"Were political generals really worse than the professionals?" Topic

When you come rigght down to it, ALL generals were "political". Everyone had a fairy godmother to look after them, even Lee. How did he get his job? He was even wooed by Lincoln!

But there were obvious "political" generals like Burnsides, Banks and Butler.
Hmmm…
Didn't Ben Butler take New Orleans?
Didn't Banks take Fort Hudson, almost as ingeniously as Grant took Vicksburg?
Didn't Burnsides defend Knoxville very successfully, with proto-barbed wire?

Wouldn't you call McClellan and Hooker "professional"?

And besides talking to the press, what exactly did McClernand do that was wrong?

Well no question some were competent or even good, but think of Sigel.

Let's be honest. Farragut took New Orleans. Butler took the silverware.

McClernand "had the slows" and a tendency to NOT do what Grant wanted.

And then Butler got himself bottled up in the Bermuda Hundred when he could have cut the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad from under the Confederate's noses with a little more effort.

Banks was barely adequate against the second (or third) rate Confederate garrison at Port Hudson but was entirely flummoxed by Richard Taylor on the Red River.

Burnside did defend Knoxville against Longstreet but it wasn't much of a task when Longstreet didn't have the means to adequately assault or besiege the place.

Hooker was at a loss as an Army commander but was a good corps commander, as he demonstrated at Chattanooga. And John Logan was another non-professional who did well as a division and corps commander under Grant and Sherman.

Jim

McClellan usually did nothing wrong. Which is to say that McClellan usually did nothing, which usually was wrong….

Logan was a very good political General. There are many good ones! Some are not household names but there are lots of good political officers.

Don

I would agree that most ACW generals were political in a sense but many of the political generals weren't trained and therefore not professional soldiers. Quite a difference in conduct many times, but there were definitely some talented amateurs.

Do you really think that Banks could have beaten Lee? Or Burnside (well, we have the answer to that one) or Butler (who was flummoxed by Beauregard)? BTW, how did Lee rise to command? He had a small command in West Virginia where he lost to McClellan and Rosecrans, then he was an advisor to Davis and just happened to be the ranking General around when Johnston was wounded. And what of McClellan? After the debacle at Second Bull Run he, in short order, manages to put the Army of the Potomac back together, and integrate it with units of the Army of Virginia and put it back into fighting trim faster than Lee thought possible (I suggest that everyone read "Taken at the Flood" by Joseph Harsh for a balance view of what McClellan actually did).

As for Hooker, he was a very good Corps Commander and when he took over the Army of the Potomac from Burnside he rapidly improved the army (which had been starving under Burnside and suffering a massive amount of desertions). He restored their pride and while losing his nerve and the battle of Chancellorsville he did move north in pursuit of Lee faster then Lee reckoned he could.

That's not my question.
Were ALL political generals worse than professional?
Burnsides beat Longstreet.

How do you define "political general"? Many of those who served in the old army owed their early advancement during the ACW to politics. Fremont had bounced between the army and politics. McClellan was tied to the Governor of Ohio. I believe Grant had connections with the Governor of Illinois. Sherman had a number of political connections. Burnside was a West Point grad and had served in the Mexican war, although he did not see combat, before he went into business and politics. On the Confederate side even Stonewall Jackson played politics to secure his appointment, leaning on connections with his neighbor, the Governor of Virginia, and he continued to play on those even after he joined the army.

I think of a "political" general as someone who rose to general without benefit of previous military service – while many of them were competent and some even excellent, when they were bad they were very, very bad – I am thinking about Dan Sickles, who went from being a US Senator to a Colonel in one big jump (He had been an militia major briefly in the 1850s) and while he did a good job in the Seven Days and at Chancellorsville he managed to get III Corps pretty much destroyed at Gettysburg

Historians tend to rank "political generals", as those whom had some military experience, but had left the military to follow more lucrative pursuits in the civilian world, and/or politics. Then there are those who had no military experience, but a great deal of political connections at all levels, or were serving in some political office at the beginning of the war.

Yes, there were good, very good, even excellent "political" generals just as there were poor, extremely poor, and total failures in the career professional military ranks. The key is figuring out how the bad ones on both sides prolonged, or to some degree shortened the war due to their less then stellar performances at various times, or even throughout their tenure in uniform.

For instance, what if Grant had not been side lined for a number of months thanks to the behind the scenes dealings of Mclernand with Halleck about Grant being drunk all the time. Might Vicksburg have been taken sooner, or might Lincoln have put Grant in charge of the AoP following Second Manassas instead of McClellan? What if Hood had not been given the army command?

Most of the political generals saw doing something great, or at least getting the credit for someone else's accomplishment would further their political careers either during or after the war. While the regular army professionals simply wanted to end the war as quickly as possible.

I would agree with Frederick's definition above of a political general and I think Sickles is a great example of one. IMHO, in most cases, they were decidely less competant then the professionals. It has been my impression that Robert E. Lee desired to have only professionals in command of any formation higher than a brigade, and he prefered professionals at that level if possible. Thanks, John Miller

It is a long time since I've read about it, but my recollection was that a fair bit of the blame for Butler's failure in Virginia in 1864 rightly belongs to his professional officer subordinates.

Vagamer63, why would the political generals be any more likely to want to prolong the war than the professional generals. I would have thought that most of the political generals wanted to make a splash and then get back to politics. On the other hand, many of the professionals had a pretty strong vested interest in the war continuing, provided that they could keep their jobs. Not saying that they did seek to prolong the war, but I would have thought that it was more in their interests to do so than the political generals.

The reality was that, even if every West Point graduate became a general, that wasn't going to cover the demand for generals. So the extra generals had to come from somewhere. While I've no doubt that the political generals generally owed their positions to political influence, if you had to pluck a group of civilians of unknown military capacity to make officers, why not politicians? At least most of them had shown leadership capability of some sort. It would obviously have been preferable if they had been given more time to learn the trade at a lower level, but I guess that that wasn't always possible. Too many of them were kept on way past the point when their incompetence should have been clear to all.

AussieAndy,

I didn't say, or suggest that the political generals were interested in prolonging the war! They were only in it for their own political, or personal advantage no matter how long it lasted! For instance, Mclernand through his political connections with the Secretary of War, whom he had supported for President, got command of the Army of the Ohio. He then spent most of his time communicating through the Secretary to Halleck how he should be given command over Grant. All that while he was under Grant's command, during which he spent most of his time disobeying orders Grant would send him. When Grant was relieved of his command Mclernand attempted via the SOW to Halleck to then take over Grants army, as well as be made the Commander of the Western Theater.

Former West Pointers, like Grant who had been out the army about 10 years at the beginning of the war always had a leg up in being offered their General's Stars. The politicians who became generals all to often proved to be less then worthy of the title of general. Then there were the non-politicians many of whom proved themselves more then capable soldiers even though they had no prior military training or experience. Chamberlain was the most well known of this group, but he wasn't the only one!

When you come rigght down to it, ALL generals were "political". Everyone had a fairy godmother to look after them, even Lee. How did he get his job? He was even wooed by Lincoln!

Lee had a solid military background and a lot of experience. That's why he was 'wooed'. Other men became generals, not because they had any military experience, but because they had political [non-military] 'fairy godmothers'.

There were nine corps commanders at Gettysburg. Only one was not a West Point graduate. He is the one who disobeyed a direct order and got his corps destroyed. He is also the one wounded general who went immediately to Washington to convice his political friends that he brilliantly saved the Union instead of all those career generals.

One reason that the Union had smaller divisions and corps than the Confederates is that they had so many 'political' appointments to satisfy. The Union raised 30% more regiments than the South with an equal number of men. Sherman spoke out against the Union practice of creating new regiments instead of sending recruits to established regiments.

There were talented 'amateurs', political appointments like Joshua Chamberlain that proved to be excellent officers once they learned their jobs. And there were West Point officers that weren't that good. However, the odds of a West Point graduate or career officer being competent compared to a political appointed civilian is pretty good.

There were enough West Point graduates like Lee that turned their backs on their military oaths to defend the Union that a paranoid Congress never really trusted the West Point generals. There was even a committee set up to investigated any and all West Point officers in 1861. It was still going strong by the end of the war.

Vagamer63
Saying that the professional generals simply wanted to end the war as quickly as possible does seem to imply that the political generals didn't or at least not until they had achieved their political ends. Even with the popular distain for politicians, to assert that none of them were motivated by anything other than personal advantage seems to be a bit harsh. Many of the professional generals also did very well out of the war and I doubt that they were all soley motivated by pure patriotism.
Regards

That'll teach me to proof read. Try "disdain" for "distain". I did go to school.

Most politicians turned general were pretty bad though there were exceptions like Logan. Some West Point graduates turned in dismal performances, like John Pope. Generally the professionals had a higher rate of competency, but it was no guarantee.

Nathan Bedford Forrest was a total non-professional, yet he was arguably one of the best military commanders of all time.

Forrest had zero military training or experience at the time he enlisted, yet he consistently defeated the professionals at every turn during his career.

Lack of professional military experience does not mean you won't succeed. Look what Joan of Arc did. I suppose that's why us gamers without any military training think we're experts too :)

Kim

Forrest had zero military training or experience at the time he enlisted, yet he consistently defeated the professionals at every turn during his career.

Forrest was defeated by (in chronological order):

A. J. Smith (a West Pointer)

Robert Milroy (not a West Pointer)

and James H. Wilson (twice) (a West Pointer)

1. Burnside went to WEST POINT.
2. Burnside OUT marched Stonewall at the start of the Fredericksburg campaign.
3.Burnside did out maneuver Longstreet at Knoxville.
4. The attack at the crater would have beaten Lee, but Grant and Meade changed Burnside's troops at the last moment.

Burnside was a professional Army officer. Who was out classed, by some Southern Generals. His performance at Antietam was good. McCleaon wanted to Blame someone so he picked on Burnside.

At Antietam, Burnside insisted on crossing the creek at the bridge named for him when it was fordable elsewhere. But, yes, he outfought Longstreet at Knoxville and in the campaign before and after.

I think some of us are confusing a general who is appointed for political reasons with generals who acted like politicians or those who factored in politics as part of their strategy.

Butler pulled a lot of strings and political maneuvering to secure his commission. Lee was a general who acquired his position due to ability. But he was a political general because he used it as a guide for his strategy. Lee followed Union politics and incorporated that into his strategy

Northern politics was one of many factors that led to three invasions of the Union, Antietam, Gettysburg and Early's invasion late in the war.

Some West Pointers were political. Some amateurs were not political. Depending on how you define "political."

It is worth noting the South was not immune to this. For example Hood's and Bragg's relationship with Davis. Breckenridge used his position to influence his old unit, the Orphan Brigade.

Didn't Ben Butler take New Orleans?

Ben Butler taking New Orleans doesn't count. He just walked in. I could have taken New Orleans with a half strength Boy Scout Troop. One of the biggest mistakes of the war is that the Confederates did not defend it. The largest port in the South and the Union took it without a fight.

I didn't think the bridge was named "Burnside's Bridge" until after the battle. I think it's name is actually more mundane, like the Middle Bridge or something like that.

Farragut captured New Orleans when his naval squadron defeated the confederate forts some 70 miles downriver and the local garrison was only prepared to defend from the land.

The confederate combatants abandoned the city after their loss and the town surrendered to Farragut's officers and marines.

Butler arrived shortly afterwards to occupy the city after it had already surrendered.

Kim

You are correct Butler came later.

Historian John D. Winters in "The Civil War in Louisiana" (1963) noted that with few exceptions the Confederate fleet at New Orleans had "made a sorry showing. Self-destruction, lack of co-operation, cowardice of untrained officers, and the murderous fire of the Federal gunboats reduced the fleet to a demoralized shambles."

Once the outer forts were defeated, General Mansfield Lovell had no other choice but to evacuate the city. The inner ring of forts were intended to resist a ground attack, the guns were facing the wrong way. Once these defenses were breached, then all that was needed was to march into the city unopposed. Lovell had loaded his troops and supplies on to trains and sent them to Camp Moore, 78 miles away.

He instructed all supplies coming to New Orleans be diverted to Vicksburg. Farragut sent 250 Marines to occupy the city. This was an absolute disaster for the South. One of the most important cities in the Confederacy and it was captured buy a few hundred Marines.

At Antediem. to say the creek was fordable is really wrong. You have to remember that ammo was made of PAPER. If THE ammo GOT WET IT WOULD NOT FIRE. Also anyone who has been at the creek knows the bank along the Confederate side is very steep. Anyone trying to climb would find it very difficult. Without the bridge it was impossible for wagons or cannons to ford the creek. To continue an attack Burnside had to take the bridge.

30 inches was considered the maximum depth Infantry could ford and still fight. Something an unloaded person in shorts and tennis shoes can cross is not at all the same as a formed Infantry regiment in the face of opposition. In a lot of ways this is the ACW version of lions led by donkeys

I didn't think the bridge was named "Burnside's Bridge" until after the battle.

Of course. But it is now a handy way of designating the bridge in question.

Some of Burnside's men eventually crossed 2 miles downstream at Snavely's Ford, and it was their presence that caused the Rebels to let go of the bridge (and the fact that they were low on ammo).

I readily admit, however, that I'm no expert on Antietam.