"Underwhelmed by Waterloo?" Topic

Apart from the media exposure on the 200th Anniversary I for one have long since found Waterloo a bit of an uninspiring battle in terms of its tactics and generalship (on both sides).

Its certainly not in the top ten battles to refight, as far as I'm concerned.

In Rory Muir's second part of his Wellington biography, "Wellington – Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace, 1814 – 1852" he makes the following points, which while well known, sum up for me both the battle and Wellington's part in it.

It was a very small battlefield given the size of the armies, Wellington had well over 20,000 men per mile of front compared to 8,000 at Salamanca. This affected both how the battle was fought and how it was remembered. Essentially it was a crude slogging match, 'hard pounding' in Wellington's famous phrase,in which the French attempted to batter the allies into submission and the allies tried to endure until their enemies were exhausted, with only the occasional quick counter-punch to ease the pressure. This limited Wellington's role; he could make no grand plans or direct sweeping strokes, but he could move among his men, encouraging and inspiring them, making small adjustments to the position of units and feeding his reserves as slowly as possible into the fray, for in such a battle of attrition victory was likely to go to whoever had fresh reserves towards the end of the day.

Like I said nothing new, but one of the most effective short explanations I've seen in a good while and as always, the question of where those "fresh reserves" might have been found with out the Prussians!

Trajanus

I agree completely but there are a few factors which make this battle such a household word:

* Napoleon was defeated and it was his last battle
* Wellington was victorious and it was his last battle
* The enemy was the hated French.
* The British claimed the entire victory for themselves
* A lot of books and memoirs are available in English
* It is situated close to England and therefore to English tourists. This applies equally to 1815 as to now as at that time an entire generation of English people could not visit the continent. Spain was too far away and even then Spanish battlefields were generally in remote locations for tourists in carriages. Brussels was, and still is, ideally located.

So Waterloo will always be famous in the English speaking world.

Modern research which shows the role played by allies and Prussians is too recent to penetrate deep seated beliefs.

The British claimed the entire victory for themselves

They really never have, from the day of the battle until now. There has been debate about the realtive merits of the contributions that all participants made – applying as much to the individual arms and regiments which participated.

They really never have, from the day of the battle until now.

The Duke of Wellington did, though.

Wellington did admit in his despatch written 18-19 June that he could not have done it without Blucher and the Prussians. He seemed to develop a more selfish view as he got older. Maybe the personal adulation got to him.

I think any battle that is the last major battle of over twenty years of war is going to attract some attention. It was also very decisive. If Napoleon had won and the war had continued then it would probably be only a footnote, except to be the battle Wellington lost, perhaps the first of many!

The drama and controversy also attract attention, it was indeed a close run thing. If any side had made slightly different choices then the result could have been very different.

In wargaming terms it is also fairly straightforward to do, compared to, say, Austerlitz or Salamanca. Austerlitz would be a very different battle with foreknowledge of what Napoleon is doing, and Salamanca probably would not have happened at all if Wellington had not spotted a fleeting opportunity to capitalize on Marmont's mistake.

I could be wrong but other battles might be more predictable in their result, Bussaco is almost always going to be impossible for the French and Borodino is most likely to end in stalemate. It is my impression that Waterloo can easily go either way.

In terms of Britain's view of the Prussian contribution, I think this was more and more downplayed as time went on as the need for a myth of British supremacy and to keep rising Prussia from getting any prestige played a part in later nineteenth century realpolitik

The Duke of Wellington did, though.

Did he claim the entire victory for himself? When was that, news to me.

Completely agree with Trajanus' OP. Waterloo is all about its' political significance, not the military details of the battle.

For me, Waterloo is to Napoleonics what NW Europe/Normandy is to WW2; a relatively small slice which English-speaking gamers tend to focus on completely out of proportion.

Just as I think the Eastern Front is much more broader and interesting in WW2, I think the Austrian/Russian/Prussian constant struggle against Napoleon is more interesting.

To counter the idea that Wellington claimed the entire battle for himself and the lads on the ridge above Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, here's a passage from Wellington's Dispatch to Earl Bathurst, ‘Waterloo, 19th June' 1815

My Lord
"… I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of
General Bülow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded…"

However, his recollections seemed to change as time passed ….. In much later years he claimed that he visited Blucher in Wavre the night before the battle. This was done to ensure that Blucher was indeed coming to support his defensive position. Nobody else supported that claim. That was Wellington attempting to shore up his risky decision to stand at Waterloo – obviously his decision would look better if he had a personal guarantee of Prussian support, rather than a tentative promise.

The greatest reason for the interest in the battle of course is that it ended Napoleon's career. Plus it was a very short campaign, and it's the campaign that brings up a lot of "what-ifs."

The 1813 campaign, in my opinion, is the most fascinating campaign for "what-ifs." I've always been drawn to some of the battles that gave Napoleon a run for his money, i.e. Eylau and Aspern-Essling.

Wellington did admit in his despatch written 18-19 June that he could not have done it without Blucher and the Prussians. He seemed to develop a more selfish view as he got older. Maybe the personal adulation got to him.

Or, like virtually all participants in notable events, his memory concentrated more on his own deeds as the years passed – an all too human tendency. Happens in any contest – war, sports, you name it.

Yep, the battle itself has never seemed particularly interesting, apart from its political impact. That said, I have very much appreciated the festivities, in combination with the internet, because we've just been awash in images of re-enactors. It's been a real pleasure to see the wealth of textures and colors--particularly the various shades of white on each uniform. Great stuff.

I was surprised how long after the battle a lot of the accounts were written. I didn't realize that Mercer wrote his account 50 years later until I read Glover's Waterloo: Myth and Reality (a book I recommend). By then he just came across as a bitter old man and you can't trust a lot of what he wrote. Kennedy was another one I believe who wrote much later and I've read that he can't be fully trusted with his details.

The campaign was short and decisive, making it one of the most easy to re-create. That's a large part of the appeal for me. That's why my gaming army of Wellington's is built for Waterloo and not the Peninsula. Mind, I do put on Peninsular battles with the redcoats wearing the wrong shako.

Why do we become fascinated with any battle? Emotion and some element of social conditioning certainly play a role for me when it comes to Waterloo. It was Napoleon going out with a bang. It could only have been more dramatic if he had died in battle like Montcalm. Blucher's role was undeniable in securing victory but I do think in proper attempts of diluting British credit people tend to overplay how much of the fighting Blucher's troops did. Nevertheless, the Prussians certainly did a damn sight more than just turn up. Where it seems that Wellington and the public memory fall down is the lack of credit shown to his own army – an 'allied' army – not a British one. Then again, Wellesley never did rate many of his own subordinate and even experienced generals. This is perhaps to be expected by an aristocratic micro-manager – especially with his proven track record of success.
Growing up with my Ladybird books and my Action Transfer booklet of Waterloo and the plastic soldiers of the Airfix Waterloo series where were only ever red-coats to be seen. Makes an impression.

Visiting the battlefield makes is very evocative. As the battle drew to an end both the French and the Anglo Dutch were exhausted – those closing hours were extraordinary in the determination on those two sides. Maybe it is not the most tactically interesting battle – but it does has a big lump of the epic about it.

The British claimed the entire victory for themselves

Oddly enough, nobody has ever cited a single historian, British or otherwise, who makes any such claim. Hofschroer doesn't even include any British writers in his bibliography IIRC. It remains a mystery who, exactly, claims Waterloo as a British victory.

Mercer wrote his account 50 years later

He wrote it based on his journals of the time. You have only to read it to see this – he describes individual peasants' dress and the insides of his bedrooms. He couldn't have done all that from 50-year-old memory.

Mercer's sin has been to undermine the claim that Germans won it by providing eyewitness evidence of the brittleness of the Brunswickers and of the effects on his battery of Prussian friendly fire. He was tactless enough to voice a heresy, essentially.

The Prussians actually came perilously close to losing the campaign for the Allies on 18 June. Wellington had requested the assistance of one Prussian corps, and fought the battle on the basis that one would come. Despite turning up late and despite having only a three to one numerical advantage, Bulow did eventually manage to crush the 10,000 French opposed to him. So Wellington's estimate of the help he would need was broadly right, although in asking for one corps, he seems to have over-rated the fighting performance of such a formation. He seems to have assumed that if his 68,000 men were assisted by 20,000 or so Prussians, he would have the measure of Napoleon.

The Prussians instead sent three corps. One did most of the Prussians' actual fighting, the other two did relatively little other than releasing troops from Wellington's left. Realistically, no more than one more corps besides Bulow's was needed, or only Bulow's had its fighting performance been up to par with any of Wellington's corps. The other(s) should have been with Thielemann at Wavre, who got defeated, ensuring that he won.

The result could very easily have been defeat at both Wavre and Waterloo. The better strategy to avoid it would have been two Prussian corps at each battlefield. There is some irony in the fact that part of the claim for "German" significance in the campaign is the Prussians' sterling work after Waterloo in handling Grouchy, but Grouchy was only still in the game because they let that happen on 18 June. Had every French force in the field been defeated on 18 June it is highly unlikely there'd have been any further resistance. As it was, Wellington correctly judged that Waterloo had politically ended the campaign. The Prussians' own chevauchee pursuing a beaten enemy possibly had much to do with the continuation of French resistance.

Wellington rather than the British was the key to allied victory; the Allies won every battle at which he was present and lost all those at which he was not, including those where the allies had numerical superiority and their choice of the ground.

The Royal Marines won the battle of Waterloo. So there, I just claimed the entire victory for the Corps.

I think the battle has more in common with a (failed) assault on a fixed position than the more "skillful" manoevering type battle. Wellington chose his fortress – a reverse slope with two bastions (La Haye Sainte and Hougoument) and packed it with troops. The ensuing French head-on assault was predictably bloody.
What strikes the reader of many Allied first hand accounts is that so many witnesses remark on how they couldn't believe that the French chose to relentlessly repeat this bludgeoning when it was so evidently hopeless.

I'm not a wargamer but I would suppose that such a game doesn't offer as much scope for imaginative tactics.

Make sure the comparisons are apple to apple.

Strategic decisions and goals vs operational decisions and goals are very different things. Tactical errors on the battlefield are usually out of the hands of CinC's but it is operational art that sets up the victory and Wellington always did better at supporting the strategy best suited for Britain to continue the fight.

If one is staying true to the strategy needed to win wars, I think no one can find fault with the superiority of Wellington. He knew never to waste his one and only army he might ever have and to effectively absorb all his allies support for maximum potential no matter how long it would take. Slow, steady and let the weight of numbers and time crush Boney down. Less dramatic but it won the war. Wellington never lost a battle and he never fought a battle unless he was fairly sure he could maximize his chances to win it.

Ol Vorwarts screwed up at Ligny because he wanted to meet Napoleon quickly and made the grand mistake of trying to quickly concentrate too closely to his enemy. Wellington, the more cautious, broke from the initial allied plan to make sure that he was not cut off from his LOC to the Channel ports, a unnecessary caution. Napoleon's speed here was disconcerting and Wellington was a bit slow off the gun as a result and could not really protect Bluecher. A mistake but not fatal in hindsight. That plan should have been trashed and the original assembly point should have been aimed at Mont St. Jean Wavre in the first place. Who made the forward plan of concentration to defend the Sambre?

The Battle at Mont St. Jean was based on the knowledge that Bluecher would be in the fight or close enough to be a concern. It was a gamble but a lesser one well mollified by knowing his ally was still nearby and game. Had the presence of Bluecher not been known, undoubtably Wellington would not have stood his ground at Mont St Jean and fallen further back. He had the luxury of time on his side.

To win the campaign…all Wellington and Bluecher needed to do was contest and survive…Russian and Austrian forces would provide the final blow to end Boney's career as needed. Napoleon had to have a major victory early or it would be 1814 all over again.

the battle has more in common with a (failed) assault on a fixed position than the more "skillful" manoevering type battle

Indeed. Wellington punched a boxer, i.e. made Napoleon fight the wrong battle. That was the skill.

4th Cuirassier

Wellington rather than the British was the key to allied victory; the Allies won every battle at which he was present and lost all those at which he was not, including those where the allies had numerical superiority and their choice of the ground.

Maida, Barrosa, Albuera and Corunna victories belong to?

Mercer's sin has been to undermine the claim that Germans won it by providing eyewitness evidence of the brittleness of the Brunswickers and of the effects on his battery of Prussian friendly fire. He was tactless enough to voice a heresy, essentially.

The Germans didn't win it either, It was a joint victory.

Paul :)

Broglie

* The enemy was the hated French.

Did the French hate their enemy?

* The British claimed the entire victory for themselves

As with British Historians neglecting the Prussians in their books and on maps, it's a big fat myth.

* A lot of books and memoirs are available in English

Yup! They certainly are! What's your point?

* It is situated close to England and therefore to English tourists. This applies equally to 1815 as to now as at that time an entire generation of English people could not visit the continent. Spain was too far away and even then Spanish battlefields were generally in remote locations for tourists in carriages. Brussels was, and still is, ideally located.

'English'? I assure you that most tourists then and now are made up of people from all over the British Isles.

So Waterloo will always be famous in the English speaking world.

As it would be with the French if Napoleon had won.

Modern research which shows the role played by allies and Prussians is too recent to penetrate deep seated beliefs.

And what deep seated beliefs are they then?

Paul :)

Albuera is a rather hollow victory, won by a larger force on the defense against a force 2/3 their size. It shouldn't have been close. Beresford was not up to independent command. I would also say the battle would have been lost if Zayas had not held out for 2 hours against great odds.

But yes, the Allies did manage to win some battles against Napoleon where Wellington wasn't present – Aspern-Essling, and Leipzig come to mind. And there were those battles in 1813 and 1814 when the Emperor wasn't there, like Katzbach.

It's been interesting enough for many a reader, wargamer and historian. Another pointless thread …

vtsaogames – I am sure Napoleon was at Leipzig FYI…

Pointless?

Not at all. The OP is posting his opinion. You disagree but that doesn't make it pointless.

Using "everyone likes it" logic must mean if movies Avatar and Titanic are not your among your favorites your opinion on movies is pointless. Or "Happy Birthday" is your favorite song to listen to.

It's sort of like telling a Texan that the Battle of San Jacinto was insignificant.

I find the battle very remarkable that two army commanders – of different personality – like Wellington and Blücher – put all their egos behind one goal – beat NtG – this they did with a minimum of planning.
Both were hell bent to support each other.

@ dibble

I am talking about the Waterloo campaign, not the Napoleonic wars in general.

It is however true that from 1806 the Prussians won against the French only when they had either numerical superiority or an ally on the field – but not always even then. 1815 was no exception.

The great emphasis on wargaming the Pennensula, the Hundred Days campaign and Waterloo in particular must have some cultural root: The field of Napoleonic wargaming is more English in origin and tradition than any other. Between Great Britain, Australia, the United States, New Zeland, etc, there have been more innovative Napoleonic gamers, more resources, research, etc. Also, they won.
I would postulate that the French Napoleonic wargaming 'tradition' tends to focus on more on other years and campaigns, ones that offer French gamers more options for glory!

While Waterloo was "hard pounding", so was Ali vs Foreman and that is reckoned to be one of the most fascinating boxing matches of all time. Close contests between greats fascinate.

At Waterloo two of the greatest generals of all time were fighting with relatively even armies directly in a battle of move and countermove and it was a remarkably near run thing. Underwhelming?! And it has the dramatic aspect of the Prussians "riding to the rescue" in the nick of time!

And conveniently the bad guys wore blue and the good guys wore red so you know which side to cheer for ;)

To my English fellow wargamers,
I don't think anyone is suggesting that any particular historian is claiming Waterloo as British victory. It's more the way the story is told and can often be more of what is not said and what someone chooses to highlight which skews the interpretation. For example, Adkin in his Waterloo Companion makes the following 'observation' when speaking of the 3,300 allied troops missing in action (desertions): "… almost half were Dutch or Belgian troops and of the remainder about 500 were from the Havoverian Duke of Cumberland's Hussars …" Given that British troops accounted for 36% of the Allied army (Adkin again)Adkin's unstated calculation has British 'missing' at 34% – proportional to their representation like the rest. The difference is, he highlights allied nationality when writing of negatives. It's subtle and may not even be deliberate – just culturally myopic. I highlight this not as a criticism – just as a cautionary note. I think everyone has the same tendency. In Australia most people (not students of history I stress) could be forgiven for thinking that only Australians and New Zealanders landed at Gallipoli in 1915 – it's the way we chose to tell the story to ourselves and neglect context.
I don't know why a French wargamer wouldn't play Napoleonics. In the field of military acheivement, I'd have thought they had plenty to crow about. A look at the TMP statistics though clearly indicates this is a very English speaking international group.

I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them.

For the hard of thinking, just read it slowly. Read it aloud if it helps. Nobody's watching.

(Written by Wellington in the first formal report of the battle – the one that would decide its public meaning for ever more)

Returning to the OP's point, whilst I agree with all your points, and finding it a very frustrating battle to refight from the French perspective, I disagree with your conclusion.

I think Waterloo is eminently wargameable for a number of reasons:

1. Its the one horse and musket battle everyone has heard of – even better known than Gettysburg

2. The small size of the battlefield, and the way it is clearly and memorably delineated by Hougomount and Plancenoit on the West and East, and neatly bisected by La Haie Sainte and the Brussels chaussee, makes it easy to layout and have everyone understand where they are.

3. With the exception of Leipzig, probably the most variety of nationalities and uniforms in one action!

4. Incredible number of 'what-if?' alternate scenarios:

From the grand tactical; Blucher doesn't turn up, Grouchy turns up. They both turn up!

The tactical; D'Erlon attacks in Column, Hougomont gets merely screened by the French, it didn't rain the night before so Napoleon's dawn attack can proceed as was planned, Ney is given a proper staff group so all-arms attacks can be coordinated.

– the list of alternate ways to play the game are endless.

I reckon Waterloo will remain of perennial fascination!

French wargamers play Napoleonics- My thought was that they may tend to focus on other years and campaigns within the Napoleonic period.

Underwhelmed? Not, not me.

I`ve been fascinated by the nature of d`Erlon`s attack and how it might have been made differently – It was so close to success!

A lot of games I`ve seen have only replayed the battle and some have even accentuated the blobbiness of d`Erlon`s columns.

Maybe you`ve seen my blogified threads ?…

TMP link

and

TMP link

Rory`s quoted summary is just that – it misses the detail and that`s where the thing has interest for me anyhow.

Hi Michael,
I had the priveledge of commanding as D'Erlon in last months refight of Waterloo at the US Military Academy at West Point. Actually, I was a figurehead, commanding the grand battery and the division that assaulted (and took!) La Hay Sante. My other divisional generals were superb in planning and execution. No matter, we chose simply to rectify some tactical errors of formation, timing, and firepower, and were able to push the enemy off the ridge.
Here is a really interesting thing:
We used two batteries of #12 guns to pound LHS from the nearest part of the ridge. Despite the obstructed lanes of fire and such, the opening of the assault with these guns on LHS 45 min prior to an inf assault made the real difference at that part of the battle. We know the French did not do this historically, choosing to follow protocol and fire at the inf on and behind the ridge. Why didn't they? Doctrine? Terrain? (exaustive study of the battery positions and topo of the firing line does not support the idea the guns were masked by ground or anything else)
My own feeling is that the French were not enegetic, creative, or opportunistic on this day. They simply did not do several things they could have done to make victory more likely.as said, formation, timing, and application of firepower.
Best,
LGQG

This battle is very hard to recreate. The French players have an advantage that Napoleon never had. They can see over the ridge. From my experience the French almost always win, because they can see the Allies every move.

Hindsight makes it very difficult to recreate ANY historical battle.

I think that the answer is/was either "soloing" it… or by using hidden units/movement for the allies.

I've never played it on the table top only on the computer.
It is very hard to win as the allies, wimning as the French is very easy UNLESS you randomize the Prussian arrival. You KNOW they arriving at some point so you play knowing they will arrive, meaning the allies are handicapped. I don't think if ever lost as a French player on any level setting provided you 1) don't get bogged down attacking Hougomont and 2) don't waste time.

Hi Michael,
I had the priveledge of commanding as D'Erlon in last months refight of Waterloo at the US Military Academy at West Point. Actually, I was a figurehead, commanding the grand battery and the division that assaulted (and took!) La Hay Sante. My other divisional generals were superb in planning and execution. No matter, we chose simply to rectify some tactical errors of formation, timing, and firepower, and were able to push the enemy off the ridge.
Here is a really interesting thing:
We used two batteries of #12 guns to pound LHS from the nearest part of the ridge. Despite the obstructed lanes of fire and such, the opening of the assault with these guns on LHS 45 min prior to an inf assault made the real difference at that part of the battle. We know the French did not do this historically, choosing to follow protocol and fire at the inf on and behind the ridge. Why didn't they? Doctrine? Terrain? (exaustive study of the battery positions and topo of the firing line does not support the idea the guns were masked by ground or anything else)
My own feeling is that the French were not enegetic, creative, or opportunistic on this day. They simply did not do several things they could have done to make victory more likely.as said, formation, timing, and application of firepower.
Best,
LGQG

But would 12 pdr cannon have made any difference? The orchard partly screens line of sight to the southern walls, and could 12 pdr roundshot have penetrated or demolished those same walls?

Allan

Hindsight makes it very difficult to recreate ANY historical battle.

While I totally agree with that I think there's a difference between playing an historic battle and playing it historically. That is to say in a scripted way.

Having said that there are ones that really can't be done.

In my view these are where the historic event hinged on a timed intervention – like Waterloo – or where some some hidden or unknown force made a key intervention – for arguments sake, say Salamanca.

I would also agree that playing out part of a battle can both negate this and be instructive – Thanks Mike!

BTW. The point of me quoting Rory was that he appears to be saying what I believe, that circumstances caused Waterloo to show neither Wellington, Napoleon, nor the military art at its finest. One side providing the wall and the other obligingly running at it!

Parts of the battle may be of interest but as a whole the tactics were pretty crude when compared with either commanders best.

@ LGQG:

the opening of the assault with these guns on LHS 45 min prior to an inf assault made the real difference at that part of the battle.

I'm always wary of this kind of phenomenon. If it was genuinely that big of a potential difference then I would think the men on the ground on the day would have seen it and done it. Either they missed the obvious, or the rules you used misrepresent the effect of artillery.

@ rallynow
The French players have an advantage that Napoleon never had. They can see over the ridge.

The fact that the Guard went forward in square as late as 7pm tells us that even then, they were still wary of a tsunami of heavy cavalry bursting on them from behind that ridge, as it had done upon d'Erlon that afternoon. The terrain did not offer merely tactical concealment and ambush opportunities to Wellington; it also hid the extent of the damage done to his army.

Had the French realised that by 7pm the only cavalry Wellington still had in hand were those being released from his left by Ziethen's arrival, they might have attacked sooner.

@ Trajanus
the tactics were pretty crude when compared with either commanders best

Aside from putting more men into LHS, what could Wellington have done that he neglected to do?

4th Cuirassier- I should have said "It made just enough difference." It still took 4 assaults as the Germans were able to re-inforce the garrison. It shook them just to the tipping point, and I don't think the place would have been taken otherwise.

Aside from putting more men into LHS, what could Wellington have done that he neglected to do?

Ah! No, that's not the point, what I'm saying is that due to the small battlefield with so many men crammed into it and faced with repeated frontal assault, Wellington could only chose from a very limited range of responses.

It's not that he didn't necessarily pick the right ones, rather that the limited range of opportunies blunted any chance of showing tactical flair.

I don't think anyone would call Napoleon a boring tactician but on this occasion he didn't so much inventiveness either.

I`ve tried the d`Erlon scenario with three more conventional attacks with variants of seeking to assault or engage the enemy.
I`ve been thinking about this for a while, but would you chaps like to suggest a more inventive method that would fit in with the practices (doctrine) of the period – you can involve 6th corps, the cavalry on the French right and/or the guard. Lots of soldiers to play with – and I`ll play it out ?

Suppose an air strike is out of the question ?

The French gave up on Balloons about 12 years earlier I think.

Michael, in our scenario it was the fresh reserves of the middle guard performing passage of lines with the division just to the right of LHS that won the ridge. Our scenario allowed these reserves ony, and they were just enough.