"The Russian Campaign 1812: Ultimate Chance for Peace?" Topic

I'd probably recommend something like Le Nouvea Repertoire de Jurisprudence, but I am not sure of the edition in which the law that you cite was commented on. I suspect, though, Kevin, that since you claim to have taken only one semester of French, you would find it very hard going.

But I wasn't interested in making recommendations. I was asking Gazzola, or you, to give a simple citation for the law that you mentioned in order to see if Colburn's assertion, which totally militates against your opinion that l'enlevement was carried out according to French law, was accurate.

I see that you failed to give it.

I strongly suspect that you have never read de la Muerthe's Les dernières années du duc d'Enghien (1801-1804), and it is true that you never said that you did, though that cuts down somewhat the value of your recommendation. If you had, you you would know as I do after reading the last three chapitres of the book, that the law that you mention is never cited.

Certainly the account was more interesting than I had hoped. I was not aware that the capture of d'Enghien was so much more complex than I had thought, and I was certainly unprepared for the book's final passage:

Napoléon avait acquis une expérience trop profonde du gouvernement pour avoir voulu renouveler un sanglant coup d'Etat, dont il se refusait à reconnaître l'iniquité, mais dont le temps lui avait fait successivement dé couvrir les conséquences déplorables pour son règne comme pour sa mémoire.

On a brighter note, I was amused to see Napoleon's comment on an article in Le Moniteur:"Cet article et rempli d'erreurs". Now I know your source for that one, at least!

But wait, there is more!

I always get confused when trying to convert those terrible revolutionary dates to French, and I browsed the net in the hope of a quick fix. And there, Eureka! I found this!(Dang, I've removed the link, hold on. Ah, here we go).

link

"The Senate had previously suspended trial by jury in cases of assassination attempts against the First Consul. The law of 25 Brumaire, an III, tit. 5, sect. 1, art. 7, also provided that "émigrés who have borne arms against France shall be arrested, whether in France or in any hostile or conquered country, and judged within twenty-four hours…" In any case, the standard procedure in the case of death sentences by court martial was, according to de Polnay again, that the sentence would be carried out within twenty-four hours."

Does that sound familiar? Not so arcane as the de la Meurthe tome, to be sure, but at least it cites the law in question. Alas, I looked through the biblio for the article and it doesn't appear as though Mr. Holmberg checked the law directly, either, so pro tem., I find nothing to contradict Mr. Colburn's claim that, in fact, Napoleon was breaking one of his country's laws because it suited him to do so.

How about you, Gazzola? Do you have a different source, or are you a student of the Napoleon Series, too?

Cheers,
Phil

I suspect, though, Kevin, that since you claim to have taken only one semester of French, you would find it very hard going.

I have taken a year of concentrated French and was actually complimented on my French in Paris after I took the course.

I also taught myself military French in high school in order to understand the painting instructions for the SEGOM military miniatures that I had bought and was assembling and painting in my spare time.

You have a great talent for either misinterpreting what people post or you just don't pay attention.

Or, did you have that incorrect information to hand based on the 'investigation' you had done?

For my translating I keep an 1828 French dictionary to hand as well as a French military dictionary. They come in quite handy.

And you still decline to give the source of your citation? Why can that possibly be? There is certainly no shame in using an article from the internet, if that is where it came from. Many of us do.

No misinterpretation. It was you who mentioned, unasked, on another forum, that you had a semester of French and also that you had "several French books" in your library. That is still more than many able contributors to this forum have. To be congratulated on your French in Paris is a compliment indeed! I have received more than one pair of raised eyebrows for my efforts.

But I still do not understand why you would give a French reference that you had not read, instead of the real one. I seem to remember that a couple of years ago, you gave me two French references on the Consular Guard, neither of which shed any light on the subject at hand. On that occasion, though, I was able to used CtrlF !

But be of good cheer, Kevin. I am sure that my constant errors and misinterpretations of all things Napoleonique must be but a tiny mote in the sunshine of your days. Do remember, though, that this is a public forum and many others out there can judge the relative merits of our chats. Perhaps, like me, they wonder why you cannot/will not give a simple, civil answer to a simple, civil question.

Cheers,
Phil

Philin Yuma

Are you unable to provide your own links or do you intend to just keep on posting links that others have already made? And it seems to me that you appear to be suggesting or challenging the research ability and knowledge made available by the various members of the Napoleon Series website?

But since you have again made a link that I had already linked, I shall take the liberty of assuming that you actually read it, so you will be well aware that it contains the following statement:

"My birth and my opinions will always make me an enemy of your government." D'Enghien told the court, "I had requested from England a commission in her army, and received for answer that they could not grant it, but that I should remain on the Rhine, where I should shortly have a role to play…" the Prince admitted to and was found guilty of being an émigré in the pay of England and of bearing arms against France. Both of these were capital offences.

He admits to being an enemy of the government, admits to wanting to join the British army and that the British have a 'role' for him. That is outright admittance from his very own royalist mouth. I reckon that is pretty conclusive evidence that he was a traitor and deserved what he got.

Yep, I read your link and saw Tom Holmberg's citation of the law in question, but, although he purports to quote a section of the law, "an III, tit. 5, sect. 1, art. 7", and though he provides a bibliography, he doesn't give his source for the law itself. Perhaps it is included in one of the books that he mentions, but there is no indication as to which.

Despite that, I would not have questioned it, particularly since he puts the matter of the law in quotes, suggesting, to me at least, that he had actually read it.

The book by Colburn, though, that I cited, adds additional material from the body of the law, that makes the apprehension of an ":emigre", and I wrote that in quotation marks because, as you know, the duke was not an emigre but a Bourbon who was exiled without the possibility of return, outside of the French nation or a conquered country, illegal.

Unfortunately, I found Colburn's book to be as one sided against Napoleon as the works of those who defended him,
hence my request for a fuller citation from you, if you had one, or Brechtel, who did not cite his source and declined to do so.

Apparently, though, you both used the apparently partial (as opposed to complete, but perhaps the opposite to impartial, too!) citation in the Napoleon series, which leaves unexplained Napoleon's repeated failure to use it in his own defense.

My interest in the period remains, principally, what it has been since I was a child, reading about our brave soldiers whipping the French and other assorted rogues, learning about how they lived, what they wore, and how they fought (splendidly, I am glad to say). Personally, I have no enmity towards Napoleon; he "fought with the best and died like the rest" to quote a modern American military slogan, and certainly have no problem, as his contemporaries did, with his killing of another Frenchman, who was no doubt conspiring against him. The issue was not of his guilt, surely, but the legality of his abduction from neutral soil.

What I do object to is not the modern Napoleonista's hero worship of him, but the invention of theories and in this case, the apparent distortion of facts, in order to make of him something that he never claimed to be.

Cheers,
Phil

Philin Yuma

I have not seen any Napoleonista hero worship, only people arguing their viewpoints, which usually offers a positive angle to your usual negative angle, concerning Napoleon, which is needed to keep a debate fair and not totally biased one way or another. I'm sure you would agree with that?

In terms of d'Enghien, you seem to have a problem accepting he was an émigré? He was.

Also, if I remember rightly, Napoleon offered amnesty to émigrés in 1802, so why did d'Enghien not return to France? That, in itself, is highly suspicious.

The more you look into the affair, the more the blame for the whole event can be laid at Fouche and Tallyrand, who appeared to have convinced Napoleon of d'Enghien's guilt.

But a good description of the event can be found in Napoleon the Great by Andrew Roberts. Of particular interest is the following:

'The next morning Napoleon was informed by a courier from Alsace that d'Enghien's papers revealed no evidence of complicity in the Cadoudal conspiracy, but did show that the duke had offered to serve in the British army, was receiving large amounts of money from London, was paying British gold to other emigres, and was hoping to follow the Austrians into France should they invade. He had also corresponded with William Wickham at the Aliens Office (that is, the British secret service) in London and with Spencer Smith in Stuttgart. 'There are few months in which I don't receive from the Left Bank some requests from our former comrades-in-arms,' d'Enghien had written in one letter, 'officers and soldiers alike, employed or not, who are only waiting for a gathering point and an order to arrive and bring me some of their friends.' In September 1803 he had promised to start a Legitimist (that is, royalist anti-revolutionary) coup in Alsace should Napoleon be assassinated, writing, 'I am waiting, hoping, but don't know anything.' (page 337)

Now before you knock the author, he does go on to say he did not think this constituted enough grounds to have d'Enghien executed. However, I disagree. He could have accepted the amnesty and returned to France but chose not to. Instead he moved close to the French border. He accepted payment from Britain and paid other emigres. And, more importantly, in his own words, he promised to lead a coup and was aware of an assassination plot against the leader of France. This means he was withholding vital information concerning an assassination plot, which in turn makes him an accomplice, and an enemy of the government and of France.

Personally, I would have thrown him in prison and said he will have a long wait before he fulfils his promise of leading a royalist coup. But then again, I have not had assassination plots and actual assassination acts made against me as they were against Napoleon. In one instance the brave royalists doing the assassination paid a 12 year old girl to hold the reins of a horse that was connected to the bomb in a wagon. She and many other innocent people were killed by the bomb, as the linked article describes. The article also mentions that there were no further assassination attempts made after the execution of d'Enghien. Interesting that, isn't it?

link

A nice summary of the d'Enghien affair, Gazzola, but it does go to show that, in my muddled way, I completely failed to make a cohesive argument. Thank you for the opportunity to do so nowthough i am afraid that a lot of what I shall say, I have said above.

"Also, if I remember rightly, Napoleon offered amnesty to émigrés in 1802, so why did d'Enghien not return to France? That, in itself, is highly suspicious."

You will remember that I gave a link for H. Colburn's book. Here it is again, for convenience:
link

That should take us to the page where it is explained that, as a prince of a cadet Bourbon house (my term), he was banned, like all Bourbons, from residence in France. It was obviously a wise move, mirrored by Louis XVIII when he made the same proscription for all members of the Bonaparte family. So no, it wasn't that he refused to return after the amnesty for the emigres, he was banned from doing so.

Your following paragraphs highlight how our arguments have become confused. Let me clear that up.

I believe that d'Enghhien was everything that Talleyrand and Fouche, and d'Enghien himself said that he was, a British spy and royalist (a no brainer there), who would happily take up arms against Napoleon and his regime. And he was a Bourbon!

To be clear, as we slid from Nelson's raid on Copenhagen to d'Enghien (leaving Russia, I'm afraid, far, far behind) it was on the basis of a link kindly supplied by Kevin, which I imagine you have read, from William Warden's "Letters…". in which Napoleon makes the following remarks:

"My Minister vehemently urged the seizure of the Duke though in neutral territory."

"It had been urged upon me again and again….that the new dynasty could not be secure, while the Bourbons remained".

"The sentence was immediately executed; and the same fate would have followed had it been Louis the Eighteenth."

If d'Enghien had been captured in France, no one would have been outraged. Certainly it happened on other occasions without the uproar that followed the Duke's execution.

No, the issue, that Napoleon mentions above, is that he was abducted from neutral territory, and you appear to have missed that point.

Like you, I have read this story many times, particularly from N's varying viewpoints, but always assumed that he had shocked Europe, particularly monarchs like the King of Prussia, who must have started wondering when a squadron of French horsemen might appear outside of their doors, by breaching international law.

Colburn's book, though, purports to show that he was breaking French law, the "notorious" an III, tit. 5, sect. 1, art. 7., which you and Kevin, following Tom Holberg's article, cited by you, claim is evidence that the law justifies the duke's arrest and execution. He however claims that the law restricted the location of the arrest to "France or any enemy's or conquered country".

Everything that I have read seems to support Colburn's version, and it seems to me that either Holberg used a source which truncated the law or he did so himself..I did not accuse anyone of iniquity, I merely asked if you or Kevin had an actual source for the law.

So far, it seems that you have not and that Colburn's version, however heavily slanted in favor of the Royalists is more consistent with known facts.. Certainly the onus on providing a source for the full version of the law lies with you who cited it.

So just a couple of minor things.

My name is not a compression of Philin Yuma but Phil in Yuma. I corresponded daily for years with an elderly CIA signals officer who signed himself Ralph in Prescott, and my name came from that. I don't think that I have ever met a "Philin", have you?

Yes the link points up, as several historians have mentioned, I think, that the d'Enghien affair scared the shinola out of a lot of would be assassins, a fact that militates in favor of the decision.

And no, I won't be drawn into a tit for tat list of children known to have been killed by Napoleon's troops! ;)

I might have given more credence to the author of your link if he had not concluded that a final attempt at assassination on St Helena succeeded when he was poisoned. Is that a seriously old article?

Cheers,
Phil

Philin Yuma

Not sure why you have mentioned your member name or its make up, it is of no interest to me or the debate?

But, in terms of the debate, you are conveniently forgetting one main point in all this, Britain was at war with France. The Duke admitted he was in their pay, which makes him a traitor and an enemy of France, let alone Napoleon. You don't really need any other reason to give him the chop, so to speak.

In terms of where he was taken, it appears he may have been allowed to live so close to the border, providing he did not plot against Napoleon and France. In his own words he broke that promise. I think that Baden were probably relieved that he had been taken. He was a liability that may have caused hostility or war between Baden and France. He wasn't worth it. Of course, I doubt the royalist d'Enghien cared about that, in the same way the other royalist plotters did not care about the 12 year old girl they paid to hold the horse of the bomb wagon being blown to pieces. And I'm not looking for a tit for tat debate on children being deliberately killed, I am merely showing the blinkered, deadly and disgusting mindset of the plotters. Sorry, but the image of a poor innocent Prince simply does not wash, well, not with me anyway.

Linked is a pretty good and fair description of the affair, which I suggest you read:
link

However, should you feel the need to challenge further any of the material from the links I have provided, I suggest you contact those that created the articles, in this case Tom Holmberg and the Napoleonic Society. I am sure they'll be happy to direct you some decent research material concerning the matter.

Yep, I read that old link long ago!

In fact, Baden contacted the French government about d'Enghien living there and were given the OK and Napoleon said later, rather oddly since he didn't follow his own suggestion, that he could easily have come to an arrangement with the Duke of Baden regarding d"Enghien's removal. I wonder why he didn't, but it is of no great importance.

I have never questioned the charge against d'Enghien. I know of no one who does. The illegality of his abduction was all that concerned his contemporaries.

I should add, though, that no 12 year old girls were employed during his abduction, so that must be a Good Thing.

My forum name is PhilinYuma; my signature is Phil. Use either if you wish me to reply to you. I suspect that Philin Yuma is some other chap and shall not answer posts adressed to him

Cheers,
Phil

Phil

Thanks for pointing that out. On my computer it looks like a space between the lower case n and the capital Y, so assumed it was two words. It was not intentional anyway.

By the way, I am happy to answer posts to Gazzola or John.

regards John

Sounds good, John!
Cheers,
Phil

What an interesting thread this has been at times, once you cut through the back and forth and ignore the repetition by some and pot-stirring of similar threads. Sorry to resurrect this one, but it has the more useful links.

‘Although raids also divert the enemy, they are primarily sudden attacks intended to destroy resources or disrupt lines of communications. In raids, there is no intention of holding the attacked position.'

By the standards of 1807 (and indeed, much later) the raid on Copenhagen was precisely that. It included elements of a siege, a bombardment and also the battle at Koge (a rather dull town, but it does have an impressive model village). The target of the raid was the Danish fleet and I'm pretty sure that if it had been possible to destroy the fleet (a resource) by some other means, the government would have avoided the expense of an expedition.

If it truly had been an invasion, then why were those orders not given? A couple of politicians debating sending British forces back after they'd left is not the same thing. Why, in one of the linked accounts (by Gazzola) did a British officer write that he hoped the Danes would burn the ships, as they didn't know what they were going to do with them, they just needed removing? If it was purely a siege, why take ships? If the ships weren't there, would Copenhagen have been attacked? No. The siege element of the raid was merely a means to an end.

As for Brechtel's comment that he has never heard of a three week raid, what can I say, other than it displays a surprising lack of knowledge of military history? Nevertheless, I shall offer some suggestions to him.

Pre-gunpowder warfare is full of extended raids; sometimes a whole raiding season, sometimes a few days of cattle raiding, burning or pillaging. Even the Vikings (those archetypal raiders), would often stay for weeks or longer – in some cases seizing horses to raid even further inland. Often, they would leave once they'd been bought off, as at Paris.

Now, Brechtel, you might say, what this has to do with 1807, it's a thousand years later? All I am helpfully pointing out to you are some examples, off the top of my head, to avoid you looking uninformed when discussing the issue in future. Fast forward several centuries and you have the medieval chevauchee in France, where the aim was disruption and plunder, where forces numbered in their thousands and sieges and cannon were employed as they wandered around, sacking and pillaging.

Surely these extensive raids stopped soon after though? Apparently not, if we go past 1807 and visit the American Civil War, we find the account of Morgan's raid – two months long and a couple of thousand men. Go forward further still to World War 2 and you have the Chindits. In 1943, 3,000 men operated behind Japanese lines for three months. I would venture that in terms of strategic impact, neither of these later raids achieved as much as that on Copenhagen. The removal of the Danish fleet from the equation gave Britain the opportunity to focus on other things.

I would agree, that since the development of special forces and the strategic bomber, the meaning of a raid has changed markedly, but unfortunately the A Team were unavailable in 1807 and even Navy SEALs would struggle to seize 30+ ships and steal them away without anyone noticing. The meaning of military terms does change over time, but they should be used in their correct context. Claiming, after your definition supported the attack on Copenhagen as a raid, that raids are characterised by small groups and a short timescale is applying the modern meaning inappropriately.

The question has also been raised, why did the British send so many men and guns? I would suggest that the old adage ‘talk softly and carry a big stick' is appropriate. I suspect many anticipated that the Danes would acquiesce once it was apparent that they were incapable of effective resistance, but better to have too many men to prosecute an alternative course of action, than too few. There would only be one attempt at taking this fleet and whilst a few thousand men might suffice for cutting enemy lines of communication (like the Chindits and Morgan), the British knew that they may have to take a city; no mean feat, plus secure a fleet. Given the Danes had an army, it would have been irresponsible to just send ships with a few marines, surely?

As to the morality of the action, I would agree with the suggestion likening it to Mers-el-Kebir. A necessary evil, from Britain's perspective at that point, although it later became apparent that the French had managed to get British intelligence dancing to their tune. The decision to bombard Copenhagen is regrettable, but it achieved results and I suspect with fewer casualties than a city besieged for longer than three days. There was no time for disease to break out, no storming and whilst the British destroyed naval capacity, they were not there to raze Copenhagen to the ground or occupy it after they had achieved their purpose. There certainly does appear to be dispute over the casualties, but civilians were given time to evacuate and the leaders in the city should have seen sense a little earlier, when the forces against them became apparent. Were terror tactics a habit of the British at that point? No. Were they a habit of others? Yes. Is attacking neutral counries bad? Yes. Is invading allied countries? Absolutely.

With hindsight, it would appear that Britain could have waited for action from Bonaparte that may have tipped the Danes over from neutrality into an alliance with them, although how long Danish forces could have held out, even with British troops, against French forces, is debatable. It may though, have seen the Danish fleet join forces with the Royal Navy, which would have probably been the best option Britain could have hoped for, followed by the fleet's capture/destruction, with the worst case scenario seeing Bonaparte utilising it.

Although the Danes did make nuisances of themselves afterwards, Britain was available to maintain naval supremacy. Attacking merchant ships and convoy escorts isn't the same as threatening the fleet with ships of the line. In tennis terms, the raid was an unforced error by Britain, much like Bonaparte's invasions of Portugal, Spain and Russia, but with far fewer negative consequences. As an interesting link provided by Gazzola concludes, ‘It is also perhaps fitting that the flagship of the Baltic Fleet was HMS Victory.'

I would assume from some of the comments in this thread that the the Japanese "raid" on Pearl Harbor should not have been regarded as an act of war by the US.

What comments might they be Delbruck and are you suggesting that the attack on Pearl Harbour was not a raid? Seizing another countries fleet is undoubtedly an act of war, but Britain obviously recognised the risks this would bring and decided it was still worthwhile. Denmark was far less of a threat without its fleet. There seems to be a lot back and forth about raid, seige, bombardment or whatever and that it is vital to be precise to determine intentions. The British intentions seem patently obvious.

Henry

You seem to be missing the point completely. The raids and guerrilla activities you have mentioned from various historical periods, were acts of war against an enemy, an enemy they were at war with or, in the case of Pearl Harbour, just about to. In contrast, the British attack and siege of Copenhagen was against a neutral country and a nation that may have become an ally, but for the irresponsible action of the British. It was a war crime, in which a terror bombardment was deliberately employed against civilians and civilian property, not the military.

If you read the various links associated with this action found in various topics, you will also discover that the British had been considering placing a permanent garrison in Denmark. The action also pushed Denmark into siding with Napoleon, thereby giving him extra manpower and an excellent propaganda weapon. That was clever, wasn't it?

And in case you missed it, here is the latest link provided by Tango01 in another thread. The end bit about the prize money made from the attack is very interesting.

However, please note, if you plan to debate this matter further, it would help and be much appreciated if you stuck to the actual event of 1807, rather than popping in and out of other historical periods, other wars or bringing up sporting analogies.

link

No can do Gazzola, it was Brechtel who decided to compare the events of 1807 to US Navy Seals, so perhaps you should have said something back then? As for requesting changes to how I post, I don't think you're in any position to do so. I've read the links thanks, both the partial and those less so.

What did the British demands reference? The fleet. That's why they were there. Were they given orders beforehand to occupy Zealand and stay on? No. Did they stay after they'd stripped the naval facilities? No. If you actually read my post you'd see I acknowledge that British intelligence was faulty, but they made the decision that a hostile Denmark with ships was far more dangerous than one without. They ended up with neither the best, nor worst-case scenario. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Henry

Okay, I should have said, how about from now on, sticking to the 1807 event. How does that grab you?

But I see you have not rejected my statement that the raids you mentioned differed to the British 1807 war crime because the raids were against those they were at war with, in many cases on territory fought over, whereas Denmark was not at war with anyone, well, not until the British forced them into one.

But if you read the links again, in all the topics mentioning this action, and there are a few, you will discover that the British did seriously consider staying in Denmark. They were just about persuaded not to, due to the oncoming winter and threat of ships being stuck in ice, threating their supply route being cut. Plus, of course, they would be prone to attacks from their new Danish enemy. As it was, they still stayed there for 66 days, ransacking and plundering all the naval stores etc. And if I remember rightly, I think I read that the Russians wanted them to stay in Zealand, possibly in order to put them off attacking one their ports.

In terms of decision making, they made the decision to ignore the fact the country was not at war with them and was not at the time an ally of France, and to push Denmark out of neutrality by stealing their ships by the use of massive force and terror attacks on their civilians. Their decision resulted in increasing Napoleon's manpower and was an excellent propaganda weapon. So well done that man!

The definition of raid given makes no reference to states of war or neutrality. You can keep trying to qualify it, as Brechtel did, when it no longer suited his argument, but I'm happy with that definition, even if it's still a little modern. I'm pretty sure the Vikings didn't make formal declarations of war on their enemies Gazzola and those medieval princes played a little fast and loose. I'd regard demanding the ships as close as you'll get to one in this case, although I don't blame the Danes for turning down the alliance offered earlier. They wouldn't have lasted long as an active enemy of France and were enjoying the benefits of breaking the Continental system. I don't blame Britain's concerns either though, after Tilsit and the ultimatum to Portugal. If the Danes had burned their ships, Copenhagen wouldn't have burned. They didn't, it did.

As for what certain politicians may have considered after the event, or commanders might have done in different circumstances, or what the Russians may have wanted? Irrelevant, as we should look at what the expedition's goals were when it set sail and what actually happened.

Propaganda value? Of course, although it didn't stop countries being willing to work with Britain in coalitions and secured naval supremacy. Britain made an enemy of Denmark? Big deal, in the bigger picture. Them and what navy?

I should add, I'm happy to focus on 1807, if you'll accept that raids for most of recorded history could well last weeks or months and indeed could consist of thousands of troops or large numbers of vessels, as pointed out in the examples given.

Henry

Of course those who favour the British during this period, would be happy to qualify it as a mere raid or even an expedition. But it wasn't a raid, It was an invasion. Again, you seem to be quite happily ignoring the fact that the British had considered leaving a permanent garrison on Zealand? Why is that?

But your support to the arrogance of the British and their war crime is truly comical. If the Danes had burnt their ships the gracious British would not have undertaken a terror bombardment using fire rockets against civilians and civilian property. How nice of them. So caring and very considerate. And how ungrateful for the Danes, who had not been at war with Britain until the invasion, to dare to refuse to give up their ships to a massive invading force of ships, infantry, cavalry and artillery.

The brave Danes, who did not consider surrender, even against such an imposing force, only surrendered after the British started killing civilians and destroying civilian property. You might not like it, but that is a war crime.

Anyway, perhaps you could give me a list of long lasting raids – and I do not mean guerrilla warfare or raiding parties such as Morgan's during the American Civil War or those already fighting in a war – I mean a raid that lasted a long time (eg 66 days like Copenhagen) which was against a neutral country. If you can do that it will be appreciated.

I'm quite happy ignoring the consideration given to a garrison Gazzola, as it was after the fact. This was no 'mere' raid, but a serious undertaking and as for the request to provide you with yet more examples now that you've decided to start moving the goalposts again, (doesn't that get tiring?) I feel no need. There were seige operations at Copenhagen, along with a bombardment, as well as the engagement at Koge. They were all carried out in the context of a raid to secure or destroy the Danish fleet.

Henry

Of course you feel no need. It is exactly as I expected. But it was you who brought up the other raids and guerrilla actions, in a feeble attempt to compare them to the attack of Copenhagen, even though they involved nations already at war with each other. Denmark was not at war with Britain when they invaded Denmark.

And yes, I can well understand you ignoring the fact that the British were considering a permanent garrison in Denmark, because it does not suit or fit in with your belief and desire to keep the two month event considered as a raid.

I'll leave other readers to make up their own minds on whose arguments are feeble (or desperate) Gazzola. If we are trying to divine purpose though, I'm interested in what happened, rather than hypotheticals. The expedition sailed with orders to remove the fleet from the equation, which they followed. They promised the Danes they would leave once the prizes were readied and kept it. There's really not much more to say.

Politicians do talk a lot and often have unrealistic ideas but that conversation took place after the expeditions was underway, as your own link says. Now, had the Danes tried to negotiate, there might have been a permanent force landed to cooperate, but they didn't and declared war. I don't blame them at all for not entering into an alliance that would probably have seen them invaded by Bernadotte. As Denmark and later Portugal found out, minor maritime powers couldn't afford to remain neutral, or there were consequences. Even when you tried negotiating, as the Portuguese did…

Henry

In terms of the British making promises, I think you will find they broke them very easily. They promised to return the ships then, after their deliberate terror bombardment of civilians forced them into persuading the Danish military to surrender, they changed their minds and said they were going to keep them, plus all the stores and materials they stole, which was worth quite a considerable amount of money. This suggests, during the period, you only believe a British promise, if you are British.

And the idea of having a permanent base in Denmark was not just connected to capturing a neutral country's fleet. Capturing the fleet was just a bonus. They had bigger ambitions and other reasons for their attack, as this letter from Mulgrave to Gambier, dated 5th Sept, 1807, suggests:

'Zealand held by Great Britain and Sweden would give those powers the entire command of the Baltic, and would tend more than any other states of things, that can be conceived, to counteract the influence of France in Russia.'
(page 18: Thesis: The Copenhagen Expedition, 1807 by A.N Ryan)

And the importance of holding Zealand and especially the Sound, is connected to British trade connections with Russia:

'The customs tables show that for any year between 1800 and 1809, Russia supplied England with well over ninety per cent of her total hemp imports.' (page 8)

There were other naval commodities obtained via Russia, such as wood, flax, tallow, pitch and tar. (page 6)

The British could not cope or possibly survive if the sea route to Russia was blocked by either Demark, who may have demanded a fee to pass through it or blocked it completely, or if had been blocked completely by the French, should they have gone to war against Denmark.

'The danger to the naval supply was certainly considered and the fleet dispatched to the Sound on this occasion did not have its duties limited to the coercion of the Danes. The safety of the Baltic trade was also in its charge.' (page 7: Orders to Vice-Admiral Gambier, July 21st, 1807)

With a nation like Britain relying so heavily on the power of her Navy, and the money made through trade that such a powerful navy allowed, I guess anything was acceptable in order to maintain that status, including attacking a neutral country and killing men, women and children.

Yes, I guess it will be up to everyone to make up their own minds, just as long as they read as much as possible about the event and not just accept the propaganda coverup that it was a raid, as some seem so happily to do. Indeed, before I started researching this event, I was under the impression that it was a quick raid in which the British successfully captured another country's fleet, which sounded very impressive. But like everything else, when you start researching it, you soon find that cosy image does not fit the facts.

And yet the British did not maintain a base…they took the fleet and left. Your quote (a observation, not an order) is dated as Copehagen is capitulating, not when the expedition was despatched. Do keep up Gazzola.

Actually, I have a suggesion. If you wish to continue to debate what might have happened, rather than the facts as they occured, perhaps you could start a new thread on what may have happened had Britain despatched a fleet to invade and occupy Zealand? We could then perhaps debate whether that would have been more or less destructive to British policy than the French invading Portugal, Spain or Russia.

The fact is the British were considering making a permanent garrison in Denmark, so it is not a what if, more of a what almost was. The idea was there and people such as Wellesley, had to argue against it. And had they lost the argument there would have been a permanent garrison there. This suggests a further aim other than the capture of the Danish fleet.

And come on, get real, it did not matter when the idea was made because Copenhagen had to taken anyway to obtain the fleet or make a permanent garrison. Without the taking of the city they could do neither.

You are definitely correct. The British were considering making a permanent garrison in Denmark, just as they were considering holding New Orleans when they launched their expedition against it in late 1814. The planning for that operation was begun in September.

But I digress (again).

Henry made an excellent point about the length of operations and raids most certainly could take a long time. But what was overlooked, I think, was both the purpose of the raids and, more importantly, the manner in which a raid is conducted.

Raiding forces have to keep moving because they are usually not equipped for either a siege or a pitched battle. Raiding forces are usually relatively small, and that includes the raids/chevauchees conducted by the English during the 100 Years' War.

Raiding, by definition, is employed in order to weaken the enemy by pillaging and burning the countryside as well as reducing the productivity of a region. And that is what the English chevauchees were designed to do. And they were usually conducted by light forces, mounted bowmen and other light troops and in general and particularly they stayed away from fortified towns and castles.

The English used the chevauchee instead of a large standing army, and part of this was the result of the high death-rate of the Black Plague. Chevauchee's were conducted by Edward, the Black Prince, Henry of Gaumont, Robert Knowles, John of Gaunt, and Henry V.

Chevauchees/raids were not an English development, but were also employed by the Spanish, French, Moslems, and the Scots under Robert the Bruce and his lieutenants.

During the American Civil War the most effective cavalry raid was arguably Grierson's during the Vicksburg campaign, along with Morgan's and Kilpatrick's as well as Stuart's. The last named had varying success, most notable being the failure of his 'ride' during the Gettysburg campaign.

Again, the hallmark of raids of any type are the mobility of the raiding force. That negates the idea that the British invasion of Denmark in 1807 was a raid.

French General Grouchy conducted a cavalry raid during the invasion of Russia in 1812.

The number of troops landed was nearly 30,000 accompanied by siege artillery (long guns, mortars, and howitzers) as well as rockets with their crews. This assembled artillery fired 6,000 rounds into Copenhagen in three days of bombardment, and the city itself and the Danish civilian population were deliberately targeted, following the plan of LtCol Murry, the expedition's quartermaster-general.

To transport heavy artillery requires specialized vehicles, such as sling carts and devil carriages, both of which transport mortars and long guns unassembled. They travel at a walking pace and are difficult to move on a good day. Further, the construction of batteries to support the siege artillery, which includes firing platforms to support the long guns, howitzers and mortars of the besieging force, requires hard labor and skill in construction and emplacement.

Thomas Munch-Peterson in his volume Defying Napoleon: How Britain Bombarded Copenhagen and Seized the Danish Fleet in 1807 describes the operation as a siege and it includes all of the hallmarks of a siege-investment of the city, the construction of semi-permanent siege works, and an intense bombardment. The heavy long guns were used to engage the Danish artillery defending the city while the howitzers, mortars, and rockets were used in the terror bombardment against the city itself and the civilian population. The spires of the city's churches were used as aiming points.

Copenhagen was 'invested' on 17 August-Munch-Peterson, 170.
'Two weeks after the siege commenced…'Munch-Peterson, 170.
The local damage to the Danish countryside, farms, and outlying villages around Copenhagen was commented on by Francis Jackson, a British diplomat: 'much consideration [for the Danes] was not to be expected…from an invading army.'-Munch-Peterson, 170.

'Cathcart's siege of Copenhagen is best remembered for the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian targets within the city…'-Munch-Peterson, 193.

'If it is found by experience that the destruction of the fleet is actually not within the power of our mortar batteries, we must then of necessity resort to the harsh measure of forcing the town into our terms, by the sufferings of the inhabitants themselves. But to give this mode of attack its fullest effect, it is necessary to completely invest the place, and oblige by that means, all persons of whatever description, to undergo the same hardships and dangers.'-Lietuenant Colonel George Murray, deputy quartermaster-general of the Copenhagen expedition, cited by Munch-Peterson, 195.

Murray's plan was adopted by General Cathcart, the commander of the land componest of the expedition. See Munch-Peterson, 195-196: 'Cathcart acted on Murray's plan-and that included the idea of a terror bombardment of the city.'-Munch-Peterson, 196.

'…as early as 22 August, in his first report to Castlereagh after landing on Zealand, he had already accepted Murray's argument that an indiscriminate bombardment of the city might be the most effective way forward.'-Munch-Peterson, 197.

If the British demands for the surrender of the Danish fleet were refused, '…the city, when taken, must share the fate of conquered places.' Cathcart and Gambier [the British army and navy commanders of the combined expedition, respectively] to Peymann, the Danish commander on 1 September 1807 as cited in Munch-Peterson, 199.

When the bombardment opened at 1930 2 September 1807 'The British concentrated their fire on the northern part of Copenhagen, using the spires or towers of several prominent churches or public buildings as their targets. Fires broke out in thirty-eight places…'-Munch-Peterson, 199.

'[The bombardment which began at 1900 on 4 September 1807] was heavy and unrelenting until around noon on 5 September, and this time the defenders proved unable to contain its effects. Much of the fire corps' equipment was damaged by now and many of its men were dead or injured. fire caught hold in several places and raged out of control…The destruction reached it most dramatic point when the venerable Frue Kirke (the Church of Our Lady), which had been a target throughout the two preceding nights, was finally brought down. Captain Bowles, watching from his warship out to sea, described the bombardment as 'the most tremendous sight that can well be conceived.' and noted that the third night 'surpassed all the rest, particularly when the largest church caught fire, and the spire (which was a remarkably beautiful one) fell in.'

'When the British artillery fell silent at noon on 5 September, the inhabitants of Copenhagen were stunned and terrified, and the city bore witness, as Cathcart and Gambier had warned in the proclamation they issued when British troops landed on Zealand, to 'the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital'. One-fifth of Copenhagen's population-20,000 people-had fled their homes to
Christianshavan or Amager and two thousand of them (2 percent of the total population) had been killed. Many of the British bombs and shells had penetrated right to the cellars of houses, the natural place of refuge, and this had increased the numbers of fatalities. It took several more days to bring the fires under control, and the flames of the ruined Frue Kirke were not entirely extinguished until the end of September. About one-twelfth of central Copenhaged was burnt to the ground and buildings over a much larger area of the city had sustained lesser or greater degress of damage.'-Munch-Peterson, 200.
The British had kept some ordnance in reserve, but employed forty mortars of various size and caliber, ten howitzers of different size and caliber as well as thirty 24-pounder siege guns. The 24-pounders were engaged the Danish artillery defending the city and would have been used to create a breach for the infantry assault if the latter had been deemed necessary. The mortars and howitzers were employed on firing within the city along with Congreve rocket fire. 6,000 artillery rounds were fired into the city, including 300 rockets.

This was not a raid, but a carefully planned invasion and siege which included almost 30,000 ground troops and an impressive artillery parc.

I'm am truly impressed by such an excellent example of the 'No true Scotsman' approach to debate exhibited here.

It was you, Brechtel, who presented a definition of raid. When this no longer suited your purpose (not very long at all), you then decided to start talking about 'characteristics' of raids, which you chose to make very specific regarding duration and numbers (neither of which were in your first definition) and of a particularly modern perception. Prior to WWII there are plenty of examples of raids which were of considerable duration and/or involved substantial numbers. However, you claimed not to have heard of these. I suppose I should congratulate you on educating yourself in such a short space of time, but we didn't really need your whole history lesson (I don't recall ever claiming raiding was an English invention, but well done on covering most of the wikipedia article on the chevauchee). I'm not sure success or failure determines whether its a raid either. Surely the key feature is WHY troops are there? What is their reason for being in a specific place?

Having established that there were in fact large scale raids and/or of a long duration (thank you for conceding that point), now we introduce another qualifier – the 'hallmark' of ANY raid is apparently the mobility of the raiding force and troops on foot don't cut it (so, not the raid's duration then, or the size of forces?). Let's see. Several Chindit columns marched hundreds of miles into and out of enemy territory. Artillery was a part of later chevauchees and seiges were common throughout. As for the Vikings, looks like they were out of luck being called raiders, what with only having their ships to deliver them where they wanted to be. I could go on, but it's overkill. Please stop posting in absolutes if you do not want your arguments to look ridiculous.

Let's see about the expedition to Denmark next. Lots of troops, yes. Lots of artillery. Absolutely. How on earth could it be mobile? Hmmm, let's see, how about we utilise the largest navy in the world to deliver them on the doorstep and negate the need for them to march or ride (with great difficulty), from Britain to Denmark? When they're done, you pick them all up and take them home. Seems pretty mobile for 1807 to me. Koge is approximately 25 miles south of Denmark. It doesn't really compare to having to walk hundreds of miles and the heavy artillery doesn't even need to go that far, so why is mobility paramount when most of the British are delivered almost immediately in place?

Brechtel, whilst apparently being so keen to be precise on terminology as it outlined intentions, you diverted the topic excellently onto a debate about the term raid, rather than considering both the British orders and actions.

Let's summarise these, shall we?

- Britain was concerned about loss of naval supremacy and threats to trade.
- Denmark was seen as posing a threat to supremacy and trade.
- Britain takes action based on faulty intelligence and makes a pragmatic decision which they know will have consequences, although they hope to avoid conflict to minimise bad publicity and poor relations elsewhere. They do however make sure it is a large expedition well-equipped for a variety of tasks (Very un-British).
- Troops are ordered to take or destroy the Danish fleet (a resource), whether by negotiations or military action.
- The expedition arrives, where the Danes (having earlier turned down an alliance) are given an ultimatum. Hand over your ships for 'safe keeping'.
- The Danes refuse, perhaps understandably, even with this massive force sitting offshore.

At this point, I'm confused after wading through all the repeated irrevelancies above. If the British have been sent to occupy Zealand, then why are the Danes being asked for their ships and why aren't the British just getting on with invading Zealand or demanding a complete Danish capitulation?

Surely they should have troops storming ashore? Surely this is costing them tactical surprise? Maybe Eisenhower should have occupied his time on 5 June by suggesting that Germany just hand over Hitler, due to the massive invasion fleet he's got hanging around the Channel and seeing if that worked. Ah, of course, that was an invasion against an occupied coast and surprise was rather important.

- We then have the British fighting a battle at Koge, conducting seigeworks and carrying out a bombardment of Copenhagen, after which the Danes capitulate. Forgive me, bu if the British were so keen to get on with occupying Zealand, why did they let civilians leave before the bombardment? Surely more mouths to feed in the city would speed up its fall? Why didn't they even occupy the whole city, let alone start roaming all over Zealand, identifying key features and preparing for a possible Danish counter attack from the south?
- Some politicians raise an earlier idea of occupying Zealand in addition to/after taking the fleet and for advice on its practicablity (I suspect due to the swiftness of Danish capitulation and thinking this could be a very happy windfall to possibly guarantee access to the Baltic). This is not welcomed by the forces actually there and it does not happen.
- Having made the numerous Danish ships ready (they must have been in a state) and stripped the city of naval stores (I can't think why), the British forces re-embark and go home to spend the prize money.

The expedition to Denmark was a raid which achieved its goals as stated at its outset. The Danes didn't get the fleet back as they had declared war before it was surrendered, rather than when they were first made an offer (and a salutory lesson sent out to others, was the thinking behind it, I expect).

Two things:

First, you have not demonstrated that the Copenhagen expedition was a raid. Supporting documentation given to you clearly demonstrates that the attack, investment, and bombardment of Copenhagen was a siege. Have you read Munch-Peterson's account?

Second, it is unfortunate that you have to make personal comments when posting. That is a bad habit to acquire, though too many make that a habit as it is easy to make derogatory comments from behind the safety of a keyboard in order to distract attention from the subject matter to hand.

Perhaps if you kept to the subject instead of making derogatory comments all of us would be better off.

How surprising. Choose to discount the comment previously made that the raid included a battle, a siege and a bombardment and then refuse to answer any of the points made, yet I am the one not sticking to the topic? Physician, heal thyself. Poor form.

The 'poor form' on your part has already been pointed out in my previous posting.

If you want to engage in a discussion, then I suggest you refrain from personal comments. I ignored them in your first posting when you referred to me, but you continue to do that.

If you wish to just bait or pick a fight, go to someone else. If you wish to have a historic discussion, then stick to the topic and leave the personal comments out.

I hardly think pointing out an extremely ignorant comment from a student of military history counts as an attack. I provided examples and you apparently chose to do some research on raids. Well done. That you then chose to follow it up with a ridiculous and easily disproven argument is your affair. I criticised the argument and not you.

@Henry Simmerson

thanks for your contributions – very interesting to read.

Henry

Yes, the Danes declared war first. But what exactly do you call sending a massive fleet, an extremely large land force of infantry, cavalry and field artillery and a mass of siege artillery, including rockets? Surround the city and aim their guns at the city and also throw in a demand for their navy, which wasn't even sea worthy?

I ask you, should the neutral Danes have-
A) Asked them over for a cup of tea
B) Let them take the ships, and of course then let anyone else who comes with a big stick to take anything they want
C) See it as a declaration of war

I don't like using modern terms, but you could look at this way – the Russians send a massive fleet up the Thames, land thousands of troops and artillery in London, and aim their guns at Westminster. Would that be considered as an act of war, considering, as Britain and Russia were not at war, in the same way that Denmark and Britain were not at war when Britain sent their 'little raiding party' for a day out, or, in this case, 66 days out?

Anyway, if you read the other long running thread on this topic you will see that Britain had been considering placing a permanent garrison in Denmark and had even asked the military to look for excuses to consider the capitulation terms void, in order to do so. But of course, the capture of the fleet had to be obtained in order for this to happen.

The fleet was asked for before the landings Gazzola. I don't blame the Danes for refusing the offer (or the previous alliance), nor seeing the arrival of the British fleet (prior to the landings) as an act of war. I have already made this point, so perhaps you should re-read the previous comments again. The same goes for consideration given to a permanent base (which was neither a consensus amongst politicians, nor accepted by commanders). I've read the other threads thank you. Mark Barker seems to be an admirable job there, so I don't feel the need to go repeating myself again.

Sticking to the order of events would help your flawed analogy make sense. Denmark was neutral. We are a part of NATO and of course this would be considered a act of war. I'm not aware of any restrictions being placed on our ports by France that we are ignoring either. However, if a Russian fleet was to magicly arrive with overwhelming force in the Thames, with most of our army in Northern Scotland, I'm pretty sure our government would come to an arrangement, rather than risk a massive loss of life to little effect, especially as there are no walls to breach.

I am unsure though, as to why you chose the phrase 'little raiding party.' I have not claimed it was a small force and you most certainly have not. I have pointed out that large and/or long-lasting raids have existed throughout military history, a point which even Brechtel has conceded after some learning.

@ von Winterfeldt

Many thanks. I enjoy yours too. I would have joined in earlier, but for a holiday. As for the topic, I have been discovering more about the whole issue and reading up on Denmark full stop. The 'Sound Dues' were interesting. I'm sure ship's captains felt much the same as I did when paying the bridge tolls as a tourist…interesting to see the importance of British-Russian trade by the mid-19th century. The two countries paid 2/3 of the final settlement fees.

Henery

Very interesting that you consider Mark Baker has done a good job, considering he felt my evidence provided which related to the British considering making a permanent occupation of Zealand as sound?

And I think the long lasting raids you mentioned were more guerrilla warfare and against an enemy they were at war with at the time. They did not arrive in neutral territory and then make threats backed up by a massive sea and land force.

If you have read the sources, as you say, you will be well aware that, yes, although the military, who appear to have been fooled into thinking it would just be a quick raid, with the Danish ships ready to sail and probably handed over at the sight of such a large force, did not appear to consider creating a permanent base in Denmark, but the politicians certainly did. That is why they requested the military commanders try to find any excuse to make the capitulation terms void. But good for the British Commanders, they replied that the Danes were sticking to the required conditions.

And I find it hard to believe that you believe that a modern day British government would meekly surrender and do whatever an invading, or in your terms, raiding force demanded. I'm sure the only arrangements they would consider, would be to declare war on Russia or whoever was doing the raiding.

And remember that, besides trying to buy off the Danes, which failed, the British also threatened them, and when that didn't work, they carried out their threat. But the Danes probably thought their threat would relate to attacking military targets, not civilian.

And the fact that the whole episode was argued and debated by the government well into the following year, suggests it was not a case of just a successful raid, but a questionable act that forced a neutral country to declare war on Britain.

Some politicians, Gazzola, some politicians, had considered an occupation once the expedition was already underway. You too are getting into the habit of absolutes that don't stack up. The fact that the 'questionnaire' after the capitulation asked what would be required if an occupation was possible shows it was not part of the original plan. Considering, planning and carrying out are all very different acts. Lots of things were considered and suggested. One act was planned and carried out – the raid.

As for debate afterwards – thank goodness for a parliamentary democracy, eh, rather than imperial commands? Fortunately, Denmark without a fleet wasn't half as threatening as one with a fleet and Britain was able to come out of the wars successfully, with a number of countries willing to work with her. Unlike how the invasions of Portugal, Spain, or Russia turned out for other parties, for example.

With regard to your implausible modern day scenario, what would you have H.M. government do? If the Russians have sailed 30,000 troops into central London, with overwhelming artillery support, there's not much to offer in the way of resistance and I'm sure negotiations would open. Anything else would be ridiculous. Really, what would you have them do?

As to what we'd call it. If they're here to steal the crown jewels, or a policeman's helmet, it's a raid. If they're here to install a new government, it's an invasion.

Well done Henry!

Some very good level-headed postings.

As you may have seen, I did try to keep the topic related to Russia (With Portugal and Spain thrown in) but the joined-at the-hip Nappy buffs kept swinging the debate back to the 'war atrocity of Copenhagen. So like the good chap I am, I played their game and also spelled out that Copenhagen was a r-a-i-d, but the oracle and font of history wouldn't have it!

Take care,

Paul :)

Thank you Dibble, it's been mostly a pleasure, if a little frustrating at times. I did enjoy catching up on the first two pages when I returned. I look forward to more discussions. Perhaps it's time for a new thread on how things may have turned out if Bonaparte hadn't invaded Portugal.

Cheers

Another Paul

Henry Simmerson

Thank you Dibble, it's been mostly a pleasure, if a little frustrating at times. I did enjoy catching up on the first two pages when I returned. I look forward to more discussions. Perhaps it's time for a new thread on how things may have turned out if Bonaparte hadn't invaded Portugal.

Cheers

Another Paul

One of the posters above has already blamed the allies for the deaths incurred in Portugal on another site (A.C.G). So I very much doubt that a discussion in this area will yield anything constructive, or even get a response, on their part.

Paul :)

Henry

I think you really need to do some serious research, since some of the 'some' politicians included some very high ranking people, such as Canning, The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Gower, Ambassador to Russia and Mitchel, Consul in Norway.

'They are the keys or locks to the finest Bay or Lake in the world. If preserved independent, they are shackled on, and maybe horns to the power of the Russian Empire…..I can affirm that whoever possesses the Danish Islands in the Sound, even the Danes themselves, drilled by Napoleon's officers, may shut the passages into and out of the Baltic against the floating force of the world, and not injure the navigation.' (page 236: Thesis. Letter John Mitchel (Consul in Norway) to the Admiralty, July 24th, 1807.

I think the line 'whoever possesses' says it all and suggests that the thought it already there.

We then get after the capitulation of Copenhagen the following:
'Under these circumstances, Sir Robert Wilson has arrived here with Your Excellency's dispatches and with the strongest intimations from persons of acknowledged ability and influence at St. Petersburg and the most eminently distinguished for their disposition to perceive a good understanding between Great Britain and Russia, that the maintenance of the possession of the island of Zealand by this country would be in the highest degree useful to the common cause and particularly agreeable to Russia.'
(page 136: Thesis: Extract of dispatch from Canning to Granville Leveson Gower, Sept 28, 1807)

So Russia is happy with Britain taking over Zealand and it does not appear that the Tilsit meeting had any effect on relations between Britain and Russia, so the Tilsit 'fear' factor can be totally ignored.

'if Denmark should refuse such an arrangement, and rejecting the liberal offers of His Majesty, should persist in a state of war with Great Britain, then to avail himself of the aid of His Swedish Majesty for the re-occupation and permanent retention of Zealand.' page 137 Thesis: Extract of dispatch from canning to Granville Leveson Gower, October 1, 1807)

Well, the brave Danes did persist, didn't they, and this suggests that if the whole sorry event was just a raid to capture the fleet, why are they discussing the permanent possession of Zealand once they had the ships?

And why would the government ask their military commanders to find any excuse to make the terms of the capitulation void?

Demark with a fleet wasn't a threat. They were not at war with Britain before the British provoked one. And the ships were far from seaworthy, as they found out when they captured them.

The parliamentary debates and arguments went on because the whole affair was a farce and a disgrace and one that forced one neutral nation, Denmark, to declare war against Britain, and pushed another neutral nation, Russia, to do so not long after.

Your reply to the modern scenario is exactly the same pathetic and arrogant way of thinking that the British had in 1807. They arrived there and expected the Danes to roll over. They didn't and the British had to resort to a terror bombardment to force the civilians to persuade the Danish military to capitulate. In terms of the British government in the modern day scenario, I would have expected them to do what the Danes did in 1807 and declare war. Perhaps you would have offered them a cup of tea and a nice talk?

I suppose it's nearly as arrogant as telling a neutral country to suspend diplomatic relations with a country you don't like, lock up the citizens of this other country who happen to live there AND hand over their ships, isn't it? Worth a try though, if it avoided conflict. I suspect the Portuguese would have preferred a Copenhagen raid and being left alone to what happened.

Anyway, you suggested the modern scenario Gazzola, enlighten us. What do you suggest the government do, now they've declared war? You have a city of around ten million people, around three days of supplies, mass panic amplified by social media, one of your major wealth-producing centres (City of London) next to the landings, as is your seat of government and head of state, a very delicate social and transport infrastructure, your forces outnumbered around 6:1 in the city and the enemy is already in the city. What's the plan? Await a glowing blue Police box?

I suspect so Dibble. I only started lurking on the Napoleonic boards because of some Peninsular games at the club, where I most recently enjoyed destroying a British Guards brigade with a well-timed massed column or two, but what happened in Portugal makes a very interesting comparison with Denmark.

Cheers

Paul

Henry

Yes, I can understand why you want to divert the debate away from the British war crime in Denmark. It is not nice reading when it is the British committing the war crime, is it?

As to the modern scenario. I don't really want to go down that route, but you seem to be suggesting that had it happened, the British should meekly surrender the city and its people? That sort of attitude would not have gone down well in 1939, would it?

But to get back to Napoleonics, that sort of situation did not stop the Spanish fighting back, did it, even though they lost their capital and most of the battles? I am assuming you are aware of the Spanish resistance to the French and the following Peninsular War? But you seem to think, in modern terms, that the British should capitulate, as they arrogantly expected the Danes to do in 1807. Shame on you.

I don't know Gazzola, you suggested the modern scenario and you've yet to explain why these hypothetical Russians are in London. I'm sure you don't want to go down that route, but please either humour us, or perhaps in future avoid nonsensical comparisons you can neither defend nor explain.

I went outside 1807 to reference actual events that really happened in history. Why are we going back to 1939 now? Was the Kriegsmarine threatening an invasion of London at that point? That's news to me. Interestingly I took part in a couple of very large Sealion games this summer (which took some liberties to ensure the Germans could get ashore in some force). In the second one the game finished with panzers about to open the road to central London and the discussion in the pub went with the view that at this point (if not sooner) the Royals and Churchill (possibly – he may have been on the street with a tommy gun) are on a boat to Canada. At least in that scenario the Empire and Commonwealth were available as substantial resources. Meanwhile a new government is attempting to broker a deal. As even Churchill said, 'Never give in--never, never, never, never, in nothing great or small, large or petty, never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense.' Fighting on when the enemy DOES have overwhelming superiority is an exercise in futility, especially when civilians are involved. Part of the government's task is to protect its people, surely. Anyway, are you dropping your hypotheticals now, or would you like some help in them making any kind of sense?

I don't think it's diverting to contrast what happened in Denmark with events that occurred in the same year to another neutral maritime nation in Europe, particularly when Denmark came off much more lightly from the experience than Portugal.

Yes, I am aware of the Penisula War. As you have repeatedly pointed out though, the British at Copenhagen had overwhelming force concentrated at the precise location to achieve their very limited aim. The same can't be said of the French after they invaded their ally Spain and tried to occupy the country.

Henry

I really think you should not consider offering the playing of wargames as evidence and reasoning for a debate. You may be a good war game player, I don't know, but it won't necessarily make you a good commander in real life. As enjoyable as they are, they are not the real thing. You can't throw a dice to beat a real enemy, surely you do understand that? So I suggest, before you consider making further posts, you take a step away from the game board. It helps.

And time reference of my post is that you were suggesting in your post, should there be a modern day Russian type of Denmark invasion of Britain (sorry that is raid to you) that unlike Denmark and Spain who, against the odds, dared to resist their invaders, Britain should capitulate because of overwhelming odds and force. Like I said, that sort of mindset would not have gone down well in 1939 or any other period for that matter, including the Napoleonic period, especially not in Britain.

The Portuguese, of course, rolled over and that is what you seem to be suggesting the British should do, in our later period hypothetical scenario. The Spanish and Danes were respected for resisting, not folding. (and yes I am aware that the Portuguese fought back later on and sided with the Brits)

And it is very interesting you did not argue against my suggestion that you think the British should capitulate? As I say, as to wargames, yes well, as enjoyable as they are, and I do enjoy them, they are but wargames, not the real thing and certainly, in this case, not an acceptable form of evidence for a debate on real events that actually happened.

Ah, Gazzola, I would be only too happy to offer you a definitive statement on what I believe the government should do if you kindly do as I asked and outline why these mythical Russians, possibly with snow on their boots, are marauding around London. I assume they're not all oligarchs in search of Chelsea townhouses, by the way? You don't need to try and make up a plausible explanation as to why the British regular army is hundreds of miles away. Nor struggle to explain how the Russians gained such a naval advantage. We'll handwave those. The British did give those the Danes an ultimatum after all, so the least you can do is provide something for the Russians to be after.

As for the rest of this sadly predictable, strawman-clutching screed, I'm not aware of claiming that Wargaming has made me a military genius or given me unparallelled insights into events that took place. Please could you quote where I said that? I'm sure you are aware that Operation Sealion never took place… However, the conversation in the pub, not during the game referred to the actual plans for evacuating the Royal Family, which are well known. Certainly more substantial than your modern day scenario.

By the way, your dismissive referral to the Portuguese rolling over sounds like you believe they almost deserved the fate that befell them. Please correct me if I'm wrong on this.