second Army so as to make it easier for First Army to expand and extend the quicker. Looking forward to your visit.

D.O.P MOST IMMEDIATE. 110900

Or:

Montygomery Notes for address to General Officers of the Four Field Armies, 7 April 1944:

"Op Thunderclap"

"Second British Army
To assault to the west of the R. Orne and to develop operations to the south and south east, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First U.S. Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg.
In its subsequent operations the army will pivot on its left and offer a strong front against enemy movement towards the lodgement areas from the east."

he tried to cover up his initially over optimisitic DDay+1 targets, essentially lying in the process

Yes Monty was so big-headed he believed nothing could prevent him taking Caen on day 1.

This is part of Monty's orders for June 6th
(I Corps Operations Order No. 1, WO 171/258)

Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defences prove to be strongly organised thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness and to make its retention a costly business."

Keegan, Hastings and Reynolds are admirers of the German military in Normandy. All 3 are biased. 'D'Este's Decision In Normandy is a long hatchet job on Montgomery. Beevor is a popular historian and is superficial and lightweight on the subject. That does not mean they are worthless just that you should adjust your bias filter to a higher than normal level when reading these book and trying to see things from the Allied side.
In the main I find US authors completely lacking in objectivity when it comes to Montgomery. National pride means he has to be denigrated for getting in the way of an early US victory.

Zetterling is also a bit of a panzer fan, and Reynolds general adulation of the Waffen SS is somewhat offputting in an ex Army Officer.

Neillands book sounds like one for the library, I like his other ones, particularly Battle for the Rhine, although he is somewhat forthright about Ike as a general (as opposed to C in C).

+4 for mkenny for referencing these often overlooked sources.

It has always seemed fanciful to me to argue that Montgomery's plan was not for the front to pivot around the British/Canadian left flank. Considering the geography shows why, i.e. the Allies are broadly aligned west to east and the bulk of France lies to the south of the landing beaches. Germany is off to the east, which would leave the US forces trailing at the wrong end of a very narrow line of advance if Second Army heads that way on its own. And of course it would also leave the German 15th Army in the Pas de Calais perfectly placed to crush a British led breakout.

To position the Allies to advance eastwards, the line has to pivot somewhere, with Caen, as the major communications centre in Normandie, the natural first choice. In events, Caen did not become the hinge, but the concept was the same.

TMP has seen lots of impassioned (and sometimes not very enlightened) debate about the relative contributions of the British/Canadian and US forces in Normandie. Neither nation can claim credit on its own, as both needed the other in order to inflict on the German army the crushing defeat which was achieved in a few short summer months.

Having said all that, read Neillands book, see what evidence he cites and make your own mind up!

I like his other ones, particularly Battle for the Rhine

I agree – another recommendation.

I'm currently reading this:

Normandiefront: D-Day to Saint-Lo Through German Eyes

The individual narratives are hard to follow because the way the book is organized, it's still an interesting read.

And Neilland book is ordered. Ah, the joy of Amazon Prime…

Apologies for the length of what follows, but it provides further strong indication that Montgomery's plan to pivot around Second Army's left flank wasn't something he made up later.

TOP SECRET
Tac HQ 21 Army Group.
No. M 505
30th June, 1944.
Lt-Gen. 0. N. Bradley, First US Army.
Lt-Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey, Second British Army.
The General Situation
1. My broad policy, once we had secured a firm lodgement area, has always been to draw the main enemy forces in to the battle on our eastern flank, and to
fight them there, so that our affairs on the western flank could proceed the
easier.
2. We have been very successful in this policy. Cherbourg has fallen without any
interference from enemy reserves brought in from other areas; the First US Army
is proceeding with its re-organization and re-grouping, undisturbed by the
enemy; the western flank is quiet.
All this is good; it is on the western flank that territorial gains are essential
at this stage, as we require space on that side for the development of our
administration.
By forcing the enemy to place the bulk of his strength in front of the Second
Army, we have made easier the acquisition of territory on the western flank.
3. Our policy has been so successful that the Second Army is now opposed by a
formidable array of German Panzer Divisions -- eight definitely identified,
and possibly more to come. The more recent arrivals seem to have come from
far afield. The Divisions identified between Caumont and Caen are as follows:
21 Pz
2 Pz
1 SS
2 SS
9 SS
10 SS
12 SS
LEHR
21 Pz is on the Caen front; 2 Pz is on the Caumont front; the remaining
six divisions are collected round the 8 Corps penetration in between.
4. It is not yet clear whether Hitler proposes to concentrate great strength
in N.W. Europe so as to annihilate the Allied forces in Normandy. He may
decide that this is a good proposition; and in order to achieve success he
may be quite prepared to give ground gradually on the Russian front, and
to accept reverse in that theatre.
His policy in this respect will emerge in due course.
5. For the present it is quite clear that he has reinforced the Normandy
front strongly, and that a full-blooded counter-attack seems imminent.
We welcome such action.
6. Our tactics must remain unchanged. Briefly, they are as follows:-
(a) To retain the initiative.
We shall do this only by offensive action. On no account
must we remain inactive. Without the initiative we cannot win.
(b) To have no set-backs.
This is very important on the eastern flank; the enemy has
concentrated great strength here and he must not be allowed
to use it successfully. Any set-back on the eastern flank
might have direct repercussions on the quick development
of our plans for the western flank.
(c) To proceed relentlessly with our plans.
These will be based on the broad policy indicated in para 1 above.
We must retain such balance and poise in our dispositions that there
is never any need to re-act to enemy moves or thrusts; the enemy can
do what he likes; we will proceed with our plans.
Plan in Outline
7. To hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between Caen and Villers Bocage, and to swing the western or right flank of the
Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the
line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of Paris.
The bridges over the Seine between Paris and the sea have been destroyed
by the Allied air forces, and will be kept out of action; a strong Allied
force established in the area Le Mans-Alencon would threaten seriously
the enemy concentration in the Caen area and its "get-away" south of Paris.
Second British Army
8. Tasks as follows:
(a) To hold the main enemy forces in the area between Caen and Villers
Bocage.
(b) To have no set-backs.
(c) To develop operations for the capture of Caen as opportunity offers –
and the sooner the better.
9. A full-blooded enemy counter-attack seems likely, put in somewhere between
Caen and Villers Bocage; the main axis of such an attack is not yet apparent.
In order to provide a mobile reserve in the hands of the Army Commander, the
7 Armd Div, now holding the right divisional sector, will be relieved tomorrow
by First Army and that divisional sector will be included in First Army area;
the inter-army boundary to be adjusted accordingly.
10. The careful attention of the Army Commander is drawn to para 6.
First US Army
11. To develop an offensive southwards on the right flank, beginning on Monday
3 July.
12. The Army to pivot on its left in the Caumont area, and to swing southwards
and eastwards on to the general line Caumont – Vire – Mortain – Fougeres.
13. A strong thrust to be made eastwards from Vire to secure the important
intercommunication centre of Flers.
14. On reaching the base of the peninsula at Avranches, the right hand Corps
(8 Corps) to be turned westwards into Brittany and directed on Rennes and St Malo.
This Corps to consist of three intantry divisions and one armoured division.
15. As regards the remainder of the Army.
Plans will be made to direct a strong right wing in a wide sweep, south of the
Bocage country, towards successive objectives as follows:
(a) Laval – Mayenne.
(b) Le Mans – Alencon. . . .
16. It is highly important that when the above operations begin on 3 July, vide
para 11, they should be carried out with the greatest drive and energy.
There must be no pause until the Army has swung up on to the line Caumont –
Fougeres, vide para 12; thereafter, the less delays the better.
17. The Army will extend its left flank tomorrow, 1 July, to include the sector
now held by 7 Armd Div of Second Army -- vide para 8.
B.L. Montgomery
General,
C-in-C,
21 Army Group.

And that seems to have knackered what formatting there was, but you should get the idea.

I would much rather have the Good Guy generals bicker over who won it, than bicker over why they lost.

Knowing how much Bradley despised both Monty AND Patton, as well as not having all that much respect for Ike, is sobering to read about. It's good that the Germans were even more dysfunctional.
So you really cannot pin yourself down to one book.
It seems that finding a top rate general who plays well with others is as difficult as finding a humble NFL quarterback or a modest fighter pilot. It's not part of the job description.

Some Chicken,

That is a very good find. One might also note – as described by Neillands – the presentation that Montgomery made to the assembled senior officers, British and American, and the King I think in April 1944 at Middle Temple (I may be off on precise date and location, not having my copy with me) at which he described precisely that plan. He was not the only one "forgetting" inconvenient truths.

Yep, just picked up both neilands books for less than the price of a modest round of drinks….I feel a bit sad in a way, but I dread to think what I'd have paid for them at Foyles
Back to the Op, another plug for eagles and bulldogs. Reynolds is indeed a bit of a panzer fan – I guess his generation of British army officers were hoodwinked by the whole von Luck et all "this is how to beat the commies" nonsense- anyway, the book comparing the 2 allied divisions is much more even handed.

Well Von Luck did spend an awful lot of time showing NATO officers how to recreate the defence scheme employed against Operation Goodwood in a somewhat more easterly setting.

"It seems that finding a top rate general who plays well with others is as difficult as finding a humble NFL quarterback or a modest fighter pilot. It's not part of the job description."

No, you don't get to be a General by being nice and cuddly. I have met some, and one of my acquaintances served under Mike 'Darth Vader' Jackson and has a few interesting stories to tell.

Their are some pretty bad books written on the Normandy campaign. I would disregard D'Estes facinating work on "phase Lines" also Max Hastings poorly researched generalisations and above all Reynolds SS fan club . Having read most of these books several times I would agree that Robin Neillands , John Buckley and Ian Daglish are probably the best writers but I would like to read a good book written by an American without an agenda so perhaps will take PeirsBrand's advice and get hold of a copy of Michael Doubler's book . If you want a really good read, get hold of a copy of "18 Platoon" by Sidney Jary, the best book written about WW2 .

"get hold of a copy of Michael Doubler's book . If you want a really good read, get hold of a copy of "18 Platoon" by Sidney Jary, the best book written about WW2 ."

Oooh, I don't know. I've read plenty of informed criticism of Doubler, to such an extent that I've avoided buying it.

Jary's book is good, I particularly enjoyed his account of the Seine crossing. An interesting contrast of views on the utility (or not) of Battle Drill is Thomas Firbanks 'I Bought a Star'. Unlike Jary, he didn't run around the battlefield in a woolly pully, and did actually do fire & movement as taught in the manual.

My favourite personal memoir from WW2 is John Foleys 'Mailed Fist'. A warm and life enhancing book. About Churchills tooo, what more could you want?

Yes Martin, 'Mailed Fist' is another great book, I have an old paperback copy that's been read many times. I would also recommend 'Lion Rampant' by Robert Woollcombe, 'Guns of Normandy' by George Blackburn, 'Breaking the Panzers' by Kevin Baverstock (about the role played by anti tank gunners in defeating II SS Panzer Korps counter attack following the Epsom battles} , "None Had Lances" by Leonard Willis. but the best descriptions of Normandy battles have to be Ian Dalglish's books on Operation Epsom and Bluecoat.

What is the general opinion of Napier's book, "The Armoured Campaign in Normandy"?

B

Have to second most of the suggestions in this thread… especially with regard to the Daglish & Baverstock books.
One thought that does come to mind is one of Bradley's comments in one of his biographies along the lines of: "Yes, we could have done things differently. But don't forget that we won!" :-)

I'm not a fan of Doubler.

I've heard he speaks very highly of you