"French irredentism 1871-1914 - a threat to Germany?" Topic

Hi all,

The Germans seem to have developed the Schlieffen Plan specifically as a way of pre-empting a Franco-Russian joint attack on Germany. But can one really make a case that such an attack was very likely?

The French were very bitter about the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, yes. And their Plans XIV, XV, XVI AND XVII all incorporated planned thrusts into that territory, as a way of liberating it. But did the French ever seriously consider putting any of these plans into action, offensively? Really? Did the Germans realistically have much to fear at all from France, in the years and months leading up to the outbreak of WW1?

Cheers all,
Redcoat

Well if you mean France initiating a war, then no. Even the most aggressive members of the war party in France stressed the need for Germany to be seen as the aggressor.

Second the French has pretty much decided that they could not take Germany on a one to one basis. The threat for the Germans was not France attacking them, it was France attacking them when they were fighting Russia.

Recent historiography on WW1 has put more focus on the role of President Poincare (a war-party member) and the Centrale in encouraging Russian willingness to risk a German War in the July Crisis. So while France by itself was not a threat, France + another major power ally was.

The Germans understood that any Eastern War would probably mean a French war, and the French war party also saw any Eastern War as a chance for France to fight Germany on good odds. This guided both war-plans, and the diplomatic policy.

Mind you nothing was determined. A different French cabinet in power, a German willingness to sale Austria-Hungary for a Russian alliance, all not unlikely possibilities, might had changed the way things played out. But with the strategic and political situation that actually existed, no the Germans did not to fear France going to war first (the Russians were clear they would not support a French initiation), but need to fear France attacking a Germany already at war, or France pushing its allies for war with Germany.

I don't think it was but I think the Germans felt it was.

It seems Germany was very concerned about being "crowded in" and surrounded by great powers that were not friendly or openly hostile.

IMO, recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was a fundamental French policy goal, but was tempered by an understanding that she definitely required the assistance of allies to defeat Germany and achieve her aims. Bismarck, I think, understood this and took great pains to maintain a network of alliances – most particularly with Russia. Wilhelm IMO unfortunately failed to grasp the delicacy of this diplomatic situation; his removal of Bismarck and subsequent decision to forego renewal of the treaty with Russia was arguably the lighting of the fuze to WW1.

France's immediate offensive into Alsace-Lorraine at the very start of the war, with the elite elements of her army, is suggestive to me as to true French goals and intentions.

FWIW.

B

You get the sense there was a lot of paranoia around in 1914. Especially in Germany…..

I don't believe in second-guessing history. The people at the time were the only people who knew what was in their minds and it's the height of arrogance a historian can make to assume he knows best than them, or he can see what they couldn't.

Alsace Lorraine were provinces France would never reconcile herself to parting with forever, but it only exacerbated the situation Schlieffen faced. Schlieffen was planning what we would call a "a worst case scenario" – a Franco-Russian attack. He believed that to do so he had to knock one of them out of the war in a very short term and could not endure a long war. He felt that a quick decisive blow at Russia that would do so could never be struck. The distances were too vast. France was the much stronger of the two and did offer the strategic possibility. The plan was divorced from any "irredentism" on the part of France, it was purely a technical plan of what to do without any political considerations.

The German crown prince was toying with the idea of giving Alsace Lorraine back as a means to easing international intentions. But I doubt that would have helped matters. France wanted back was not Alsace Lorraine, but their vanity. The humiliations of 1870, 1815, 1762.

They wanted an enormous eraser to rewrite history and believe Napoleon (both of them) won.

Little did they know they would be handed the granddaddy humiliation of them all , in 1940.

This is all very interesting – thanks all, thus far.

I am interested in establishing which Germans, in June 1914, reacted to the assassination of FF in Sarajevo by saying, "Gosh, that's just what we were looking for! If we can only now stop the Austrians losing their bottle, and gee them on to attack Serbia, then that would bring in the Russians and – by jingo – we could then use Rusian aggression as the excuse that we need to implement the Schlieffen Plan and attack France too! And not a minute too soon, given all the blessed railway building that the French are subsiding in Russia…"

Who thought like that?

a) The German General Staff?
b) Bethmann-Hollweg and other statesmen?
c) The Kaiser?
d) All of the above?
e) Some combination of the above?
f) None of the above?

Or is it fairer to say that most of the above tended to see the July Crisis more as a way of cementing the alliance with Austria and splitting up the French and Russian (and Brit) alliance?

Many in Germany IIUC viewed the alliance with Austria-Hungary as a diplomatic burden in many ways. AS far as German interest in fighting a two front war, I don't think they were really that enthusiastic about it; it was not a smart play and was fraught with risk.

B

The school of thought that puts primary blame for the war on Germany (Fishcer school, Copeland among Political Scientists) point at Moltke the Younger and Bentham-Hollweg to a second degree as the main war advocates in Germany during the July Crisis.

The school that tends to focus on all parties (example is Clark) notes that the main war advocate in Germany was Moltke. Hollweg was ok with a Russian war, or even better a Austro-Serbian war, but did not want a European war. The Kaiser was closer to Hollweg's view.

The reason the Germans were so supportive of Austria in 1914 was a) the fear that Austria felt it was not supported enough by Germany in 1912, which might lead to an Austrian defection (however impossible in reality) b) the feeling that Russia would back down as it did in 1908 and 1912-3.

Now my memory is sketchy but I think some of the main german actors in the July Crisis and up to that were

Richard Von Kuhlmann (Councilor in London)
Count Pourtales(Ambassador to Russia)
Gottlieb von Jagow (Foreign Secretary)
Alfred von Tirpitz(Secretary of the Navy)
Wilhelm II (Emperor)
Theobolod Bethman-Hollweg (Reichs-chancellor)
Phillip zu Eulenburg (Confident friend of the Kaiser)
Heinrich von Tschirschy (Councilor in Vienna)

Look up their personal or expressed views on the matter and you will get a feel of the peace vs. war party dynamics in germany.

Howdy,

Yet, Russia mobilized first, and we may never know what the French said to the Russians during the crisis diplomatic rush.

I think the key comment in the above discussion: "… the need for Germany to be seen as the aggressor."

and Germany lost the war …

Ponder on,

JAS

@Howdy

Russia mobilized first, and we may never know what the French said to the Russians during the crisis diplomatic rush. I think the key comment in the above discussion: "… the need for Germany to be seen as the aggressor." …and Germany lost the war …

Surely Russia mobilised because Austria mobilised against Serbia?

And surely Austria mobilised against Serbia because the Germans gave them the 'diplomatic blank cheque' (6 July)?
link

So we are back to Berlin: no German assurance of full military support to Austria = no general European war?

When the Germans issued that full assurance on 6 July, which of the key players expected and wanted it to lead to war with Russia (and France)?

Actually the Russian mobilization order(preparedness for war actually) predates the Austrian start of mobilizations (but not the order) by a day or so. Historians mucked it up when reading Russian mobilization orders because of the differences between Gregorian and Julian calendars (see Clark and McMeekin for the particulars).

We are pretty confident that the indicators are that the French also gave a blank check to Russia in the July Crisis. Yes we do not know what was said exactly, but their are multiple pre- and post- crisis indicators that Poincare fanned the war-flames in St. Petersburg and the Centrale in Paris.

redcoat

None of those who took part in the blanck check decision. But the main war advocate in Germany, Motlke the Elder did not take part in the blank check part. He was on vacation. Both Hollweg and the Kaiser seem to have thought that Russia would not interfere. They vastly underestimated (the anti-Fisher school) or did not care (the Fischer school) about the Russia reaction, though people like Clark and McMeekin indicate that important elements in the Russian decision making had decided on an Austrian war early in the crisis.

For the Germans not to give the blank check you would need either the UK leaving the Entente, or the Franco-Russian alliance collapsing. As long as the Entente existed in the eyes of the key German decision makers the maintenance of the Austrian alliance was paramount. Also remember that it was Wilhem and Hollweg that offered the last best hope for peace through the Halt at Belagrade proposal (though again the Fisher and anti-Fisher people disagree on its sencirity. I am anti-Fisher).

But again, the best you can do to answer this is look at the recent historiography and track the views of those people I listed (Or use the list of participants in the Cline Pointing book).

Only recently have I come to see that Russia seems to be the main force driving events. Granted Russia with French backing, but it was Russia. They threw Serbia under the bus in both 1913 and early 1914 during the Balkan Wars, but only a few months later were the great protectors of Serbia. It was all for the Russian better interests, and I don't fault them for that, but they seem to be the driving force. Due to the Russian Revolution, many have tended to forgive them their role, but it seems that they were behind, the assassination, the mobilization and the start of the war.

On to the original point…Did France encourage it in order to get back Alsace and Lorraine?… that is open for debate.

Shouldn't we be calling it Elsaß-Lothringen?

Motlke the Elder did not take part in the blank check part.

Moltke the Younger surely?

Wasn't the Kaiser's biggest mistake in effectively driving Britain into the Entente in the first place?

@138SquadronRAF

Wasn't the Kaiser's biggest mistake in effectively driving Britain into the Entente in the first place?

Deffo agree. It takes a particular kind of genius to convert three mutually hostile colonial powers – in the shape of France, Russia and Britain – into allies.

138SquadronRAF you are correct, my mistake

redcoat maybe this book is for you. It has pro and anti-fisher thesis historians, classical paradigm and peace science paradigm political scientists all arguing in the same book. Believe this is rare (the Vasquez and Elman book on Balance of Power is the only other one I am aware of). It came out recently so it takes into consideration the new historiography.

link

here is John giving his spiel in more people-friendly format
illinois.edu/lb/article/72/85527

and if you can get academic journals somehow he does a review of the new books here

link

Disclaimer: John Vasquez was my Dissertation adviser and chair.

As for Britain, recent scholarship indicates that what really happened is a grouping alliance (Clark talks about it). Britain tried 18th century alliance norms, and as in the 18th century it got grief for it. To explain. A grouping alliance is an alliance with a enemy or potential enemy. The goal is to gain some control over the foreign policy decisions of your ally. This happens when you are unable to block pernicious for you foreign policy decisions by that enemy via adversarial means. The UK was as worried as Germany about Russian industrialization, and Russian expansionism in Central Asia. The problem is that the Brits had come to see Japan and British might in Central Asia as inadequate for checking Russian expansion. An alliance with Germany would not change that basic worsening security environment. And as you guys said Willy did all the bad things to make it worse (building a fleet that siphoned British resources from central Asia to the channel). So in the end crucial decision makers (Grey and otehrs) decided that the only choice was grouping Russia. A bad choice for millions of Britons and Commonwealth soldiers.

Very intelligent thread. I feel genuinely educated. Thanks all, particularly KTravlos.

Thank you. Essentially World War 1 is my advisors hobby project. The research he does for fun.He is getting close to retirement and after 20 books and 77 book chapters and articles he now gets to do the stuff he really likes for fun. Some of it has rubbed off on me (I was more of a Crimean War buff when I was accepted in the PhD)

Thanks all, esp. KTravlos! "The Outbreak of the First World War" has duly been ordered!

An essential book on this is George, Nicholas, and Wilhelm by Amanda Carter. The book shows the personal interaction of the three "cousinly" sovereigns and their part in the start of the war.

Thanks for the information gentlemen. I wish the Napoleonic Boards could be like this. The disadvantage of the place is that there is the "Idiot Tendency" that derails discussions.

I must be losing my mind. I am presently reading Ian Ousby's "The Road to Vedun: France, nationalism, and the First World War." Actually I took a break from that to read something else and that must be the reason. Anyway, I am reading this and Ousby has several chapters on this very subject, and others as well. This is a book which deals with the details of the battle, but also goes backwards and forwards in the History of France to fit the battle of Verdun, how it happened, what it meant then and came to mean in French History, and its legacy for Gaullism, Petain, and the rest. It's a slow reading book, not because it's hard to read, but because you want to carefully think of what the guy is saying. He's packed a lot into it, and as they say "there's a lot of meat in that sausage" which means you have to go through it carefully and think about it.

However it is a masterful work and does a great job in my opinion of explaining the what, why, and wherefore of Verdun and how it became so central to French self view.

Otto

Otto, thanks for telling us about that book. I might check it out.