"Leggiere's 1813 work - a gap in the secondary sources?" Topic

I find it interesting that Michael V Leggiere's recently published Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany; the Franco Prussian War of 1813 Vol 1 makes no reference in the otherwise comprehensive bibliography to General J.P. Riley's similar work, Napoleon and the World War of 1813, Lessons in Coalition Warfighting, published in the United States in 2000.

Leggiere's work purports to be the first comprehensive history of the 1813 campaign, according to the blurb on the dust jacket. More accurately perhaps, in the preface Leggiere states his book has the aim of exploring the campaign within the context of coalition diplomacy and in particular the Prussian relationship with their Russian allies, but of course this is also the exact grist of Riley's mill.

An oversight in the bibliographic compilation, or a judgement on the good General's work ?

"Warfighting"
Is there any other kind?

Mike Leggierre's emphasis is on Prussia, as you noted from the preface, and the 1813 campaign in Europe. Riley's book is not that focused at all. Take a look at the table of contents: Riley goes all over the place, including North America and points in between. In other words, Riley's work is general, while Mike's work is more specific. And if Riley used mainly secondary sources rather than all those lovely archival sources, then there's no real reason to include Riley's book in the bibliography.

If it really matters to you, I'll be happy to ask Mike why he omitted Riley.

Thanks Maggie – yes I would be keen to know. I do now appreciate there are differences in scope, but still a considerable overlap in the challenges of maintaining coalition unity I would have thought…

But a far more urgent question if you have the author's ear is what's happening to the second volume of the 1814 saga!

I have both of Riley's books on 1813 and, sad to say, I was not impressed. There were too many errors in fact in the book(s) which hurt the books immensely.

Brechtel198,

Would you recommend an alternate source on 1813?

I have the set on order (Amazon said June 30th, now August 31st?) and look forward to reading them.

Thanks,

Bill.

But a far more urgent question if you have the author's ear is what's happening to the second volume of the 1814 saga!

Seconded! :-)

Bill,

I have the first Leggiere volume on 1813 and am awaiting the second. I highly recommend his work and I've heard him deliver papers on the subject of 1814.

B

Brechtel198,

I misread your initial post and mentally substituted Leggiere for Riley. The dangers of too little coffee. I have the Leggiere volumes on order.

Where's my coffee cup!

Bill.

I have his 1814 book and his "Napoleon and Berlin". His style is a little bit dry, but his scholarship is outstanding. Next month I will order his 1813 book. Together with Lieven's "Russia against Napoleon" I hope to have covered the German campaigns. It's a pity that nobody has made the same treatment for the Austrians! (Yes, Mr John Gill, I am looking at you!)

Hi Kevin,

I have both of Riley's books on 1813 and, sad to say, I was not impressed. There were too many errors in fact in the book(s) which hurt the books immensely.

Please share a few of these errors from the first book?

(The second was a rehash of the first in a more popular 'Coffee table' format, as General Riley freely admitted in the preface)

Here are some of the errors that I found in Napoleon as a General which I reviewed some time ago. I hope this helps.

This volume was something of a disappointment. While there are interesting points made in the text, and more points that are at the very least arguable, there are too many errors of fact in the text which don't add to the overall impact of what could have been an excellent volume on Napoleon's generalship and his contributions to the art of war.

The following are some of the errors in the text, each error followed by the page number of the quotation and a correction from various reliable primary and secondary source material:

-`First, perhaps, according to those principles of war that have not changed-even though Napoleon himself would have disputed that such enduring principles exist.'4

Napoleon was a master of what is now recognized as the Principles of War and there is no evidence that he himself `would have disputed' their existence, especially as Lloyd had already put into print the precursor of the recognized principles.

-`For a commander like Napoleon who, as will be seen, rarely consulted allies or clients, and who surrounded himself with mediocrities who stood in no danger of becoming rivals…'10

The generals who served Napoleon were arguable the greatest collection of military talent to ever serve one man. I doubt that a case can be made, for example, to demonstrate that Davout, Soult, Lannes, Berthier, and many other French general officers of the period were `mediocrities.'

-`When he did succeed, he did so at the cost of a great deal of blood and treasure.'14

This somewhat sweeping statement is inaccurate. At the very least up to 1809, French losses in Napoleon's campaigns were much less than his opponents. As late as 1813, at the Battle of Dresden and in 1815 at the Battle of Ligny, Napoleon still inflicted losses on his enemies at a three-to-one ratio.

-`Treaties of alliance produced subjects, like the Confederation of the Rhine…'23

The main members of the Confederation of the Rhine were sovereign states, such as Wurttembert, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Bavaria, who were allies of France and not `subject' states. Napoleon left their internal administration alone and treated their soldiers as equals to his French troops.

-`Building on previous experimental organizations…the French army had instituted an all-arms divisional structure in 1796, and in 1804, his armies swollen by conscription, Napoleon created corps, each of up to five divisions. At that time there were ten of these corps, including the Guard, the reserve, and the cavalry.'24

The `all arms' division was in existence in 1792 when the Wars of the French Revolution began. The French began to experiment with a divisional organization at the end of the Seven Years' War from 1760-1763. Napoleon began using a corps structure in 1800 during the Marengo campaign in northern Italy, and General Moreau in Germany was directed to do the same. In 1805 when Napoleon was forced to move east from the Channel to confront an Austrian invasion of Bavaria (his ally) the Grande Armee was organized into seven corps d'armee, a cavalry reserve, and the Imperial Guard, which was not a corps in the sense of a corps d'armee.

-`…the staff had no devolved responsibility, since everything was decided by Napoleon. He failed to develop his staff officers, just as he failed to develop his subordinate commanders…'26 and 71

Staffs don't decide anything; they recommend and do the necessary leg work for the commander. They are designed to relieve the commander of detailed minutiae, allowing him to command. Berthier's general staff indeed had great responsibility, and without it Napoleon's sweeping campaigns would not have been possible. The detailed planning, for example, of moving the Grande Armee from the English Channel into Germany in 1805, moving the Army of the Reserve across the Alps and into northern Italy in 1800, and for the unprecedented concentration before the invasion of Russia in 1812 was done by the French general staff directed by its chief, Marshal Berthier.

As for the oft-used statement that Napoleon `failed to develop his subordinate commanders' one of the allied observers at Imperial headquarters, the Saxon liaison officer, Ferdinand von Funck, remarked that `Napoleon had the gift of improvising rough droves of conscripts…into soldiers on the enthusiasm of the moment, and of training commanders.'

Napoleon certainly carefully trained Eugene as an army commander in 1809 and trained his imperial aides-de-camps, general officers themselves, in his methods of warfare.

-`…the confederation was partly a new security zone on the Rhine frontier, and partly a source of manpower-it made the Befreiungskrieg of 1813 as much a German civil war as a war of liberation.'48

As the German states of the Confederation of the Rhine were independent states and there was no one unified nation of Germany, the idea that the War of Liberation of 1813 was a German civil war. A case can be made, however, that it was a war of liberation by Prussia for as much German territory as it could take and keep in order to bring as much of Germany under Prussian control, whether the `liberated' Germans wanted to be or not.

-`The Imperial Guard completed the army. Originally no more than a reinforced regiment, in 1805 this corps numbered only 5,000 grenadiers, 2,000 cavalry and 24 guns.'75

The approximate strength of the Imperial Guard in 1805 was 12,200 and consisted of one regiment of grenadiers a pied, one regiment of chasseurs a pied, one battalion of sailors, a regiment of elite gendarmes (mixed horse and foot), a regiment of chasseurs a cheval and a regiment of grenadiers a cheval. A squadron of Mamelukes was attached to the chasseurs a cheval. There were also two companies of horse artillery and two artillery train companies as well as a company of veterans. No single officer was ever in command of the Imperial Guard. Marshal Lefebvre was frequently employed as the commander of the Guard infantry, and Marshal Bessieres of the Guard cavalry.

-sailors as `marines'75,95

The French armed forces during the period had no marines as such. Many times infantry regiments from the army supplied `garrisons' of troops to serve on French warships in that capacity. The Guard unit referred to here were in actuality sailors: the French term `marine' means the navy, and `marin' means sailor.

-`In 1806 the Middle Guard was established.'76

The Middle Guard was not formally `organized' until 1812. Two infantry regiments that eventually became Middle Guard units, the fusiliers-grenadiers and the fusiliers-chasseurs, were formed in 1806 from the remainder of the velites with a cadre from the senior infantry regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs. The majority of the rank and file were taken from the line and the Legions Departementales. They were not designated Middle Guard, though, until 1812.

-`His subordinates never succeeded in maintaining the initiative in Spain for long…'79

In eastern Spain Suchet kept the strategic initiative at least through 1812.

-Davout in 1806 `receiving from Napoleon cruel jibes about his eyesight.'80

Napoleon's comment to Col Bourke, Davout's senior ADC at Auerstadt was that `your marshal sees double' because he reported his victory over 62,000 Prussians, which at first Napoleon did not believe. It wasn't a negative comment or a jibe.

The following all on page 83:

-`From 1806 onwards these guns were increasingly used in massed batteries designed to smash a hole in the enemy's line…'

Actually, it was at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807 where General Senarmont, Victor's chief of artillery in the I Corps, used the corps artillery as an offensive weapon.

-`The heavy cavalry-cuirassiers, lancers, dragoons…'

Lancers are not heavy cavalry, but light cavalry, and `officially' in the French army dragoons were listed or classified as light cavalry. However, dragoons were used as heavy cavalry in the field.

-`The carabineers and horse grenadiers also acted as mounted infantry'

This is incorrect-both are heavy cavalry and were employed as such. They were definitely not mounted infantry.

-Naming light dragoons as French cavalry.

The French fielded no `light dragoons.' This is a British army classification, not a French one.

-`A cavalry brigade formed of all disciplines usually formed part of each corps.'

Cavalry brigades and divisions in the Grande Armee were homogenous in that they were formed of the same type of cavalry (light or heavy).

-`By 1809 the infantry was formed into battalions of nine companies…'

In 1808 the French infantry battalions, both line and light, were reorganized from nine companies to six.

-`…the ninth company was a light company known as voltigeurs. At divisional level there was an additional battalion of light infantry known as tirailleurs.'84

There were no separate infantry battalions at the division level in the French army known as `tirailleurs.' When formed, the voltigeur companies were the 3d company in every infantry battalion.

`The confusion was exploited by the French artillery, and especially by the guns of Victor's corps, 36 12-pounders, which were brought into an enfilade position overlooking the Russian position.'93

The entire passage on the battle of Friedland is incorrect. Victor's I Corps did have 36 field pieces, but there were only six 12-pounders in the corps artillery. The remainder were either howitzers, 4- or 6-pounders. The six 12-pounders were not employed by Senarmont in the attack and were held in reserve. This is in the 1st Corps after action report of the action.

The main attack at Friedland was assigned to Ney's VI Corps. His first assault was routed, with the exception of three regiments, and Victor's artillery commander, saw this and attacked the Russian center with 30 field pieces organized into two large batteries. After rallying his corps, Ney attacked again and helped Senarmont destroy Bagration's command in the Russian center and left.

-On page 94 describes the battle of Aspern-Essling as a `carefully-laid ambush.'

There was no Austrian ambush at Aspern-Essling. Napoleon initially crossed the Danube unopposed and occupied the villages of Aspern and Essling. The Archduke Charles attacked in the afternoon and could not dislodge the greatly outnumbered French from the two villages.

-`One should never forget that Napoleon and his system were themselves the product of a successful insurgency which had become a revolution.'103.

This is a somewhat confusing statement, as the French Revolution against the monarchy was not an insurgency. Further, most of the reforms of the French army had already taken place by 1789.

While this volume is indeed interesting and can be a thoughtful read, there are too many errors in the text for it to be useful as a reference work. So, while it should be read by students of the period for some interesting opinions and insight, it is not a reliable reference.

-`When he did succeed, he did so at the cost of a great deal of blood and treasure.'14

This somewhat sweeping statement is inaccurate. At the very least up to 1809, French losses in Napoleon's campaigns were much less than his opponents. As late as 1813, at the Battle of Dresden and in 1815 at the Battle of Ligny, Napoleon still inflicted losses on his enemies at a three-to-one ratio.

That statement is not that far-fetched as you imply. Although in particular battles Napoleon inflicted more casualties than he suffered, from 1807 onwards the costs of war in men, materiel and money were staggering. French treasury was in the brink of collapse more than once. It was only by employing ruthless measures of explotation on France allies that Napoleon managed to keep fed his war-machine.

-`…the staff had no devolved responsibility, since everything was decided by Napoleon. He failed to develop his staff officers, just as he failed to develop his subordinate commanders…'26 and 71

Staffs don't decide anything; they recommend and do the necessary leg work for the commander. They are designed to relieve the commander of detailed minutiae, allowing him to command. Berthier's general staff indeed had great responsibility, and without it Napoleon's sweeping campaigns would not have been possible. The detailed planning, for example, of moving the Grande Armee from the English Channel into Germany in 1805, moving the Army of the Reserve across the Alps and into northern Italy in 1800, and for the unprecedented concentration before the invasion of Russia in 1812 was done by the French general staff directed by its chief, Marshal Berthier.

As for the oft-used statement that Napoleon `failed to develop his subordinate commanders' one of the allied observers at Imperial headquarters, the Saxon liaison officer, Ferdinand von Funck, remarked that `Napoleon had the gift of improvising rough droves of conscripts…into soldiers on the enthusiasm of the moment, and of training commanders.'

Napoleon certainly carefully trained Eugene as an army commander in 1809 and trained his imperial aides-de-camps, general officers themselves, in his methods of warfare.

What Riley meant, and you miss, is that Napoleon never developed a true General Staff, which could have helped him to carry a successful war over the enormous operational area that was common at least from 1809 onwards. Napoleon thought that he, and he alone, could understand the operational tempo adequately. While Berthier was brilliant at translating Napoleon's ideas into workable plans, he was just one man. Once Napoleon grew older and lost his touch, the lack of a professional General Staff was felt in French operations. ADCs were not real Staff officers, but glorified messengers.

-`Treaties of alliance produced subjects, like the Confederation of the Rhine…'23

The main members of the Confederation of the Rhine were sovereign states, such as Wurttembert, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Bavaria, who were allies of France and not `subject' states. Napoleon left their internal administration alone and treated their soldiers as equals to his French troops.

I can only guess that this statement comes from naivete. The kingdoms and states of the Confederation of the Rhine depended on Napoleon's goodwill to implement any policy that remotely affected military planning, from conscription to taxes. They couldn't implement an independent foreign policy. The only thing that they were not was French departments, but they weren't independent states either.

What Riley meant, and you miss, is that Napoleon never developed a true General Staff, which could have helped him to carry a successful war over the enormous operational area that was common at least from 1809 onwards. Napoleon thought that he, and he alone, could understand the operational tempo adequately. While Berthier was brilliant at translating Napoleon's ideas into workable plans, he was just one man. Once Napoleon grew older and lost his touch, the lack of a professional General Staff was felt in French operations. ADCs were not real Staff officers, but glorified messengers.

And your interpretation, as well as Riley's is wrong. What you have put forth here is the common misconception of the Imperial General Staff and one that keeps being repeated without researching the subject.

If you read Thiebault's two staff manuals, as well as other material on the Imperial general staff, you'll find that the staff planning that occurred was one of the main reasons that the Grande Armee performed consistently well. The problems that occurred in 1813 were in part the result of heavy losses in 1812.

Other references that are helpful to understand the Imperial General Staff are Odeleben's and Funck's memoirs. The French general staff was the most advanced of the period and not merely 'messengers' or 'clerks.' That point of view clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding of that staff and staff operations and functions in general.

I can only guess that this statement comes from naivete. The kingdoms and states of the Confederation of the Rhine depended on Napoleon's goodwill to implement any policy that remotely affected military planning, from conscription to taxes. They couldn't implement an independent foreign policy. The only thing that they were not was French departments, but they weren't independent states either.

You are incorrect.

The major states of the Confederation of the Rhine were independent states and they chose France because they were afraid of being ingested by either Austria or Prussia. They were treated as allies by Napoleon and not as part of France or as subject nations. Generally speaking, Napoleon left their internal affairs alone and it is interesting to note that the allies in 1813-1814 required more of them in men and supplies than Napoleon ever did.

The western German states did not want to become part of either Prussia or Austria, which was certainly the intent of those two latter nations. France under Napoleon gave them a chance to maintain their independence by becoming part of the Confederation of the Rhine as well as French allies.

The major states of the Confederation of the Rhine were independent states and they chose France because they were afraid of being ingested by either Austria or Prussia. They were treated as allies by Napoleon and not as part of France or as subject nations. Generally speaking, Napoleon left their internal affairs alone and it is interesting to note that the allies in 1813-1814 required more of them in men and supplies than Napoleon ever did.

The western German states did not want to become part of either Prussia or Austria, which was certainly the intent of those two latter nations. France under Napoleon gave them a chance to maintain their independence by becoming part of the Confederation of the Rhine as well as French allies.

And yet that doesn't change the fact that they were not truly independent states. Their foreign affairs were managed by France and were bound to her interests. Their military fought under the command of French generals, appointed by Napoleon, and in order to further French strategic goals as understood by the Emperor. Their recruiting quotas were set from Paris. Even their taxes were collected according to French needs.

Those are not the tenets of an independent state. They were not more independent than California or Texas are independent from the USA, today.

And your interpretation, as well as Riley's is wrong. What you have put forth here is the common misconception of the Imperial General Staff and one that keeps being repeated without researching the subject.

If you read Thiebault's two staff manuals, as well as other material on the Imperial general staff, you'll find that the staff planning that occurred was one of the main reasons that the Grande Armee performed consistently well. The problems that occurred in 1813 were in part the result of heavy losses in 1812.

Other references that are helpful to understand the Imperial General Staff are Odeleben's and Funck's memoirs. The French general staff was the most advanced of the period and not merely 'messengers' or 'clerks.' That point of view clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding of that staff and staff operations and functions in general.

I must to disagree. Napoleon was a one-man-show. He was aware, and more importantly, he believed to be, head and shoulders, intellectually speaking, above everybody else. He was his own General Staff. Berthier, talented as he was, never acted like a true Chief of Staff. He was the most able individual in Napoleon's entourage at translating his orders into clear operational plans. However, he didn't intervene in the planning; he didn't give his insights nor discussed them with the Emperor. Even the most cursory look to Napoleon's correspondence makes clear the extent of the Emperor intervention in every aspect of military -and political- planning.

True General Staffs are more than mere mouths for the Kings, Emperors or Presidents. They do not -should not- decide policy, but they present plans and discuss them, and once approved by the political authority put them into motion. That wasn't how the French Staff worked. They served as lines of communication from the Emperor to his Marshals and Generals, but never ever participated in planification.

As long as Napoleon was at the top of his powers, both physical and intellectual, he was able to make the system work smoothly. It started to break apart when the Emperor grow older, became exhausted and his armies grew so big that even an individual of his talent couldn't hope to manage properly. It is not by chance that his campaign in France in 1814 reminds us to his earlier campaigns: his armies were smaller, fought in a smaller area of operations and therefore were well within his ability to manage the operations.

Had he well trained staffers? Yes, of course he did. Did they work as a General Staff? No, they didn't.

Hi Kevin,

Thanks for your response. But you claimed to have found errors in Napoleon and the World War of 1813, Lessons in Coalition Warfighting did you not? This is his volume I have read and believe to cover much of the same ground as the Leggiere book that is the subject of this thread. Have you found any errors, as opposed to differences in interpretation, in this volume?

Thanks Kevin

"I must to disagree. Napoleon was a one-man-show. He was aware, and more importantly, he believed to be, head and shoulders, intellectually speaking, above everybody else. He was his own General Staff. "

Absolutly all experts agree on that – amongst else Stephan Béraud

I wonder what the ratio inflicted in 1812 was, so 3 to one to the grande armée – 1,000,000 dead Russians ???

Navy,

Sorry I took so long to respond, but it has been a little busy here and I had to dig out the two other Riley books to look them over again.

I don't use them and, sorry to say, I wouldn't use them as a reference myself.

The following are some of the errors that I have found in the two books:

From 1813 Empire at Bay:

-‘Now he was on the defensive…'-page 2.

In 1813 Napoleon seized the initiative against the allies and moved eastward into Saxony, where he joined Eugene's Army of the Elbe and continued eastward. Napoleon did not stand on the defensive in 1813.

-'12,000 more sailors were formed into artillery batteries.'-page 4.

While some of the naval artillerymen were used to rebuild the French artillery arm, it wasn't anywhere near 12,000 men so employed.

-‘Marie-Louises''-page 4.

The term ‘Marie-Louise' was used to describe the young conscripts of 1814, not 1813.

-‘Napoleon's wars began in order to guarantee the frontiers which the Revolution had won…'-page 5.

Napoleon's wars began with the breaking of the Treaty of Amiens by the British and, in 1805, to counter the Austrian invasion of Bavaria.

-naming the Westphalian contingent ‘probably the most effective' contingent.-page 5.

The best troops in the Confederation of the Rhine were undoubtedly the Wurttembergers, Saxon cavalry, along with the contingents from Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. The Westphalians were not the best troops from the Confederation.

-‘…16,000 Swiss soldiers recruited directly into the French army.'-page 6.

The four Swiss regiments that served France were raised by treaty by the Swiss themselves. They were part of the French army, but they retained their own identity and traditions. They were issued eagles.

-the numbers of the foreign contingents from the Confederation of the Rhine are incorrect.-page 6.

The assigned numbers of troops for the Confederation of the Rhine contingents was:

Bavaria: 30,000.
Wurttemberg: 12,000.
Grand Duchy of Frankfurt: 2,800.
Baden: 8,000.
Berg: 5,000
Hesse-Darmstadt: 4,000.
Saxony: 20,000.
Nassau: 4,000.
Westphalia: 25,000.
Anhalt and Lippe: 1,450.
Schwarzenberg, Waldeck, Reuss: 1,500.
Mecklemburg-Strelitz, Mecklemberg-Schwerin: 2,300.

-‘Napoleon himself had no interest in people's opinions or feelings: he was merely concerned to see that the system worked smoothly.'-page 7.

This is a misread of Napoleon's character as both a head of state and a commander.

-‘…around 2 million men passed through the ranks of the army.'-page 7.

The total that were conscripted into the Grande Armee for active duty was 1,350,000 from 1800-1815. The levied total was 2,646,957. Those that were not called to active duty were either not needed or were on ‘reserve' status.

-‘From its [conscription's] inception as an annual process in 1799 until April 1815.'-page 7.

There was no conscription in 1815 as the Bourbons had abolished it in 1814. That was their one act that was universally popular.

-‘…the French army had instituted an all-arms divisional organization in 1797, and in 1804, with his armies swollen by conscription, Napoleon created seven army corps each of up to five divisions.'-page 8.

The French began operating with a division structure in 1760. During the French reform period from 1763-1789 the all-arms division was developed and was employed until abolished by Napoleon who preferred homogenous divisions of infantry and cavalry. Napoleon began using the corps system in 1800 during the Marengo campaign. None of the corps in the Grande Armee of 1805 had five divisions. While the corps headquarters could control from two to five infantry divisions plus the corps cavalry brigade or division and the corps troops, the ‘typical' corps of 1805-1807 had three divisions, not five. The larger corps would come later. Davout's corps at the beginning of the 1809 campaign, for example, was almost 70,000 men, but this changed during the course of the campaign.

-‘The size of the corps could vary enormously, sometimes amounting to between one third and one half of the army.'-page 8.

The strength of the individual corps of the Grande Armee varied from corps to corps based on two things-the capabilities of the corps commander and for the purpose of confusing enemy intelligence. Further, units could be transferred between corps or to make new corps available for operations. At the beginning of the 1809 campaign Davout's III Corps did have over one-third of the army assigned to it, but again, that changed during the course of the campaign. For 1812, there were eleven numbered corps in the field, along with four cavalry corps and the Guard. None were as large as either one third to one half of the army.

-‘The problem, of course, was that the staff had no devolved responsibility, since everything was decided by Napoleon. He failed to develop his staff officers, just as he failed to develop his subordinate commanders.'-page 9.

The Imperial staff had considerable responsibility for ancillary planning, such as moving the army from the Channel into Germany in 1805 and for the unprecedented concentration before the invasion of Russia. Napoleon did not do that, Berthier and the staff did. And the efficiency of the latter concentration can be seen in Heinrich von Brandt's memoirs. He was an officer in the Legion of the Vistula and was moved with his unit from Spain into eastern Europe for the invasion. It was done professionally, swiftly, and efficiently.

There is an excellent overview and summary of the Imperial Staff in Chapter V of Col Elting's Swords which I highly recommend.

-‘However, there was then no staff college, nor any system of supplying trained officers for the staff.'-page 10.

French staff officers rotated between the staff and the line, with the major exception of the senior staff officers, who were section heads under Berthier. There was a French staff corps, which was created by the Law of 29 October 1790 (see Thiebault's 1800 staff manual). The general idea that a staff college was needed is a modern requirement put on the Imperial staff to justify critiques such as this one. Junior staff officers were trained on the staff by the veterans.

The modern 'obsession' with having a staff college is incredible.

-‘Not that Napoleon intended delegating any responsibility to his marshals: he had never encouraged initiative, nor had he trained his senior commanders, just as he never instituted a staff college.'-page 11.

-‘The author refers to Napoleon as Frederick the Great's ‘greatest pupil.'-page 14.

Napoleon was not Frederick's ‘pupil.' Napoleon undoubtedly could have taught Frederick a thing or two. And it should be noted that Frederick won only about half of his battles and he was saved from disaster in the Seven Years' War by the death of the Russian Tsarina, Elizabeth.

-‘There Murat handed over his command to Prince Eugene…and returned to Naples.'-page 21.

Murat deserted, leaving no one in charge. Berthier convinced Eugene to take command and informed Napoleon of the de facto assumption of command and convinced him to confirm it.

-Mistakenly gives Davout command of the VII Corps.-page 22. Davout commanded the I Corps and later the XIII Corps when assigned to defend Hamburg.

-Mistakenly names St Cyr as the commander of the I Corps in March 1813.-page 23. St Cyr commanded the VI Corps in early 1813. He later commanded the XIV Corps.

-‘…Napoleon's famous disregard for blood…'-47.

This is nothing but a reliance on the old allied and English propaganda of the period. It is an incorrect assessment.

-‘Having milked Spain of its best troops in the spring he now faced the prospect of having the English at his back, a war on two fronts that he could ill afford.'-67.

The war in Spain caused Napoleon to have a war on two fronts in 1809 and from 1812 onwards. It didn't become one in 1813-it was already present.

From Napoleon and the World War of 1813:

-The idea that the allies were going to allow Napoleon to remain the head of state of France is incorrect, especially after Leipzig.-19.

-‘In 1806, when Napoleon had last conducted a campaign in Germany…'-45.

The campaign of 1809 was also fought in Germany (Bavaria) in the first phase of the campaign.

-The characterization of Ney's envelopment at Bautzen is incorrect. Ney had command of more than his own corps and Jomini certainly helped Ney botch the maneuver. The idea that ‘possibly Napoleon hoped that Jomini would keep things on the rails' is incorrect.-106. This is also in the other volume on page 53.

-‘What Madison overlooked was the nature of Bonaparte's government. It was no longer, and had probably never been, the sort of enlightened republicanism envisaged by the revolutionaries of 1789, but a despotism as absolute as anything seen before or since.'-371.

This is somewhat over the top and clearly demonstrates that an understanding of the Consular and Imperial governments is lacking.

-the author confuses the Saxon and Wurttemberger cavalry brigade under Normann at Leipzig. Normann's brigade refused to charge and the regiments were disbanded and Normann cashiered-186-188.

General Comments:

-You are correct in that the two books are similar in content and the mistakes are repeated.

-Using both Bourrienne and Jomini as sources hurts the volume as those two authors are considered by many to be unreliable.

-Drouot's artillery attack at Lutzen is played down which is unfortunate. Drouot blew out the allied center (Flahaut gives an excellent description of the carnage as he accompanied the Middle Guard into the assault). It was a decisive move and led to the end of the action.

-Metternich's duplicity in Dresden during the armistice is underplayed. Metternich was no ‘mediator' but he had already made up Austria's mind on what they would do and had already agreed to join the allies.

-And, finally, Eugene's campaign in northern Italy in 1813-1814 is completely overlooked. It is an interesting campaign as Eugene had to fight both the Austrians and Murat in 1814.

He was his own General Staff.

That is absolutely incorrect and displays a complete lack of knowledge of the Imperial Staff and what it accomplished as well as what a staff was for.

And everyone does not agree with that assessment.

And I have never encountered an 'expert' in military history nor do I expect to. There are excellent historians with differing opinions and there are some authors who are not historians at all. There is quite a difference.

You may wish to consult Thiebault on the French general staff.

Had he well trained staffers? Yes, of course he did. Did they work as a General Staff? No, they didn't.

You are incorrect.

The general staff that Berthier instituted and later worked with Napoleon to modify was the best general staff of the period.

Others, such as the Austrians and the Prussians, took it as a model, and the Prussian general staff was still in the embryonic stage in 1815.

So you say, but the available evidence says otherwise. It points to Napoleon making all the operational decisions, devising deployments and allocating resources, while Berthier acted like a military secretary for his boss. You tell me I should read Thiebault. I recomend you to read Napoleon's Correspondence. I must say that I have only worked through the years 1805-1811, but the picture is clear: that Napoleon was a workaholic of amazing abilities and that while he left to his subordinates the minutiae of day-to-day operations, he never left them intervene in the decission process. Berthier provided him with intelligence, maps and a cunning ability to process Napoleon's plans into clearly written operational orders. But as you probably know that is a minuscule part of the work of a real General Staff. Sorry, but I can't agree with you.

You, as others have too many times, either fallen into the anti-Berthier trap as promulgated by Jomini, or just don't understand how a staff works.

The staff is there to support the commander and to relieve him of all detailed work. And the chief of staff runs the staff and ensures that it is organized and runs properly.

The chief of staff is not a commander and works for his commander. Who do you think planned and executed the Grande Armee's marches? Napoleon undoubtedly told Berthier and his subordinates what he wanted, but the planning and work was done by Berthier and his staff.

It was Berthier who moved the Grande Armee from the Channel and into Germany in 1805; into Spain in 1808 and 1809, unscrewed the mess that Napoleon made in Germany in 1809 by attempting to command from Paris with both written orders and those by telegraph; and it was Berthier who planned and executed the immense concentration of the Grande Armee for the invasion of Russia.

Without Berthier and his staff none of that would have been possible. And it was probably staff failures in 1815 that contributed to the campaign in Belgium failing. Napoleon said it himself after Waterloo-that if Berthier had been present he would not have suffered that misfortune.

Again, in order to understand Napoleon's relationship with Berthier (which by the way was one of the most successful partnerships in military history) an understanding of what a staff does and how it functions is very helpful.

I would suggest that the summary given by Col Elting in Swords (who did understand how a staff is supposed to work as well as what a chief of staff also does and is responsible for) which is excellent and right on the money. And he studied the Grande Armee and Berthier far longer than either you or I have. He also had staff experience as well as teaching military history for eleven years at West Point.

Anyone who actually believes that Berthier was nothing more than a clerk and a conduit for Napoleon's orders is missing the point and underestimating both Berthier and the staff he designed and ran.

Hi Kevin,

Thanks for the response. Given the author's credentials as both a respected academic and a senior commander experienced at operating within a coalition, I think his unique insight into coalition operations outweigh these half a dozen mistakes that you list. However I do share your dislike of Jomini as a source!

Specifically:

From Napoleon and the World War of 1813:

1.-The idea that the allies were going to allow Napoleon to remain the head of state of France is incorrect, especially after Leipzig.-19.

2.-‘In 1806, when Napoleon had last conducted a campaign in Germany…'-45.

The campaign of 1809 was also fought in Germany (Bavaria) in the first phase of the campaign.

3.-The characterization of Ney's envelopment at Bautzen is incorrect. Ney had command of more than his own corps and Jomini certainly helped Ney botch the maneuver. The idea that ‘possibly Napoleon hoped that Jomini would keep things on the rails' is incorrect.-106. This is also in the other volume on page 53.

4.-‘What Madison overlooked was the nature of Bonaparte's government. It was no longer, and had probably never been, the sort of enlightened republicanism envisaged by the revolutionaries of 1789, but a despotism as absolute as anything seen before or since.'-371.

This is somewhat over the top and clearly demonstrates that an understanding of the Consular and Imperial governments is lacking.

5.-the author confuses the Saxon and Wurttemberger cavalry brigade under Normann at Leipzig. Normann's brigade refused to charge and the regiments were disbanded and Normann cashiered-186-188.

1. This gels with my understanding that right up until January 1814 the Austrians at least were prepared to see N keep his throne.

2. 'Germany' is a vague concept during this period. Perhaps he should have put 'North' Germany, but I think this is a very minor point.

3. No-one is in a position to know what was in Napoleon's mind at the time, but this seems a reasonable supposition at the time – Jomini was not 'found out' until later…

4. Seems a fair summary. General Riley's theme was not the nature of French government after all, and as a succinct summary, it works for me!

5. OK seems like an error, but a minor one that does not warrant casting any shadow over the overall thesis.

Thanks Kevin. It just seems to me that these errors are either minor or ones of interpretation, and that the General's unique position astride both academe and commanding coalition ops give him unique insight into the allied perspective of 1813 and I'm surprised that Leggiere has either overlooked, or dismissed, his opinions.

You're welcome.

I stopped after awhile in looking for errors because they were becoming too frequent. The author's knowledge of the Grande Armee is lacking and the books (why two on the same exact subject?) are not as in depth as Leggiere's and not as well done.

And, again, I don't believe those two books are good enough to be used as a reference.

So, we'll have to agree to disagree on them, which is fine also.

Sure! Although I think I did mention that the second book was simply a stripped down coffee table version of the first – probably a mistake….

J agree with basileus66 – the operatinal planning was the domain of N, as all sources proove this as well.

Berthier played an important part – no doubt, but he had no operational skills, also his advise was usually ignored and bad tempered N caused more than once tears in the eyes of Berthier.

for more just read the book of Coppens about the 1812 campaign.

Here an eye witness who sums it up nicely

Fezensac, aide de camp du maréchal Berthier :

Nous voyions peu le prince de Neuchâtel, n'étant chargés d'aucun travail auprès de lui; il passait presque toute la journée dans son cabinet à expédier des ordres, d'après les instructions de l'empereur. Jamais on ne vit une plus grande exactitude, une soumission plus entière, un dévouement plus absolu. C'était en écrivant la nuit qu'il se reposait des fatigues du jour; souvent au milieu de son sommeil il était appelé pour changer tout le travail de la veille, et quelquefois il ne recevait pour récompense que des réprimandes injustes, ou pour le moins bien sévères. Mais rien ne ralentissait son zèle; aucune fatigue de corps, aucun travail de cabinet n'était au-dessus de ses forces; aucune épreuve ne pouvait lasser sa patience. En un mot, si la situation du prince de Neuchâtel ne lui donna jamais l'occasion de développer, les talents nécessaires pour commander en chef de grandes armées, il est impossible au moins de réunir à un plus haut degré les qualités physiques et morales convenables à l'emploi qu'il remplissait auprès d'un homme tel que l'Empereur.

Both you and Basileus are incorrect.

If you actually believe your idea to be correct, then please explain:

-How Berthier organized the Army of the Reserve in 1800 and then moved it across the Alps and into northern Italy.

-Who did the planning for the move from the Channel to Germany in 1805?

-Who did the planning for the move to concentrate the Grande Armee for the invasion of Russia?

-Please explain Thiebault's comment on Berthier in 1796 regarding his suitability as the chief of staff.

-And 'all sources' do not agree with you.

Again Berthier was the first of the great chiefs of staff in military history. He was more competent and more qualified than either Scharnhorst or Gneisenau and the list of general officers who praised his abilities is significant.

Navy,

Yes, you did mention it and I kept that in mind when quickly going over the two books. I don't understand why a second one was needed…

The following is some material on Berthier from various officers who served with him as well as a little of his correspondence with Napoleon:

‘Quite apart from his specialist training as a topographical engineer, he had knowledge and experience of staff work and furthermore a remarkable grasp of everything to do with war. He had also, above all else, the gift of writing a complete order and transmitting it with the utmost speed and clarity…No one could have better suited General Bonaparte, who wanted a man capable of relieving him of all detailed work, to understand him instantly and to foresee what he would need.'-Thiebault, 1796.

‘All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport…were thrown on him…The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's] hands…He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to which Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to make sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.'-Ferdinand von Funck

Berthier had ‘incredible talent…hard and irascible…amendable to reasonable representations.'-Ferdinand von Funck

'If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune.'-Napoleon after Waterloo

‘I can speak of him with more knowledge than anyone else, for it was I who formed him in America…I know of no one who has more skill or a better eye for reconnoitering a locality, who accomplishes this more correctly, and to whom all details are more familiar. I shall perhaps find someone who can replace Berthier, but I have not yet discovered him…'-General Custine

[Berthier] ‘has all the necessary qualifications for making an excellent chief of staff.' –Duc de Lauzan

Napoleon, with whom Berthier served for 18 years through victory and defeat stated in 1796 that Berthier had ‘talents, activity, character…everything in his favor.' After the action at Lodi in 1796, Napoleon also stated that 'the intrepid Berthier, who was on that day a cannoneer, cavalier, and grenadier.'

'Berthier was also the most indefatigable person I knew, and when I one day congratulated Count Daru on his wonderful power of sustaining fatigue and doing without sleep, he said to me, 'The Prince of Neufchatel is even stronger than I am; I never spent more than nine days and nights without going to bed, but Berthier has been in the saddle for thirteen days and nights at a stretch…' –Baron Lejeune

'Berthier, the chief of staff, always spent the day around me in combat and the night at his desk; it is impossible to combine more activity, goodwill, courage, and knowledge. He was very active and followed his general on all reconnaissances without neglecting any of his work at the bureau. He had all the qualities of a good chief of staff. He knew topography well, understood reconnaissance detachments, amended personally to the expedition of orders, and was accustomed to briefing the most complicated movements of an army with simplicity.'-Napoleon

Scherer to the Directory, 6 January 1796:

‘General Berthier, now employed as Chief of Staff with the Army of the Alps, seems to me by his knowledge of the country and by his military qualifications very suitable to meet this requirement [army command]. I would make him commander of the reserve. He would be incomparably more useful to this army than to the Army of the Alps.'
‘Be so kind, citizen directors, as to accede to my request. It is entirely based on the benefits that will accrue to this army by transferring this general officer whose military talents I have come to know since the war.'

The following is the advice sent to Napoleon at the beginning of the campaign of 1809 in order to clear up the staff mess caused by Napoleon:

Berthier to Napoleon 11 April 1809:

‘Sire, I very much desire Your Majesty's arrival, to obviate the orders and counter-orders which circumstances, together with Your Majesty's commands, have made necessary.'

Berthier to Napoleon 14 April 1809:

‘I should have been relieved of considerable embarrassment, Sire, if your telegraphic dispatch of the 10th, which arrived at Strasbourg on the 13th and was sent on here on the 16th, had reached me earlier. I would have fulfilled your wishes. But, after carefully rereading your instruction, you seemed determined to hold on to Ratisbon: this is the position which we occupy. I would have preferred to have concentrated on the Lech.'

The following is Berthier urging Napoleon to confirm Eugene as the army commander following the desertion of Murat in January 1812 at the end of the retreat from Russia:

Berthier to Napoleon 16 January 1812:

Sire,
‘An aide-de-camp from the King [Murat] brought me at noon a letter from His Majesty, a copy of which is attached. I have urged the King to keep command of the army; but he has replied to me that his decision is irrevocable. I have told him that he could not leave until the Viceroy's [Eugene] arrival, since he was due here in the evening. In spite of the Viceroy's entreaties, His Majesty persisted in relinquishing command. The Viceroy did not wish to accept it; but finally, the King's carriages being ready to go, I persuaded him to take command provisionally. I observed to His Serene Highness that the army could not be without a commander-in-chief for ten days. I have assured him of my zealous support despite my poor state of health.'
‘Your Majesty will recognize how important it is for the Grande Armee to be organized and for your deputy to be nominated by decree. I do not allow myself to make any observation on the King's conduct; I place myself under the command of the viceroy.'

‘I offer Your Majesty my humble duty and my profound respect.-Alexandre'

The following secondary material on Berthier might also be helpful:

From By Command of the Emperor by SJ Watson:

‘…Frequently one hears that the successful commander is born and not made. Even more is this true of the ideal staff officer; for, to be content to work for another and to see fame and honor always falling to another, demands qualities of loyalty, self-effacement and strength of character which are very rare in human nature.' 8-9.

‘These are the very qualities that Berthier displayed throughout his long and adventurous career. Joining the army when he was scarcely twelve years old, he served in the infantry, in the cavalry, as a topographical engineer and a general staff officer. He fought on four continents. Yet his career was by no means an unbroken sequence of successes; for, during the French Revolution, he was in his fortieth year summarily demoted from general to private, and shortly afterwards dismissed from the army altogether. But within nine years of his reinstatement he became the first of Napoleon's marshals.'-9.

‘The Emperor employed Berthier not only as his trusted chief of staff, but also as a commander-in-chief, as minister of war, and as an ambassador extraordinary; and in every assignment he invariably demonstrated meticulous efficiency and prodigious capacity for work that made him indispensable and irreplaceable…Amid the sunlit vineyards of Italy, the burning sands of Egypt, the bleak plateaus of the Guadarrama and the icy wastes of Russia, he was always ready at any hour of the day or night to appear properly dressed in uniform to give advice to, or to take orders from, his master.'-9.

‘Transcending all his other qualities were Berthier's self-effacement and his loyalty. While in private he was Napoleon's confidant and often his outspoken advisor, he was always careful to appear as his deferential servant in public…So it is hardly surprising that Berthier has been eclipsed by the legend of Napoleon's infallibility; and in general military commentators have either scorned him as a pen-pushing nonentity, or have criticized him for not making decisions which in fact were the prerogative of his commander-in-chief, or have even reviled him for not countermanding, on one occasion in 1809, the explicit order of his Emperor.'-9

‘…if the study of Napoleon and Berthier does nothing else, it convincingly demonstrates theat the strength of a successful partnership between a commander and his chief of staff is ever greater than the sum of their strengths as individuals.'-11.

‘Throughout 14 January there was a fierce ‘dog fight' on the plateau of Rivoli, where Berthier once more played the part of an assistant commander as well as a staff officer. He first of all took over the 14th demi-brigade of Joubert's division with its supporting arms, and later directed a cavalry charge supported by artillery against an Austrian counterattack: as Bonaparte wrote to the Directory four days later, ‘he displayed on this occasion the bravery that he has so often shown in this campaign.'-59

‘In this campaign, too, Berthier proved that he was a great chief of staff as Bonaparte was a great commander. In particular, during the final advance into Austria he successfully performed the most difficult task of maintaining communication with the three widely separated columns, and so coordinating their movements that, unlike Alvintzi's forces the previous year, they could not be defeated in detail. As in normal military practice, Bonaparte made the commander's decision and decide the concept of his operations; while Berthier unfailingly provided the information on which the decisions were based, and he then compiled, transmitted, and supervised the execution of the detailed orders for their implementation.'-63

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, 128-130

‘…Napoleon took Berthier as his chief of staff only after his first choice…refused the assignment. Their relationship quickly became one of mutual dependence…Because he worked in his Emperor's shadow, Berthier's accomplishments seemed matters of routine. In 1800 he organized the Army of the Reserve and moved it across the St. Bernard Pass into Italy; in 1805 he planned the Grande Armee's march from the English Channel into Austria; in 1809 set up the assault crossing of the Danube before Wagram; and in 1812 handled the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russia.'

‘To the army and the world at large, Berthier was a mixture of brusqueness and courtesy, never suffering fools gladly, but never insulting, and careful of his subordinates self-respect. Always ready, properly uniformed, orderly in all things, he was a quiet example to a new, restless army of thoroughgoing individualists. His courage was beyond doubt, whether in rallying a broken column and ramming it home through keening Austrian musketry across Lodi bridge or, in 1812-just turned sixty, exhausted, and very sick-pulling the command of the retreating Grande Armee together after Murat had deserted it. His position made him the handy butt of both Napoleon's temper and the other marshals' anger, but neither of those affected the even tenor of his work. His health finally failed toward the end of the 1812 campaign; he was ill during much of 1813 and 1814, but his work still was well done, is orders clearly written, his insistence on proper staff procedure unrelenting.'

The following is from Theibault's 1800 staff manual:

'The great advantages which much manifesty result from a well-conducted Etat-major or staff, are acknowledged in every military country. France, however, seems alone to have entered fully into the system, and to have added the experiment of practice to the suggestion of theory.'

'A general Etat-major is…the central point of the grand operations of armies.'

'The organization of our Etat-major…is nevertheless worthy of admiration, and one of the greatest excellences in our mode of making war. It may be conjectured, which impulse, and effect a number of select, zealous, intelligent, and skillful officers, forming an Etat-major like ours, and intimately connected, as they are, with all the various distributions of war, may give to an army, in expediting its operations and infusing into them all possible perfections…'

So, according to Thiebault, the French had a functioning and skilled general staff, though he noted that it could always improve. The idea that the French did not have a general staff, or, that the staff was not efficient, is incorrect.