""With the support of even one corps only"" Topic

Famously, Wellington declared he would stand at "Waterloo", if Blucher could promise him the support of a single Prussian corps. Now we all know what did transpire and the three corps he actually sent turned a defeat into a rout.

But what if only von Bulow's people had emerged from the Bois de Paris to face Lobau and threaten Plancenoit, or indeed had instead followed Ziethen's route to Smohain, Papelotte, La Haye etc and supported Wellington's left? Heaven help Grouchy I guess, but both sides agreed he really did not matter on the day!

I have often thought that Blucher showed genius, bordering on insanity, to risk his army as he did, but I now wonder if Wellington's offer to stand, with but a single Prussian corps in support was equally "brave" for which read "unwise".

I know this is daft question from an armchair strategist, armed with the gift of hindsight and a vast library on 1815, but I would love to know what others think.

fine line between daft and brave

Blucher was a great leader of men. A man you could admire, respect, and know that his word is good…he will do what he says or die trying.

How could you not admire the man's heart?

Like Rocky Balboa in the Rocky movies, Blucher was absolutely relentless, picking himself up over and over again, that you couldn't help but admire the heart of that man.

I, like Wellington, would bet my life on Blucher being there come Hell or high water…

Frank

Blucher absolutely hated the French, this is well documented. Wellington told Blucher he would support him if he could at Ligny; Quatra Bras prevented this.

Blucher made a promise to Wellington and personally encouraged Von Bulow's men on the march from Wavre to Plancenoit, to keep his promise.

Von Bulow's brigade consisted of 24 battalions of Landwehr, 12 of line and 9 cavalry, 5 of which again were Landwehr. They arrived in force around 4:00 PM tying up a considerable number of French troops, which could have been used against the Anglo-Allied army. (I painted most of Von Bulow's Corps up in Calpe 28mm.)
Landwehr battalions actually kicked some of the Young Guard out of Plancenoit.
(My personal opinion of the Young Guard, the best of the 1814 conscripts is that they really are not guard, but should be rated more as regulars.)

Later, portions of the Ziethen's Corps; Steinmetz's brigade showed up. Steinmetz's brigade had fought at Ligny incurring many losses as they fought at St Armand, A cornerstone of Ligny.

Napoleon observed Prussians debouching from Bois De Paris around noon according to Peter Hofschroer, causing him to move troops in that direction. He had failed to put any reconnaissance beyond Plancenoit.

Had only Von Bulow's Corps arrived, Napoleon still had to commit 3 divisions of infantry and 2 of cavalry. So really no difference in how the battle finally ended.

If Zeithens's Corps had arrived instead of Von Bulow's there may have been a better outcome for the Prussians as Steinmetz had more line/reserve troops; 24 of these and 12 Landwehr. He also had 2 regiments of dragoons, more lights and fewer Landwehr cavalry than Von Bulow. It took Von Bulow 3 assaults and much time to finally take Plancentoit. Possibly Steinmetz would have done better?

Had either of these Corps arrived on Wellington's left flank at Papelotte, then it would have allowed him to move troops from his left to the centre earlier. The extra Prussian troops moving towards Plancenoit again necessitating Napoleons move of troops to protect his right flank/rear. Also creating a more solid defensive line on the ridge.

Gaming Waterloo is usually very different. In any game I have played the French usually win. This was the case at the local HMGS West convention Enfilade. However the French lost heavily at Ligny.

Great responses.

Firstly then DoW could be sure Blucher would turn up with something. Secondly, Napoleon would probably have had to protect his flank exactly as he did. Whatever the tale of captured Prussian Hussars, all he could say for certain was that someone was heading for his right from Wavre, whether one or three corps.

Good arguments then that to stand at Waterloo, with the support of even a single corps, would have brought the invasion to a halt at the least

Just a few observations:

-Conscription was not introduced in 1815, so the Young Guard could not have been made up of recently inducted conscripts. For the make-up of the Young Guard regiments Lachouque and Scott Bowden can be referenced.

-The Prussians suffered much more heavily than the French at Ligny, and Napoleon fought outnumbered (83,000-67,000). It was one of his best-fought actions. Prussian casualties were about 34,000 (which included 12,000 deserters); the French 11,500.

-I have always found it interesting about the promised Prussian support in Belgium after Quatre Bras and Ligny. It seems to me that too many believe it was a done deal because of the promise no matter what the operational picture was. Regardless of the promise, the Prussians showed up after many operational difficulties, not the least was the defeat at Ligny and the subsequent disorganization of the Prussian army. Without the presence of Bulow's uncommitted corps (and therefore unhurt and intact) rallying the Prussians after Ligny would have been much more difficult. The promised Prussian support was not a sure thing until it actually happened. And if it had been only one corps, the French would have been successful in either delaying them or defeating them on the right flank.

-The Young Guard was thrown out of Plancenoit after desperate fighting, having repulsed the first Prussian attack, the Young Guard (4,000) being outnumbered. The support they received was two battalions of Old Guard infantry which attacked with the bayonet and threw the Prussians out, two battalions against fourteen, and inflicted 3,000 casualties on the Prussians. The Young Guard rallied and with the two Old Guard battalions reoccupied Plancenoit.

-Bulow was at St. Lambert around 1300. He was followed at a distance by Pirch and Zieten. At 1500 Bulow had his corps assembled behind Lasne Brook at St Lambert. He was not in motion with his corps in full view of the French. Bulow did not begin to cross Lasne Brook until sometime after 1500. Bulow heard artillery fire in the direction of Wavre around 1600 and did not continue to cross until 1630 after being browbeaten by Blucher. Bulow was finally across the brook and ready for action around 1800.

-French cavalry snatched Prussian prisoners early, as well as intercepting a message from Bulow to Wellington while the Prussians were in St. Lambert. This was well to the east of Plancenoit, along a line southeast of Frichermont. French cavalry outposts were on both sides of the Bois de Paris. This was around 1600. Bulow was still northeast of the Bois de Paris.

-The Young Guard did well in 1815, fighting outnumbered on the French right flank. They were Guard troops and raised as such. Again, see both Lachouque and Bowden.

-Bulow's corps led the Prussian advance to Waterloo because it had not been engaged on 16 June.

-And there is no assurance that if only one Prussian corps that showed up on 16 June that the allies would have won.

French Conscription started during the revolutionary wars and continued when Napoleon took power.

link

Tables of Conscription starting in 1800.

link

Regarding the make up of the Young Guard, Paul Dawson seems to differ.

link

Nice analysis on both sides of the debate here.

wrgmr1: I think he meant that there was no conscription only in 1815.

I also seem to remember reading that a more forward deployment by Lobau or the cavalry initially sent beyond Plancenoit may have prevented Bulow from debouching from the Bois, or at least significantly delayed him. Although having just walked the ground I can see why the unsupported cavalry couldn't deploy closer.

Since the thread is about 1815 I would have thought that it was obvious that my previous posting was about 1815.

With that in mind, the Bourbons abolished conscription in 1814 and Napoleon did not reintroduce it in 1815.

That being the case, the Young Guard of 1815 would not have been made up of conscripts.

If the choice of sources is between Lachouque and Bowden on the one hand and Dawson on the other, the former are the sources to use.

When I was (much) younger we misread the setup instructions for AHGCs 'Waterloo' and managed to swap the entire Prussian Army for Bulows Corps.

So poor old Bulow had to fight Ligny on his own, while the entire rest of the Prussian Army turned up some time later.

It did make a French victory quite easy!