"A Prelude to the British Bombardment of Copenhagen " Topic

"In mid-August 1807, a British army landed on the Danish island of Zealand and laid siege to Copenhagen. The object of this military operation was to secure the surrender of the Danish fleet into British hands – a goal which was
achieved after Copenhagen had been subjected to three nights of bombardment during the first days of September 1807. Earlier that year, in late March, the coalition government made up chiefly of the Grenvillite and Foxite parliamentary factions had been succeeded amidst great acrimony by the Portland administration, a ministry which brought together the former followers ofWilliam Pitt. The
attack on Denmark was the most strilung initiative undertaken by the new government in 1807, and the Danish policy of the Portland administration was strongly criticized by the opposition during the parliamentary session which stretched from January to July 1802.
One of the arguments used by ministers and their supporters in defence of the government was to imply that the decision to attack Denmark built on the policy pursued by their predecessors. In particular, a number of despatches written by Earl Grey, foreign secretaly between September 1806 and March 1807 and now co-!eader of the opposition, were produced to demonstrate the hard line he had supposedly adopted while in ofice. Grey and other members of the opposition vehemently rejected the insinuation that, whatever their fine words now, the Grenville administration would in practice have pursued the same policy towards
Denmark in the late summer of 1807 as the Portland ministry if it had remained in power. As one prominent member of the opposition put it, Grey felt that he had been accused "of holding one language while in office, and another when out
of itn3. Needless to say, no resolution of the question was achieved in 1808: this was a matter of party advantage and one side was never going to yield to the other. In a less partisan way, the question has remained implicit in all discussion among historians of the factors which led to the British assault on Copenhag-e n in 1 Should the British decision to attack Denmark be seen as a response to an immediate and unexpected crisis in July 1807, as the child of Friedland and Tilsit? Or is…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Armand

A long heated debate on the attack against Copenhagen in neutral Denmark can be found in the Russian 1812 topic in this board. Some saw it as a raid, while myself and others saw it as an invasion, considering the time the British stayed there and the high number of troops and ships involved, plus there were more artillery pieces, such as siege mortars, employed than at the Peninsular sieges.

It appears that Napoleon "played" the British intelligence services by feeding them information that he intended to seize the Danish fleet. This left Great Britain with the same dilemma it faced with the French fleet at Mers-El-Kebir in WW2 – in both cases enemy possession of the ships in question would have seriously dented the Royal Navy's advantage and made the invasion of Great Britain and/or Ireland a greater possibility, whether directly in the eastern Atlantic or English Channel/Irish Sea, or indirectly via threats elsewhere that would sap the RN's strength in home waters.

By falling for Napoleon's ruse, the British unwittingly drove the Danes into an alliance with Napoleon that would not otherwise have been considered. That said, there is no way that the Danes could have stopped Napoleon overrunning Denmark anyway; and whilst the Danish fleet could have put out to sea, there were limited options as to where it could have sought shelter.

As for the invasion/raid argument – unless there was clear evidence that the British either intended to stay for a long time, and/or replace the government/monarch with one of their own choosing, there is no evidence to support the invasion theory. How much artillery was deployed is neither here nor there; it was a big raid, because it had a big purpose – to neutralise the entire navy of a major maritime nation.

No.

Raids are sudden, short, with a limited objective, and certainly don't last for at least three weeks. And the numbers involved in a raid are generally small.

Sieges take place over time, involve large numbers of troops, heavy artillery was used, and siege batteries are emplaced in field works.

Copenhagen in 1807 fits the definition and attributes of a siege, not a raid, and the objective was permanent, not temporary-the seizure or destruction of the Danish fleet.

Why does it matter whether the military operation that took place is described a raid or a siege?

Are raids good and sieges bad?

Neither of them are precise terms so isn't it rather like arguing whether a party you went to was a shindig or a hootenanny?

SJDonovan

The British attack is often described as a raid, that is, a quick action just to capture the fleet of a neutral nation. But the action lasted quite a long time, and included land operations and siege of the city. The siege also included the deliberate bombardment of the civilians including the use of fire rockets, which has been termed by some as a 'terror bombardment'. The British intention, as they admit, was to scare the civilians into forcing the military, who had refused to surrender, into capitulating. But the Brits went against their word after the military surrendered and not only stole the warships but they took every ship they could lay their hands on and plundered all the stores. They were going to stay but later decided not to, so it was not a quick raid as British apologists try to portray. Even the British king called it a very immoral act.

It is important to understand the vocabulary and terms of the subject you're discussing.

Military terms are indeed precise and the definitions of 'raid' and 'siege' are quite different.

To be either familiar or fluent in military terminology is very important when discussing military history. It is neither unimportant nor pedantic, but being fluent in the vocabulary of the subject is very important, and it certainly demonstrates that you know what you're talking about.

The definitions of a siege and a raid have been given before for Copenhagen have been given in the other thread regarding the operation and the British operations against Copenhagen certainly fall into the definition of a siege.

Munch-Peterson in his book on the subject, Copenhagen 1807, defines the operation as a siege as previously demonstrated in the other thread.

Well Brechtel, do what you are banging on about and study what a raid is. There is no set in stone time of how long a raid should last or what a raid should involve.

If you have a defined meaning, please put up the link to it. Not a modern meaning but(as you so much use in your diatribes)in the context of Georgian warfare.

Anyway the link to the paper has been put up on this forum many times.

Paul

I already have posted a period definition for 'siege' from the following artillery manual:

From the American Artillerist's Companion, by Louis de Tousard, Volume II, 656:

‘Siege: the position which an army takes, or its encampment before fortified town or place, for the purpose of reducing it. To undertake the siege of a town, to invest it, to form lines of circumvallation, to open trenches, etc. To lay siege to a town, to draw your forces round a town, for the purpose of attacking it.'

It seems to me that you have no idea of the difference between a raid or a siege. And as posted before, the British themselves described the operation against Copenhagen in 1807 as a siege.

Have you read Munch-Peterson's book as it has been referenced in the other thread?

It seems to me that you are just a bit confused on basic military terminology…

My friend Gazzola… I have read the debate … one of the most interesting from a long time in "Napoleon Media"… I agree with you and Kevin… and this maybe sustain your points…

I also put another thread about that siege and I'm reading a book about it too that soon I hope to end and put in here for free read.

Regards
Armand.

Gazzola … see here…

TMP link

"NEW LIGHT ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE BRITISH BOMBARDMENT
OF COPENHAGEN IN 1807…"

Amicalement
Armand

Massena

There is no more a confused person than yourself, as you have proved yourself many many times.

Copenhagen was a R-A-I-D. That there was a siege within the confines of the raid still makes the operation a R-A-I-D.

I will not carry on with your 'bat and ball' debate as you and it are rather boring.

Paul

The issue is very simply resolved:

Please show where the British designated the operation a raid.

It has already been shown that they believed it to be a siege, and that was a primary source.

Your ad hominem comment is noted. Your continuation of that type of posting merely reflects badly on yourself-no one else.

dibble

If it was just a raid as you obviously want to maintain, can you please explain why the British were considering staying there? I believe it was only the danger of the sea becoming iced over and trapping their ships or preventing supplies getting to the mass of troops on the land, that made them leave, eventually, after being there for seven weeks. I guess you conveniently ignored that?

Kevin:
Since Dibbs has already reached the stage that I am rapidly approaching, just a few random thoughts, since this has already been talked to death.

First a question. Surely you didn't mean that it was OK for you to say that Dibble was confused but it was "ad hominem" when he said the same of you? Perhaps you meant something else.

You ask Dibble if he has read Munch-Peterson's book which I mentioned elsewhere. Since you asked me a similar question about a French tome that you had obviously not read, allow me to ask, have you read this book, yourself?

If you have, you will remember that much of the book deals with the diplomatic arguments and maneuvers that took place before the actual raid and bombardment. Yes, the occupation of Zealand, which was ceded to England anyway, following Napoleon's final defeat and exile, was contemplated, but as you know, not carried out. Do you find England guilty of "thought crime" as well?

I remember Munch-Peterson using the terms "preemptive strike" and "bombardment", but not "raid or "siege", though I do not plan on rereading the book just now, to prove the point for you. Unless you have a citation one way or the other, why bring up the book at all?

I can say, though, that the gist of "Defying Napoleon", like Chandler's opinion, is that it was a great idea, masterfully executed.
I think so, too.

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

No one can doubt it was a successful attack but I am surprised that you think it was a great idea for Britain to attack a neutral country, lay siege to a city, deliberately bombard and terrorize and kill the civilians using a mass of artillery, siege mortars and fire rockets, rob their stores and steal their ships? It also turned a neutral country into an enemy that sided with Napoleon, thereby increasing his manpower, and whose reduced navy were still able to sink a mass of merchant ships?

Since you asked me a similar question about a French tome that you had obviously not read, allow me to ask, have you read this book, yourself?… I remember Munch-Peterson using the terms "preemptive strike" and "bombardment", but not "raid or "siege", though I do not plan on rereading the book just now, to prove the point for you. Unless you have a citation one way or the other, why bring up the book at all?

I've already posted material from Munch-Peterson's volume on Copenhagen, but in case you missed it, I'll repost the information from that book again. And, yes, the author used the term 'siege' for the British operations against Copenhagen in 1807-more than once.

"Cathcart referred to the British operations against Copenhagen as ‘the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital.'"

"Munch-Peterson refers to the shelling of Copenhagen as a 'terror bombardment' on page 197 of his book."

"And Munch-Peterson also calls the operation a siege multiple times in his narrative. He also mentions that George Murray argued for an 'indiscriminate bombardment' of the city as being 'the most effective way forward.' And the footnote for that discussion refers to correspondence between Cathcart, the commander of the land forces at Copenhagen' with Castlereagh."

"Here's the bottom line for the operations against Copenhagen in 1807, from an issued British proclamation, that warned the Danes against any resistance:
'But if these offers are rejected…the innocent blood that will be shed, and the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital, must fall on your heads.'"

"And from Munch-Peterson on page 195, the parameters of a siege against Copenhagen are outlined:
'The navy could not remain at sea in these northern waters much beyond October, and the 'lateness of the season' meant that there was insufficient time to conduct 'a regular siege' of Copenhagen. That was the traditional method of capturing a city, a laborious process of digging trenches parallel to the walls that would creep closer and closer to the fortress by means of zigzag trenches. Murray's conclusion was clear-cut: 'that our principal reliance must be upon the effect of a bombardment, and that we must either endeavor by that means to destroy the Danish fleet, or force the government to surrender it into our hands.'
Murray's conclusion for the success of the operation was:
'If it is found by experience that the destruction of the fleet is actually not within the power of our mortar batteries, we must then of necessity resort to the harsh measure of forcing the town into our terms, by the sufferings of the inhabitants themselves. But to give this mode of attack its fullest effect, it is necessary to completely invest the place, and oblige by that means, all persons of whatever description, to undergo the same hardships and dangers.'"

"The numbers I quoted from Munch-Peterson were 2,000 dead and 20,000 homeless/refugees."

I do hope that the above answers your query.

In addition to the above, it should be noted that the subtitle for Chapter 9 of Munch-Peterson's work is 'Copenhagen Besieged.'

Further, on pages 194-195, it reads, in part, 'A third plane, the one Murray favored, was to land on both Zeland and Amager and to invest Copenhagen on all sieds. The initial debarkation should take place on the coast north of Copenhagen, and once the city was surrounded on the side of Zealand, a second landing could be carried out to secure a complete investment of the Danish capital.'

It should be noted, that when a city or fortress is besieged, it is first 'invested.'

Time was limited for the investment, however, and 'The navy could not remain at sea in these northern waters much beyond October, and the 'lateness of the season' meant that there was unsufficient time to conduct 'a regular siege' of Copenhagen. That was the traditional method of capturing a city, a laborious process of digging trenches parallel to the walls that would creep closer and closer to the fortress by means of zigzag trenches. Murray's conclusion was clearcut: 'that our principal reliance must be upon the effect of a bombardment, and that we must either endeavor by that means to destroy the Danish fleet, or force the government to surrender it into our hands.'-195.

One aspect of British siege operations that Munch-Peterson apparently overlooked was that they had no viable engineer troops with which to conduct 'a regular siege.' The British engineer arm at this point (1807) was an organization of officers only, and they were not particularly trained in the intricacies of siege warfare. They did not have trained and organized engineer troops with which to conduct proper siege operations until 1813 at the sieges of San Sebastien. Their normal procedure was to invest, bombard, and then assault the fortress besieged with infantry once a breach in the walls had been effected. (See Wellington's Engineers: Military Engineering in the Peninsular War 1808-1814 by Mark Thompson.)

Regarding other aspects of the siege, including the plan to conduct a terror bombing:

'Cathcart acted on Murray's plan-and that included the idea of a terror bombardment of the city.'-196.

'[Wellesley's] plan, if put into execution, would totally invest Copenhagen and make it impossible for any provisions to get through. A British move onto Amager was 'a more certain mode of forcing a capitulation than a bombardment [since] no city…can be expected to hold out when cut off from all supplies.' 196-197. This plan was not adopted.

'…as early as 22 August, in his first report to Castlereagh after landing on Zealand, [Cathcart] had already accepted Murray's argument that an indiscriminate bombardment of the city might be the most effective way forward.'-197.

Cathcart, the army commander, along with Gambier, the naval commander, gave their ultimatum to the Danes, and told them that if they did not accede to British demands regarding the Danish fleet that 'the city, when taken, must share the fate of conquered places.'

Excellent posts Kevin

Thanks.

It's getting a bit repetitive, but sometimes I guess that's what has to be posted.

Excellent as usual Kevin!.

Many thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

John:
"No one can doubt it was a successful attack but I am surprised that you think it was a great idea for Britain to attack a neutral country, lay siege to a city, deliberately bombard and terrorize and kill the civilians using a mass of artillery, siege mortars and fire rockets, rob their stores and steal their ships? It also turned a neutral country into an enemy that sided with Napoleon, thereby increasing his manpower, and whose reduced navy were still able to sink a mass of merchant ships?"

My apologies, John, I see that it is nearly a week since your post addressed to me , but alas, family issues have precluded my making any serious (i.e. researched) entries on the Napoleonic forums. Let me redress that now,

We agree that it was a successful raid, but you question both its brutality and effectiveness.

When Kevin was quoting "Defying Napoleon", and I asked him if he had read the whole book, I was thinking in particular of this passage (p.244):

"The decision of the British cabinet in July 1807 to attack Denmark and sieze the Danish fleet was no more ruthless than many of the actions by other powers during the Napoleonic era -- or indeed during other periods of history."

I am reminded, for example of Napoleon's invasion of neutral Hanover and Portugal, and, historically, "terror bombardments" by the French at Geneva, 1684 and Brussels, 1695, but there was no country particularly guilty. Remember Wolfe at Quebec.

Since the term "siege" continues to raise its doubtful head, I should point out that no "siege mortars" were used. Mortar batteries to lob shells into the city, of couurse, but no guns heavy enough to knock down the city walls. That, of course, might have been because, as usual in the British army of the time, they were not available, to the later vexation of Wellesley in the Peninsula, but when the military defenders finally abandoned the city's ramparts, no attempt was made to scale them as would surely have occurred in a siege, and after the city capitulated, neither military nor civilian personnel were obliged to evacuate. And again, civilians were given prior warning to leave before the bombardment commenced, without fear of molestation.

I am loathe to get into the totally irrelevant, in my opinion, issue of whether the expedition was a "raid" or a "siege", but since our freind Kevin asked for usages of the word "raid", here are a few to match his citing of one author (I think; did I miss a post?;)), Munch Peterson.

I not only went to Annex C351 of my magnificent personal library, I also used that marvelous electronic device, Google Search and found four citations in addition to that of the Danish naval historian, Christian Bjerg, before losing interest:

Rene Chartrand, "Vimeiro, 1808" p.33
Andrew Lambert, "The Crimean War", p. 123 (not to be confused with the book by the same name that he wrote with Stephen Badsey).
A.H. Baltern, "Resolute and Undertaking Characters", p. 9

HOWEVER!!!!

Jorgen Nielsen on the Danish Naval Forum 07-14-05 et seq,
link
uses the term "raid" several times, but also uses "siege" applied to what I would call the bombardment. To misquote Ironman, "can't we have both?"

Raids, sudden attacks on unsuspecting targets, were an often-used gambit by the British Navy, and certainly this was secret -- Wellesley, in a letter to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland one week before he set sail stated that "it is not positively settled that we are to go". (E. Longford, "Wellington: The Years of the Sword", p.133) -- and the Danes were taken completely by surprise.

I have given my reasons for preferring "bombardment" to "siege", but certainly the last term does not preclude the use of the first.

Which brings us to that interesting part of your question that deals with the strategic question of whether or not the expedition -- I like the Countess's all-embracing term, and it will pleasantly remind Americans of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, which had ended triumphantly, a few months earlier -- benefitted GB militarily. It might also be fun to look at that "2,000 killed" figure; there's an interesting, though rather obvious problem, there.

But it's nearly midnight, and I still have some "manly" work to do -- welding some iron pipes to make a coat stand for GD -- so I shall look forward to your reply before continuing.

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

If you read the following link you will see that firstly, siege mortars were employed and used.

p74-a Danish galley was lost due to a lucky shot from a shore based mounted mortar.'

p76-a description of the number and type of mass artillery employed

p75/76-describes the British reasons for not employing traditional SIEGE tactics and employing terror bombardment tactics instead, despite the misgivings of some, including the Wellesley.

Had they not employed the terror bombardment, including the use of fire rockets, they would have had to disengage or breach the walls via traditional siege methods. They had over 25,000 troops and a mass of guns, so they could have done that.

link

To me, it was a successful attack and siege, albeit an unprovoked one and one that resulted in turning a possible alley into an enemy, which then British merchant ships.

One of the main problems the British had regarding 'proper sieges' is that they had no engineer units with which to conduct them 'properly' until 1813 at San Sebastien.

That's the main reason why Wellington's sieges were messy and costly and also why some British sieges had to be lifted/abandoned in the Spanish Peninsula.