"Napoleon's failures as military commander" Topic

The recent thread about Napoleon as military dictator got me thinking. Most posters, even those who feel strongly disgusted by Napoleon, agree that he was a brilliant military commander. I speculated that while he was at the top of his powers -physical and mental- that affirmation is difficult to deny; but that after Tilsit he wasn't as brilliant as he used to be.

Kevin, who nobody would confuse with someone anti-Napoleonic, did a good summary of the Emperor's most significative strategic failures:

As I've said before, the three greatest mistakes Napoleon made were Spain, Russia, and the Continental System.

I can't but agree with his assessment. Perhaps, I would add to the list his treatment of his allies as vassals rather than partners, particularly from 1809 onwards. His vision of a Continental block, a short of United States of Europe, that could compete with Britain was anchored in France as dominant power, being the rest just tools to be used as the Emperor thought best.

While those are mistakes pertaining to the realm of strategy, I suspect that after Jena-Auerstadt Campaign, the ability of Napoleon as military commander, i.e. at the operational and tactical level, was on the decline. Eylau wasn't his finest moment, and Aspern-Essling can be considered a tactical defeat or, at best, a hard-won draw. Smolensk and Borodino weren't model battles either; while Leipzig can be argued to be one of the worst moments of Napoleon as military commander (to accept battle with the back to a river, spanned by a single bridge to be used in case of a retreat becomes necessary, is one of the most egregious mistakes than any military commander worth his salt can make).

In my opinion, from 1807 onwards Napoleon faced three problems that impaired his ability as military commander:

1) Declining health,
2) Mental exhaustion, and
3) Bigger armies and operational areas that couldn't be expected to be managed effectively even by a commander as brilliant as Napoleon was, even if he would have been at the top of his game.

What do you think?

Nice topic, although I think this also belongs with the "Dictator" topic.

The problem with being so aggresive is that sooner or later, everyone is against you. Hence, the number of Alliences against him. Napoleon was also succesfull because other countries didnt wanted a war (again).

About your opionion, his health is never really proven. The so called experts are not sure if at Waterloo he started the battle so late baecause he was not feeling well. Same for his mental exhaustion.

I am not saying that these issues were not a real problem or not. Personally I think he only had one big problem: Himself!

Napoleon was a really arrogant man. At Waterloo he said to one of his Generals: You think Wellington is a great General, but he is not. You only say he is great because you lost a battle against him. Wellington is nothing but a average General.

the books to read on this subject and which in my opinion are the state of the art – by far outclassing Chandler and any other English or German publication are

Béraud, Stéphan : La révolution militaire napoléonienne

so far two volumes published and I am eagerly waiting for the other planned two schedules.

Though Béraud is very positive about the ability of Napoléon as military commander he is not closing his eyes of his failings as well.

He faced in my opinion several problems.

His art of war relied on living from the country and he failed completly to sort out and to understand logistics.

This shows already in the Syrian campaign where his whole campaign collapsed due to very poor logistics in a hostile and poor environment.

In case he encountered that challenge he had big problems to sort out supplying his army.

In his latter years he seemingly was immune to any advise and sage advise was usually ignored, as prime example the Russian campaign of 1812.

Already in the 1809 campaign, some authors -like Buat – see a decline even in the strategical operational art of war, when not persuing Archduke Charles and instead heading for Vienna.

Napoléon was just still at the top of the game – as long as he was the cic and controlling his corps, when he needed to control armies his operational art of war reached its limits, for that the massive defeats of 1812 and 1813 (twice ruining his army), 1814 and finally 1815.

That is he very badly lost 4 military campaigns in succession and failed to sort out the miliatry situation in Spain as well.

Also his enemies learned a lot form his art of war but developped it to a higher level, that is more than one army commanded by army commanders who owned a staff as well, under the overall control of a strategic commander like Schwarzenberg in 1813.

Chosing the wrong men for the wrong tasks, Jerome and Junot in 1812

Trying to defend everything in 1813 even when the strategical situation changed when Austria entered the war after the armistic, failing to concentrate his armies.

While no enemy till 1812 understood how to really fight Napoléon he did not understand the same situation from 1812 onwards.

So yes he revolutionized warfare and dominated it but then he got stuck and did not develop any further while his enemies did.

As you also point out there must have been severe wear and tear of fighting continual wars – and running a country.

I forgot where Napoleon himself stated that all commanders – especially those waging offensive wars – had a limitied good time – and he gave himself a time till about around 1808.

I didn't know about Béraud's books. Thanks for mention them!

But overall, did he not have fewer failures than any other military leader of his age?

OK, once they were actually on a battlefield, The Duke could have beaten him, as I suspect could Sir John Moore or Kutusov, as much because of the quality of their soldiers, as leadership skills. But think of the scale of Napoleon's forces, his political role and his skill as a strategist……..

Many a mistake, but best of his era by far?

what is best of his area?

Surley not after 1812 any longer, one disaster after the other, at one point he overreached himself and while in the years before he dictated successfully the pace how a campaign was waged, he failed to do it from 1812 onwards.

Fewer failures in what?

Destroying completly his own army of 1812 – such a crushing defeat?

In my view he would win against Wellington, as well as Moore and whomever up to 1809, but then he had a rupture in his carreer from which he never recovered.

It is interesting to see that a lot is written about how he achieved his successes, but few analyse his complete failures (amongst else the Egyptian campaign)

How come that a general who dominated warfare ended in such a deep fall?

I think still actually even surviving after the 1812 disaster is a testament to some insane genius, let alone the fact that he continued after it.

No doubt, Napoleon was a military genius and especially took advantage of his enemies during the early wars. But, I suspect that the enemies started learning and getting better themselves, thus the less dramatic impact in the later wars.

Suspect it was the failing of all the "Indispensable Men" of history.

Either he could not, or would not, train others to his level. Therefore when the armies get too large, or the front becomes to large, he cannot be everyplace at once.

The same applies to governance albeit more abstractly. Such men rarely leave a sustainable government in their wake.

Genius of that stripe is both a blessing and a curse to the Man and mostly a curse to those who survive him,…if they do.

Bob

Either he could not, or would not, train others to his level. Therefore when the armies get too large, or the front becomes to large, he cannot be everyplace at once.

That's my suspicion too. Actually, I believe that's one of the reasons why we can appreciate hints of his former brilliancy in the management of the operations in 1814 in France (smaller armies and smaller operational area), particularly when compared with his campaigns in 1812 and 1813, and even in 1809.

All very good points, but those who would downgrade Boney have still not risen to my challenge.

Give me a name, von W.

Someone from the "Napoleonic Era" who was consistently a better military commander. OK, I accept the obvious answer, but we are talking about a vast difference in scale.

and I hasten to add that I still regard Gen Buonaparte as a thoroughly unpleasant piece of work. "Oh, he is no gentleman, but his hat is worth etc………." I do not have to like him, but I do respect him and think he defined his time.

Someone from the "Napoleonic Era" who was consistently a better military commander.

I don't think there was one. Probably, only Wellington was almost as good tactician as Napoleon; he also had a better comprehension than Napoleon to the needs of fighting as part of an alliance. And yet that's not relevant to the topic, as we are not debating the relative merits of different commanders but only speculating about the shortcomings of one of them: Napoleon.

I believe that only by understanding Napoleon at his failures we can understand his successes. The goal is not downgrade Napoleon's abilities but explore his limitations as military commander. How much were those limitations due to cultural factors? How much to the increase of the operational stress caused by the formation of bigger armies operating on bigger regions? How much was a fault of the French military system itself? How much was due to Napoleon' supposed declining health? How much it was a consequence of Napoleon duplicating as commander in chief and head of the State at the same time? Or were those failures caused -as mentioned by Bob- by his inability or desinterest in training his subordinates as theater commanders able to operate efficiently without supervision from the Emperor himself? Besides Soult and Davout -may be also Suchet- none of his other Marshals were up to the task.

Best

Once the size of his armies had got down to a scale manageable by himself alone, in 1814, he was able to completely out think and out march the allies once again.

From this I conclude his problems 1809-1813, and again in 1815, was purely the inability or unwillingness to entrust subordinates with effective 'wing' command.

Nothing to do with a bad case of piles or man-flu…

after Tilsit he wasn't as brilliant as he used to be.

Robert Epstein, in Napoleon's Last Victory, argues that it was more a matter of his opponents getting better than Napoleon declining. He also knocks the idea that Napoleon did not teach his subordinates his methods firmly on the head, with numerous examples to the contrary.

@Von W. Thanks for the reference books by Béraud.

My feeling is that Napoleon was first and foremost an opportunist who took advantage of slower thinking and action taking people than himself. His personal bravery in the beginning, shows by his willingness to lead in battle.
He had an ability to see the larger picture and be very detailed as well. Wellington was the same. Gneisenau had the same ability but was weak when he was left in command by himself.

As mentioned earlier by Von W. one of Napoleon's major failures was to not supply his army, but let them live off the land.
I'm not at home and don't have access to my library but I read a book a couple of years ago about a German soldier who was in the 1812 campaign. He said there was no real supply of food after they left Poland. They had to scavenge the whole way to Moscow and back.

The same problem is described by Petrie in the 1806-1807 campaign. It seemed better in the 1809 campaign.

Another problem was he tended to promote men who were brave but not necessarily good generals. Those he sent to Spain were consistently beaten by Wellington. Some he promoted were very good but were killed leading in battle, such as Lannes.
Others, such as Davout he tried to keep from overshadowing his own victories and successes. To me this shows his ego was in great need of being top dog. An egoic man will need his ego fed regularly and having anyone seen as better than him brings out the fight.

Being a detailed orientated person he also wanted to control all the small minutiae of running the army, far too much for one man. As Von W. mentions he struggled with larger armies but seemed to manage well with smaller ones.

He also should have either trusted Tallyrand and listened to his counsel more often or gotten rid of him, as he was eventually a problem on the home front.

Again as Von W. says choosing the wrong general for the task.

"Give me a name, von W."

In his good days Napoléon or Bonaparte did not to fear anybody but in 1812

Barclay de Tolly outwitted him and not playing into his hand

1813

Schwarzenberg and the dynamic duo Gneisenau / Blücher as well as Bernadotte Nothern Army

1814

All of them, the odds were too much

1814

Wellington and Gneisenau / Blücher again

It was a dual way – decline of Napoéon and improvement by the Allies.

Napoléon lost the strategic grip, which he once so masterly used from 1812 onwards – 1812 – he had no concept of the campaign other that one good battle would slove all problems, what a contrast to his earlier campaigns, where he beat the opponenet already in the operational art of war from start one of a campaign

His inability to delegate and to trust his subordinates to any degree invalidated his brilliance over time.

More on Stéphane Béraud

link

also he wrote a nicely illustrated work

Bonaparte en Italie – Naissance d'un Stratègie 1796 – 1797

the only complaint, it takes a long wait for the volumes to be published

While those are mistakes pertaining to the realm of strategy, I suspect that after Jena-Auerstadt Campaign, the ability of Napoleon as military commander, i.e. at the operational and tactical level, was on the decline. Eylau wasn't his finest moment, and Aspern-Essling can be considered a tactical defeat or, at best, a hard-won draw. Smolensk and Borodino weren't model battles either; while Leipzig can be argued to be one of the worst moments of Napoleon as military commander (to accept battle with the back to a river, spanned by a single bridge to be used in case of a retreat becomes necessary, is one of the most egregious mistakes than any military commander worth his salt can make).

Just a few comments…

Eylau was a tactical draw with the result being heavy casualties on both sides. Nothing was decided by the action.

Friedland the following June was another spectacular victory and it ended the war. Thanks to Lannes excellent delaying action, Napoleon found the Russian army in a trap of its own making. They were lucky to get anyone out at all.

The campaign of 1809 is very interesting and the first half of the campaign, where the Austrian offensive into Bavaria was completely defeated by an improvised army is one which Napoleon declared he was most proud.

Essling is one of the most interesting fights of the period being a hasty river crossing that almost succeeded and finding the French fighting greatly outnumbered and the Austrians, despite their numerical superiority unable to decisively defeat the French. The detailed planning and execution of the next French crossing of the Danube in July is noteworthy, and again the Austrians were defeated at Wagram, which brought an end to the war.

I don't see in the above two campaigns any loss of either tactical or operational skill on Napoleon's part.

Leipzig was not fought with the French having a river at their back. The French were oriented north-south in the main sector of the battlefield and their main line of communication was to the north based on the fortification complex of Torgau/Magdeburg. Lindenau and the Elster were on the French right flank. That route was the secondary line of communication and there was neither time nor materials for a major engineering project to construct other usable bridges over the Elster. The land was largely marshes/swamps which is why there was a mile and a half causeway from Leipzig to Lindenau.

I know this won't go down well with everyone but he needed to be more ruthless & shoot a few of subordinates. Marmont & probably Bernadotte.

Mightn't have helped but it couldn't have hurt.

It certainly wouldn't have hurt.

1) Declining health,
2) Mental exhaustion, and
3) Bigger armies and operational areas that couldn't be expected to be managed effectively even by a commander as brilliant as Napoleon was, even if he would have been at the top of his game.

I really don't see the problems of 1 and 2 above. I think the idea of declining health is overblown. And mental exhaustion cannot be actually determined. It certainly isn't indicated by his tone in the Correspondence. And his activity in getting ready for the campaign in Belgium in 1815 is noteworthy.

However, in 1805 Napoleon made the comment that everyone has his day in war as in anything else. He figured he had six good years left and that would make it 1811. He invaded Russia the next year. Perhaps he should have taken his own advice.

Frederick once stated that 'offensive generals' are rare in any age, and by that he meant those capable of commanding independently and performing competently.

After having to leave too many of his 'fighting commanders' in Spain in 1808-1809 his choices for senior commanders not only got a little thin, but his choices for them in 1813 are puzzling. Neither Ney nor Oudinot were capable of commanding more than one corps and leaving Davout in Hamburg was a grave mistake. Further, staff losses in Russia had been very heavy which hurt operational control.

deadhead

You said, 'the Duke could have beaten him', I'm not so sure. We will never know, of course, because other than Waterloo, it did not happen and in that action Wellington had to be saved by the arrival of the Prussians. LOL

Also, according to the historian Glover, Wellington said of the Peninsular Battle of Fuentes de Onoro 1811, 'If Boney had been there, we should have been beaten' And he should know better than all of us.

As much as I enjoy reading and researching Napoleonic defeats (by all sides) as well as the victories, I find the theory of defining Napoleon's failures as a means of defining his military abilities, as more of an excuse just to talk about his failures by those who don't want to talk about his far more numerous victories.

In football terms, it is a bit like looking at the defeats of the team that won the league to see how good they were. It won't work. In my opinion, it is just another feeble excuse by some to knock Napoleon.

also his creation of marshals created problems, in the glorius past of the one and only Republic you had an général en chef and he was responsible for the army, in Napoléon's days you had Marshals who felt superior in rank to generals, and when two or three should act together there was no clear cut military hierarchy and more often then not they saw each others as rivals – or when a general and a marshal – St- Cyr versus Oudinot at Polotsk, only when Oudinot was wounded the better general took over.

I think the idea of declining health is overblown.

However, witnesses wrote about Napoleon uncharacteristic inactivity at battles like Borodino or Waterloo. Although, I have not a definite opinion on this matter. It's perfectly possible that you are right and that the idea has been overblown.

And mental exhaustion cannot be actually determined. It certainly isn't indicated by his tone in the Correspondence.

Fair point. Perhaps, more than mental exhaustion what afflicted Napoleon in later years was that he was like a juggler trying to control a ball too many. No matter how good he was, it was too much even for him.

leaving Davout in Hamburg was a grave mistake

Agreed. At the time it made sense, though. Hamburg was fundamental, in Napoleon's mind, to enforce the Continental Blockade in Northern Europe. I don't think he had relented to enforce that strategic goal even after the disaster in Russia. It stands as logical that he assigned the post to his ablest commander; possibly the only one that could have been successful with the relatively speaking scarce resources he had at his disposal. With hindsight, we know that Davout could have been more efficiently used as wing commander in Saxony, but on balance, and with the intel Napoleon had at the time, it wasn't actually a mistake.

when two or three should act together there was no clear cut military hierarchy and more often then not they saw each others as rivals

Good point, VW.

Correlli Barnett's view is that Napoleon the statesman set problems that Napoleon the general could not solve. Thus the manner in which he pursued the war with Britain after his fleet was defeated was to impose a reverse blockade. This necessitated the conquest or control of the entire continental coastline, which was beyond the capabilities of his armies and has never been accomplished by anyone before or since. Spain and Russia were military disasters brought about by his own diplomatic strategy.

I don't really buy the idea that he was any less than head and shoulders above every other commander of his day. The guy was a giant. Wellington was a superb battle captain but he had no idea how to use heavy cavalry or artillery properly and at Waterloo the vaunted rifles and light infantry spent most of the day fighting as close order infantry. Blucher masters the art of rrtreating and rallying but he and all the others needed massive numerical advantage to beat Napoleon – and even then it wasn't a foregone conclusion.

Corelli Barnett's book Bonaparte is horrible with too many inaccuracies and comparisons to both Nazis and Communists.

This 'biography' and Schom's are the two worst that I have seen.

of course one can determine mental exhaustion, in case one is – one committs more mistakes when not exhausted, sleep deprivation alone will cause this very quickly and along with mental exhaustion physcial exhaustion will follow.

In contrast to many other rulers Napoleon lived a hard life, often in the field, exposing himself to danger, and running a country as well, this will cause mental exhaustion as well as declining health – he was a human and not a superman who could shrug this off.

Davout in Hamburg makes perfect sense, on one hand get rid of a rival and or hold an important position of the Elbe defense line.

One of his problems was that he either wouldn't delegate or couldn't (due to the lack of talented people around him, which is very unlikley)or in case he did he chose the wrong persons.

Declining health is certainly not overblown, make sound decsisions with a head ache or without, he had quite a few which affeted him at some battles – as said Borodino for example.

Only von W has attempted to meet my challenge….and he has just given us a few names, who, on an odd occasion, in a given year did well against Napoleon.

As for DoW, I would only suggest he might still have beaten Boney on any field, because of the quality of his infantry…and provided the forces were reasonably equal of course. That would never have happened. Boney's genius was as a strategist and in handling forces any Allied commander could only dream of.

I am no fan of Gen Napoleone Buonaparte. I think he was a thorough cad. I think he was not very tall and he had no idea how to use a bricole! He was a military dictator or any term of abuse you wish to apply to him

But he was the best of his age, unless you can name me one other………..

Wellington was a superb battle captain but he had no idea how to use heavy cavalry or artillery properly and at Waterloo the vaunted rifles and light infantry spent most of the day fighting as close order infantry.

In the context of Waterloo the problem is that Wellington knew exactly how heavy cavalry and artillery should be used!

The heavy cavalry was concentrated to disrupt the French main effort once this had been identified. Which it did – two cavalry brigades breaking up an entire infantry corps that was poised to breakthrough! Text book use of heavy cavalry in the defence! (The very minor detail that they then got out of hand and suffered heavy casualties, strategically, is of no consequence, they were a one shot strike used exactly at the right time and place!)

If you want to find an example of how not use heavy cavalry, look no further, ahem, to the other side of the valley!

And in an inexperienced army, his veteran light Regiments were deployed exactly to best advantage – with no need to counteract any French use of heavy skirmish screens, they were ideally used to defend key strongpoints or in the line to bolster the strength of his line.

Similarly, his artillery was dispersed to strengthen the resolve of the line, biased towards the West to cover the approaches most favourable to the attacker. Concentrating artillery into grand batteries, which to those with a little knowledge is the acme of artillery tactics, only applies on the offensive or if the ground permits rapid redeployment if the enemy's main effort proves to be elsewhere! Once again text book use of artillery in defence!

he needed to be more ruthless & shoot a few of subordinates.

Yes, purging generals worked so well for the Republic.

Yes, purging generals worked so well for the Republic.

Mightn't have helped but it didn't hurt.

Yes, purging generals worked so well for the Republic.

Punishing senior officers is not a 'purge.' Bernadotte, at the very least, was guilty of dereliction of duty in 1806. Marmont was guilty of treason in 1814.

Dupont was punished for abandoning his troops to the Spanish as prisoners of war, of which only about ten percent survived terrible treatment by the Spaniards in prison hulks or on Cabrera Island in the Balearics.

Fournier was cashiered for insubordination in 1813. Bernadotte was finally sacked after Wagram.

deadhead

Really, no matter what your viewpoint of a historical character is, and we all have our own, one should not condone people to use a term of abuse to anyone during the Napoleonic period. Unless, of course you agree that is it acceptable to call the British Prince Regent a fat and useless blob and Blucher elephant man?

@deadhead

but why did he fail so badly from 1812 onwards, ignoring his first failure in Syria?

What made the God of War to a Mortal of War – suffering incredible losses – ruining himself, his country and some of his allies??

I am always surpised that those lost campaigns are ignored, tell me another Napoleonic general who lost out so badly in 4 consecutive campaigns???

I hold with von Moltke the Elder who said "Strategy is a system of expedients" and "No plan last longer than 15 minutes past contact with the main body of the enemy." I am also an unrepentant Clauswitzian, believing that the dominant determinant in war is mere chance.

As to Napoleon he was a master of flexibility and "expedients" and was able to take advantage of the opportunities that suddenly presented themselves to him. Thus he was able to grab "the lucky break" and capitalize on this. This is possible, as others have said, only when he was at the moment and place of decision, and that the subsidiary operations of others were not going to counteract or vitiate his success. This was rarely the case in latter campaigns. He also had an instrument in his Marshalls, Generals, and Army who were finely attuned to his will and knew what he wanted when he said it. I think that was the reason for his military success, but when he did not get the breaks, when he was forced to depend on others, and especially far-flung operations, he did not prosper. All of the Napoleonic triumphs we know of took place "under the masters eye." All the lesser so triumphs, and the failures happened elsewhere until he was just overwhelmed.

In a further point, I don't think Napoleon could EVER have trained his marshals to be like him or gain his touch simply because that would have required that they be given the freedom and ability to exercise their own "masters touch." This was never going to flower, not because they weren't competent, but the presence of Napoleon "anywhere" was going to suck all the oxygen out of the room and they were always going to be looking over their shoulders to consider what he would think and what they might get blamed for.

Thus it's not really fair to blame them.

War had become too big even for Napoleon, and once he could not keep everything "under his eye" it began to go bad.

Otto

The best summary of the marshals' abilities that I have found is given by Col Elting in Swords Around A Throne, page 155:

'Massena, Davout, and Suchet were the masters, capable of independent missions. So, to a lesser degree were St Cyr, Soult, and-for a while-Macdonald. Lannes, had he lived, might have ranked with their best. The rest were human projectiles who required their Emperor's aim and impulse. Their service was hard. Their names are remembered.'

All in all, they were, arguably, the best collection of military talent (along with other French general officers, such as Eugene, Grenier, and Desaix) to ever serve one commander.

You could hardly argue that Napoleon didn't possess the service of a number of exemplary subordinates but on many levels he was let down by generals of lesser ability. The retreat from Moscow was made infinitely worse by logistics foul-ups etc by various generals.

Compare this to Frederick the Great whose often sub-par performance is saved by the likes of Seydlitz & others.

Someone, above, argued wars had become too large: I'd agree & add you were only as good as your command roster in many ways.

Along the lines of ego, Napoleon benefitted from the defeat of the French royalty, but could not help being sucked into it's appeal of "absolute rule."

Case in point – The Continental System. This was his response to England's continued meddling in Continental affairs by paying Napoleon's enemies to start wars against France. A better response than a trade war might have been to completely emasculate his enemies. Had he completely disbanded the Austro-Hungarian Empire after Austerlitz, and completely disbanded Prussia after 1806, nobody would have messed with him again.

But rather than destroy these dynasties and their "Ancient Regime" kingdoms, Napoleon came to want to be one of them. Therefore he could not bring himself to do what really needed doing.

L'empereur quittant ses troupes le 5 décembre 1812, après avoir confié le commandement à Murat, a la certitude de les avoir sauvées du piège adverse. Il résume d'ailleurs ainsi la situation dans une lettre du 29 novembre 1 : « L'armée est nombreuse, mais débandée d'une manière affreuse. Il faut quinze jours afin de la remettre au drapeau. » Le 4 décembre , il estime que « dix jours de repos et de vivres en abondance remettront la subordination ».

One would think N lost his touch with reality in the retreat to come to such conclusions.

A point that has not been mentioned is that Napoleon generally kept the best troops for himself. The old, middle and young guard (often 4,4,7 regiments apiece) were an elite that he kept under his control as an extra reserve. This did weaken the quality available to the other generals and established an additional aspect of battle management for his opponents to think about and force mistakes…. Sort of like a German WWII general keeping 5 regiments of Tiger tanks as his personal reserve.