"Map of the Battle of Copenhagen" Topic

From Rosseau …
As we talk recently a lot about this… (smile)

From here
link

Amicalement
Armand

Hi Armand

Unless I missed something, the discussions were concerned with the British attack and siege in 1807. From what I can see, although I can't spot any dates, the map appears to refer to the 1801 sea battle. Good pic though.

I don't remember a 1801 sea battle… (smile)

I was sure it's about the British attack to Copenhagen…

Amicalement
Armand

Hi Armand

You may well be right. It is hard to tell. And I can't see any dates to confirm it? But it is very interesting that it has been given the title The Battle of Copenhagen, rather than a raid, as some British apologists would foolishly tried to palm it off as.

Here are some other images of the battle and siege of the city.

link

Many thanks my friend!. (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Not difficult at all, gentlemen. The map states clearly that this was the the battle of le deuxieme d'Avril, so it had to be the battle of 1801, not the raid and bombardment of 1807, both of which, though, were significant victories for our country.

I'm a little disappointed, though, John, that you are still stuck on the highly questionable debate, launched by Kevin, of course, and of absolutely no importance to any historian of the event, about "raid" versus" "siege" and that you didn't respond to my post in response to yours on the recent thread on the topic.

Ah well, "tomorrow to fresh seas and oceans blue. ;)

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

I find it amazing that you still define a raid as an operation involving a mass of ships and land forces, used more artillery and troops, including siege mortars, than land sieges, bombarded the civilians including the use of fire rockets in an attempt to terrorize them into forcing their army to surrender the city, since they had stubbornly resisted the siege, and above all, a situation in which the British stayed there from mid August to late October, for 66 days? As various sources offered in previous debates on this matter, the British did consider staying in Denmark and making a permanent base but were put off the possibility of their ships being landlocked by ice. Plus, of course, their attack had now made an enemy of Denmark, who then sided with the French and increased Napoleon's manpower.

If you still consider that a raid, then that is your choice. Personally I think you and others who think like you are in denial and do not want to admit it was more than a raid and a war crime against a neutral country at the time, who had done nothing to deserve the attack and what even the British king called 'a very immoral act', the facts of which I know you are well aware of.

Not difficult at all, gentlemen. The map states clearly that this was the the battle of le deuxieme d'Avril, so it had to be the battle of 1801, not the raid and bombardment of 1807, both of which, though, were significant victories for our country. I'm a little disappointed, though, John, that you are still stuck on the highly questionable debate, launched by Kevin, of course, and of absolutely no importance to any historian of the event, about "raid" versus" "siege" and that you didn't respond to my post in response to yours on the recent thread on the topic.

An attack upon a neutral nation is a 'significant victory'? I find that comment to be incredible.

Do you not consider Munch-Peterson to be a historian? It has been clearly demonstrated in other threads that he considered the 1807 operation against the Danes and Copenhagen to be a siege.

Do you believe that if you repeat incorrect information enough that people will then believe it? Or are you merely trying to wear them down with blatant inaccuracies?

You are repeatedly incorrect in different aspects of the period and the tone of your postings does you no good at all, nor do your petty 'investigations.'

And bringing my name up in a thread in which I am not involved is petty, underhanded, and quite despicable.

Quite incredible.

Phil

Knowing the difference between a siege and a raid is of vital importance militarily and historically. It defines the intent of the event.

But I did not realise you had asked a question in your last post in the Prelude to the Bombardment of Copenhagen topic.

Apologies. I have now made a reply.

Thank you John and Kevin for resurrecting this issue. There is certainly much to be said on the subject

Rather than argue old points, such as the suggestion that Christian Bjerg, a senior historian with the Danish Navy (the academic equivalent of the late Col. Elting, no doubt) was in error and that Munch Peterson, also a Dane, who is (or was. I don't know what happened to him when he got out of gaol) a senior lecturer in a well known English provincial university was correct in calling the Copenhagen affair of 1807 a "siege", seems to be a matter of personal choice, so the appeal to authority simply cancels itself out.

I believe that, under Canning, England organized a very secret naval raid (see my evidence for this in the earlier thread) to intimidate Danemark into giving up its fleet to the British rather than to the French.

That is pretty much what happened in 1801, though the Danish fleet was not being ransomed, and,in that case, land support was not deemed necessary. The plan there was that if the Danes did not asgree to the British ultimatum, Nelson who led the British delegation, would have fired the city by bombardment. Indeed, he said so (cf. T. Pocock, "The Terror Before Trafalgar", p.2).

The 1807 raid was to be a repeat of the first, aimed at bullying Danemark into giving up its somewhat decrepit fleet rather than having it fall into Bonaparte's hands -- Talleyrand, at his master's orders, was already laying down terms to the Crown Prince.

The difference between the two attacks was that when Danemark, not unnaturally, to be sure, refused the British terms, the naval bombardment was supplemented by ground support, both to beat off the Danish army and to attack Copenhagen itself by bombardment.

The issue now remains, in purely technical terms, as to whether the ground forces launched a supplementary and successful bombardment of the city, or a siege.

My contention that this was a bombardment rather than a siege is based on four considerations, its goal, its conduct, its time frame, governed by the same considerations that made the original maritime attack a raid, and the outcome.

The British goal was to browbeat the Danish commander into submission.by destroying his city, though not its inhabitants, who were given time to leave, though, of course, many could or would not in that tremendously overcrowded city. This is quite different from the usual goal of a siege, which is to enter a fortress or fortified town (most major European cities, like Copenhagen, were fortified), break through its defenses, expel its
garrison and take possession of it after the usual orgy of raping and looting. I think that we all know enough about sieges of the period to know that this is true. This, of course, did not happen at Copenhagen

The British did not conduct their campaign like a siege. I have just been reading Lt. Col. May's delightful "Observations on the Mode of Attack [by] Heavy Artillery", written in 1819. This RHA officer was present at a number of sieges during the Peninsular War and a strong advocate of iron 24 pounders.

Wellington had no siege guns, of course, but, as in the Peninsula, he could have breached the walls with mines. The practical issue with such a strategy, though, even if he had intended occupying the town, was the time that such mining operations took. May gives a good account of the time that such British and a few French sieges lasted.

But since this was a raid and no one knew if or when the French or Russians would show up, time was of the essence. Bombardment, in this case, neatly solved the time problem, and the Danes were ready to come to terms in four days. A remarkable success for the Brits.

As soon as the treaty was signed, the British took what they could of the Danish fleet aand scarpered. The Danish troops and governor were allowed to remain in the city, something that never happened in any siege that I can think of, and the surviving civilians, by far the majority of a city of about a million (?), were unmolested.

It has been suggested here and elsewhere, that the attack drove Danemark "into the arms of France". Realy? And how did that benefit France or, perhaps more importantly , Russia? It certainly didn't do the Danes any good or the Brits much harm.

Jenny Uglow, in "In These Times", gives an account of how many English people were horrified by the attack, "those poor Danes; they will never forgive us", and certainly, the parliamentary opposition predictably condemned the affair, but Uglow also tells of the delight with which civilians received goods obtained illicitly by merchant ships that passed through the Baltic.

You mention, John, the losses to merchant shipping experienced by daring into the Baltic. I was surprised to discover a contrary account by Raymond who examined the courtmartials on all British naval ships lost at sea and discovered thAt more ships were lost to bad weather than from all hostile navies combined.

But what of the moral issue? Wise historians, certainly all that I have read on this subject, includiing Munch Peterson, Bjerg, Chndler and Raymond (cf: link do not delve very deeply into its moral significance.

I shall not get into Napoleon's invasion of neutral countries like Portugal and Hanover from a moral standpoint, I do not think it relevant, but last Thursday, I spoke with a German speaking plumber from Yugoslavia, and it was pretty obvious that he left that lovely country after serving with Milosevich. I tiptoed around the war crimes issue, but he suggested that those who faced war crime tribunals today were those who lost I don't think that history has changed much ion this regard..

A few days ago, I watched the movie Good Kill, in which drone bombings were labelled by one actor as "war crime". Fiction, of course, but that film came into sharp focus when American bombers destroyed a hospital run by Doctors without Borders two days ago, on the grounds, denied by the staff, that it was being used as a Taliban haven. Will the US ever be tried for war crimes over this incident? They, with British support, destroyed the civilian cities of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki without retribution. One county's war crime is its enemy's necessary, though regrettable, preemptive strike.

Thanks again, chaps. This is a complex and most interesting topic, seldom broached in Napoleonic forums (I wonder why?;p)

Cheers,
Phil

1. Thank you John and Kevin for resurrecting this issue.

2. The difference between the two attacks was that when Danemark, not unnaturally, to be sure, refused the British terms, the naval bombardment was supplemented by ground support, both to beat off the Danish army and to attack Copenhagen itself by bombardment. The British did not conduct their campaign like a siege. I have just been reading Lt. Col. May's delightful "Observations on the Mode of Attack [by] Heavy Artillery", written in 1819. This RHA officer was present at a number of sieges during the Peninsular War and a strong advocate of iron 24 pounders.

3.Wellington had no siege guns, of course, but, as in the Peninsula, he could have breached the walls with mines. The practical issue with such a strategy, though, even if he had intended occupying the town, was the time that such mining operations took. May gives a good account of the time that such British and a few French sieges lasted.

4. …and the surviving civilians, by far the majority of a city of about a million (?), were unmolested.

5. It has been suggested here and elsewhere, that the attack drove Danemark "into the arms of France". Realy?

6. …with British support, destroyed the civilian cities of Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki without retribution. One county's war crime is its enemy's necessary, though regrettable, preemptive strike.

1.Actually, it was you who brought it up if you check the postings in this thread…

2.The naval bombardment was ineffectual in 1807 which was why siege artillery was landed and batteries constructed to fire on the city.

3.Wellington most certainly had siege guns in the Peninsula and there were thirty 24-pounders emplaced in the British batteries that ‘ringed the western perimeter of Copenhagen.' See Munch-Peterson, 201.
Cathcart and Bambier, the British army and navy commanders, warned in a proclamation that they had subjected the Danes in Copenhagen to ‘the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital' and not to a raid. So, the British commanders themselves stated that the British operations against Copenhagen were indeed a siege.

4.The population of Copenhagen in 1807 was about 200,000, so you're just a ‘little' off on your estimate. 20,000 Danes fled the city and 2,000 were killed by the bombardment. One-twelfth of the city was burned to the ground and there was much damage to the city besides. See Munch-Peterson, 200.

5.The Danes allied themselves with France after the siege and bombardment. Seems to me the comment is accurate.

6.The US supported the British air operation against Dresden and the British had nothing two nuke drops on Japan. And your analogy is false since Denmark was not at war with Great Britain in 1807 while Japan and Germany were most certainly at war with Great Britain and the United States.

Phil

A besieged city is a besieged city. You don't have to lay mines or breach walls to undertake a siege. If you surround a city it is under siege. Anyone entering or leaving the city was under the control and discretion of the besieging forces, in this case the British.

The bombardment, or rather terror bombardment, was only part of the siege. It was not aimed at military targets because the military refused to surrender. The decision was made to aim at the civilian areas, the city, in order to terrify the civilians into forcing the military to surrender, which worked. That is why they also employed the fire rockets which were mocked for their accuracy but were excellent for their use in terrifying the civilians and helping setting fire to the civilian buildings.

And come on, using the word 'scarped' is a bit comical. They were there for 66 days! You don't 'scarper' after 66 days! They were only forced to leave due to the approach of bad weather which might have trapped their ships in ice. Otherwise, they may well have stayed longer. The idea of staying had been considered.

It seems that it is only British apologists you want to use the term raid to make it sound less of a war crime. This was a neutral country. They had no right to demand the Danish fleet and threaten that they will only leave them alone if they do so. They had no right to demand it and the Danes had no reason to give up their ships. They gave the same reply as the British would have done, had Napoleon demanded Britain give up their navy. It is basically an unprovoked attack against a possible ally, disguised as a mere raid to cover up the reality.

Phil

This is an interesting article on the attack against Copenhagen by Rory Muir. If I read it right, it is described as an attack not a raid. Investment of the city is mentioned, and interrupting the supply of food and water to the city and the bombardment itself. There is also mention of how the British staying there was considered and how Wellington argued against it. There is also mention of the British troops plundering in the areas around the city. The Danish casualties are also discussed.

link

Phil

In regards to Bjerg, if this is the same article you are referring to, he states 'The British raid in the Baltic and the attack on Copenhagen.' He separates the actions. Also interesting to note, he does not employ the term raid in the title of his article.

PDF link

Maintaining naval supremacy was always in the British interest. It would appear that this strategy went beyond the niceties of diplomacy and respect for neutrality.

Not dissimilar to Mers-el-Kebir to reduce the Vichy French navy from falling into Axis hands.

Controlling or removing a fleet from the balance would be an important strategic issue. Not for nothing that the French captured the Dutch fleet in the Texel in 1795.

Well, gentlemen,our debate over whether Copenhagen suffered a siege or a bombardment could go on indefinitely without either side conceding, so I shall end my part of the discussion with a couple of quotations from the same author that clinch the matter for me. Remember that it is my position that Copenhagen was subjected first to a naval raid and then a bombardment.

Kevin Kiley, as well as having published several books on the Napoleonic period,is a retired major in the U.S. Marines artillery, so he should know a thing or two.

On p.70 of his Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, he is careful to distinguish between the "siege of Huningue" during the hundred days, and the "British bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807".

Why does he call it a bombardment rather than a siege? That is made clear on p.30, where he describes how a siege was conducted in the reign of Louis XIV, and, of course, during the period that he is discussing: "the siege was still the dominant military operation of the period, the attack and defense of fortified places, and thus the controlled territory around them, was the object of the exercise…. the artillery piece and the shovel were the tools that dominated the siege. Large heavy-caliber guns were needed to batter and breach the fortress walls, either to pave the way for the infantry assault, or to allow the garrison to surrender with the honors of war".

Well, there you have it. At Copenhagen, as Munch Peterson makes clear, the 24 ponders were not used to breach the fortress walls, no mines were dug with trusty shovels, no surrounding territory needed to be controlled, there was no infantry assault, even though the city walls were unmanned after their defenders wisely fled, and the garrison was not required to surrender.

I rest my case.

The issues of whether an attack on civilians is justified in time of war, and the Hague, Kevin and I agree that it is, and of course, Britain and Denmark were at war for several weeks (8-29-07n to 9-1-07) before the bombardment started, so we should be in agreement, but if anyone would like to discuss it further, I would be happy to start a new thread on the emergence of what Clausewitz called Kreigraison in the early 19th century marking an end to the chivalric concept of war, I would be happy to open a new thread on it. I am even prepared to quote that hoariest of maxims, "Inter arma silent leges".

For now, let me leave you with this first-hand account of how heavy artillery was used by Wellington and infantryman Small at the siege of Badajoz. You will never see that British victory in the same way again. YouTube link

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

You post appears to be wanting to target Kevin Kiley, rather than debate the topic of classing the event as a siege or raid?

But as I said in a previous post, you do not have to breach the walls, or fire on the walls or attack the walls, to undertake a siege. You surround or invest the city, which is what happened, including cutting off the city's food and water supplies.

And the British decided to speed things up rather than continue with the usual lengthy siege methods by deciding to deliberately terrorize and kill the civilians, as well as destroying and setting fire to civilian property, instead of military targets, in order to 'persuade' them to 'convince' the Danish military to surrender the city, which, as I mentioned before, worked. They would have had to breach the walls had the civilians not convinced the Danish military, who had no intention of surrendering until the terror bombardment happened.

And come on, if you read the various accounts again you will see that the surrounding land had to be controlled and was controlled by the British and KGL troops. They deployed, depending on sources, something in the region of 18-25,000 infantry, cavalry and horse artillery in order to do this. They actually fought a land battle against Danish troops who were hoping to relieve the besieged city.

I guess it will always be a matter of opinion, I suppose, as many things are. But to me the evidence points to it being a siege and an illegal theft of a neutral country's ships and stores, which involved a deliberate terror attack against the civilian populace causing numerous deaths and destruction to their property in the process.

Others, of course, may still prefer to see it a mere 66 day raid!

One observation that should be made regarding any British siege up to 1813 is that the British army did not have the capability to conduct a 'proper' siege because of the absence of trained and skilled engineer units. And from what I have seen their engineer officers were not skilled in siege operations either.

You will never see that British victory in the same way again.

After how many failures? The British failed to take Badajoz twice and finally took it the third time with a very costly infantry assault, the main assault failing.

And the first siege of San Sebastien was also a failure…

At Copenhagen, as Munch Peterson makes clear, the 24 ponders were not used to breach the fortress walls, no mines were dug with trusty shovels, no surrounding territory needed to be controlled, there was no infantry assault, even though the city walls were unmanned after their defenders wisely fled, and the garrison was not required to surrender.

The siege guns and rockets were used to bombard the city and the civilian population. The British artillery used the Frue Kirke (the Church of Our Lady) as an aiming point and it collapsed under the weight of the bombardment on the third night.

Royal Navy captain Bowles remarked from the deck of his ship that the bombardment was 'the most tremendous sight that can well be conceived' making a note that the third night of the bombardment 'surpassed all the rest, particularly when the largest church caught fire, and the spire…fell in.'

Why does he call it a bombardment rather than a siege? That is made clear on p.30, where he describes how a siege was conducted in the reign of Louis XIV, and, of course, during the period that he is discussing: "the siege was still the dominant military operation of the period, the attack and defense of fortified places, and thus the controlled territory around them, was the object of the exercise…. the artillery piece and the shovel were the tools that dominated the siege. Large heavy-caliber guns were needed to batter and breach the fortress walls, either to pave the way for the infantry assault, or to allow the garrison to surrender with the honors of war".

You have taken the partial sentence on Page 30 out of context, leaving out 'In all the bloody battles of the wars of Louis XIV,…' The sentence begins at the bottom of page 29:

The entire quotation is then:

'In all of the bloody wars of Louis XIV, the siege was still the dominant military operation of the period. The attack and defense of fortified places, and thus the controlled territory around them, was the object of the exercise. Vauban and his Dutch counterpart Coehorn were the two leading experts in the field of military engineering, and the artillery piece and shovel were the tools that dominated the siege. Large, heavy-caliber guns were needed to bombard and breach fortress walls, either to pave the way for the infantry assault, or to allow the garrison to surrender with the honors of war.'-Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars: Field Artillery 1792-1815.

So, that portion was not about the Napoleonic period, but the period of Louis XIV, Vauban, and Coehorn. Therefore either your research is shoddy (as usual) or you are being intellectually dishonest. Your choice.

Kevin Kiley, as well as having published several books on the Napoleonic period,is a retired major in the U.S. Marines artillery, so he should know a thing or two.
On p.70 of his Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, he is careful to distinguish between the "siege of Huningue" during the hundred days, and the "British bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807".

It certainly reads that way on page 70 of Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars: Field Artillery 1792-1815 on page 70. That section/chapter is on the development of rockets, and a bombardment is certainly part of a siege, is it not?

You should also consult Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars: Artillery in Siege, Fortress, and Naval 1792-1815, which is Volume II of the artillery study. On page 326, in the Index, Copenhagen is listed under 'Sieges.'

Further, on page 116 of the same volume, in the last paragraph on the page, it begins with 'The British attack, siege, and bombardment of Copenhagen…'

Nothing is said about a 'raid.'

You have also erred in the presence of siege guns at Copenhagen, and there most certainly were 24-pounders in the British inventory, and there were also 24-pounders in Spain in the British sieges. You can consult the Dickson manuscripts for the information. Dickson became Wellington's artillery commander and he is one of the outstanding artillerymen of the period.

Brechtel198

Excellent posts.

Thanks very much, Gazzola.

It is not my usual practice to quote from my own books, but this time it was necessary because of being taken out of context.

"Therefore either your research is shoddy (as usual) or you are being intellectually dishonest. Your choice."

First let me say, Kevin, that I deeply resent your attempt to force me into being shoddy or dishonest. I insist that I have as much right as you to be both at once -- remember, for example, that marvelous thread where you claimed some unspecified bulletin proved that there was no middle guard at Waterloo? As usual, you were correcting someone who said there was. You maintained the fiction despite half a dozen sources that I gave you to the contrary, including Ney's account, and your response was that it was a "common error!" And of course, we both knew that your source was Esposito's Atlas (map 158?) where Elting was either wrong or was referring to the cavalry. What fun we have!

Your first post above is puzzling, because you appear to imply that I either sloppily or dishonestly missed out your reference to Louis XIV from the passage from your book that I cited, but you quoted my passage where I specifically mentioned him. Why would I need to repeat the fact?

The first post that you ever addressed to me, Kevin, was "You should learn to read." Good advice for all of us!

I gave up on your second post when you started quoting Vol II of your artillery book which I have not read. Apparently it has only been out for a few weeks, and you did not send me an advance copy, so I didn't even know that it was available. I checked it out this morning, though, and ordered the book which should arrive on Saturday.

(John. You praise Kevin's post that cites the new volume, so I can only assume that you have already read the book. What do you think?)

I did look at the preview, and your description of the siege equipment in the first lines of "Lock Stock And Barrel" do not give me the impression that things had changed radically since the days of Louis XIV, so I am still confused as to why you think that the mode of besieging had changed so significantly. Perhaps when I read more, I shall understand better.

Your post does serve as a nice promo for your new book, though certainly no harm in that, and it is much briefer than that of our latest conspiracy theorist. If people don't know the book is out, they can't read it, of course. I shall write a review of it on that other forum, next week, and spread the word. I enjoyed the first volume, and expect to enjoy this one, which is closer to my period of study.

BTW, reading the reviews of your first book, inserted in error, I was reminded that Titans had, according to a recent survey about Waterloo, a remarkable effect on the British public.

I was chatting with an English friend on line a few months ago and pointed out that 14% of the people polled believed that Napoleon won that battle. My friend sniffed -- no easy task on a chat line -- and said "They must have all read the Waterloo chapter in Kiley's "Once there were Titans"!

By the way, you should have a stern word with Amazon. They listed a remarkable number of reviews, but when I checked them out, they were of your first two Napoleonic books. Wot a liberty! Tell them that they are either sloppy or deliberately dishonest. That should get quick action!

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

Your posts have turned into more of a personal attack against Kevin Kiley than any form of debate on if the British war crime in 1807 should be considered as a siege or raid.

Only if the debate returns to the topic in this or other threads oddly but presently running on the same event, then it will be worth considering debating the 1807 Copenhagen attack further with you. I do hope this is the case.

Personal attack, John? Surely it was Kevin who said that either my research was sloppy, as usual, or that I was intellectually dishonest, and I think that you praised him for that post! ;p; I have made no such remark about him. I have even bought his latest book, and money speaks louder than words. So be a good chap and continue to write on this thread or not, but I'd rather that you didn't try to show me the moral highroad. Kevin is old enough to take care of himself, touching though your concern may be.

Incidentally, as I noted, your praise of his second post in which he cites several passages from the new book implis that you must already have read it. What do you think? I'll think about posting my review here, but you might want to beat me to the punch.

Hard to know what else to talk about here, after the rather pointless "bombardment" "siege" dispute is mercifully ended.

There does seem to be a mistaken idea that England attacked a neutral country that was not at war with them. My comparison with the WWII "terror" or "strategic" bombing of Dresden by the allies, when that town was no military or manufacturing importance, was denied on the grounds that we were at war with Germany, but as we know, both from the Baltic paper that I linked here, and from That old Danish pamphlet from 1808, Denmark, their patience spent and their backs to the wall, declared war on Britain.

Britain, desperate to preserve their access to the Baltic as a route for both their exports and imports, including wood needed for the navy, were not able to promise complete protection against the French beyond Zealand, and still wanted to "borrow" the Danish fleet anyway.

When Wellesley launched the ground assault, though, on the 29th of August and of course, when the bombardment was started on the September 1st, the two countries were at war and Danish neutrality meant nothing more than it did for Hanover or Portugal.

If you wish to discuss that, then I would be happy to do so, but it is not really a military but a diplomatic discussion.

We could of course, discuss the conflict itself, but there isn't much to tell, Denmark didn't stand a chance.

Of more interest, perhaps, is the topic that I suggested a few posts back, the issue of Kriegraison, preached by Clausewitz and practiced by Napoleon, particularly, I would argue, after 1809. Lots of stuff to look at and argue there, for example, was Napoleon's "modernization" of the army after 1809 and the fact that he never won another campaign, coincidence or linked?

Was Wellington's change of siege tactics from sparing the civilians in the early Peninsular sieges, to near annihilation at San Sebastian, a sign that he became hardened by years on campaign or that he recognized the new necessities of modern war, and was Copenhagen a precursor for a trend away from the chivalry of monarchs with private armies duking it out to the no-holds barred fighting of "nations in arms?

Or finally, sticking closer to home, you might wish to expand your argument (I think, it's way back there somewhere!) that Britain's bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 drove Denmark "into the arms of France"? That might be fun.

Or perhaps you have an entirely new related topic of your own.You choose.

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

The British, by the very act of sending such a massive force to Denmark, and making the threats of surrender your fleet or else, were not only declaring war on Denmark but arrogantly forcing them to have to side with the British or the French, whether they wanted to or not. And due to such arrogance, along with the deaths of men, women and children, caused by the British terror attack, the Danes decided to side with Napoleon.

As the linked article states, the British invasion force was off Denmark on 2nd August and then moved into Danish waters on the 3rd. This was a hostile attack but the Danes did not actually declare war against Britain until 16th Augusts, so NO, Denmark was NOT at war with Britain when they were attacked but Britain WAS at war with Denmark, due to their attack and invasion of Denmark.

You will also see that it states (page 7) that the British land forces with rockets invaded Zealand to the north of Copenhagen on the 16th August.

PDF link

BTW, reading the reviews of your first book, inserted in error, I was reminded that Titans had, according to a recent survey about Waterloo, a remarkable effect on the British public. I was chatting with an English friend on line a few months ago and pointed out that 14% of the people polled believed that Napoleon won that battle. My friend sniffed -- no easy task on a chat line -- and said "They must have all read the Waterloo chapter in Kiley's "Once there were Titans"!

There is no 'Waterloo chapter' in Titans. Nice try.

Your post does serve as a nice promo for your new book, though certainly no harm in that, and it is much briefer than that of our latest conspiracy theorist. If people don't know the book is out, they can't read it, of course. I shall write a review of it on that other forum, next week, and spread the word. I enjoyed the first volume, and expect to enjoy this one, which is closer to my period of study.

There is no promotion of the book, intentional or unintentional. You were the one who 'quoted' from Volume I and took the quote out of context. Therefore, you 'opened the ball' on the subject, not I.

Thank you, though, for ordering Volume II. I hope you enjoy it.

Phil

I have just started reading a very interesting Thesis by A.N Ryan. It is titled The Copenhagen Expedition 1807.

During the debate on raid versus siege, there was a question of surrounding area not being important or contested. However, of page 151, Ryan writes:

'The whole of Zealand, with the exception of Copenhagen, was now under the control of the English.'

After a land battle:
'Wellesley's corps spread out over the country mopping up Danish detachments.'

If you look at maps you will see that Zealand is quite an extensive area. And to be surrounded, as the city was, a vast area needed to be in control of the besiegers.

The number and type of guns were also in question; Ryan mentions (page 155) the British using 48 mortars and howitzers, and 20 x 24 pounders. Plus of course, the rockets.

I have only just peeped into this work, so I don't know what else I will find. But it has been extensively researched, including Danish sources.

I think there has been an historical 'cover up' to keep this war crime considered as a mere raid.

A cover-up so successful that in a parallel with debates about the legality of more modern wars, the matter was extensively debated in the Houses of Parliament with motions of censure moved by the Opposition that an attack on a neutral was illegal under the Rules of War – and so well hidden that the transcripts are freely available in the Public Record Office and Hansard…

The counter-argument was that Denmark herself was in no position to guarantee her neutrality and was caught in the proverbial rock and hard place between being forced to side with one power or the other. Given the then-dominant position of France as the dominant continental land power, the British could not take the risk of losing access to the materials for mast timber and rigging that naval power depended on, so the decision to attack was taken.

No need to look for conspiracy when all the facts are clear – you just have to judge for yourself whether the justification was there.

As a Brit with no wish to learn to have to enjoy foreign food involving molluscs and amphibians and sing the Marseillaise my view would be 'justified if a bit legally dodgy'.

Bit like attacking a Spanish squadron loaded with gold on the grounds it would end up on Nappy's coffers if we did not, but without without having quite got round to declaring hostilities. One man's pre-emptive action is another man's piratical act. And that had the effect of putting Spain into the War on the French side too – hmm there is a pattern here.

Anyway, this is an Age of Sail thread so lets get back to talking about someone painting the Victory pink …

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Mark

This topic is also being discussed in the 1812 thread, so I am afraid I will be repeating myself here. But I will try to keep it brief.

The problem is that not everyone reads or researchers the true facts of the event. Indeed, I must admit that, before I started researching this event, I was under the impression that it was a quick and successful raid by the British navy that resulted in the capture of an opponents fleet. It is only when you start researching the event that you find it nothing like a raid at all, and it wasn't quick. It was a war crime committed by Britain. And the capture of the Danish fleet was not the only aim at the time.

Britain wanted to hold and protect the sea route to Russia, from which Britain relied so heavily for naval supplies, such as hemp etc.

'The customs tables show that for any year between 1800 and 1809, Russia supplied England with well over ninety per cent of her total hemp imports.' (page 8: Thesis: The Copenhagen Expedition 1807 by A.N. Ryan)

And in a letter from Lord Mugarve to Gambier, dated Sept 5, 1807:
'Zealand held by Great Britain and Sweden would give those powers the entire command of the Baltic, and would tend more than any other state of things, that can be conceived, to counteract the influence of France in Russia.'
(page 18: Thesis)

And I'm not sure you can class it only as an Age of Sail thread. True, the navy was employed to bus the invading troops and massive siege artillery to Denmark, and then take everyone back home again, along with the stolen ships and naval stores, but, apart from a few actions against Danish galleys, the main action took place on land, involving infantry, cavalry and field artillery, plus the besieging artillery and rocket units. They were on land for two months. And during that time there was a land battle, a siege and a terror bombardment.

Sorry, I've only seen this because of the cross-over onto the Age of Sail message board.

Our group extensively researched Nelson's 1801 attack (which the actual print that started this discussion shows) for the 200th anniversary Conference in Portsmouth, where we had the pleasure of welcoming the noted Danish historian Ole Feldbaek.

I suppose my main point is if there has been a conspiracy to paint the attack as a raid to hide its nature as a 'war crime', it has been a remarkably unsuccessful one. Conway's Naval History series clearly refers to 1807 as a 'siege', and Pope's The Great Gamble clearly summarises the events including the surrounding of the city, dispersal of local militias by and the bombardment … I think you look for a conspiracy where none exists.

Secondly, no-one thinks the possession of the Danish fleet was the main objective. Denial of that fleet to Napoleon, yes – but in both attacks the real reasons were to secure trade routes to Baltic mast timber, tar and hemp as you mention and to influence the "bear in the room" – Russia in its dealings with France. Being trapped between entering alliance with one of these power blocks or the other Denmark was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Again, all of these points are made in various accounts.

Finally, and what prompted me to contributing at all, was use of term 'war crime'. That Denmark was unprepared and had done nothing itself to provoke the 1807 attack other then refuse to side with one party against the other is beyond doubt.

But to use the 20th/21st century term 'war crime' to describe 19th century behaviour following a sequence of diplomatic approaches, ultimatums, landings, declarations of war etc. is unnecessarily emotive and devalues the term away from the universally condemned conduct that the various Conventions address.

Professor Feldbaek's book ends with a summary of the 1807 attack and the longer-term effects of the rest of the Napoleonic Wars on Denmark, which virtually ceased to exist as a recognised state for nearly 50 years. While he describes these events with a sense of sad resignation, at no point does he use the term 'war crime' and I saw no evidence of this view in my our explorations of the city, fortifications and its excellent museums.

If there was a war crime committed, you would expect the Danes to have a view…

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Mark… have you read this…?

TMP link

Amicalement
Armand

Mark

Good post. But the Danes did have a view, as shown in some of the linked articles, including the one offered again by Armand.

I don't think I have used the term conspiracy. However, judging by some of those posting here and on the other thread (Russia 1812) where the same topic is discussed, there seemed to be a strong belief that it was just a raid.

Of course, they may have obtained such a view in the same way as I did before researching the event, although some probably just want to ignore the reality of the situation. And sadly, not everyone reads naval history or researches every topic, so it could perhaps be understandable that little is known by some about what exactly happened and exactly who and what was involved and for how long. But researching it certainly opened my eyes.

In terms of war crimes. It was one. There is no denying that. Civilians and civilian property were deliberately targeted. But yes that is perhaps too modern a term. Perhaps then, with that in mind, it should be thought of as the King of England at the time described it, it was 'a very immoral act'. I think that says it all.

Dear Armand,

No – I had not seen this before, thanks for the link.

I must admit I rarely venture much further than this particular Board on TMP because the debates get so angry – and the ones on this subject on the Napoleonic Media Board are no exception …

A very interesting account and solidly consistent with the sources I quoted in my reply.

Being of its time we will forgive the picture of someone running out of their house when the bombardment starts shouting " O Britain, Queen of Nations, Mother of such Noble and Manly Sons, Is this Thy Work ?" in Danish – as I'm sure they all did, and the incredibly patronising view of the efforts of the "peasants" when the Home Guard Militia turned out against regular troops and took casualties.

Pretty obviously we are dealing with someone of education and position here writing for effect, and it is noteworthy that the account is published in England and in English …

As I mentioned the conduct of the attack was hotly debated at home and the subject of deep division between Opposition and Government – it was certainly not 'hushed up'.

As a nation famed in international matters for waiting until it is 99% too late but waking up eventually, acting this decisively and effectively does seem somewhat uncharacteristic !

From the external discussion I see no evidence of invasion (i.e. establishing a long term presence) at all – it was obviously hoped to do the thing by diplomatic approaches but with the tools present to force matters if needed.

Again, all very un-British to give the commanders on the spot what they needed and for the Army and Navy to work together, but it boded well for later developments in the Peninsular War.

Best wishes,

Mark

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Gazzola,

Sorry, I did not see your post when responding to Armand – did not mean to seem rude.

I can see we are going to have to disagree amicably on this one. Immoral ? – well I'm not going to argue with the King in whose name it was undertaken…

A war crime ? – well I'm no lawyer, but taking the articles of the 1899 Hague Convention:-

It is prohibited to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.

No doubt the British would argue that action was imperative to prevent the Danish fleet being annexed into a Franco-Russian alliance and maintain access to materials necessary to maintain the Royal Navy in operation. And there lies the debate.

The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.

Copenhagen was certainly defended.

The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.

This was done.

In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.

We can't get this right even today, but I see no evidence of deliberate targeting of such places. Napoleonic artillery and rocketry hardly counts as a precision weapon…

I'll take your point it was not really cricket, perhaps you'll take mine that it is not a black-and-white war crime, and that such terms are best left to conduct such as deliberate mistreatment of prisoners and non-combatants that are worthy of outright condemnation.

Best regards,

Mark

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Mark

I will answer the point you raised in your reply to Armand first, concerning your not seeing any evidence that a permanent long term presence was intended.

'I should wish to know, regard being had to the temper of the inhabitants of Zealand, and the means of keeping any naval forces in the Baltic, even of the lighter description to watch the belt in winter, how far the permanent occupation of that island can be looked to as practicable, and with what extent of means it might be rendered tenable against France in possession of the adjacent ports, first upon the supposition of the Danes being parties to its defence; Secondly, of the Danes being put in possession of it as a Security for the restoration of Swedish Pomerania, and thirdly of our attempting to hold its ourselves as a Position commanding the entrance to the Baltic.' (Castlereagh to Gabier, 3rd August, 1807. p176-177: Ryan's Thesis)

You will note the date of this letter is before the declaration of war and before the bombardment of the city of Copenhagen.

As further support, a questionnaire was sent to the British commanders on 13th September. Here are two of the questions asked:

(xi) Under all circumstances above alluded to, coupled with the means of disposition of the people of Zealand to act against us, what amount of force do you consider as the least with which the occupation of the island should be attempted.

(xiii) Supposing it should be determined to endeavour to retain possession of Zealand, what supplies may be required, and within what time may they be sent?

I think the above is ample evidence that a permanent garrison was considered by the British, both before the action and after the capitulation.

In terms of war crimes, the killing of civilians happens, usually accidently. But in this case, the British made a deliberate decision to fire on the civilians and civilian property, using artillery, red hot shot and fire rockets. This fact can't be glossed over because the weaponry employed did not involve, as you put it, precision weapons. That may well be true for the rockets, but I'm pretty sure they were quite good on targeting with artillery. Plus, it suggests an air or either irresponsibility or uncaring, to use weapons like rockets, if they were so unpredictable, although, of course, they made excellent terror weapons.

Gazzola,

Thanks – I was going from the composition of the force deployed that at least the initial decision had been for a shorter term expedition.

Sometimes these questionnaires (and the recorded questions in Councils of War to get back to the naval side) were intended to prove a negative to answer awkward questions back home.

In 1807 the British would have had the previous year's reverse at Buenos Aires to inject some element of caution, but the disaster at Walcheren was still to come …

No, I'd have to say that the evidence and your conclusion on a longer term occupation being seriously considered is sound.

On the last point I'm not glossing over anything, but this was war and these weapons featured in any bombardment of the time. If the British had sealed the city without warning, prevented civilian evacuation and then razed the place, that (in my view) would justify the term war crime.

After all, if we did not use rockets and bombs during the night, the 5th and 6th lines of the Star Spangled Banner would be reduced to people humming …

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes. We can't get this right even today, but I see no evidence of deliberate targeting of such places. Napoleonic artillery and rocketry hardly counts as a precision weapon

The city itself and its civilian population were deliberately targeted by the British with artillery and rockets.

Further, 'As early as the weekend of 11 and 12 July [1807], the newspapers were full of reports that the British expedition bound for Swedish Pomerania had been halted in the Sound by the Danish government. The rumor was entirely without foundation, but in the following week the press and in particular the Morning Post, the ministry's leading mouthpiece, continued to speak of the closure of Danish ports to the British flag and of a probably rupture with Denmark. Lady Bessborough reflected the prevailing atmosphere when she wrote to Gower that the Danish fleet was to be employed 'to forward the long threatened invasion, and…will sail round the North of Scotland and made a descent on Ireland…'

It should be noted that Gambier sailed for the Kattegat 'on 26 July with 16 ships of the line, 7 frigates and 16 smaller vessels.' See Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen and Seized the Danish Fleet in 1807 by Thomas Much-Peterson, 139.

Back to the deliberate bombardment of Copenhagen and the damage inflicted:

Copenhagen was 'invested' on 17 August-Munch-Peterson, 170.

'Two weeks after the siege commenced…'Munch-Peterson, 170.

The local damage to the Danish countryside, farms, and outlying villages around Copenhagen was commented on by Francis Jackson, a British diplomat: 'much consideration [for the Danes] was not to be expected…from an invading army.'-Munch-Peterson, 170.

'Cathcart's siege of Copenhagen is best remembered for the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian targets within the city…'-Munch-Peterson, 193.

'If it is found by experience that the destruction of the fleet is actually not within the power of our mortar batteries, we must then of necessity resort to the harsh measure of forcing the town into our terms, by the sufferings of the inhabitants themselves. But to give this mode of attack its fullest effect, it is necessary to completely invest the place, and oblige by that means, all persons of whatever description, to undergo the same hardships and dangers.'-Lietuenant Colonel George Murray, deputy quartermaster-general of the Copenhagen expedition, cited by Munch-Peterson, 195.

Murray's plan was adopted by General Cathcart, the commander of the land componest of the expedition. See Munch-Peterson, 195-196: 'Cathcart acted on Murray's plan-and that included the idea of a terror bombardment of the city.'-Munch-Peterson, 196.

'…as early as 22 August, in his first report to Castlereagh after landing on Zealand, he had already accepted Murray's argument that an indiscriminate bombardment of the city might be the most effective way forward.'-Munch-Peterson, 197.

If the British demands for the surrender of the Danish fleet were refused, '…the city, when taken, must share the fate of conquered places.' Cathcart and Gambier [the British army and navy commanders of the combined expedition, respectively] to Peymann, the Danish commander on 1 September 1807 as cited in Munch-Peterson, 199.

When the bombardment opened at 1930 2 September 1807 'The British concentrated their fire on the northern part of Copenhagen, using the spires or towers of several prominent churches or public buildings as their targets. Fires broke out in thirty-eight places…'-Munch-Peterson, 199.

'[The bombardment which began at 1900 on 4 September 1807] was heavy and unrelenting until around noon on 5 September, and this time the defenders proved unable to contain its effects. Much of the fire corps' equipment was damaged by now and many of its men were dead or injured. fire caught hold in several places and raged out of control…The destruction reached it most dramatic point when the venerable Frue Kirke (the Church of Our Lady), which had been a target throughout the two preceding nights, was finally brought down. Captain Bowles, watching from his warship out to sea, described the bombardment as 'the most tremendous sight that can well be conceived.' and noted that the third night 'surpassed all the rest, particularly when the largest church caught fire, and the spire (which was a remarkably beautiful one) fell in.'

'When the British artillery fell silent at noon on 5 September, the inhabitants of Copenhagen were stunned and terrified, and the city bore witness, as Cathcart and Gambier had warned in the proclamation they issued when British troops landed on Zealand, to 'the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital'. One-fifth of Copenhagen's population-20,000 people-had fled their homes to
Christianshavan or Amager and two thousand of them (2 percent of the total population) had been killed. Many of the British bombs and shells had penetrated right to the cellars of houses, the natural place of refuge, and this had increased the numbers of fatalities. It took several more days to bring the fires under control, and the flames of the ruined Frue Kirke were not entirely extinguished until the end of September. About one-twelfth of central Copenhaged was burnt to the ground and buildings over a much larger area of the city had sustained lesser or greater degress of damage.'-Munch-Peterson, 200.

The British had kept some ordnance in reserve, but employed forty mortars of various size and caliber, ten howitzers of different size and caliber as well as thirty 24-pounder siege guns. The 24-pounders were engaged the Danish artillery defending the city and would have been used to create a breach for the infantry assault if the latter had been deemed necessary. The mortars and howitzers were employed on firing within the city along with Congreve rocket fire. 6,000 artillery rounds were fired into the city, including 300 rockets.

Contrary to popular opinion, a good degree of accuracy could be obtained by period artillery, especially long guns. Rockets were area weapons and against such a large target as a city, they could hardly miss. The mortars and howitzers could have their fire adjusted by the fall of shot, and since both fired explosive shell, which caused fires, the fall of shot could be somewhat observed. Congreve rockets had an incindiary round.

So, to conclude, the Copenhagen expedition was an invasion of Denmark and Copenhagen was put under siege. The idea of it being a raid is inaccurate. Raiding forces seldom, if ever, stay in the same place and conduct formal siege operations. The secret of success of a raid, no matter what the duration, is speed and movement. And the British landed almost 30,000 men, which is just a little large for a raiding force, not to mention the movement of siege artillery which requires special vehicles (sling carts and devil carriages at a minimum) and the movement of them is slow. Then the siege batteries had to be constructed in order to emplace the artillery.

Lastly, and most importantly, the civilian population of Copenhaged was deliberately targeted and the churches of the city were used as deliberate aiming points and targets. So, the portion of Mark Barker's posting quoting above is inaccurate.

Mark

Good post. But the British knew that a considerable number of civilians remained within the city, and they still bombarded civilian targets, rather than the city walls or gun emplacements.

Of course, I suppose we have to remember that the military were under pressure from a frightened bunch of politicians, who, of course, were not there, and who had sent them to Denmark in the first place. They obviously thought the city would be easy to take and that a show of force would probably be enough. How wrong they were, as they were to the state of the Danish ships, most of which were nowhere near seaworthy and why it took a further six weeks after the capitulation to get them fit enough to sail.

But you have to ask, why did the military, after going to such an enormous effort of taking all that gun power to Denmark, embark it and build gun emplacements, have an incredibly large land force of infantry, cavalry and field artillery, defending them and driving off the feeble Danish relief attempts, still not bother to try and breach the city walls? Not that they had to anyway, they could have simply cut the water supply and with so many civilians and military within the city walls, that would have soon become a major problem for the defenders. They could have been forgiven if the civilian locations had been hit by mistake when firing against military targets, but this was not the case.

I think the British may have wanted to use their attack on Copenhagen as a warning and example to other neutral nations that they cannot sit on the fence. They have to chose sides or be forced to. Unfortunately for Britain, this resulted in Denmark siding with the French and not that long after, Russia declaring war against Britain.

Gazzola,

But in Russia's case the die was already cast with the treaty of Tilsit, which was known to the British at the time. It was that, and France's probable intention to use the fleet in a move on Britain's ally Sweden that forced the situation and made actual Danish neutrality impractical.

That late in the year was no time for a lengthy siege, for once the politicos acted with speed, sent more than enough force to do the job and with orders that did not need delaying references back to London. That is how to use seapower.

Why so such much force ?, well I think your first answer is correct and indeed was stated as so by Gambier – such an overwhelming force could conceivably have made surrender without resistance and bloodshed honourable.

Denmark's main army was elsewhere but its return to defend the capital had to be considered, which is one reason that I think they took so many men, able to deal with the small local forces but also to deal with reinforcements.

Access to the Baltic trade on its own, never mind prevention of a move on Sweden was reason enough for the attack, I don't think a wider "encourager les autres" message was an intent myself.

Best regards,

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Mark

If they knew a lengthy siege was not possible due to the time and approach of winter, it suggests they either arrogantly thought the Danes would just surrender at the mere sight of red coats and British sails, or that the intention of bombarding the city had been planned all along, should they not capitulate straight away. You don't send such a large force with excessive heavy weaponry for fun.

And most of the ships were not seaworthy and it took the British six weeks to get them fit to sail at all, let alone become battle worthy. British intelligence was poor.

The aim was maintain the sea link to trade with Russia etc and to frighten other neutral nations into siding with them or France, the capture of the fleet was a secondary measure to obtain the first. The event was an example of the 'fear' factor as mentioned by Canning:

'With a Northern Confederacy formed against us, we should have had to contend with fears at home, as well as the enmity of all Europe (for we must not disguise the fact from ourselves – we are hated throughout Europe – and that hatred must be cured by fear). We have now what we have had once before, and once only, a maritime war in our power, unfettered by any considerations of whom we annoy, or whom we may offend. And we have (what would to God poor Pitt had never resolved to have) determination to carry it through.'
(pages 225-226-Thesis: letter Canning to G. Leveson-Gower, dated October 2, 1807)

I think he missed out after whom we may offend – whom we may kill to obtain our aims, including women and children. By the way, I am not condemning the military, who were following the orders of their superiors and had to do the dirty work as usual.

According to Thomas Munch-Petersen, in his book Defying Napoleon: 'Copenhagen was the subject of recurring debate until early April 1808, and the waves often ran high.' (page 233)

They government were also challenged about the so called intelligence based on the Tilsit meeting;
'How could secret intelligence from Tilsit have reached the government in time to influence policy towards Denmark?' (page 234)

'George Ponsonby, delivered a robust defence of Denmark. The Danes would have chosen war with France rather than with Britain, he claimed. If 'the rashness and precipitation' of the British government in persecuting Jackson's insulting ultimatum had not forced them to take the contrary path. And he raised the question of Danish naval preparations.' (page 234)

'When Gambier's report to the Admiralty on taking possession of the dockyard at Copenhagen on 7 September was published in the official gazette, one passage was carefully deleted. It read: 'as few of the ships are in any considerable progress of equipment. It will require some time to complete them for sea.' (page 235)

And of course, we know the slimy politicians wanted to retain Zealand as a permanent base and were not happy with the terms of the capitulation and wanted the military to find any excuse they can to cancel out the terms:

'a sufficient cause of declaring the capitulation to be void.' (page 213: Letter Hammond to Canning, 20 September, 1807)

'Mulgrave was sure the government would 'have the country with us in any specious ground we may take for retaining Zealand.' (page 213: Mulgrave to Canning, 20 September, 1807)

I doubt the politicians were pleased when the British commanders reported back that the Danes were sticking to any conditions agreed to.

…I would argue, after 1809. Lots of stuff to look at and argue there, for example, was Napoleon's "modernization" of the army after 1809 and the fact that he never won another campaign, coincidence or linked?

As the changes in infantry organization began in 1804-1805 with the official designation of the voltigeur companies in French infantry battalions, both light and line. The reorganization of the infantry battalions from nine companies to six began in 1808, not after the campaign of 1809.

Other than those, what 'modernization' began after the campaign of 1809.

Interestingly, the 1813 campaign can actually be said to have been two campaigns, one in the spring before the summer armistice, and one after which culminated in Leipzig and the French retreat across Germany.

That being the case, and notably the French won the spring campaign driving the allies back to the Oder, Napoleon wasn't finished winning campaigns in 1809.

…that marvelous thread where you claimed some unspecified bulletin proved that there was no middle guard at Waterloo? As usual, you were correcting someone who said there was. You maintained the fiction despite half a dozen sources that I gave you to the contrary, including Ney's account, and your response was that it was a "common error!" And of course, we both knew that your source was Esposito's Atlas (map 158?) where Elting was either wrong or was referring to the cavalry.

Dates for the decrees establishing four regiments each of Old Guard infantry in 1815 was posted long ago.

Further, Petit in his memoir (which can be found in the English Historical Review, volume 18 April 1903) specifically refers to all eight regiments as Old Guard. So, Col Elting was correct and it isn't fiction.

Was Wellington's change of siege tactics from sparing the civilians in the early Peninsular sieges, to near annihilation at San Sebastian, a sign that he became hardened by years on campaign or that he recognized the new necessities of modern war…

To which 'early sieges' are you referring?

Wellington's sieges, both the successes and the failures, were hampered until 1813 by the lack of engineer units with which to conduct 'proper' sieges.

The British getting out of hand at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz,and San Sebastien is another matter.

OK, before this thread vanishes off onto the whole of the Peninsular War …

To reply to Gazzola:-

Yes, the Canning letter is well known and widely quoted, but important not to mix slimy politician's wishes with military practicality …

No, the intent was not to keep the trade routes with Russia open, we had already lost access to Russian iron and replaced this with Swedish, one of the drivers for keeping them as an ally.

The prime objective was putting the Danish fleet 'beyond use, brought upon by the Tilsit agreement between France and Russia. It was as a result of this that a massive expeditionary force was put together in pretty short order, with the clear objective as stated by Gambier to cow Denmark into surrendering the fleet and indeed to ruthlessly force the issue if this was not enough and to do it while the campaigning season was still open and keep the Danish land army (elsewhere at the time) out of the picture.

We did not need that fleet (although the thousands of tons of stores were very welcome), the objective in modern parlance was to get that fleet 'beyond use' so it could not be used to support seaborne landings against Sweden (for which they could have been used as troopships) or other invasion operations.

… and in all that, it was remarkably successful in its execution.

Trade with the Baltic could be continued in the face of a neutral or hostile Denmark deprived of her fleet, but it would have been prevented if the such forces had been allowed to combine into a Northern Coalition.

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Dear Brectel

From the various posts it seems to be very important in this thread to debate whether this was a raid or not for reasons that I must admit are lost on me..

James (yes, that one – beloved to U.S. students of the War of 1812) in 1826 and Douglas in 1855 both clearly describe the casualties as listed in Munch-Peterson, loss of the officially announced number of houses and the considerable damage to two churches (and this was considered noteworthy enough for James to mention it specifically).

Douglas is clear that the city was invested, beseiged, bombarded and captured – you just can't get any clearer than that.

Rather than a cover-up, there was a clear debate in Britain at the time as to whether the action was simply justified, undesirable but unavoidable given the overall strategic situation, or illegal and totally unacceptable by all standards of civilised behaviour of the time (and therefore valid to be condemned by us 200 years later as a war crime).

I tend to the second opinion. Ruthless and unpleasant, yes – an illegal attack on a neutral under the Law of Nations, yes, an effective use of seapower in the service of State that had been at War for a decade and the survival of which was still in some doubt, yes – but what we would now term a war crime, in my view no.

Why is that ?

Central to your point would seem to be that the specific use of rockets indicated a greater disregard for life than the norm.

Any firing on a city with the weapons of this period is by definition going to be indiscriminate. I am afraid that your assertion that mortars and howitzers are somehow weapons that could be aimed to avoid targets such as churches etc, is just not borne out by the firing practice of the time.

In 1746 an artilleryman called Williamson made notes from the firing of 12 shells of identical calibre and charge from a 13-inch mortar at Port Mahon, with the range being determined by triangulation from two plane tables over a mile apart. The filled weight of the shells varied between 224 and 228 pounds, the time of flight between 28 and 33 seconds and the range if these standard sheets from 3625 yards to 4570 yards – almost a thousand yards of variation (table in Caruana – History of English Sea Ordnance Vol. 2).

With accuracy like that, you are going to put that shell somewhere within a city block or two, no better. When I met up with an veteran artilleryman this evening and asked him whether he would use churches etc. as an aiming point in such circumstances today his answer was "Er, yes obviously, and where else would you expect their artillery observers to be ?"

With weapons of this period, there is a world of difference between what you are aiming at and where the shell actually is going to land, especially with indirect howitzers and mortars.

You also note that rockets are incendiary in effect. When they were developed by Woolwich Arsenal they were seen as replacements for carcass, an incendiary projectile already in used by the artillery.

Their advantage in naval terms was that they could be fired with no recoil rom ships without the massive construction a specialist bomb vessel would require.

Their military efficacy was hotly debated, Wellington famously wanting nothing to do with them ..

To close:-

It certainly was a full scale expeditionary force with the possibility of siege planned from the outset.

The selection of the weapons to be used does not suggest any lesser discrimination of the effects than any other bombardment of the time.

It was explained in the declaration to the Danes what the effect of resistance would be, and this would be carried through by the British with a ruthlessness surprising to an earlier time but which would become increasingly common as the war dragged into its second decade.

Best regards,

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

Mark

The problem with throwing up the Tilsit excuse is that there was no evidence that any agreement was made for the French to capture or use the Danish fleet.

After Russia requested peace with France after it had been beaten at the Battle of Friedland, it did not side with France against Britain and did not declare war against Britain until December, months after the Copenhagen affair.

'The treaties merely stipulate that Russia would make common cause with France if Britain had failed to accept peace under Russian mediation by 1 December 1807.' (page 130: Defying Napoleon by Thomas Munch-Petersen)

Britain had the chance to make peace and allow the other nations equal independence at sea, but refused to do so. Instead, Britain chose war and started one with the neutral nation of Denmark by an unprovoked attack on Copenhagen and bombardment of its civilians.