"Waterloo Betrayed: The Secret Treachery that ..." Topic

"Mike – in 1806 the Prussians were concentrated and maneuvering."

One of the reasons of the defeat at Jena was the lack of concentration – two "armies" Rüchel and Hohenlohe, and even Hohenlohe split up his forces again – and Braunschweig was already retreating.

It was a complete different scenario – and Ns right wing Davout and Bernadotte cut the lines of retreat to at least Rüchel and Hohenlohe's units

Stephen, vW, my point is that the use of the "Battalion Carre'" or diamond had been used before and the intention appears to have been to have the army in a shape to engage and defeat enemy forces that it met along the way. It also uses the road networks in a way to maintain concentration of forces.

In 1806 this was aimed across the Prussian lines of communication, in fact the concentration of the French forces prior to hostilities is worth researching for similarities to 1815. In 1815 the thrust is on Brussels perhaps for strategic and political reasons with the benefit of the Charleroi to Brussels axis cutting the line of communication between Wellington and Blucher.

As it turned out June 16th allowed the French to engage both the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies whilst they were in the process of concentrating and therefore at a disadvantage.

The levels of friction appear to have been high for all the armies in the campaign. Authors have pointed out the mistakes on all sides, the Prussians slow concentration especially Bulow, Wellington seems to have delayed issuing his orders for concentration etc.

For the French we see high levels of friction with a command structure that is not settled (eg late arrival of Ney), staff organisations not "match fit" and inexperience (Grouchy as a wing commander and Soult as CoS).

For the Treason case, it perhaps needs to be demonstrated that Soult's performance was significantly worse than could have been expected. Was Soult's performance below expectation under the circumstances, was he too passive in communicating in detail, did he simply seek to cover his mistakes in communicating (eg the dispersed state of I corps on the 16th).

from 1813 Napoleon was confronted with a new strategical situation, he would have to fight against indipendent armies – by good army commanders, they would follow a strategical goal.
Napoleon's system of war was not designed to cope with that – in 1815 he faced the identical problems, two armies, who supported each other, he could not accomplish anything with his old manoeuvering.
Ligny and Quatre Bras are often seen as two battles, but in my view they were one, both armies (Wellington and Blücher) already supported each othere (even only indirectly) that Blücher was saved from total destruction and Ney failed his operative goal.
As for Soult being a traitor, this has to be prooven, it is an theory. That Soult acted strange postmortem 1815 campaign makes the topic not easier.
However how could a chief of staff betray in the middle of his whole staff, some staff officers must have noted something odd going on.
The traitor theory is of course a great thing for all Napoleon apologist, and again a scape goat is presented, this time not Ney – nor Grouchy – for a change Soult.
I disagree completly that Napoleon was at his prime in 1815, he was obese, ill, showed inertia and lost his famous genial view of land and enemy armies.
He was out manoeuvred by Wellington and Blücher (certainly also by the intelligence gained from desertors) – but this simple analysis is obviously too simple to be true – and or is not a fact Napoleon apologists like to hear.
So we have
the culprits
Grouchy
Ney
Soult
who is next?

von W., in 1806 the Prussian armies may have been separated – but they were not dispersed in camps awaiting the campaign. And though they did get the chance on June 14th to begin concentrating, if we look as the Anglo-Dutch and Prussians as one allied army, then the hostilities began with the allied army largely dispersed.

Mike – was Soult's performance worse than could be expected? Absolutely. I document in copious detail that Soult's acts were not products of negligence or any other element of competence. Those works that have historically suggested Soult was not up for the job have rarely pointed to any tangible facts – and those that are used are false. (Berthier always used multiple orderlies, for example, is _not_ true – in fact to commence one campaign, 1 orderly was used for several Corps, and they were more than a day away. Vandamme was about an hour or less from HQ and within the borders of France. One well known author told me that he saw the riding accident that produced a broken leg in Vandamme's injury reports, but could not substantiate that. On June 15th, Pierre Joseph Billards did fall and break is leg, but he was a general of brigade, and the location says Saint Amand which would make the date suspect.)

Outside of Bulow's misunderstanding of the initial order, the Prussian concentration did fairly well – the 2nd and 3rd Corps were able, with prolonged force marches, gather at the Sombreffe position in 36-40 hours – which is less than the two days expected – and Bulow was further away. And this concentration began with 11pm orders – hence the initial dispatch was in the darkest of night, though then units had the entire day to execute as dawn was before 4 am.

Ney's late arrival and lack of staff was impactful… but, the lack of urgency on June 16th was completely a product of the orders from Napoleon. While many blame Ney for not seizing the day, the initial orders did not come until mid-morning, long after dawn, and they were casual in tone.

Why?

Because on June 15th, Napoleon believed his left wing was north of the Sambre and extended to Quatre Bras. Not a red-coat had been seen. Napoleon based June 16th on bad information – information Soult knew as documented in the correspondence. As reality materialized, the urgency ramped up, but the plans Napoleon made were not executable. He was telling Ney to envelop – while MORE THAN HALF of Ney's force was still closer to Napoleon.

Because of the battle of Ligny and the opportunity for decisive victory, and then the subsequent issues with d'Erlon, the world has focused on the late afternoon maneuvers rather than the tremendous issues prior. Napoleon, in his memoirs, even massaged the truth to make it appear his maneuvers on 15th produced the battle intentionally. But we must remember, Napoleon went to his death not knowing a lot of what happened on the left, and in his memoirs he reported the dispositions WRONG.

Finally, back to Soult, while intraday communications during the heat of events are where one would expect to see the greatest friction and error by a new staff (and we do see the names of places in dispatches being wrong or non-existent) the fact is Soult's greatest damage occured in interday orders – such as those to Gérard which sent him a day later and a day's march short of Napoleon's intentions. Or in the June 12th order rewrite, which has defied explanation.

As we work to augment the record, explanations may materialize. But until then, the current record, which maps to the known reality quite well, demonstrates Soult's calm, intentional acts that were authored and executed quite well. This is what the detractors ignore – those stubborn facts.

von W. – Soult was suspected of malfeasance before, during, and after the campaign.

You are making general arguments – never has this work been presented as an excuse for Napoleon. If anything, it demonstrates his arrogance at dealing with people that many close to him noted. One can lose a war by maneuver, or by poor logistics, or in this case, by poor choice of personnel. in 1815, one can argue that Wellington/Blucher operated poorly – as Clausewitz does.

What this effort was meant to do was point out realities of 1815 and this campaign that have long gone ignored, and whether Soult was a traitor, or tried half-heartedly, or just a buffoon, a great deal is documented that dramatically changes the historical understanding of this campaign.

Instead of making the same general arguments you have made several times – why not read it and then come back and argue any specific point you want.

I concede Napoleon was fat – so no need to use that one again!

How absurd to claim that Napoleon could not cope with the Allies in 1813. The victories at Lutzen, Bautzen and Dresden, and especially Dresden where he was vastly outnumbered, suggests otherwise.

And even more absurd is to possibly think of Ligny and Quatre Bras as one battle. Napoleon commanded and gave orders at Ligny and won, while Ney commanded at Quatre Bras and obtained what could be considered a draw. Had it been one battle, Napoleon would have been in total command and made sure that D'Erlon arrived where he wanted him to, which meant that the Waterloo result, had there still been a Waterloo, may well have been different.

And yet another absurd thought is to think people are looking for scapegoats. There is no need. Everyone knows that the final blame lies with the chief, as it does with the praise for his numerous victories. But they also know that Soult, Ney, Grouchy and D'Erlon did let him down and did not do as well as they should have done, for whatever reason.

And come on, Stephen was not looking for a 'scapegoat' for Napoleon's loss in his book, he was re-examining and challenging sources and the 'accepted' reasoning for what happened. For some reason, that appears to put the wind up some people. It seems more likely that Stephen's book may be challenging their 'comfy' viewpoint?

New materials have arrived, and it is quite exciting to evaluate them.

It has long been reported that Napoleon, realizing he was surrounded by royalists and spies, planted false information that could confuse the allies. Both Blücher and Wellington received reports of the feint on Charleroi and advance on Mons. Napoleon would later say in exile that he instead chose to hit the Prussians first because he believed Wellington would be slow to respond, whereas had he hit the Anglo-Dutch first, Blücher would have responded aggressively. If we believe Napoleon and Wellington, Napoleon had the campaign thought out in May at the same time Wellington was putting the final touches on his battle plan at Mont St. Jean.

But is this really true?

In the June 6th report from Soult to Napoleon, and the June 10th orders to Soult, the army was positioned in a manner that it could operate either against Charleroi or Mons. And the correspondence, including new pieces which have emerged, reinforce that whatever decision Napoleon had made, he certainly wasn't communicating it to his own staff or command!

But of course, could Napoleon really have decided in late May or early June what his plan was going to be? Again, hindsight has been the enemy of analysis for 200 years. We know what everyone did, and where the major formations were, so the stories spill out in perfect synchronicity and we believe them…

But, we know that the Allies received many reports, and many were false. And we also know, especially with the emergence of new materials, that what Napoleon communicated to Soult and his Corps was consistently a position that was to enable either an advance on Charleroi or Mons… and they state this! (these new materials will be made available, though it will take some time as even more materials are awaited.)

Once again, as with Bourmont, we must add some common sense… Napoleon was great, but there is no way he could be certain that by the time he was on the frontier on June 12/13th that the situation would have remained static. Indeed, even a new or better opportunity could have emerged.

Instead, based on his correspondence, and that of the army, we have to revise this view. What most likely happened was that Napoleon considered many options, and the allies received leaks of most. In fact, it wasn't that there was too little information, but that there was too much – something Wellington spoke of quite plainly before and after the campaign. Authors may cherry pick a few reports that seem to indicate that the Allies knew all – and while the Allies had everything – basically 100% of the French situation, they also had a whole lot more that was false… and in early June of 1815 they did not know the truth. Napoleon was in fact rumored to be on the Frontier for weeks in a row to the point that on the eve of the campaign, there are famous letters from some in allied high command dismissing any chance of an attack.

So I believe Napoleon positioned the army at the frontier with several ideas in mind, but nothing finalized. Hence, whatever information leaked to the allies could not reveal his intentions as they were not finalized and would not be until Napoleon received some final word on the Allied dispositions… and this was crucial, for a plan set in motion with 3 day old information was ripe for failure.

And of course it only took a 12 hour head-start by the Prussians to cripple Napoleon's plans.

So why is this important?

Because we are trying to understand why Soult did what he did which at times was absolutely contrary to what the record tells us he was supposed to do. The record looks nefarious, and even experts that do not agree with that possibility cannot explain Soult's acts. (by the way, not drawing a conclusion is not a weakness, especially in light of the known issues with the correspondence.)

So what this presents is a possible explanation for the problems that wrecked the final days of the French concentration on the frontier… what if Napoleon's favored plan was the advance on Mons with a feint on Charleroi?

Wellington certainly thought it was the best plan, and Napoleon would state repeatedly how great his plan was, and how he predicted everything including Wellington's slow response. Napoleon essentially said, "I outsmarted them, but Ney, Grouchy, Rain…" His supporters still stay this.

Consider that one new source has Bertrand, in a letter to Soult, referring to II Corps (Reille) as the lead Corps, I Corps the left, III Corps the Right, VI corps the center, and the Guard the rear… if you draw that box on the map, it is pointing towards Mons, not Charleroi.

Soult left Paris for his mission to Lille, and was not with Napoleon when the key decisions were made. What if Napoleon changed his mind – what if Napoleon's own agents informed him of Wellington favoring the Mons approach… (and it was obvious by Wellington's dispositions as well) what if Napoleon did not plan false intelligence, but simply let the staff around him believe the Mons approach was favored so that it would naturally leak out (this is what Callatay believes). What if the delays of the concentration let Napoleon to favor the more eastern advance – IV Corps was already going to cause a day delay.

What if what if what if – important to keep in mind that these conjectures lack any hard substantiation, and in fact, are weaker than intentional nefarious acts by Soult.

However, we must follow what we can find, and I just wanted to offer this update of the vein of research I am currently following.

What is clear to me is that the general history, that Napoleon conjured up a plan months in advance and then executed it is plainly wrong. Even if it was his favored plan, his army was moved and communicated with several options, and that these options were apparently still on the table as late as June 10th. And a late shift of the advance could offer an explanation for Soult's mangling of the June 10th orders on June 12th – especially if Soult believed the Mons advance was preferred.

And the fact that there is no record of Napoleon being pissed about the plan mangling is not a minor point. And, if Napoleon was aware that he played a role in the late confusion, it would certainly explain why the whole episode is washed over in his own accounts of the campaign.

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Of course, even if the final decision on advance created confusion, one should not be too quick to embrace as a final solution. The "smoking gun" in my mind has always been Soult's behavior on the 15th and 16th – the black and white data that has been left behind is clear: Napoleon did not know where his army was – Soult did. This came about due to a moment of confusion, and Napoleon was never informed.

Could it be that likewise, Napoleon's final decision created an opportunity to muck things up?

Regardless, once again regardless of what point of view one may take on Soult, I think there is valuable historical revision here…

The correspondence, the one primary source material we have from this campaign, makes it clear that Napoleon was keeping his options open until the very end – and common sense supports this because Napoleon's great strength was improvising in the midst of his enemies. He could not with certainty know in April or May the allied dispositions, and thus he could not have with certainty spread false intelligence of a feint towards Charleroi with advance towards Mons. More than likely, the final PLAN, and the final RUSE were the products of Napoleon's final decision – a decision that at least was not communicated to the Army until June 13th… and we may never know when Napoleon settled on the the advance on Charleroi.

And to truly appreciate how potentially awesome Napoleon's plan was, one need only wargame a June 14th advance with the Prussians still in their camps. I can see no way that the Nivelles-Namur road is held, or that the Allies can unite south of Brussels.

But didn't Napoleon want to divide each army and defeat them in detail? That is what so many historians tell us… but the correspondence, as usual, tells a completely different story.

Quite interesting my friend!. (smile)

By memory… there were some Wellington principal spy who cannot arrived to him because Napoleon close the borders?

This man was important in other campaigns. Don't remember his name.

Maybe he contact Soult? (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Grant – who had famously been captured in Spain and escaped, and then posed as an American soldier while still in British uniform, and developed contacts in Paris during 1814 that he would leverage in 1815.

I confess I only know a popular history of the man – and as we know, this may either overstate or understate reality.

Yet it is true that there was a steady stream of information coming from Paris – coming from the entourage of some of Napoleon's closest advisers, such as Bertrand. Hobhouse's May 31st diary entry has "General Letort talks of the French separating Wellington and Blucher." Does this support that this was Napoleon's plan from the start? Or does it demonstrate that Napoleon, who famously kept decisions so close to the vest, was allowing the Charleroi view to escape into the Salons of Paris where it did eventually reach Wellington's ears.

The correspondence of late May through early June always leaves open the direction of advance. If Napoleon favored one – why would Letort know? Or was this Napoleon's way of manipulating Wellington. But if this is true, then it makes the execution of the final concentration even that more inexcusable… or treacherous!

Napoleon did realize that whatever the Allies heard or believed was not all that important – all that mattered was where he and his guard could be and the axis of advance – they key was speed, could he and his army act ahead of definitive intelligence.

The answer is yes – it could… but it could not outrun intelligence that originated from within the army, and hence why the treason on the night of June 14th is so critical…

I have been challenged by some that say my book title was fantastic, and I didn't prove an impact of treason. I clearly did a bad job on this – for I would argue quite plainly that regardless of Soult, the fact that there were traitors within the French government and army is indisputable… likewise the treason of June 14th is almost indisputable. Certainly later Prussian historians were matter of fact about it, though Gneisenau, Blücher and Wellington may not have wished to share the glory with individuals they may have not respected.

But that June 14th treason only became relevant when the campaign was delayed and Bourmont was made the vanguard of the right column… and that is why I continue to seek answers to what happened from June 5th-June 12th.

Hope to hear more soon my friend!.

Quite interesting!.

Amicalement
Armand