"At what range would infantry typically open fire?" Topic

Assuming relatively open terrain, what were the typical ranges infantry would be ordered to open fire on an enemy?

I know that's a painfully broad question but just looking for a reasonable rule of thumb.

200 to 300 yards were effective range for rifled muskets.

Watching Glory again the other day and they showed their first battle with two lines facing at what looked like less than 100'. I don't know how anyone could not get hit except for the guy next to you is shot twice. That being said I still like to believe if not literally it took a man's weight in lead to kill him.

It's not only so much about effective range, though very important, it's also about visibility of the target. Based on my time on the Army rifle ranges, etc. … The 300 meter target is barely visible. Today most firefights take place around 250m or less. Based on terrain, LOS, FOF, etc. … At about 200-250m the human target is still pretty small. But presents a much better target than 300m. Here's another example. Both the M14 and M16 have the same max effective range – 460m. At that range, with open iron sights, you'll have a very small target indeed. But note both those rifles have different ammo and specs. The Max range of the M14 [7.62] is around 3700, the M16 [5.56] about 2500. In many cases during the ACW units would maneuver into firing positions of less than 50m to be effective. Of course we are now talking about "blocks" of human targets not individuals. Keep firing "block vs. block" and sooner or later you'll hit something.

Terrain has a lot to do with it – ACW battlefields were rarely the open billiard tables many of our games see.

Also, Minie rifles had a steeply curved trajectory. Firing at much over 150 yards called for range estimation skills that most regular infantry didn't have. Sharpshooters and such were another story.

Thanks guys.

How standardized was training? I assume there were printed manuals that explained at least in theory how a commander should order his troops?

Obviously, reality can differ from the theory but if we know what the text book assumption was, then we can work backwards from there :)

The following is from Mark Grimsley, "Surviving Military Revolution: The U. S. Civil War" in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press (2001), pp. 74-91.

"These dynamics go far beyond the hoary, college-survey notion that the Civil War was a revolutionary conflict by virtue of its technology or tactics. Such a notion is misleading and sometimes flat wrong. The text-books tell us, for example, that the new rifle-muskets greatly extended the range and killing power of the infantry and that this innovation revolutionized the battlefield. In fact, a survey of the ranges of engagements in all major battles between First Bull Run (21 July 1861) and the Battle of the Wilderness (5-6 May 1864) reveals that the average infantry unit opened fire on its opponent at a distance of 116 yards – an improvement over the 80-100 yards characteristic of smoothbore warfare, but at best an incremental improvement."

This statement is footnoted as follows:

"This sample was created using the keyword "yards" in a computer word search of War of the Rebellion…. The search yielded numerous references to ranges of engagements. The battles examined were First Bull Run (2 unequivocal range references), Second Bull Run (8), Antietam (21), Fredericksburg (10), Chancellorsville (16), Gettysburg (25), Bristoe Station and Mine Run (7 combined). If anything the ranges were somewhat shorter, since five of the longest ranges are from attackers' estimates of the distance at which they first received musketry and artillery fire. (It is uncertain they could have detected the difference between the two types of fire.) In any case, the findings corroborate those of Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (1987), pp. 144-150. From his own survey of Civil War ranges of engagement, Griffith concluded that the average range for musketry was 127 yards. One explanation for the relatively short range is that most Civil War commanders preferred the shock effect of a single close-range volley as opposed the the firepower advantage of several volleys delivered at longer range."

Another important factor in the mix is the very correct idea that your first volley is the best you will get so use it wisely. The advancing enemy may be visible at two hundred yards but you withhold fire until they present an unmissable target at one hundred yards or less, sometimes much less.

I think you will find that the exact same thing, holding the first volley for a devastating blow at close range, was normal for the smoothbore era. The difference being that the ranges are even closer, whites of their eyes range. That brings up a question, at what range do you see the whites of their eyes? Ten yards? Anyway, I would imagine fifty yard or less would be typical for the smoothbore era. Has that been surveyed?

I think the mistake that's being made is thinking that an extra fifty yards of effective range isn't a revolution on the battlefield.

According to Paddy Griffith, Brent Noseworthy and Earl Hess, it appears that ranges were slightly longer on average than Napoleonic but not much. The steeply curved trajectory mentioned above and the lack of training in estimating range and aiming fire are given as reasons for casualties that are similar to wars using smoothbore muskets that preceded the ACW.

I just received Earl Hess' latest book on infantry tactics in the ACW, but I have not read it yet. Too busy with books on the creation of the U.S. Constitution at the moment. I will check back with you when I have gotten to it.

Very nice guys, thanks.

How standardized was training? I assume there were printed manuals that explained at least in theory how a commander should order his troops?

Same answer I always got from IBM techs, "It depends".

There were numerous manuals available. Most popular was Hardee's Tactics, which was a translation of a French Chasseur manual adjusted for a 10 company battalion instead of the French 6. Zouave regiments often followed French Zoauve drill. There were lots of drill manuals and not everyone got the popular ones.

There is a story of one farmer officer ordering his farmer troops with Gee and Haw commands. Lincoln, when a captain in the Black Hawk War, could not figure out the correct command to get his company through a gated fence. He told them to fall out and then fall in on the other side.

One difference that seems to be ignored is that beyond about 125 yards the smoothbore musket roundball had a much deeper drop than the shaped miniball. ………. ………………. The smoothbore did not even have sights (other than the bayonet lug), whereas the Enfield/Springfield had "zero->100yard" 300 yard and 500 yard leafs. Infantry in fixed defense positions would have time and pre-battle ranging shots to estimate even the far distances. ……………………… So the ACW rifled muskets could put down a longer range "area fire", whereas the smoothbore couldn't. Tactically, if an enemy was approaching, the usual choice was the same- fire a first volley at a short range where the morale and actually killing effectiveness per volley was the most. ……………………The most important (I think) feature of shooting with such iron sights is the appearance of the size of the target, when looking down a barrel. Think in terms of the height of a man, when looking through the rear sight at the front sight in terms of "thumbs". What do I mean by "thumbs"? Close one eye, stretch out your arm and look the height of your thumb held horizontal at arm's length. That is a "thumb". It is a measure of the angle of elevation that the target takes up. At 50 yards, a 6 foot man is about 1 "thumb" tall and at 125 yards he is half a "thumb" tall. You have to hold your weapon still within this sight picture to hit that man. (If your weapon is properly loaded and sighted, then the bullet trajectory doesn't matter at all- it could be a 220 Swift or a Brown Bess- if it is sighted properly for range then its all the same). I think this is the real reason for the issuing fire at short ranges. Short range meant that the human error in leveling the gun became acceptable compared to the perceived size (height) of the target………………………..(note: prior poster, Legion4, is onto this idea as well)

Yes, I spent a lot of time shooting in my youth before joining the Army Infantry '79-'90. The closer the target, the better chance you have hitting it, of course. For those who have limited time in weapons' firing. You can do a little exercise. Have someone stand at difference ranges from where you are standing. Note it does not take very long to see how small a human target gets at longer ranges. Like I said, at 300 meter a human target is down right tiny with open iron standard sights.

When firing my M-14 from a foxhole, I could hit anything under 250 m. Beyond that, I couldn't see the target.
ACW firing was anywhere from 200 yds to point blank. I read an account from the Army of the Tennessee recalling how, from the top of a hill, the men layed down and waited until the Rebels were almost upon them. They then rose up as a unit and fired at point blank range, driving the Confederates back. Of course the Rebs reformed and hit them again – several times in fact, but could not get closer than a dozen yards from the Union line.

Typically 100 yards or less.

Even in ideal circumstances, the repulse of Pickett's charge, most infantry regiments reserved fire until 80-100 yards.

I don't see anyone opening up at 200-300 yards. It would be a waste of ammuntion and needlessly start fouling the pieces. A trained rifleman who had time to position himself and aim at a target might take a 300 yard shot, a firing line would not.

As noted above, most people can not hit a target 300 yards away now when using modern rifling and ammo manufacturing technology. I say 150 yards max, 100 and under if possible.

To add to the discussion: the Enfield and Springfield rifled muskets had a muzzle velocity of 800 feet (245 meters) per second. That alone limits the ability to fire effectively to 200-300 yards (180-275 meters).

A skilled sharpshooter could hit a target at a much longer range (see Gen Sedgwick who may have been killed by an Enfield), but the mass of soldiers were taught to fire fast, not aimed.

Weasel's question about what was said in the manuals is an interesting and important one. The main manuals used during the war, Hardee, Casey, Scott, and the various ones derived from those three are, for the most part, simply a set of instructions for drilling infantry in the various movements that would be needed on the march and in battle. There is virtually NOTHING in any of the manuals instructing an officer HOW to fight. No advice on what range to open fire at, no advice on which formations to use in which situation. As Sherman stated after the war in relation to tactics manuals: "Thus far in our history tactics have been simply a collection of rules for passing from one formation to another. How to fight has been left to the actual experience of war."

Anyone care to comment how this translates to Zulu & Sudan colonial conflicts with the Martini-Henry? The British must've opened up at must longer ranges to achieve the casualty rates that they did. 23,000 killed & wounded at Omdurman vs 430 British casualties.

JPK

That's the British.

The British infantry destroyed the Russian artillery line at 800 yards at Inkerman. They were vollery firing, but shook out into a open order under cover and plonked away for hours.

There is a very large degree of training necessary to apply effective fire at long range. Few units in the ACW ever got it, and only really the CS Army of Tennessee and some select sharpshooter units were that capable.

When playing Volley and Bayonet I rate US and most CS infantry as having smoothbores for range, but +1 die for the percussion ignitition.

Also have to consider that many units on both sides, especially in 1861-2, were armed with smoothbores -- some units (such as the Irish Brigade) even preferred them. At Port Hudson, in the summer of '63, many Confederates units were armed with smoothbores. After a few unsuccessful Union assaults, many Rebels had two pieces, a captured rifle for skirmishing and long-range work, and their regular smoothbore for close-range fighting. (Probably loaded with buck-and-ball.)

The British must've opened up at must longer ranges to achieve the casualty rates that they did. 23,000 killed & wounded at Omdurman vs 430 British casualties.

At Omdurman the British are armed with the Lee-Medford rifle which had replaced the Martini-Henry. It was a bolt action, 10 shot, magazine feed modern rifle.

They also had long ranged rifled artillery and Maxim machine guns directed at massed infantry armed primarily with swords and spears charging over level ground with no cover.

There is no comparison between this and the ACW

Kim

Agree Kim … I've fired both muskets and bolt action … very little comparison …

I always find this question coming up, and the answers above pretty much sums up what is written. The impact of the rifled musket is over rated for the reasons given.

The revolution in the ACW came with increased rate of fire, not range. Later Union cavalry actions attest to this. It was the beginning of suppressing fire and shock tactics….at least in my humble opinion.

Wouldn't increased accuracy have been at least as important as increased range? if not more so? Especially for things like skirmishing.

The effect of skirmishing and skirmishers in a major battle was pretty much inconsequential.

While a rifled musket would be more accurate at 100 yards over a smoothbore firing at a single target, when the target is a mass of troops standing shoulder to shoulder the casualty rate will be pretty much the same.

Kim

In my opinion the real revolution in ACW warfare is caused by the rifled musket, but not concerning its effect on enemy infantry but rather on artillery and cavalry. Its greater effective range and accuracy, as humble as it in fact was, still negated the ability of either of those two arms to close assault the enemy.

Far and away the greatest killing power of civil war era artillery is with canister. You could no longer bring your artillery within canister range to assault massed infantry. If you did so your crewmen and horses would be shot down. Shot, shell and shrapnel at long range was harassment but could not break an enemy formation. This shifted artillery to being really deadly only on the defense when the enemy had to enter its canister range. For the same reasons cavalry could no longer charge massed infantry and expect to survive. This causes a shift in the dynamic of warfare and made the defense more powerful than the offense. As the war progressed and both armies came to be armed primarily with the rifled musket you get a foretaste of WW1. Armies now entrench any time they are in proximity and if they stay for any length of time these trenches look like something out of the great war.

The level of marksmanship training was laughable, but that does not mean that many did not learn on the job and become expert.

Don't be too quick with the WWI comparisons. Armies have known the advantage of entrenching for centuries before the ACW. This was common during sieges. But it was rarely seen in the open field because armies had to keep on the move to forage to feed themselves. They couldn't dig in and stay put or they would starve. But the railroad changed all that during the ACW. Armies could stay in one place indefinitely (and entrench). This was something new and it was caused more by the railroad than the rifle-musket.

I agree with what Panzerfaust said about artillery and cavalry. And entrenchments. While what ScottWashburn says is also true, but by the summer of '64 the main armies in both Virginia and Georgia were entrenching every new position they took, whether they intended to stay there or not -- and they often didn't stay long. For one thing, it allowed them to occupy longer lines, making it harder to outflank them even as frontal assaults became more costly.

I agree with earlier comments about the terrain. However I think it also depended on whether we are talking about skirmishers or troops on the main line.

Don't be too quick with the WWI comparisons. Armies have known the advantage of entrenching for centuries before the ACW. This was common during sieges. But it was rarely seen in the open field

Yes, that is true. But as noted as tech made weapons more lethal. In the later stages of the ACW you saw more digging in then in the earlier battles. The bottom line as any Infantrymen knows. To survive, generally in many cases you have to get something solid between you and enemy fire … Along with camo and concealment. When I say camo I mean using foliage, etc., to blend in with your surrounding, stay in the shadows, etc. … Not uniforms, which really didn't come about until WWII and beyond.