"Movement in Warmaster - Flawed?" Topic

Writing in Battlefront magazine, David CR Brown observed:

Within Warmaster, units can move, move again and then move again, as long as they pass their command roles. This seems to conflict with history; after all, Wellington could pretty well determine the speed of advance for battlefield formations, both friend and enemy.

Do you agree?

I think it's fine. Find me a battle were everyone advanced when they were suppose to at the official rate. Stuff happens. In Warmaster some units may get double or triple moves but a lot don't, it depends on if you as a commander want to play it safe and try to advance every unit once or go crazy and push with one flank while ignoring the other.

The only part that is flawed is when I fail a command roll and lose a game. However, when I make roll after roll, the movement system works perfectly fine.

Same system is used in Blackpowder. Some people don't like it, but many do.

Impetus uses a very similar system. I like it, but you have to be careful with it because one failed role and you could be way out in front, alone, and disordered…….

I don't think that David CR Brown understands what the movement is supposed to reflect.

You can move and move and move again and that can be useful, but sometimes you do it and then you don't move with another formation or unit and then the first unit is out there getting its butt kicked by the entire enemy army.

Units advanced stupidly, look at Charonea.

Also the game, being a fantasy game set in a medieval tech level world would not have had the same type of drill for the soldiers that Wellington could have expected.

Maybe the Elves would move like that.

The only real problem with the rules is that the Dwarf infantry is the fastest in the game!

As opposed to rules where all infantry move 6", and you know exactly when the two forces will meet?

Warmaster is not perfect, but it introduces randomness and unpredictability into an otherwise potentially very linear game.

Warmaster and derived sets have movement represent both "tactical" and combat movement. Units rarely reliably make three+ bounds and perform a perfect strike, thought it's very useful to move a unit to the flank or perform a sideways march (think Cynocephalae) Try one of those with more classic rules and you start to wonder how those Romans pulled it off … Also the repercussions can be devastating, you may well be able to move one unit in the right position, but the next unit that is vital to cover yours doesn't and in the next turn your opponent wipes the floor with the perfectly exposed unit.

I don't buy heavy infantry moving more than light cavalry, as it happened to me on more than one occasion.
I think it's fine for fantasy battles but not so for historical.

Find me a war in history where troops and units did what they were suppossed to do all the time…

I have not read that piece by Mr Brown, and he usually writes intelligent pieces, but the rise in 'opinion pieces' in magazines is getting a bit tiresome of late. Its a personal hobby and we all pursue it in a personal manner that suits us. The articles that seem to desire to tell me how my hobby should be kinda annoy me a bit.

In part it seems done just to court controversy and arguement. Cant be doing with that. Tabloid journalism.

I prefer the recent approach to such articles taken by Conrad Kinch in this months Miniature Wargames in his well presented and reasoned article on the use of points systems. An article that presented two sides of the arguement and then strove to deliver an eloquent and reasoned conclusion.

The movement in the warmaster familiy is not flawed IMO. Wellington couldnt calculate when the prussians would reach Papelotte or how many time his troops needed to reach Belle Alliance.

But the Warmaster activation system is flawed as a command system. Bob Coggins has once said, a good command system has to master the parade test. You can organize a military parade (without enemy involvement) with it. The Warmaster system is not only too random, it is too random in the parts of a battle, that a general can control.

As others have stated I think the Warmaster mechanism simply represents a bit of fog of war without using event cards or random activation.The chance of success gets slimmer with each ordering of the same group in the same turn and just because you can doesn't make it a game winning tactic. I remember a game where the enemy high elf cavalry came all across the board in one activation (probably 3 orders with very lucky dice rolls) but then found that cav was too separated from the rest of his host and was defeated piecemeal by my united host.

D6 Junkie: Salamanca?
However, I do think the random command element echoes some aspects of command quite well. But it's not perfect.
And I don't agree with the 'parade test'. Carrying out commands in battlefield conditions is entirely different from a pre-planned (and probably rehearsed) parade-ground evolution.

Warmaster (and some other systems that introduce chaos and randomness by die roll) tends to overdo it a bit much for historical settings. Extreme cases could be easily moderated by very minor rules tweaks.

Such a simplistic approach to introducing a lack of control is fine in a game for players who are only interested in seeing the end effect on the table, and not in the processes that created the command failures in the first place (miscommunication, poor visibility, faulty judgement, lack of coordination, terrain variability, subordinates with their own agendas, etc.). I find it much more interesting (and I'm referring to games with multiple players on a side) to set up interesting terrain and a challenging tactical problem, and then let those processes occur naturally between the players . . . which creates plenty of chaos without resorting to failed command rolls, believe me.

What I really find humorous is naval game designs that use those types of systems, and leave bunches of ships sitting around waiting for a successful activation roll; it is entirely inappropriate in any period after the introduction of sail. Ships might not always move at the speed or in the direction that the overall commander desires, but they are always doing something.

I always find it amusing that some people are not capable of not over-analyzing a gaming mechanism.

Of course command rolls and associated movement distances do not mimic the command activities as carried out by a real general (cfr. also the other thread on "pips"), just as rolling a D6 does not mimic an infantry soldier firing his musket.
However, these mechanics taken as a whole and averaged out, produce something that is similar to what we think happened in a real battle, do provide us with with a fun game, and do create a feeling of "being there" in the wargamer.

Some people really seem to think there are signs on real world battlefields that say "Difficult hedge. Please wait 5 minutes before crossing."

If a rule does something you do not like, THEN CHANGE THE BLOODY RULE!

Amusing anecdote:

When I was an armoured infantry platoon commander 25 years ago ago, my company commander gave me an order to occupy a specific position. He knew how long it would take my platoon to get there and deploy. I knew how long it would take for us to get there and deploy. We both knew. Of course I didn't get there in time because of 1. the guys taking too long to mount; 2. a map reading error on my part.

So how do we model that in a wargame? By reducing movement with D6" each turn for a given unit? By keeping movement the same each turn, but reducing the number of turns in which the unit can be moved (e.g. command rolls)? By factoring this in in the first place and assuming such things happen all the time, and put a fixed movement distance on all units?

There is no right or wrong answer …

since i play orcs, I never get to move anyway. aside from that, for me, all of these systems are just abstractions to give the feel that complete control is impossible. I don't mind them. the battles that I've played using this type of orders system all work out in a believable way in the end.

I will say that I really like how Lion Rampant has uses the mechanic of orders rolls. basically the odds of success increase if you are using the troops in a way that they would have been actually used. so archers shooting is an easy success, whereas its harder to make them charge, etc.

No more flawed than any other "simulation". Is moving every unit 6" (or what the rules give as move distance) every turn more realistic? Is moving every unit a set amount, plus or minus a die roll every turn more accurate? You pays your money and makes your choices.

My limited experience is that units that I WANT to move seem to freeze more often than units moving three times per turn. Units that go hell bent for three moves (including those in Black Powder) often get left out on a limb.

The movement rules in Warmaster et all don't represent the physical speed of the unit, they represent the ability of the unit to get it's together and be where it needs to be.

-Will

Is this the David Brown of " General de Brigade" rules? If so, his rules are for relatively small scale ( divisional level) and there may well be some merit in his criticism at this level of game. Warmaster is probably a "higher level" game and so incorporates mechanisms which try to replicate the problems of coordinating a number of "divisions". It's also for Ancient/Medieval era, when communication on the battle field, especially with Allied units, would not be very sophisticated.
I grew up with rules where units moved a fixed distance, but I personally like the randomness of many modern rule systems- a favourite is the mechanism used in Sword and Spear, with random numbers of activation dice which then need to be rolled to get units moving.

Mr. Brown clearly does not understand what the command roll represents.

For me, the random movement is a real turnoff. When I cannot get a column of units to move from point A to point B without someone screwing up when all they have to do is follow the unit in front of them, I have to say that it does not in any way represent reality. Yes, in real life there are screwups but not every single time for the simplest maneuver. IMHO, it is a far overdone way to introduce "friction".That being said, we play the game and I enjoy it for the most part…

Does anything in the warmaster command roll reflect the quality of who is intending to react to the movement?

If the answer is no, then its a poorly thought out mechanism that the writers couldn't be bothered thinking about with their brain in gear.

Mr brown clearly understands the failure of representation of command that this poor mechanism fails to address.

It fails black powder, cold war commander, blitzkreig commander. As a mechanism for fantasy rules, who gives a monkey's……. it is all about spells and flying lizards.

As a mechanism for fantasy rules, who gives a monkey's……. it is all about spells and flying lizards.

Uh, no, it's not. The designer, Rick Priestly, writes in the introduction:

Warmaster is fundamentally a bame based on a general's ability to command rather than on his troops' ability to fight, although that will come in useful too! Each turn of the game reflects the time taken to consider, formulate, communicate and enact decision made by the general rather than the literal time it might take for a man to walk or run a certain distance or shoot an arrow. Indeed, as in real wars, we must assume that our warriors spend a great deal of time awaiting orders and relatively little time actually moving or fighting. This idea underpins the whole Warmaster game.

So, I don't think it is 'overthinking' the issue to ask if Rick's assumptions about command in 'real wars' is reasonable--even though he is writing rules for a fantasy game--whether the rules reflect what he wanted to model: command in real wars. David gave his assessment.

Personally, not know what the *#*!@ of 'real war' Rick based his conclusions on, nor David for that matter. Because of that, both Rick's game interpretation of 'real war' and David's criticisms are hard to assess in a reasonable manner.

I mean, could Wellington have predicted accurately the marching speed of an elven army?

Some weeks, random movement is the only realistic option, other weeks, fixed movement is the only realistic option.

Weasel:

So, which weeks did Rick P. choose to represent? Assuming of course, that what you say is true… And to my knowledge, Wellington never met an elven army in battle, which is why Rick doesn't address that question, I am sure.

@Esteemed Editor

I disagree

Indeed, the statement is so poorly thought out that I would consider the Gentleman writing to be an idiot who doesn't do sufficient research before presenting an opinion

As (the great) McLaddie says – the book explains the process, with the implication that the Gentleman writing has not actually read the rules he is criticizing – the main basis for my comment on his intellectual status

More subtly, there is a lot of criticism that the strict Igo/Ugo approach leads to ahistoric results, the original Gentleman should be aware of this debate and comment on Warmaster command in that context. A mechanism that gives variable movement will at a high level better model the chaos of the battlefield. Adding this mechanism into the c3 mechanism gives simple yet playable rules. Choosing the order to move your troops and risking additional movement is a nerve-wracking experience :)

As StCrispin says – Lion Rampant extends the mechanism to allow for the quality and capability of the troops being commanded. This is an inexpensive set of rules that anyone interested in game design should have a go with. So Warmaster is not perfect :)

The other criticism of Warmaster I have is that you want to roll low for command ( e.g. roll under 10 on 2D6 ). This sometimes confuses this bear of little brain when everything else has to roll high

John

I agree with other posters that the reviewer, Mr Brown, doesn't really understand what variable movement is intended to replicate. Personally I love any system that tries to disrupt the top down control most gamers exert over their table top armies. The other important dimension to variable movement that hasn't been mentioned so far is that the opposing side cannot anticipate with certainty the movement of any forces against it. Too often players attempt to redress deployment mistakes by shuffling troops about but in games like Warmaster this comes with certain risks.

If you follow the hobby you will likely be aware of Dave's moves over the last few years to highlight the command and control challenge on the table top. It has been a central pillar in the evolution of all 3 rule sets he publishes – General de Brigade, Guns at Gettysburg and BattleGroup PanzerGrenadier. I suspect he would be happy to have started this conversation but perhaps disappointed that some people's contribution would be limited to calling him names.

Personally I think the command and control challenge that needs to be represented on the table top is that troops either move or don't move – they don't suddenly move 3 times faster than they normally would for no reason.

I prefer some "chaos" in my C3 systems, and I appreciate the simple elegance of the Warmaster system, but I've always felt the swings between motion and stillness are too extreme in Warmasterform rules. I think there are much more engaging ways to represent asymmetrical battlefield maneuver rates than to have Mommy Luck do it me. She never listens to me, even if I through a tantrum…

Interesting side note: the Warmaster system has always seemed like a really cool idea for the operational level, moving around divisions and corps. I have also thought it would probably be fine on a Medieval battlefield, where C3 was pretty much "line up here and charge when I give the – hey come back!". For horse & musket tactical units and "civilized" armies of the ancient era, the Warmaster system poisons my suspension of disbelief.

Personally I think the command and control challenge that needs to be represented on the table top is that troops either move or don't move

I disagree about this too. I think units should only be completely stopped without player options in certain extreme circumstances (e.g. gone to ground under a hail of fire, or the command staff was cut down in the middle of a maneuver, or a complete morale failure is well under way, etc.). These days I prefer C3 that influences but does not determine movement rates (e.g., move half, move full, move with bonus). I also dislike units getting "stuck" in unbelievable positions because the dice continually say they can't move, as if they had waded into setting concrete.

I am pretty agnostic about specific mechanics, as long as the rules provide a rich decision cycle, themed appropriately for the military situation being simulated, with a lot of player engagement.

- Ix

Replicate? Is it possible to make an exact copy of warfare on the tabletop?

Mr Bown's comment are 100% correct, other than the relevance of Wellington to Warmaster.

Within Warmaster, units can move, move again and then move again, as long as they pass their command roles.

True. I assume he meant rolls.

This seems to conflict with history;

True. For example, historical commanders did not use dice to pass a command roll.

after all, Wellington could pretty well determine the speed of advance for battlefield formations, both friend and enemy.

Unproven. Irrelevant. No evidence supplied. Welly might have used a telescope. Using such a statement with the previous ones is a Fallacy (which means a formal error in logical reasoning).

So in summary, Mr Brown's comments are innocuous.

It was The Editor who proposed that the rules are flawed, not Mr Brown.

All Mr Brown said was that the rules conflict with history. They do.

Getting back to The Editor's proposition, is movement flawed? From a game design perspective, abstraction and approximation are valid techniques. My own view is that intermixing command rolls with movement is an error, but not a big one. Many games use an "activations" technique to sequence and implement random variance in movement. The old Milgamex rules kept command and variable movement separate. Was Milgamex a better game? I can't remember.

Where Warmaster does well is keeping the player involved in the action, albeit by using an activations mechanism.

Is historical accuracy necessary for wargames? I don't think so. Could the Warmaster movement mechanism be improved? I think yes, but then it wouldn't be Warmaster.

Is there any point in trying to improve it, given the low resolution of the game? I don't think so.

Investigations into accuracy of wargames is a useful activity only for games that set out implement real-world processes.

Investigations into accuracy of wargames is a useful activity only for games that set out implement real-world processes.

According to Priestly, he did:

Indeed, as in real wars, we must assume that our warriors spend a great deal of time awaiting orders and relatively little time actually moving or fighting. This idea underpins the whole Warmaster game.

I guess whether you like the warmaster-style rules comes down to whether you view war as a deterministic exercise or an example of chaos theory in action. I tend to take the letter view, but YMMV.

-Will

According to Priestly, he did:

I don't think he did.

"Our game is inspired and informed of what we know of historical armies and ancient warfare. It is not, and does not pretend to be, a simulation – putting aside for the moment the impossibility of analysing an ancient battle at first hand. Ultimately, the game is an entertainment that aims to capture some of the qualities of ancient warfare whether perceived or real."

I think this is the gist of things:
"Here are our fantasy rules rehashed and repackaged as ancient warfare rules. They are good fun."

Regarding the earlier quote in the post above, how does this one sound?

As in nature, we must assume that our model ducks spend a lot of time quacking and relatively little time flying. This idea underpins the whole Duckworld game.

I wouldn't conclude that the author attempted to produce a game based on real duck behaviour from that – probably the opposite.

As in nature, we must assume that our model ducks spend a lot of time quacking and relatively little time flying. This idea underpins the whole Duckworld game.

I wouldn't conclude that the author attempted to produce a game based on real duck behaviour from that – probably the opposite.

thehawk:

"As in nature" means the attempt isn't based on real duck behavior, but probably the opposite.

Really?

The designer writes:

"Our game is inspired and informed of what we know of historical armies and ancient warfare. It is not, and does not pretend to be, a simulation.

???The game is built around what we know of historical armies and ancient warfare, but it isn't modeling that [probably the opposite???].

Really?

So what is the designer doing?

"Ultimately, the game is an entertainment that aims to capture some of the qualities of ancient warfare whether perceived or real."

Of course, it is ultimately entertainment. DUH. However, if the game is designed to 'capture some of the qualities of ancient warfare', then he had to bend over backwards quite a ways not to create a simulation of those qualities.

But he wouldn't be the first designer to work hard to say his design captures history, but isn't history, isn't a simulation. [just the opposite?] It makes a hash of any discussion of game design and any attempt [or claim] to 'capture' history.

For instance:
'Perceived or real' is a meaningless qualification in this case…unless the designer purposely chose to include qualities he knew were only perceived and not real history. Did he? If so why? If not, why make that qualification?

It's an empty qualification. He says that the game was "inspired and informed of what we know of historical armies and ancient warfare." Is that perceived or real?

It is all intellectual and wargame design mush. But hey, it's ultimately entertainment, so it doesn't have to make sense, perceived or real.

I guess whether you like the warmaster-style rules comes down to whether you view war as a deterministic exercise or an example of chaos theory in action. I tend to take the letter view, but YMMV.

War isn't isn't an either/or proposition. I don't think any games are… even Yatzee. War isn't deterministic, though men work very hard to make things happen the way they want them to. It isn't chaos theory in action either, not unless you believe that everything on the battlefield happens by chance and Napoleon was just lucky for twenty years. War obviously isn't just chaos theory in action.

War, like life is a combination of both. That is what I find interesting and entertaining. If wargames were only one or the other, any games would be pretty boring.

There needs to be unknowns on our little battlefields. If every unit arrives exactly on time and does exactly what we want at the very moment we want it, this doesn't sound like any battle report or first-hand account I've ever read for any era.
While it is certainly not a simulation, I prefer some random movement (or non-movement) to cover situations that I, as C-in-C, am not aware: terrain that proves more difficult than usual to navigate, overly cautious battalion commanders, confusion of orders, reluctant troops who pause before finally being encouraged to move forward again, losing sight of the flanking battalion etc.
In Warmaster, I think this works fine. It may not be right for every system, and some players hate anything that's random, but it's one way to give the feel of not being in complete and total control of all of your troops at once.

I am surprised that more people haven't challenged Brown's supporting proposition that "Wellington, after all, could pretty well determine the speed of advance for battlefield formations, both friend and enemy."

This statement is patently false and belies that real challenges that commanders having in exerting their control over lower formations. One has only to read Keegan's discussion of Waterloo in Face of Battle to realize just how chaotic battlefield circumstances were/are.

Variable movement bounds allows fluid battles like Salamanca to occur on the tabletop. Marmont took a calculated risk by stringing out his army as he did and Wellington pounced on him by making a rapid advance that caught the French piecemeal. I think it is easy to forget the risk that Wellington took in advancing his army as he did and the consequences that might have ensued had the British failed to advance as quickly as they did. This was calculated, bold leadership by Wellington, not inevitable calculations of movement speeds.

Most gaming systems do not allow this kind of fluid dynamic to take place (ie troops move forward in small, predictable steps that telescope to the enemy one's intentions.) Personally I find systems like Warmaster far more satisfying because of the variable movement of units without imposing a complex ordering or command and control system on the game.

This statement is patently false and belies that real challenges that commanders having in exerting their control over lower formations. One has only to read Keegan's discussion of Waterloo in Face of Battle to realize just how chaotic battlefield circumstances were/are.

Marcus Brutus:
Keegan was looking at the common soldier's experience of battle, not the commander's.

Dundas and Torrens in the British regulations provide the expected movement of a line of battalions across open terrain under enemy artillery. Their estimates are 1000-1200 paces in 12-15 minutes. There is your variability, but also what they see as the norm.

At Austerlitz, Napoleon asks Soult how long it will take him to reach the Pratzen Heights about 1400-1600 yards away. He says '20 minutes'. Both he and Napoleon were experienced officers. If Soult couldn't realistically make that call, Napoleon wouldn't have asked and certainly Soult wouldn't have committed to that number. As it is, that is a pretty common rate of movement for the period.

So,
1. It isn't patently false, especially battles like Salamanca. Marmont didn't take a calculated risk. Both armies had been 'strung out' pacing each other for two weeks. His lead division moved too far ahead. It was an error Marmont was rushing to correct when he was hit by cannon fire. Wellington jumped on that mistake because he knew how long it would take for Pakenham to move to attack compared to the French moving up to their lead division. All calculations.

2. Marmont's problem and wounding above is also a good example of friction, chaos and chance.

This was calculated, bold leadership by Wellington, not inevitable calculations of movement speeds.

It was very much a calculation of movement speeds…what else? There is no 'pouncing' without a reasonable estimation of time and distance.

I calculate how long it takes for me to drive to work each day. There are any number of things that can and do slow me down and stop me. Even so, I do reach my destination within a few minutes of my estimation most every day. With experience of the route and general travel, I have gotten even better.

Military men do this kind of calculation all the time, now and back then. They tend to be even more precise than I am going to work.

So what is a realistic balance between that kind of calculation and chance in battle, the real world? That is the question.

That is one question that neither Brown nor Priestly have given any indication of answering from what I can tell.

Keegan was looking at the common soldier's experience of battle, not the commander's.

I think Marcus Brutus meant Keegan's The Mask of Command, not The Face of Battle. Easy mistake to make.

Actually I meant both EvilBen. One of Keegan's stated goals in writing Face of Battle was to counter the prevailing military narrative that had battles reduced to rational events with tidy maps. Battle is messy from top to bottom.

My question for McLaddie is how he imagines a Pratzen Heights occurring on the table top with most sets of rules? With small, incremental movement like we find in most sets I have never seen it happen. Oddly enough, I think one set that could make it work would use a movement mechanism like Warmaster. I also think that this mechanism would also allow Wellington to make his assault at Salamanca possible. Of course, there can be no guarantee since there are many examples of missed timing in battle, even by great commanders.

If you want to see grand, sweeping advances try Blucher: for reserve units up to three feet in one move!

My question for McLaddie is how he imagines a Pratzen Heights occurring on the table top with most sets of rules? With small, incremental movement like we find in most sets I have never seen it happen.

MB:
I agree. I think you are asking a question that wasn't asked by the designers of those rules sets. However, the movement wasn't all that sweeping. Marching 4/5 of a mile in 20 minutes isn't that fast. However, it is 20 inches at a scale of 75 yards per inch, 14+ inches with 100 yards to the inch. It does take some rethinking of movement on the table. I'm working on the issue. I know others are and have.

Henry M:
Are you talking about the 'magic move' in Blucher, where one time and one time only, hidden units can move 12BW? Whatever that represents, it wasn't what Soult or Pakenham did…certainly not in relative speed and distance.

Soult was hidden, but that was because of the fog and the fact the Allies had abandoned the area in front of him, not because he was too far away or could move really fast. Pakenham wasn't hidden and moving no faster. Both armies at Salamanca were visible to each other. They had been marching with each other in view for two weeks.

McLaddie, multiple moves aren't really above the relative speed of table top movement versus real life but rather, a mechanism to reflect command and control limitations and the timing of command choices. It isn't that Napoleon and Soult knew how long to took to march 4/5 of a mile to the Pratzen Heights but rather when to launch the attack in the first place. Napoleon and Soult got the timing right at Pratzen Heights but the reason it so noteworthy is how difficult and rare it is to actually accomplish in battle. So in Warmaster terms the French made several command rolls and advanced much faster in game terms than the Allied commanders could anticipate. Had they failed a command roll along the way it would mean that they didn't get the timing of the advance quite right.

McLaddie, multiple moves aren't really above the relative speed of table top movement versus real life but rather, a mechanism to reflect command and control limitations and the timing of command choices. It isn't that Napoleon and Soult knew how long to took to march 4/5 of a mile to the Pratzen Heights but rather when to launch the attack in the first place. Napoleon and Soult got the timing right at Pratzen Heights but the reason it so noteworthy is how difficult and rare it is to actually accomplish in battle.

MB:
I didn't say anything about multiple moves. I have no problem with that. However, what Napoleon and Soult did wasn't all that rare, other than they did it better than most. From what I understand Napoleon and Soult's exchange was recorded because it was the French first move of the battle. It was well-timed, but timing was everything in every battle for every general. It is something generals worked on quite abit[wrote about too] from a variety of angles organizationally because, believe it or not, they were aware of all the things that might go wrong.

So in Warmaster terms the French made several command rolls and advanced much faster in game terms than the Allied commanders could anticipate. Had they failed a command roll along the way it would mean that they didn't get the timing of the advance quite right.

In other words, Napoleon's calculations and Soult's estimate were simply rolls of the dice… and they just got lucky? If the dice had gone against them, that meant they screwed up the timing? Who are the players? The dice gods?

So, Napoleon's plan, which he worked on for days, his calculations down to telling Soult to wait fifteen minutes before starting out was simply a lucky succession of die rolls? Where in the *#$* is the generalship and timing in that mechanism? Isn't the timing of the advance something that commanders made happen rather than simply winning the lottery? [or not]

That is not how Napoleonic command worked or where the chance events effected their calculations, orders and efforts.

However, what Napoleon and Soult did wasn't all that rare, other than they did it better than most.

Really? The Wikepedia entry for Austerlitz begins with "Widely regarded as the greatest victory achieved by Napoleon." Not a run of the mill battle result even for Napoleon. The signature event of Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz was the French occupation of the Pratzen Heights at precisely the moment it could cause the Allies most damage. Brilliant but hardly common, even among great commanders.

In other words, Napoleon's calculations and Soult's estimate were simply rolls of the dice… and they just got lucky? If the dice had gone against them, that meant they screwed up the timing? Who are the players? The dice gods?

I think this is an odd point McLaddie. What we are talking about here is game mechanics that allow for the replaying of historical moments with toy soldiers. Unless you're committed to simply reenacting historical battles any mechanism is going to introduce some element of chance into it. Napoleon and Soult might have got the timing wrong at Austerlitz. Napoleon certainly got the timing wrong for Augereau's advance at Eylau. Lee and Longstreet got it right at 2nd Manassas but wrong at Gettysburg. Any mechanism has to account for a variety of outcomes.

MB:
Austerlitz was Napoleon's greatest victory. That doesn't mean that his and Soult's act of gauging movement and timing was rare… or by chance. Soult didn't say, "Gosh, I don't know how long it will take. We'll just have to see."

Of course we are talking about game mechanics. And no, there is no reason for them to simply be replays. Boring and not a game. So we want to have the possibility of other outcomes.

The point is whether the game mechanics follow the same dynamics experienced by Napoleon and contemporaries, variety and range of chance occurrances included. We have to be clear about what we are discussing.

Napoleon didn't get the 'timing' of Augereau's advance at Elyau wrong. The problem was the snow storm: Augereau couldn't SEE the Russian guns [nor they the French] until very close. It wasn't a 'timing' issue. You can't time the contact with the enemy if you can't see them. According to Priestly, the command system wasn't designed to include Line-Of-Sight issues too.

This is true of Lee at 2nd Manassas and Gettysburg. It wasn't a 'timing' thing that Lee got 'right or wrong', but rather a a host of other issues not part of the command system per se. I could make an argument that Longstreet got the 'timing' wrong at 2nd Manassas. He was late to arrive.

Getting the timing 'wrong' is a matter of miscalculation on the part of the commander… not a constantly repeated chance event. There certainly are things that can screw up an advance ONCE the timing/movement has begun, but that may or may not be something unforeseen or something created by the enemy [like Augereau's experience.] So, part of the question is how much 'variability' is reasonable in recreating the Napoleonic command process--and what creates it?

Leaving it all up to chance does too things:

1. Creates a Yatzee kind of system: Wonder what I'm going to get this time?--before any decisions are made.

2. Leads players to not calculate timing, but act opportunistically with what they rolled 'this time.'

Bottom line. A player in Warmaster can't and wouldn't do what Napoleon did: Create a plan that required Soult marching at a particular time and distance or ask a supordinate player commanding Soult's corps "How long will it take you to get to X?" Why? Because both players know it all depends on the roll of the die, not a calculation they can plan around.

And yes, having played Warmaster more than once, I am aware that you can 'depend' on a minimum movement ability because of the die rolls…most of the time. The question is how Napoleonic commanders or ACW or Ancient commanders viewed the process and made decisions. They certainly didn't do it 'minimalistically.'

As Priestly states what the command system is supposed to represent, I simply don't think it succeeds, though I will admit, I have no idea what he based his conclusions on.

Each turn of the game reflects the time taken to consider, formulate, communicate and enact decision made by the general rather than the literal time it might take for a man to walk or run a certain distance or shoot an arrow. Indeed, as in real wars, we must assume that our warriors spend a great deal of time awaiting orders and relatively little time actually moving or fighting. This idea underpins the whole Warmaster game.

Lots of assumptions about the 'time' it required and how variable it was. Assuming that warriors spent a lot of time awaiting orders is also suspect. It doesn't mean that waiting wasn't planned rather than a chance event because commanders were formulating their orders or screwing up their 'timing.'

I like chance in games and think that 'friction' was a major issue in battle, so I'm all for game mechanics that represent it. Battle is always a struggle between chaos and order. Getting those two in the places and balance as reflected by reality is the trick.

It is the difference between gaming accidents on the Freeway by simply rolling a die for how many occcur each turn and where and simulating a stretch of Freeway by establishing the real-life numbers, times and where most of them occurred--and why… Then creating a system that models that. It could still be a single die roll, but representing something of the chances in reality rather than just raw chance based on nothing particular.

I enjoy playing Warmaster and even games like Piquet and Command & Colors. That doesn't mean I think they have model much of the command processes, abilities and friction experienced by actual commanders… the very things they have been designed to mimic.

If we go back in time -- would there be ANY chance that Soult didn't reach the heights in time despite his 20-minute estimate? If you answer no, then avoid any sort of variable movement system as the mechanic does not suit your version of how a battle should be played.
I think there was some chance he didn't make it, so I accept variable movement AND I think there is still generalship involved. Before I make any sort of attack, I need to get my troops in positions that give them the best probability of success, which would NOT be three moves away (sticking to the Warmaster example). I need to maneuver them into position first, then the odds are in my favor of the attack going off in a coordinated manner.
Soult didn't roll dice, but he certainly calculated odds, which is what we are doing on in our games, and variable movement adds a chance of failure before contact is made.

Soult didn't roll dice, but he certainly calculated odds, which is what we are doing on in our games, and variable movement adds a chance of failure before contact is made.

Tshryock:

Absolutely. So, to capture that ability to calculate, we would have to have the variability, the 'odds' as close to real life as possible.

Or to put it another way: What could happen to screw up that march? What things could go wrong where and why?

Soult knew the ground. Napoleon had command of the battlefield for more than a week…on purpose.

The enemy had left, so that wasn't an issue. The troops were in formation, ready to step off.

So, what kinds of things could go wrong in this instance to produce that variability?

Obviously, not knowing the ground and where the enemy is could create that variability, but those issues don't require a command system based on a die roll… because such a system ignores those issues and the ability of the commander to 'caculate' regarding them.

I remember McLaddie your debate years ago with Sam Mustafa over wargaming as simulation versus game. This conversation is drifting in that direction. I am definitely in the Mustafa camp. When we play on the table top we are definitely not impersonating Napoleon, Soult or Kutuzov either. There are many reasons for this but the simplest is that we have metaview that no real life commander ever has. Again, I think you misunderstand what a mechanic like multiple movement is meant to represent. It has little to do with actual movement speed but rather the ability to organize and muster the move in the right time. It also reflects the unknown in battle that no commander can fully anticipate.

Napoleon didn't get the 'timing' of Augereau's advance at Elyau wrong. The problem was the snow storm: Augereau couldn't SEE the Russian guns [nor they the French] until very close. It wasn't a 'timing' issue. You can't time the contact with the enemy if you can't see them. According to Priestly, the command system wasn't designed to include Line-Of-Sight issues too.

I guess it depends on what one means by "timing." The beauty of a system like Warmaster's is that it doesn't have to explain exactly what it was interrupted the timely move of units. It could be anything from weather, to unobserved terrain to mislaying of orders, to a horse being shot out from under a commander. It just occurs. At Eylau Napoleon's timing was off because of the unforeseen intrusion of weather.

1. Creates a Yatzee kind of system: Wonder what I'm going to get this time?--before any decisions are made.

2. Leads players to not calculate timing, but act opportunistically with what they rolled 'this time.'

There is a real, practical reason why both Caesar and Napoleon said that it is better to be a lucky commander than a skillful one. Timing in warfare is skill, art and luck. Why? Because no commander has all the information he needs to make a fully informed decision. I am certain that there are other command and control systems that can get us to the same place as a Warmaster like system. I prefer multiple moves with command rolls because it gets the job done in an simple and efficient manner.