"So What Could Napoleon Have Done Differently....." Topic

…that would have won the Waterloo Campaign. Based on your knowledge of history, and your wargaming experiences, what (if anything) do you think would have changed the outcome of(a) the whole campaign and (b) the battle at Mont St. Jean on June 18th. Have you ever played games in which a different French strategy or tactical approach brought them a convincing victory and changed history? Please stick just to the campaign itself, not the larger war involving the other powers of Austria, Russia, etc.

Well, "fixing" the Waterloo campaign is simple: 1) ensure an aggressive and effective pursuit of the Prussians after Ligny, and 2) coordinate your attacks better at Waterloo – although, without the Prussians, even a workmanlike effort would suffice.

The whole point of the 100 days campaign was a swift French advance to defeat either the Anglo-Dutch or the Prussians (ideally both) before the Austrians and the Russians appeared in the theatre.

Take away the pressure of the Austro-Russians and the French didn't need to rush against the others. They might have raised more of a field army instead.

Perhaps if he had got out of the other side of the bed on the morning of the 18th June?

Used some Preparation H before the battle.

He should have had his very best commanders with him:
(1) Davout: Nap's equal by 1815, he was wasted keeping an eye on Paris;
(2) Murat: overlook his best cavalry commander's lack of loyalty in 1813--for the moment;
(3) Suchet: he was wasted keeping an eye on the border elsewhere--success there would not matter if the main thrust were defeated. Jerome or Ney would have been better, perhaps--at least they would not have been on the field in Belgium.

Also, find someone other that Soult as Berthier's replacement; he would have done much better than Grouchy at pursuing the Prussians. Finally, Nap should have shot Fouche and Tallyrand out of hand. Leaving backstabbers in place is never a good idea.

I appreciate the good advice given above and I'm sure Napoleons would have appreciated it. What tied his hands was the political situation.

He could not appear as a bloody tyrant and shoot people such as Tallyrand. He needed to spead his talent across the various commands to keep Paris and other fronts from crumbling.

In hindsight, you can offer suggestions such as don't use Ney but before the event, how can you know.

Europe would not let him "win." Too much invested in his defeat to even let him be alive in France, much less emperor…

Murat was a no go right. He had immediately offered to support the allies if he could keep his throne.

Time and again I look at the campaign and think 'If only the French had not been so dilatory'. There were so many occasions where they missed their opportunity. Napoleon himself once said 'I can give you anything but time' and yet he seemed to waste so much time which trickled down to others. The hours wasted on the mornings of the 16th, 17th, and 18th could have been used to secure victory but were squandered and thus history was written.

Oh yes, and he should have shot Fouche and brought Davout.

Mind you, in the long run, it might not have made that much difference once the Russians and the Austrians arrived en masse.

Someone could have given him a buttload of toy soldiers and he might have been happy on Elba.

Okay, so much for the overall command postings. But the point of my question was, "what could he have done differently during the actual campaign in Belgium?" Should he, for example, have put more of his army against the Prussians? or against the Anglo-Allies? Should he have gone around the Prussians' left, and tried to cut them off from their bases of supply? or perhaps tried to do the same to Wellington by throwing the main effort around his right in order to separate him from the Channel? Or would he have done better to have kept his army concentrated and gone right up the middle, trying to achieve a true central position between the British and Prussians?

Once at Mont St. Jean on the 18th, should he have concentrated his attacks against Wellington's left? right? or again focused more on going right up the center along the Brussels Road?

In both cases, did Napoleon make the mistake of trying to advance on too broad a front, and thus gave up the concentration of force that might have brought him victory?

Concentrated on Wellington after Ligny

Wellington was ready for a move around his right, so that wouldn't have worked. If Napoleon had directed the pursuit of Blucher that would have ended the campaign.

There wasn't anything wrong with the strategy it was the execution that was the problem.
1) D'Erlon wasted marching back and forth
2) Generals used to Wellington hiding behind next hill – so moved slow

Agree with Korvessa.

And Quatre-Bras could have been an Allied disaster, if de Constant Rebecque didn't have his Dutch Belgians there in time. And even then, if the French pushed on, they should have broke through the few troops positioned there and take the crosspoint in a few hours time.

The pursuit of the Prussians at Ligny also would make a huge difference.

As Korvessa wrote, it's all about D'Erlon, if he had pushed on to Ligny, the Prussians were in for a real defeat. As far as Waterloo is concerned I don't believe Napoleon could really has won that battle, with 60.000 Prussians marching on his flank. (In a wargame you might win as French but in real life I doubt it).
What Napoleon should have done different is not some tactical move etc but just take the threat of his opponents more seriously. Napoleon underestimated Wellington and the Allied army (did not believe they had real staying power) and especially he underestimated Blücher, and there he should have know better, in 1814 it was Blücher who kept coming back instead of retreating.

Bumbydad's first 3 points are valid, I was thinking the same thing.

If Davout had been present at Waterloo and commanding instead of Ney, when Napoleon left the battle for a rest,he would not have made the same mistake Ney did sending in cavalry without support.

D'Erlon, should have made up his own mind to go one direction or the other. Following the Emperors orders to Ligny would have been the best choice

Vigorously following up the Prussians possibly would have prevented them from appearing at Waterloo.

However even if Napoleon had won both battles, the Austrians and Russians were moving on Paris. He also underestimated the resilience of the Prussians.

At Wrgmr1, there is no real evidence that Napoleon left the field for a rest, it's in the waterloo movie, but not really documented on the 18th. Napoleon was after all in command so he should have stopped Ney. I agree that Davout would have been very usefull in the campaign although I would rather see him in pursuit of the Prussians. But then Napoeon needed a sure man at his bacj in Paris, not easily corrupted and davout was just that.
For the rest I totaly agree with you.

Provide Ney with a functioning staff team so that he could have kept a grip on the Left Wing; ensuring that:

1. The various corps and divisions were properly closed, concentrated and in hand to exploit at Quatre Bras

2. Understood the plan and kept in good communications – DÉrlon!

As it was Ney was left with his personal ADC, Colonel Heymes, and a ragbag of whatever light cavalry officers he could temporarily grab. Hence half the Armee du Nord was an indiscplined, strung out traffic jam excuse of an army, with corps marching back and for to conflicting orders delivered by aides who didn't understand the situation and didn't know the command structure.

Put Soult on the left to face the British, he'd fought Wellington before. Put Davout on the right to face the Prussians. Appoint Berthier's #2 as Chief of Staff (can't recall his name, my library's in storage and Kevin Kiley and great uncle Archie Becke makes the same point iifc.)

If you're going to use Ney, give him something like the Imperial Guard where you can keep an eye on him.

Murat, politically toxic, but a useful cavalry commander.

Suchet gets a good rap for Spain, but was he a good commander in the field or a good administrator?

Make Lazare Carnot minister of war.

Better yet, try not to p/o Gouvion Saint-Cyr in 1813 and have him on side in 1815 rather than have him sit on his hands.

Navy 417 makes an excellent point – Scharnhorst realised that some field commanders needed a strong chief of staff to function; Ney was a classic case. Proving that the French staff system left much to be desired and that the Prussians were leading the way the to the future.

Won?

Why bother sending Grouchy after the Prussians?

Instead send a smaller Cavalry force to watch them and take Grouchy to Waterloo. Then Napoleon would have had two more Infantry and one more Cavalry Corps to beat the Allies and more than enough troops to face the Prussians when they showed up.
After all, Napoleon reached Waterloo on the 17th and the Prussians took an extra day to march about the same distance!

Hopeless. The coalisés would never let him, and too many of them.

Jcfrog has it.

Waterloo fascinates us as gamers and those with a military interest but ultimately all it could ever do was determine how soon Naploeon lost.

His army had already sustained losses at Quatre Bras and Ligny, even if he had won Waterloo it would not have been cost free. Replacing these would have been well nigh impossible as conscription would not have worked again and other Allied arimies were soon to be available.

I doesn't really matter if you look at things in terms of avoiding mistakes in the actual Waterloo campaign, or plan a compleatly different historial scenario, long term it plays out like the Civil War – as long as the Allies (Union) hold their resolve the French (Confederates) will lose in terms of men and resources.

It needs to be kept in mind that the hardcore rallied to Napoleon on his return, the majority of France had decided enough was enough in 1814, getting the nation to join the cause needed not just quick victories but ones where the butchers bill was virtually non existent.

@Trajanus. The question was about the Waterloo Camapign, not about changing history.

Napoleon did a many things right in Belgium 1815. He took the middle position between the two allies, parting their front. He tried to beat one ally after the other and succeeded until Waterloo. If his plan on the 18th was to pin the british right (by faint attacking Hougomont) and burst through the middle, that wasnt a brilliant plan, but could pssibly have worked, if the Prussians wouldnt show up.

IMO he should have organised a swift and bold pursuit of the prussians, that had not given them the time to reorganize. Something like the pursuit 1806 would have changed everything for the campaign.

1) Told Ney and Kellerman to write down somewhere whether or not Picquet's brigade of dragoons got to Quatre Bras.

2) Given every cavalryman a bricole so they could remove the British guns on the ridge.

stay consul for 10 years, then retire

Very droll Super Max, very droll! :o)

Understood the question Decebalus, just pointing out Waterloo made no difference to the ultimate outcome, so dreaming up what Napoleon might have done differently would still produce the same long term result!

Camcleod is right I think: If we look for strategic missteps within the campaign, then Grouchy's mission may be the crucial one. The 30.000 men assigned to him were either too much (if the Prussians were beaten, as Napoleon seems to have assumed) or too little ( to prevent a comeback, if that's what he feared). Another 20.000 thrown against Mont St. Jean, on the other hand, could well have breached Wellington's position before the Prussians got there in strength.
Not that it would have mattered in the greater scheme of things of course, Trajanus has it straight there.

We need to assume that most things could not have been changed so refining the OP…
what one thing could have changed the initial campaign and Waterloo could have gone differently….
D-Erlon, D-Erlon, D-Erlon!
The one thing changed would be…..
that once Napoleon received Neys recon of Frasne in meeting late on the 15th and no change upon the early morning of 16th coming from Ney to that affect ( which doesn't happen as we know)- He sends his most effective imperial Aide de Camp ( name?) and has him drag D-Erlon towards left flank of the Prussians under direct imperial orders.
This would have:
1) Allowed a bigger French push would highly caused Blucher to have become captured once his horse went down on him.
2) This causes a panic in the Pussian Army and Gneisenau coordinates an Earlier Prussian withdrawal and its direction becomes more , if not directly towards Namur. He one does not trust Allies and secondly his training says fall on my LOC.
3) The pursuit of Grouchy automatically now becomes effective.
4) No Prussian arriving on the 18th at Waterloo.
5) Ney does not make the mistake of the Cavalry attack since pressure of no prussians and better result with Lobau.
5) Wellington must withdrawal towards the channel and under a heavy French cavalry pursuit since cavalry corps are not destroyed by Ney's blundering.
MG

I've got a much simpler opinion.

Don't send for Ney at the last minute and then expect him to take command of an entire wing. There was no need for a "wing" commander. That's what the Corps D'Armee system was all about. Mortier had already begged out from command of the guard on account of acute sciatica. Give Ney the guard command. He had that assignment under the 1st Restoration anyway. On top of that, Ney had already proven he was not up to that level of command at both Lutzen and Bautzen. No need to prove it again.

If Reille had just commanded his own corps, along with Kellerman, and things had gone exactly as they did at Quatre Bras, there would have been no difference at that crossroads. In fact, Reille, who was more familiar with the situation anyway, might have done a better job.

The important difference would have been that, Reille, with things not going well at Quatre Bras, would not have had any authority to counter-command D'Erlon to return to Quatre Bras, and D'Erlon would have marched into the Prussian right-rear at Ligny and crushed the Prussian army.

So, you want ONE SINGLE DECISION that would have made all the difference? Give Ney the guard, and let everything else proceed as it did. GAME OVER.

Very interesting but…Not sure on that Widowson.
From politics of the Marshall-ate and when there is multiple corps moving for one mission together, was lead by one of them being appointed "Wing" or it was assigned by available resources ( Ney in this case).
None of those three was a choice or he would have done just that.
It appears Napoleon didn't really have a choice and not a case of missed opportunity with a simple action.
Much less politics in the way with an imperial Aide with imperial orders.

BTW: I meant Right flank- thanks for showing me my error.

2 cents
MG

Then here's to the Sons of the Widow…..

Great one line idea. Ney was never really fit to be left on his own. Chandler must have had him in mind when he described marshals as "mere human missile" so much that goes wrong in those 3 days in June can be traced directly him. Le brave des braves et la plus épaisse de l' épaisseur.

He should have stayed on Elba another year

The Bourbon's efforts to turn back the clock would have totally alienated the masses of the French people by then

The quarrels at the Congress of Vienna would have intensified particularly between Austria and Prussia over the German states Napoleon would then have the opportunity to negotiate with one or two powers supporting their positions in return for allowing him to return Francis of Austria was still his father-in-law and may by 1816 been in a position to help Napoleon if he were to get something out of it as well like most of Poland and the Balkans.

Another year of rest would have allowed a lot of French veterans to begin regaining their health and for the prisoners to have returned This would also have given Napoleon and some of his key officers time to recover and rest as well. A year of peace would also have given French agriculture time to improve particularly in increasing the number and health of horses.

England could not afford to keep such a large navy or army and would have disbanded a lot The may not have had the large army to commit to a European campaign that they had in 1815. Prussian reserve forces may also have disbanded by then as well.

If Napoleon had landed in early Spring of 1816 he may not have had to fight at least until autumn and possibly into the Spring of 1817 This would have allowed him a lot longer time to organize

The two unknown factor here are Napoleon's health and how well he would have been by 1817 and the possibility that the Allies would ship him off to St Helena before he culd get off Elba.

Toronto48 has a good point. He could have waited longer before returning. Who knows what may have happened then. However, all our ideas are based on hindsight. We know what happened and what could have happened if things had changed or had been done differently. Napoleon did not have that luxury.

And the suggestion that had he won it wouldn't matter because the Austrians and Russians were coming, is an interesting one. If he had won it may have stunned them, especially had he beat Wellington, the invincible one.

The allies had defeated Napoleon before but they had struggled against him in 1814 and now he had a bigger army, and one that would have been full of confidence had they beat Wellington and the Prussians, so who knows how the Allies would have reacted to that.

But anyway, no one can change history – it remains as it is.

Leave Ney back in Paris and bring Davout instead.

He should have stayed on Elba another year

Not an option – the Bourbons had welshed on their agreement to provide funds (quelle surprise!) so he had no means of providing for his faithful retainers. And without retainers, no doubt the Bourbons would have employed assassins to do what they couldn't on the field of battle.

He was a gambler, and he took the gambler's throw at exactly the right time. Might have succeeded too, if he'd decided to trust Ney a few days earlier and provided him with a functioning staff….His fear of allowing a subordinate to shine clouded his judgement…

Napoleon was truly infected with that fear, and it killed him. Sidelining Davout was a big mistake, beginning in 1813. Rejecting his flank attack idea at Borodino is another example of that phenomena.

But GB would NEVER have allowed Napoleon to return under any circumstance.

The answer seems to have been nothing he could have done differently. Even if he had won the campaign in "Belgium", the Alliance was determined to see him out. Not necessarily to replace with a Bourbon king…but no way was he coming back running France. Even Austria was far from prepared to see him back…as for the Tsar and Prussia……

He underestimated the strategic determination of Europe and the tactical abilities of soldiers of countries that had been second rate in previous conflicts.

So the only thing he could have done is not play the game at all (That film and Tick Tack Toe and the computer…was it Wargames?). But then the poor devil could not just stay on Elba……..

He could not win whatever he did by 1815…..he gambled there was not the will to fight once more in exhausted nations. As soon as that was not evident………..hopeless……like the Kamikaze. You fight on even though……

D'Erlon, should have made up his own mind to go one direction or the other. Following the Emperors orders to Ligny would have been the best choice

When given contradictory orders by two higher-ups, you always follow those given by the guy who signs your paycheck! Send your last division to help Ney (it might not make it to Ligny in time anyway) and hit Blucher's right. Even if the Prussians weren't completely routed, they still would have been driven off the road to Wavre and so unable to help Wellington.

Very interesting discussion, just one comment: If the Prussians would have been decisively beaten at Ligny, Wellington would not have fought at Waterloo, he would have retreated further, covered by the Foret de Soignes, and probably ultimately embarking his troops.

Soultadvised Napoleonic not to send so many troops with Grouchy.
I believe he said an infantry corps and a few thousand cavalry would suffice to pursue the Prussians.

If taken, this advice would have given Napoleon the extra infantry he needed. This might have stopped Ney using cavalry where infantry was required to break the British lines.

IMO Grouchy's force does seem over large for what it was intended to do and a waste of men for what it actually did do.

BTW imagine if Ney had of been assigned to Grouchy's role and vice versa.

I'm late to the discussion, but what is so often overlooked in discussing this campaign is that Napoleon intended to commence hostilities on June 14th.

The French concentration, often called brilliant, was a disaster. Gérard was ordered a half-days march and a day late for a June 14th start. The Reserve cavalry did not receive the June 10th orders until June 12th. The June 10th final concentration orders were rewritten by Soult that removed the right column – Napoleon countermanded what he could, but III Corps remained in the center and IV Corps was lone on the right spread from Florennes to Mariembourg.

The delay of the campaign had fatal consequences as it allowed traitors (See Prussian accounts, specifically Lettow-Vorbeck) to tip off the Gneisenau and allowed the Prussian army to begin concentrating at the Sombreffe position a full 12 hours earlier.

Had Napoleon's intentions been executed, the French army, on June 14th, would have crossed the Sambre and seized the Nivelles-Namur road. No battle of Quatre-Bras, no battle of Ligny, the paved artery connecting Blücher to Wellington cut south of Brussels.

What do the Allies do then? On a boardgame, they attack in perfect coordination. In real life, if either attempted to act against Napoleon, he could turn on either an eat it.

Most likely retreat, and Napoleon reaches Brussels on June 15th. He had already printed proclamations as he expected this result, and he had placed Flemish speaking guides in the vanguard – Flemish is spoken predominantly north of Brussels.

So the singular action Napoleon could have taken was with his choice of Major-General. He was NOT seeking to split the allied armies and defeat in detail. This was a political campaign, to seize Brussels, to force the King from Ghent, to galvanize France and stabilize his government. He completely believed the allies would retreat when he gained the Nivelles-Namur road. He believed this on June 16th, and his orders to Ney were clear: he would push a single Prussian corps as far as Gembloux, and they would force march through the night to Brussels.

However, he was unaware of the Prussians beginning their concentration on June 14th before midnight, and he was unaware of the progress of his left wing (see his and Gourgaud's memoirs versus reality – see the correspondence – see the Bulletin that said Quatre Chemins was taken. Note, this was not a lie to impress Paris, "Quatre-Chemins" was not a place anyone knew, and during the campaign, the French called it numerous things… Soult called it "Trois-Bras" The lancer from the guard cavalry called it "Quatre Bras." It was a crossroads near a farm. Now, Fleurus was a famous Republican victory from 1794, and the Bulletin outright lied when it said that the French were masters of all of Fleurus)

Finally, Napoleon did not say that the battle of Waterloo would be as easy as breakfast – the sole source for this quote did not even use it in his own book, and half the quote was well known first appearing in Chateaubriand's memoirs. Most likely, it was to hide the fact that Napoleon did send recall orders, through Soult, to Grouchy the night of June 17th and early 18th, and Soult made sure they didn't arrive. The Prussians received one of the orderlies, see Zach, Letourner. The flankers on the right of the French line at Waterloo were told to link with Grouchy far far earlier than would have been possible if the first recall was sent at 11 am with Zenowicz. Napoleon/Gourgaud/Bernard/etc. were right, Grouchy was expected, and expected early… Napoleon was not the liar history says – for instance, the entire French army knew that Bourmont/staff had tipped off the Prussians on June 14th – Charras, and other anti-Napoleon republicans began to cleanse the traitors from the Waterloo history in the mid-19th century.

Even Victor Hugo's father-in-law was working for the king in the Ministry of War! (see his memoirs) The treason in 1815 was massive…

May 9th, Napoleon announced that Soult would be his Major-General, that was the key decision that lost the campaign in Belgium in 1815.

On NapoleonSeries forum, I have a diary of the campaign, and I also include a bibliography of where the French correspondence can be found from online sources (Gallica, de Wit, etc.) I also include a bibliography of sources related to Bourmont, and a history of the French correspondence and why it didn't aggregate until all veterans of the campaign had died. In my book, I have all the correspondence involving Soult/Napoleon for the campaign, over 100 pieces, both in the original French and translated into English, along with long passages from Lettow-Vorbeck, Rumigny, Janin, etc.