"Pentagon: The Iraqi Army Abandoned Tanks, Artillery..." Topic

Let me address the "Europeans engaging militarily"

If the US engaged militarily in WWII the way the European countries have engaged militarily (so far) the spread of fundamental Jihad there would be a lot of German or Russian language in these posts. The Europeans current immigration policy (and the US to an extent too) is the equivalent of Britain inviting the SS to come to their country and then give them government assistance and privileges in 1943 while the SS plots the overthrow of the British from within the country. Maybe I'm a little too extreme but I think you get the idea. It's the political leadership which is reflected in the will of the people, not the military. Not all Muslims are bad and not and not all SS worked at prison camps or killed POW's but exceptions do not make the rule.

The spirit of my posts has been that it is not just the military and hardware that defeats your enemy but the overall Will of the people and their government/leaders in that country to fight even while losing. Fighting on your own turf for your own home is a huge advantage.

Britain lost to the colonists in 1780 not because their military was inferior but because of attitudes back home. Correct me if I'm wrong but many Brits were against the war as were some members of Parliament. They needed to hire mercenaries to get enough troops over there. I think there were other outside circumstances too.

The US pulled out of Vietnam not because of military defeats but because the will of the Vietnamese was stronger than the US. All of the drug induced counter-culture protests that got press coverage helped bolster the Vietnamese morale. The Tet Offensive was a massive military defeat for North Vietnam but a massive morale victory for them which was their secondary objective. Failed US leadership and underestimating the enemy were some root causes.

I've worked with the Royal Marines and FFL 2nd Para Rgt on Corsica so I'm well aware of their capabilities and have respect for all European military forces – combat and non-combatants. The policy of some of the European countries (I don't have the time to go into a lot of specifics so excuse me) has been to send non-combatants only. That's not my idea of engaging the enemy to defeat them. However, the contributions of non-combatants is important and does contribute to the overall mission. It can be even more important than military action when trying to win over the people. But when your enemy sees you are sending non-combatants into a combat zone you are not going to force him to have negative DRM's on his morale checks.

I do not mean to speak negatively about the European military, I was speaking about their country and leadership will to fight. If the leadership and people of a European country don't feel they should be engaged militarily in the war and it's all the fault of the US so be it. That does not mean their military forces will not perform to a high degree when called upon – if led properly with a defined mission. That's completely different than the National Morale of the people. Historically the European countries have been slow to engage the spread of Islam until it was at their doorstep and then decisively defeated them. They can and will do it again but it is going to be a different type of engagement, not military. The question to the US and Europe is when will you see it as a real problem and act? What action other than military will it take?

The Barbary Pirates ruled the Med extorting and robbing the Europeans for almost 1000 years until the American Navy and Marines brought them under control. The defeat of the Axis spelled the end of the Ottoman Empire and was a team effort by the Allies. Call it a cultural, nationalistic, religious or economic struggle, it does not matter. It's here to stay.

Breaking the will of the enemy or changing their ideology is key to defeating them. So far the Jihadists have not failed their morale checks and it looks as if their opponents are failing to activate. Maybe the Jihadists enemies don't have any order dice in the cup. You can't roll any hit dice if you don't activate.

So here is a question to the Europeans hanging out here. I like you guys, really, I still have relatives in Germany. I even played Rugby for 10 years. I've partied with British Marines and sailors Rugby teams from the HMS Hermes and some destroyers and subs while in south Florida.

At what point will a European country do something decisively to stop the spread of Jihad within their own borders and what could the people, politicians and leaders do to entirely stop it? This is a question that addresses the will of the people to do something, not send the military off to a foreign country to fight.

We don't get any worthwhile European news in the US. Freak reality TV shows sell more advertising in the US than factual and informative programs. Besides, I'd be willing to bet 25% of Americans could not find Europe on a globe.

Maybe we should start another discussion on this.

Wolfhag

Weasel --

You missed my point. I am not interested in a debate about European capitulation on core values of Western Civilization. And if I were, I'd want more than "no we aren't", which is all your response amounted to. (For instance, one might address why the Rotherham abuses are isolated incidents and that the bureaucrats in charge were punished. Or, one might explain that the incredible increase in the Swedish crime and rape rate [and the apparent indifference of bureaucrats] is not the result of immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, but rather the result of changes in how rape is defined.) I only mentioned the issue because I stated my optimism about the American variant of Western Civilization. I felt that I needed to briefly explain why I am not so sanguine about Europe.

Bangorstu --

Again, I note you failed to answer my question, so I'll re-ask. What insurgencies do you think the IDF did well in? If you argue that the IDF performance in 2006 indicates that the IDF has "lost a step", then logically, there must have been some prior IDF performances that were much better.

Now, if you want to amend your argument to "the IDF thinks it performed poorly in 2006" then I agree, although I think you overstate the IDF's dissatisfaction. However, this does not provide any evidence whatsoever that the IDF has lost its effectiveness on the conventional battlefield.

Still waiting for you to produce any significant evidence of that…

Tbeard – Whatever makes you sleep at night sir.

* * * * *

Wolfhag – This may help clarify things more:
Post WW2, the general stance of European militaries (and the purpose for their existence) has been for peacekeeping operations abroad and defence of the father/motherland at home.

In some cases, this is defined by constitutions, in others by practice.
Germany sending troops to Afghanistan was a huge public debate for example, for obvious reasons.

In Denmark, my home country, engaging in a war that was not strictly peacekeeping was a very big decision as it was reversing 150+ years of armed neutrality as national policy.

It can also be noted that in countries without long, colonial history, military force has always been viewed as an emergency, a state of affairs that is both unnatural and undesirable.
Whereas in France and the UK (for example), the idea of sending soldiers to enforce policy abroad is far more palatable, due to the history of those countries doing so.

A century of cultural policy is not readily changed, nor has there been, in the broad public opinion, persuasive reason to do so.

I am not assigning value to these policies, merely explaining why they are there, for better understanding.

* * * * *

As far as domestic policies, that question is probably hard to answer without going into specific countries.
Denmark has some of the most strict immigration policies in Europe, enacted (at the time) by openly xenophobic politicians.
(no, not all immigration debate is about xenophobia and racism, in this case it was, however).

I'll turn the question over to you however:

What is it that we should be doing, that we are not?
I have lived in both the US and in Denmark and I see very little difference in how both countries handle such issues.

As a point, many European countries have laws against hate speech which would apply to someone openly advocating a Jihad, while in the United States, unless linked to credible threats, such speech would be allowed under the first amendment.

The US has stronger surveillance systems in place for detection and prevention, though that obviously comes up against civil liberties questions and raises some very fundamental issues.

Living in countries with rule of law, freedom of expression (within limits) and freedom of religion means that certain actions are not legally permitted and would in many cases violate national constitutions.
Neither should we abandon such principles lightly.

How do /I/ think we should handle things?
I'm a writer, not a policy maker. But it would seem to be that well integrated immigrants who feel a sense of belonging to the society they live in are a lot less likely to pick up rifles and blow things up.

When you look at domestic terror cases, whether Islamic or not, they are generally from people who feel detached, alienated, alien or feel that they are under threat.

These are big questions that are not easily solved, because doing so costs money, it takes time and it makes people uncomfortable.

Cheers and best wishes.

Weasel -- "Tbeard – Whatever makes you sleep at night sir."

Before I respond, I'm curious. Did you intend for that statement to be interpreted as smug and condescending? Or is there some other intended meaning that I missed?

tbeard – well I'll compare the IDFs performance in 2006 to their performances in previous conflicts from 1948 onwards.

You know, the same criteria used by the IDF themselves…

Now you may choose different goalposts, but I'm content to let the IDF report stand on its own.

Wolfhag – if the Europeans dealt with the Jihaddi problem as the US dealt with the Nazis, you'd still be waiting for help from any nation not yet bombed.

We'd have left you to fight on your own until such time as the terrorists got round to us – so spare me, please.

That, unlike the US, most European nations are not bombastic, don't have a habit of picking fights and prefer to spend tax money on minor things like health care doesn't mean they're cowardly or indeed not doing anything.

Our police forces are exceptionally competent. The British police are currently breaking up plots on a monthly basis.

Given that, where does a military response seem appropriate? What good would killing several thousand more Arab civilians do?

We're doing plenty to stop the spread of Jihad inside our own borders.

you've just not noticed because it doesn't generally involve SWAT teams and dead bodies all over the news.

Bangorstu --

So, in other words, you're unwilling to cite an example of a pre-2006 anti-insurgency operation where the IDF did well. Therefore, I assume that you're abandoning your assertion that 2006 shows that the IDF's efficiency has seriously eroded. It appears now that you're reduced to stating that the IDF was dissatisfied with its performance in 2006. No debate there.

Dear Tbeard,

Thanks for taking the time to educate a sometimes slow and ignorant vet like myself.

I was under the impression that there have been close to 60,000 U.S casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I had also heard that U.S./Allied casualties have been much higher.

From what friend in the know have told me, our allies include the national armies or Iraq and Afganistan, as well as many other countries – Britain and Germany, to name just two. I heard that when we take all of those nations in, plus contractors, the armed allied personnel casualty total has topped more than 100,000.

What a relief to know that U.S./Allied casualties are only around 6,700! The things one learns on a wargame site!

I will be sure to tell my high school pal, Rich, that his losing a leg to an IED near Baghdad doesn't qualify him as a "casualty". He will also be pleased to know that the Iraqi translator that died working with his platoon that day was likewise, apparently, the victim of an automobile accident (or maybe a drug-gang slaying, heck, who knows).

"Arabs", even our those who are our allies, obviously shouldn't be counted as Allied casualties. Where would it all end if we were to do that? Treating the people we arm and train as colleagues to be counted, remembered and mourned instead of expendable, nameless "Hajiis"? Imagine the damage that would cause to "Arab" morale!

Also, I appreciate the point about "military effectiveness", especially when I think about what people who were much smarter than me have had to say about warfare (some German guy and a Chinese guy, whose names can't remember).

I was under the impression that the ultimate yardstick for military effectiveness was, well, a military's ability to actually win wars and bring peace. You know, like the Soviets, British and Americans (among others) did in World War II.

By that yardstick, the U.S. military hasn't been exceptionally effective over the past sixty years. According to my count it's been one tie, one loss, one win and, now, what look increasingly like two losses. I guess you could call the Cold War a win, but judging by all the alarming stories our friend Armand posts here, it doesn't seem like the U.S.' struggle with Russia is actually over yet. Looks more like the end of a halftime break to me. (As for Panama and Granada… Well, if you must count them "wars", do so, but scraping up those two operations as great war victories kind of proves my point.)

Finally, I am very pleased to learn that bombing does not count as "fighting wars". What would you suggest we call it then? Airborne induced landscaping? But I'm curious: does that mean if someone bombs us, it's not really war?

Once again, thank you for your insights. You obviously know what the heck you're talking about when it comes to "Arab effectiveness".

I mean, given that you have fought "Arabs" yourself, right?

I think I can speak for all American fighting men and women when I say that I really wish we'd had your insights when we were being shot at in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we'd just know about how "ineffective" those "Arabs" were, we wouldn't have been half as scared!

I believe that a fundamental cause of the rancor in this thread is a lack of definition of "military effectiveness". WRT that issue I believe that Abrams Driver has it dead right, especially with his reference to the German and Chinese fellows! :-)

We Americans too often measure military success in kills and terrain alone. This is silly, especially in the context of post-WWII wars such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan when we never deployed enough troops to wage "total war" as happened in the ACW and WWII.

In the case of more recent wars such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria we're not even willing to pay the bills to wage war let alone draft the troops needed to do it right.

Recently the same fellows in congress who sued the president over "unconstitutional acts" related to immigration just voted to give him money (off budget so they can pretend it's not deficit spending) for a war against ISIS that they're unwilling to vote to authorize. Talk about lack of national will when even our most extreme hawks lack the courage to simply vote for a war.

Our recent enemies (and our vets who fought them) seem to better understand the totality of war far better than our arm chair warriors. They take the long view and know that a sustainable victory takes more than a great kill ratio and temporary/fleeting control of random bits of terrain.

Here's a perfect example. We "won" WWII but the extreme right wing ideology that we thought we defeated and which was shared by some Americans back then is alive and well today in America. We took Berlin militarily but the same world view that led to the Smedley Butler affair after WWI still exists.

Later this week a member of congress, Paul Ryan, will lead the charge to remove anti-slavery language from a trade bill. And our president, an African-American, also opposes the anti-slavery language. Both are pushing to put American workers in competiton with the same sort of industrial slaves used by WWII Germany.

And here everyone in this thread thought we won WWII! :-)

So there is tactical military effectiveness (battlefield kills and the control of terrain) and then there is actual victory in a conflict. They are NOT the same thing and the former can even impede the latter. Just ask ISIS recruiters who use US support for brutal ME dictators as a recruiting tool. Or just wait a few years and ask Malaysian radicals angry about US support for a brutal regime that profits from human trafficking and slavery (but please don't ask why those future Malaysian rebels "hate us".)

Abrams Driver --

"Thanks for taking the time to educate a sometimes slow and ignorant vet like myself."

You're quite welcome; obviously you needed it. But my patience is limited so I don't know how much more I can do for you.

If you can rebut arguments I made, then do so. But I find the "I'm a vet and therefore I win the argument" tack to be tiresome and pathetic. Frankly, such tactics make me question whether you are actually a combat vet. See, no combat vet I personally have known (9 I can think of) has EVER used his status as a cheap argumentation tactic. Most refuse to talk about it with anyone but their closest friends and family (and sometimes not even then).

So when some joker beats his breast in a hobby Internet forum and (metaphorically) bellows "I have seen the horror of war and so has my buddy, therefore I WIN THE ARGUMENT," I feel compelled to call bull. In any case, if there was some reason to do so, I guess I could produce genuine combat veterans to take my side of the argument. But that would replicate your cheap stunt. And of course, facts don't change merely because someone claims to be a combat veteran. So I won't do it.

And your feeble attempt to "pull rank" strongly indicates to me that you have no real facts or evidence to back up your claims. And this obvious dishonesty makes me question your other claims.

So…I made pretty specific factual assertions and logical arguments. Rebut them if you can. But "I saw the horror of war so shut up" doesn't get it.

There have been approximately 6800 US deaths in the Long War (5,000 of which are battle deaths). Wounded totals are about 50,000. Over roughly 10 years. By contrast, there were 58,000 deaths in Vietnam (about 48,000 battle deaths) and over 210,000 wounded. About 60% of those casualties occured in 3 years -- 1967-69. Korea had about 60% of the casualties as Vietnam in a 3 year period. The worst year in Iraq (2007) saw 997 KIA. In Afghanistan the worst year (2010) saw 497 KIA. The worst year in Vietnam was 1968 with 16,899 KIA.

I used the word "casualties" one time initially, but even the village idiot should have been able to tell from the context that I meant KIA, not all casualties. Hopefully, this clarification will help you, alhough it doesn't change the points I made. I deeply apologize for the confusion my imprecise language caused you.

"…I think I can speak for all American fighting men and women "

Oh, I seriously doubt that.

Dear Tbird,

Having actually fought and lost friends to "Arabs", I do not find them so ineffective and cowardly.

I suspect that most of your friends and relatives who saw combat in Afghanistan and Iraq would say the same, if you started talking to them about your theories.

I don't know anyone who had bullets coming at them who thinks the way you do. I certainly don't. None of my friends do. Your relatives and friends are either made of sterner stuff or (as I suspect) you've never tried to run this theory of yours by them, probably because you have an idea how they would react.

Would that I could be a fly on the wall when you start talking to Iraq/Afghanistan combat vets about how "cowardly" and "ineffective" their opponents were. Yes, I do indeed think I can say for all American fighting men and women that your opinion there wouldn't be very popular.

I am talking about people who actually got shot at, however. I am sure that there are plenty of folks who were in theater and never heard a shot fired in anger (or only at a great distance) who think just like you.

VIS seems to get what I am driving at, but you seem to have some difficulties, for all your intelligence. So let me spell it to you as simply as I can.

The people I met on my two tours of Iraq were not stupid. They knew very well that the U.S. was not there for their good. They knew the leaders that were being installed were corrupt. The smarter ones (since I was only talking to Iraqis who spoke English, and I presume that people who are bilingual are pretty smart, I presume these guys were smart) also mentioned what happened in Vietnam. I heard a couple of times "You will leave here when you get bored or when it becomes too expensive".

My impression is that people were not exactly interested in dying for the U.S. and that's what the Iraqi government was seen as being: a U.S. puppet, wholly bought and paid for by Washington.

Again, these are just a few on-the-ground and anecdotal impressions, but what you've been saying here pretty much shows those Iraqis I talked to to be right.

I find it pretty characteristic of a certain mind set that you can't seem to distinguish between casualties and deaths unless nudged.

Can you say "body counts"?

What's worse, from the point of view of the present discussion, you don't even consider the Iraqis and Afghans who are our allies to be "allied casualties", even when nudged in the most unsubtle way.

In short, it seems that you don't care about them at all.

Is it any wonder, then, that they don't want to die for you?

We don't even have a good idea of how many Iraqis have died fighting our war, let alone how many Afghans. I am certain, however, that the total number is now well over 100,000 – and that's not counting the 60,000 American casualties and the probable 5-10,000 other allied casualties.

The "Allied forces" have probably lost over 200,000 men in these wars. That is a substantial butcher's bill, however you count it. And that's at the end of decades of warfare that cost Iraq and Afghanistan millions of casualties. I won't even bring up how much money got poured down the drain, or the fact that a prime beneficiary of this spending was a company heavily associated with the vice-president of the government that green-lighted the occupation of these countries.

So here you come now, cheerfully chattering about how "~6,700 casualties" isn't really all that bad, by comparison with other wars, and lamenting about how those "Arabs" just aren't up to snuff on the battlefield, by Jove.

That attitude, my friend, is the best reason I can think of why I wouldn't fight for the U.S., were I an Iraqi or Afghan. I'd just be thinking about how I could get out of the region. In fact, I am not even sure I want my own son to go into our military, if our country's future is going to be endless wars such as these to now useful purpose.

I don't think Iraqis and Afghans are stupid, cowardly or "ineffective" at all. I think that, like the Vietnamese before us, they will push us out, eventually. And like Vietnam, give them 20 or 30 years and we will be friends with them again.

Just like we are currently getting chummier with Iran.

Abrams Driver --

Again, I have not called Arabs cowardly, so you really should stop
lying about that. And since you do not have a mindreading machine, perhaps you should not depend on your absurd speculations about how I (or anyone else) think. You might also want to take the sanctimony down a couple of notches (particularly when it's based on misrepresenting what I've said).

I mentioned KIAs because *you* asked "if the "Arabs" are so cowardly and inept, who killed and wounded my friends in Iraq…"

My response -- after reminding you that I have not called the Arabs cowardly -- was to point out that merely killing some enemy troops does not automatically mean that an army is particularly effective.

This seems to me to be a ridiculously obvious point. After all, even the most inept armies in history managed to kill some of their enemies. Do you actually suggest that one cannot draw meaningful distinctions in effectiveness between (say) the Wehrmacht and the Italian Army? Really?

Besides, if you didn't want any comments, why did you bring it up? Oh, that's right…you tried to play the "I'm a combat veteran so shut up" card, didn't you? Well, (a) I strongly doubt you are actually a combat veteran (and am increasingly skeptical that you're even a veteran at all); and (b) even if you are a combat veteran, so what? Facts don't change merely because you are a combat veteran.

So please take your self righteous lecturing elsewhere; I'm not interested and it doesn't change the facts. At the very least, stop lying about what I've said and address my actual statements. Which, at the end of the day, are hardly novel --

1. Arabs have historically proven unable to field effective armies against Western (or even non-Western, non-Arab) opponents. The reference to "armies" should make it clear that I am discussing conventional warfare, not insurgencies.

2. The primary reason for this are multiple components of Arab culture that hinder the development of capable modern armies.

What about those statements is particularly novel or controversial? And I have supported those statements with cites from recognized experts (Dupuy, Pollack and de Atkine), which stands in stark contrast to your emotional, self-righteous posturing. You might consider that cheap, dishonest sanctimony isn't really worth a whole lot.

Just to slake a thirst for body counts, I decided to see if I could quantify how many Allied casualties there have been so far.

60,000 U.S., we all agree on. But that's just military personnel, not contractors.

There were also about 1800 contractors (non-Iraqi) personnel killed between 2003-2011 and 10,500 contractors wounded. According to Cost of War, however, another 1600 U.S. contractors have died in Iraq since then, for a total of about 3400 up to 2014. They are supposedly 80% of contractor deaths. So that means, let's say, maybe 4000 total contractor deaths, 2003-2014, and – using the wounded figures for the 2003-2011 period – probably about 24,000 wounded. That's 28,000 contractor casualties.

There were roughly 300 non-Iraqi allied deaths and some 2700 wounded from 2003-2011. Call it a nice, round 3000.

Iraqi government documents and stuff from Wikileaks shows some 250,000 "friendly" casualties, about half of which are civilians from 2003-2012. From June 2003 through December 31, 2010, there were 16,623 Iraqi military and police killed, so presuming 8 wounded for every dead, that would mean 150,000 Iraqi security force casualties for the 2003-2014 period is a pretty good ballpark estimate.

Then we turn to Afghanistan…

Here we see another 3200 US contractors dead up to 2014 so figure, again, around 4000 total contractor deaths and 24,000 wounded, for 28,000 total casualties.

Some 13,000 Afghan police and soldiers were killed during this period. Figure a lower wounded rate than Iraq (fewer people actually making it to medical care because of worse conditions). Let's say six wounded to every killed, so 78,000 wounded and 81,000 total Afghan allied casualties (and I think I am being very conservative here, as this doesn't count casualties among tribal allies).

1000 non-Afghan allied troops were killed there as well, however, so that's probably 10,000 total casualties.

So now we can finally do the math and get a ballpark idea as to the allied losses during this war:

60,000 U.S. Military (Iraq and Afghanistan)
31,000 contractors (Iraq)
28,000 contractors (Afghanistan)
3,000 non-Iraqi allies
10,000 non-Afghan allies
150,000 Iraqi allies
78,000 Afghan allies (probably many more)

…for a total of 260,000 Allied military casualties, up to the beginning of 2014.

Now, Vietnam, it ain't. But it's also a far cry from TBeard's "~6,700 casualties". That is quite a bit of blood letting being done by "cowardly" and "ineffective" irregular forces, with no "main force" support (as there was in Vietnam).

And that doesn't mention the probable 500,000 – 1,000,000 OTHER friendly casualties, all told, nor the current round with ISIS and the renewed Taliban.

Pretty shocking for a war that was supposedly "mission accomplished" back in…. 2003? 2004? I forget. So many lies under the bridge by now. It's a wonder how the people who said this would be a short, cheap war can look themselves in the mirror.

Perhaps this explains why beards are now back in fashion?

TBeard,

You started with the mindreading machine, my friend, not me. So if you turn yours off, I'll do the same with mine. As it stands, you have no call to ask me to shut off my suppositions about you when you are talking about my service.

Good for the goose, good for the gander. You'll get back exactly what you put out on that point. You'll note I am making no suppositions about you in this post. I trust you'll either extend same courtesy to me or not complain when I turn my mind reading machine back on..

I'll give you that you haven't called the "Arabs" cowardly. I get the feeling that this is definitely implied in the original post, but OK. Let's just deal with you claiming they are "inept".

You didn't mention KIAs at all: you mentioned casualties.

But that is not the worst problem. To my mind, the center of the problem is that you won't or can't admit that any losses other than American are relevant. It doesn't matter what kill ratio our troops chalk up if we can't commit them because we don't have a viable political goal and our silly electorate is tired of seeing their sons' and daughters' blood spilled for no good purpose.

And I have addressed your main point several times now: war is politics by other means. We are losing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Losers are in no position to demean their adversaries' "effectiveness".

By the way, the U.S. suffered 212,000 casualties in Vietnam, more or less, between 1965-1975. So we are about a third of the way there in Iraq/Afghanistan, when we start counting U.S. contractors.

But given that our adversaries in Vietnam had large and well-protected sanctuaries, the open aid of two of the world's major powers (and the only other superpower) and substantial conventional forces….

Well, all I can say is that those non-superpower supported, non-conventional "Arab" forces with few to no sanctuaries to fall back on are doing a pretty damned good job in the body count business.

No SAMS, no tanks (until they captured a few from our allies), no air force, the only "sanctuary" controlled by an at-best neutral power, no superpower backing, an immensely greater technology differential… And they've still caused almost a third as many casualties as the NVA/NLF.

Say what you like: that isn't "ineffective".

Sorry to anger you TBeard, but you are just wrong. I actually think you're the best sort of ally our adversaries can have: one who consistently underestimates their abilities, resolve and wherewithal.

Abrams Driver --

"You have no call to ask me to shut off my suppositions about you when you are talking about my service."

You played the "I'm a combat veteran so shut up" card, followed by the "only I have seen the horror of war, coward, so shut up" card.

I responded that I don't believe you for the simple reason that your behavior is completely unlike the behavior of the combat veterans I've personally known. They would never use their service in such a trivial and disingenuous way. And in a *hobby* forum, of all places. <shrug> So, I still don't believe you, for the same reasons.

As for your suppositions, I'm only cautioning you that you really don't seem very astute in determining what I think. Feel free to continue tilting at the windmills however.

"I'll give you that you haven't called the "Arabs" cowardly. I get the feeling that this is definitely implied in the original post, but OK."

Sorry, but I implied nothing of the sort, and I challenge you to produce a quote from me to back that claim up.

"You didn't mention KIAs at all: you mentioned casualties."

From my post: "Compare with US KIA in Vietnam -- 58,000 for the entire war (and 39k in 1967-69)…" Looks to me like KIA is mentioned in this sentence…

"To my mind, the center of the problem is that you won't or can't admit that any losses other than American are relevant."

Relevant to what? Have you even asked me if non-American casualties are relevant to whateverthehell you're talking about? Besides, if I added in all the non-US casualties in Vietnam and Korea, then my original point would be unchanged.

"And I have addressed your main point several times now: war is politics by other means. We are losing in Iraq and Afghanistan."

Are you sure you haven't lost situational awareness? I have not weighed in on whether we are losing in Iraq one way or the other. I have observed that air power alone cannot win a war, so it's dubious to say that "we" (meaning our ground forces) are losing a war in which we are only using airstrikes. The ones losing in Iraq are the local forces opposing ISIS in my opinion. If it makes you feel any better, I would agree that the current U.S. approach seems highly unlikely to defeat ISIS.

Since you obviously are not understanding the points I've made, let me try one more time to summarize them for you:

1. Arabs have historically proven unable to field effective armies against Western (or even non-Western, non-Arab) opponents. The reference to "armies" should make it clear that I am discussing conventional warfare, not insurgencies.

2. The primary reason for this appears to be multiple components of Arab culture that hinder the development of capable modern armies. This position is supported by numerous authorities with considerable real world experience with Arab militaries.

3. According to Dupuy's QJM, the Iraqis were among the least effective of the Arab contingents in the 1973 war. Since the QJM calculates that military effectiveness is a relatively immutable quality, it's likely that the Iraqis are still among the least effective Arab militaries. Assuming that the QJM is accurate, of course (which I think it is). Considerable support for this (i.e. that Arab cultural traits return when Western trainers leave) can be found in de Atkine's articles, which I've quoted extensively. This, I propose, explains why the Iraqi army has performed poorly against ISIS.

4. You asked "if the 'Arabs' are so cowardly and inept, who killed and wounded my friends in Iraq…" I replied that merely causing casualties does not necessarily make an army effective. I then pointed out that, by historical standards, U.S. KIAs in Iraq are fairly modest (compared with Korea and Vietnam). I later asked you if you seriously believe that no meaningful distinctions in effectiveness can be made between (say) the Wehrmacht and the Italian Army in WW2. (You failed to respond, preferring instead to answer questions I did not ask and to counter arguments I did not make).

5. Facts don't change merely because we are emotionally disturbed by them.

6. The QJM determined that the IDF actually got more capable from 1967 to 1973 to the 1982 Bekaa Valley operations. I see no reason to assume that the IDF has lost effectiveness on the conventional battlefield. The IDF's performance in the 2006 insurgency sheds no light on its effectiveness in a conventional war.

If you have anything to say about the points I just summarized, please do so. I'm really not interested in your other arguments.

AbramsDriver – very good psoting which resotres my faith in the US fighting man.

Too often it seems us 'allies' get regarded as ablative armour or political cover by the US public, as if our casualties somehow don't count.

Hence my well known annoyance over the US hierarchies' distain for 'fessing up over blue-on-blue.

Tgunner seems to be bent on insisting that he knows more than the IDF about the IDFs performance…

He also seems to have forgotten in his desire to prove that Arabs can't fight…. that they're still fighting.

And dying.

While us Western folks are cheering from the sidelines and doing three parts of all.

Ramadi fell because the Commander told his men to bug out ASAP in the face of intelligence which suggested mass suicide bombings in the town centre.

From the accounts I've read, this was a bad call, made by a commander who was physically exhausted.

It happens to all armies. I recall it happening to the Americans in Korea when faced by the Chinese initially.

Dupuy states that armies can't change. Ever. Which makes me wonder how the Arabs managed to conquer their empire, or the Americans lose the war in Vietnam…

It's a theory which drips of cultural superiority of the kind that ensured we thought the Japanese couldn't build decent planes because they weren't white…

I will ask one question.

If it's not killing lots of the enemy and achieving objectives, how do you measure combat effectiveness?

"If it's not killing lots of the enemy and achieving objectives, how do you measure combat effectiveness?"

That's easy: during and after a conflict whose political objectives prevail?

For example, in Afghanistan, US and allied forces can score far more kills and ultimately temporarily take any terrain desired.

But that doesn't mean they're combat effective because the moment they return to the wire at night the bad guys control the civilian population, the government they're fighting for is as corrupt and nasty as the Taliban which turns civilians against them, and their firepower superiority often results in carnage that creates more bad guys. And sustaining that superior combat force is really expensive.

Meanwhile the Taliban usually control the civilian population unless a superior allied forces decides to leave the wire and allied firepower and the corrupt Afghan government they defend just add to Taliban numbers. The Taliban forces are also really cheap to maintain.

I just really don't beileve that you can call a force "militarily effective" when the enemy's political views ultimately prevail. War truly is politics by other means and thus politics is the final arbiter of military effectiveness.

Good answer – which is why I, unlike tbeard, think the IDF (for example) did badly in 2006.

They expended a lot of sound and fury and totally failed to either destroy Hezbollah or, indeed, even stop them from firing missiles.

As for Afghanistan – depends. The Taliban have lost control of much of the country because, outside of Pastun areas, they're not popular. Hence the NATO offensive gave the locals change to recover.

And it's noteworthy that the Afghans haven't collapsed, which you'd expect from tgunners analysis as they're another tribal people.

Bangorstu --

"Good answer – which is why I, unlike tbeard, think the IDF (for example) did badly in 2006."

Given your obvious animus towards the IDF, I suspect that the IDF has *never* done well in your estimation. Feel free to correct this opinion by telling us when you think the IDF did well.

Until you do, your views on the IDF are frankly not worth much (since we know what they are before even asking).

Also, like Abrams Driver, you have a habit of misrepresenting () what I've said. I don't believe I've given an opinion as to how the IDF did in 2006. All I've said is that their performance in a small anti-insurgency operation in 2006 has no relevance to their likely performance in a conventional war. I have agreed that the IDF seemed dissatisfied with its performance in 2006. So I assume you'll retract this misrepresentation, yes?

For the record, the IDF did exceptionally well until 2006…

And I don't think I've misrepresented anything.

Bangorstu --

"Dupuy states that armies can't change. Ever. Which makes me wonder how the Arabs managed to conquer."

Uh, no, Dupuy says nothing of the sort. My own QJM examples given earlier show a marked improvement in Syrian effectiveness between 1967 and 1973. What the QJM shows -- and 20th century history bears out -- is that effectiveness doesn't change much over a century. That is perfectly consistent with the theory that cultural inputs profoundly impact a nation's ability to field an effective army. Culture, as most knowledgable people understand, is extremely resistant to change.

The Arab conquests you refer to occurred before the rise of modern nation-states. Essentially, Arab tribal armies, inspired by intense religious fervor, defeated other tribal armies. As the saying goes, "that was then, this is now". A modern, industrial state is a profoundly different enemy than a medieval tribe. Surely you can understand that.

At the end of the day, it seems painfully obvious that you are one of those tiresome folks who scream RAAAAACCCCCIIIISSSTTTT at anyone who acknowledges the historical fact that Arabs haven't done well on the modern battlefield (and are unlikely to do so as long as Arab cultural norms prevail ). Then, when your sanctimonious bull is exposed, you start whining about irrelevancies and mischaracterizing the views of your opponents. You also appear to harbor an unreasoning hatred of the Israelis (holding you to the same standards you hold others to), which is ironic given your multicultural posturing. And while I'm sure others might welcome a long and tedious Arabs vs Israelis whine fest with you, I am not one of them. Please review my summary of my points above and restrict your responses to points I've actually made.

Bangorstu--

"For the record, the IDF did exceptionally well until 2006…"

Which operations do you think they did particularly well in?

"And I don't think I've misrepresented anything."

Uh, yes you did. You made a very specific claim -- that I don't believe the IDF did poorly in 2006. I challenge you to find a single statement I made where I said that.

The Israelis did well in 1948, 1956, very well in 1967 and, ocne they got over thier surprise in 1973.

Ever since their main mission has been oppressing Palestinians rather than defeating Arab armies, their effectiveness has tailed off.

And for the record you consistently avoided stated the IDF had ever had a problem until I cornered you with their official report..

Bangorstu--

"And for the record you consistently avoided stated the IDF had ever had a problem until I cornered you with their official report.."

Bull. It's much better to simply acknowledge a mistake, then move on, you know. I understand that mistakes happen (I make them myself occasionally -- really, it's true); but trying to cover up a mistake is indistinguishable from a lie.

Regarding the IDF, it seems that we agree that it has a pretty consistent history of doing extremely well on the conventional battlefield. Therefore, wouldn't you agree that it would take more than a single subpar performance in a relatively small anti-insurgency operation to reasonably conclude that the IDF's efficiency on the conventional battlefield has eroded?

I decline the opportunity for an Arab-Israeli moral whine fest.

As said before, whatever helps you sleep at night.

The IDF hasn't fought a conventional war more or less in my lifetime, so I suggest how well it would do now is a moot point.

It's not a single sub-par performance though is it?

They weren't particularly effective in southern Lebanon – eventually getting kicked out, nor have they managed to suppress Hamas.

Indeed they took comparatively heavy casualties last time they ventured into Gaza.

They've not really been that good since 1973, from what I can see.

I respect your service Abrams Driver. And again, we all have to remember "casualties" mean = KIA, WIA, POW/MIA … And no doubt too much blood has been drawn …

which restores my faith in the US fighting man.

stu … you never should have doubted it …

Actually I misspoke. My problem is more with the attitude of the US military Command and indeed political establishment.

My problem is more with the attitude of the US military Command and indeed political establishment.

Like in the UK, the US Military follows all the lawful orders of the President of the United States. At least that is as I remember it in the soldiers' oath …

Bangorstu --

"As said before, whatever helps you sleep at night."

Actually, Weasel said that. Are you a sock puppet for Weasel (or vice versa?).

"The IDF hasn't fought a conventional war more or less in my lifetime, so I suggest how well it would do now is a moot point."

Right, because obviously if it didn't happen in your lifetime, it must not matter.

And I note that you are changing your story. You initially claimed that the IDF had lost a step; now you're saying the question is moot.

In any case, the QJM shows that:

1. The IDF consistently performed well in the 5 conventional operations it engaged in from 1948 thru 1982.

2. The IDF improved in effectiveness after each of the first four operations.

3. Effectiveness tends to be relatively consistent over long periods of time for each army (and in particular, the IDF).

4. Arab effectiveness has been consistently bad throughout the same period (with the exception of the Syrians, who improved from "worst in history" in 1967 to "merely awful" in 1973).

And by your own admission, you admit that the IDF was excellent in operations pre-2006.

I also think that it's reasonable to assert that a single example of a subpar relatively small anti-insurgency operation says nothing about an army's abilities in conventional warfare.

Therefore, there seems to be no factual evidence or logical reason to justify your (original) contention that the IDF has become less effective in conventional warfare.

However, since you now appear to admit that you don't really have an opinion on whether the IDF is less capable in conventional warfare, then we have nothing further to discuss on this point, seems to me.

As I stated earlier, I'm uninterested in debating IDF (or US) performance in anti-insurgency operations. Many critics take it as axiomatic that insurgencies cannot be defeated by Western powers (or at least by Israel and the US), so they twist every bit of evidence to support this belief. History contradicts this belief, but many folks are so emotionally invested in this belief that no amount of contrary evidence will persuade them to change their minds. I prefer not to waste time with people like that as life is too short.

Do you still allege that anyone who believes that the Arabs have performed poorly in conventional wars in the 20th century and that this poor performance is caused by Arab cultural traits is a racist?

Since my original post and most of my followups have dealt with the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM), I thought it might be useful to give a very brief overview of how it works. The QJM is explained fully in "Numbers, Predictions and War, 2nd ed." by T.N. Dupuy.

1. Dupuy's "Historical Evaluation And Research Organization" (HERO) compiled a detailed database of many hundreds of battles. From that database, they extracted mathematical relationships between weapon lethality, casualties caused, casualties taken and ground taken or lost. Elaborate formulas derived lethality values for every weapon, from a knife to a tank to a bomber to a tactical nuclear weapon. External factors like terrain, surprise, weather, etc. were computed based on analysis of the database.

2. Essentially, the model works like this. First, determine combat power (P) of each side -- P = S x OE x Q. P = combat power; S=force strength (number and types of weapons plus personnel); OE = operational/environment factors (terrain, weather, etc., which are assigned a set value*); Q=troop quality. Then determine a relative combat power ratio between the two sides. Then, using a series of formulas, determine casualties, ground taken, mission accomplishment etc.

3. The interesting thing is that two of the factors (S and OE) are objective (i.e., they are calculated by mathematical formulas or have consistent defined values). And if you have an actual battle to evaluate, you will know what the casualties and ground taken/lost was. In effect, you'll know what the combat power ratio is. This then allows you to calculate the quality (i.e. "effectiveness") of historical combatants. Thus, if you have a database of 200 WWII engagements, you can calculate the effectiveness of each side in each battle. A weighted average will give you an average quality rating for each combatant that will be accurate (assuming the population of battles analysed are representative).

4. You can then apply the model to hypothetical battles. Your primary challenge is to assign the appropriate effectiveness ratings. But since the QJM shows that in actual battles, effectiveness doesn't change much over the last hundred years or so, you can use historical values with a high degree of comfort.

5. The application of this analysis to the Bekaa Valley is instructive. After the 1973 War, the QJM determined the effectiveness ratings for the Israelis and Syrians in that war. Using those ratings, the QJM predicted a poorer Israeli performance than occurred in actuality. Therefore, the implication is that the effectiveness gap between the Syrians widened (as it did after the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars). The IDF got better or the Syrians got worse, or a little of both.

6. Using the QJM for the Gulf War, the QJM predicted far fewer US casualties than the other models, using effectiveness values from the 1970s, with an increased US effectiveness value to account for the professionalization of the US Army after Vietnam. The actual performance of the US forces was somewhat better than predicted, so the implication is that the US effectiveness rating was a little higher than assumed.

This is a very simple overview of a very sophisticated mathematical model, so any problems are probably due to my incompetence in explaining it.

*It's interesting that while terrain and weather values have remained consistent, it appears that achieving surprise has a higher value in the postwar period. I think this is likely due to increased operational efficiency (I.e., the "decision cycle" of postwar armies have gotten shorter, so more can be done against a paralyzed enemy).

Not a sock puppet, just using a neat phrase.

If the IDF hasn't fought a conventional war for four decades, the hands-on experience has encessarily been lost.

There will be no-one in the IDF today who fought in 1973 because time marches on – as idneed does technology.

As it happens, I'd expect them to handle anything the Syrians (for example) could throw at them with contemptuous ease. But it's far from a given.

Training isn't war – as the experience of 2006 showed all too starkly.

As for your four points – I'd say it's problematic to say they did better in 1973 than 1967 since they spent the first part of that war being kicked from pillar to post, having been shown to have misjudged the modern battlefield.

Though I accept it's easy to look good when undertaking a surprise attack.

I'd say the Syrians were better than 'merely awful' given they drove in the IDFs defences initially…

And of course, in issuing a blanket statement about Arab armies, we're both ignoring the fact that a lot of Arab states aren't involve din this theatre of operations… like the Moroccans, Tunisians, emiratis etc.

My assertion was the IDF has become less effective. I never mentioned conventional warfare – just noted that it wouldn't be the first time an army has rested on its laurels and been found wanting.

It has, after all, shown no signs of being the super-army of legend anytime since 1973.

You might regard COIN warfare as unimportant, but alas it's the most common form of warfare around.

your attitude seemingly pervaded the US Army as well.

At the time of the initial invasion of Iraq, John Simpson of the BBC (who has seen more warfare than most, and still has some USAF sharpnel in his ehad courtesy of a blue-on-blue_ noted that US forces were very poor at doing basic things like manning checkpoints.

Armies with UN experience were better, and calmer. Being calm meant the civilians were calm and less likely to do something stupid.

Note that hard experience has, over the years, turned the US Army into an exceptionally fine COIN army – but those lessons had to be learned the hard way by an army which looked down and sneered at the 'police actions' of the UN.

Insurgencies can be defeated by Western powers. The UK has done it twice, albeit a minor role in Oman.

And yes, I think that anyone who thinks an entire race of people will behave in a set fashion by virtue of having 'racial characteristics' defines themselves as racist.

Syrians are very different people from Saudis. Both are remarkably different from the vineyard-owning Tunisians….

If the IDF hasn't fought a conventional war for four decades, the hands-on experience has encessarily been lost.

Facts? Oh, I'm sorry, you don't deal in facts. As for losing fighting capability over time, the US hadn't fought a conventional war for some 4 decades when they went into GW1. Didn't do too badly, IIRC…

Armies with UN experience were better, and calmer. Being calm meant the civilians were calm and less likely to do something stupid.

Hate to point out the obvious, but most blue beret missions are PEACE KEEPING, NOT war fighting. And the UN has a long history of failed ops, I might add.

I'd say the Syrians were better than 'merely awful' given they drove in the IDFs defences initially

Well, when you massively outnumber your opponent and catch them by surprise, you SHOULD do pretty well. The problem is, Stu, even with those advantages, the Syrians were stopped cold, driven off the heights, couldn't stop the Israeli counter attack and ended up with Israeli artillery dropping rounds into Damascus. And that's against numerically inferior Israeli forces. With all those advantages going in, the Syrians still managed to get their heads handed to them. That qualifies as PRETTY AWFUL.

And yes, I think that anyone who thinks an entire race of people will behave in a set fashion by virtue of having 'racial characteristics' defines themselves as racist.

And given your constant, unending rant on the Israelis (in this and other threads), using your own definition, one could call you racist, as well….

OK if you want facts…

Between 1945 and 1950 the US Army seemingly lost all ability to fight a conventional war.

And in WW1 the US Army spent time being trained by the Allies before they entered combat, and even then initially tried the wave tactics abandoned by the French and British the year before.

And, in case you think I'm being anti-American, the British didn't cover themselves in glory in 1956 either.

Whereas the UN ahs a history of failed ops, peacekeeping teaches skills like how to handle scared civilians, how to man a roadblock etc.

All skills the US didn't have when they went into Iraq.

How is being critical of Israel 'racist'. There is a difference between being anti-Israeli and being anti-Semitic… despite what certain Israelis say.

I'm commenting on one nation – not ascribing to 22 different nations the same characteristics because they have the same language.

Tbeard –

Before I respond, I'm curious. Did you intend for that statement to be interpreted as smug and condescending? Or is there some other intended meaning that I missed?

To end the conversation.

Between 1945 and 1950 the US Army seemingly lost all ability to fight a conventional war.

Just a few things to consider: The Inchon landing and the breakout from the Pusan perimeter (which nearly resulted in the encirclement of the entire North Korean army) and the subsequent pushing of the North Koreans to the Yalu River. Not bad for an army that had 'lost all ability to fight a conventional war'.

Stu- I'm done with you. You've shown yourself to be so biased as to make further discussion useless.

I wonder how well the American Army would fight if it wasn't being paid?

Probably quite well.

Because for most of us who did serve it wasn't for the money.

Because for most of us who did serve it wasn't for the money.

Amen, brother….

"I wonder how well the American Army would fight if it wasn't being paid?".

We beat the largest, most powerful empire in the world, a few hundred years ago, and gained independence, so……

Shh… the Israelis are 'Western' and therefore superheros.

Which rather disproves the Deleted by Moderator views Deleted by Moderator I see here.

You're getting really good at this, Stu. Line after line of irritating snark that never quite attacks anyone in particular, while you smear, well, everyone who disagrees with you.

And I don't think I've misrepresented anything.

That, and your bland obstinacy, drives a lot of people who should know better up the wall.

Two doghousings on a three page thread. Bravo.

Zippy – well since people Dawghouse me, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

I fail to see how pointing out historical facts like the US Bug-Out in 1950 makes me biased… ditto how my agreeing with the IDF on their own assessment of 2006.

Having a different point of view doesn't make one biased….

Mithmee 28 May 2015 5:04 p.m. PST

I wonder how well the American Army would fight if it wasn't being paid?
Probably quite well.

Because for most of us who did serve it wasn't for the money.

coastal2 28 May 2015 6:43 p.m. PST

Because for most of us who did serve it wasn't for the money.
Amen, brother….

stu … you just continue not to get it … As two other US Vet pointed out again. And besides … in a firefight, whether you get paid are not is not going to stop the enemy from shooting at you. DOH ! Now if you stop shooting because you didn't get paid … you'd probably die from enemy fire. AND No one joins the US Military to get rich ! The more I think about your comment stu, just makes me again, notice how out of touch with reality you are when it comes to many military topics. Especially when it come to many things about US soldiers …

You might regard COIN warfare as unimportant, but alas it's the most common form of warfare around.

your attitude seemingly pervaded the US Army as well.

And I don't know where you get that idea, and you have mentioned this before. Let me enlighten you … On a tactical level, the average US Infantry soldiers can do raids, ambushes, set booby traps, hunt down the enemy, etc., as well as any force on the planet. The only thing that prohibits the US Grunt from being more effective is the strick ROE. Which in all cases is not warranted. Unless they changed US ARMY RANGER SCHOOL, the entire course revolves around fieldcraft, tactics, techinques and dismounted patrolling, etc. … And if you don't know stu, dismounted patrolling includes raids and ambushes among other things …

I accept that no-one in the military does it for the money.

That wasn't quite my point.

If the guys doing their duty in Iraq, or wherever, weren't being paid – or fed – at all, I rather suggest you'll find their desire to put their lives on the lines tapers off a bit.

People like to feel appreciated.

My points about the US Army disregard for COIN comes from various reports about the public distain for UN type operations because 'real soldiers' did high intensity ops.

And from a number of journalists who know their stuff noting that initially US soldiers weren't that good at check-points. That's even noted in Generation Kill…

Same journos noted that British and Canadian troops were better at check-points and other similar soft-skills.

Now the US Army wised up quickly, but at the beginning the skills gap was there.

All of the things you note aren't in doubt. But there's a lot more to COIN than that…

My points about the US Army disregard for COIN comes from various reports about the public distain for UN type operations because 'real soldiers' did high intensity ops.

I have no idea where you got that idea or concept. Real soldiers do their duty. Whether it's killing insurgents in a mud brick hut or an MBT of a large conventional army. Again, I don't who wrote or said such things ?

But there's a lot more to COIN than that…

I know, however from my standpoint and experience levels, etc. … Ambushes and Raids and killing the insurgents is the bottom line from my POV.

How does every discussion on the happenings in Iraq get Isreal dragged into the discussion?

Way I see it, only one person does this, and rather consistently. That would imply an agenda.

Bangorstu, why dont you just start your own postings stating how you hate Isrealis, who are typically Jewish, rather than hijacking other people's discussions?

Legion – again it's not a case of 'real soldiers doing their duty'.

It's whether they were adequately trained in vital 'soft skills' or not.

And al lthe evidence is that the US Army wasn't, because the Command showed distain for police actions and never thought they'd fight one – leaving that kind of gendarmerie stuff to the Canadians and Europeans.

Your idea that ambushes and raids are the be all and end-all of COIN rather proves my point…

The ultimate means of winning a COIN war is to get the populace on your side, and to do routine boring stuff like checkpoints, whilst remembering most people are ordinary Joes who want to be left alone and who might well be nervous facing a bunch of foreign soldiers who don't speak their language.

That way you get the intelligence required to plan you ambushes and raids.

Tango Tim. Casualties is dead and wounded.
Fatalities is dead
That's the usual meaning of those terms imho

And al lthe evidence is that the US Army wasn't, because the Command showed distain for police actions and never thought they'd fight one – leaving that kind of gendarmerie stuff to the Canadians and Europeans.

Your idea that ambushes and raids are the be all and end-all of COIN rather proves my point…

stu … you are a bit off in your comments. Check Points provide a modicum of control over enemy infiltration of an area. Searching vehicles, carts, etc. for insurgents, weapons etc. … IDing locals, visitors, new guys in town etc. And provides a modicum of intel. Also in the intel gathering matrix, it is just one small part of gathering intel. Drones, LP/OPs, Sniper positions, mounted and dismounted patrolling, knocking on doors, finding and paying CIs, and general observation of the battlefield. Is also part of intel gathering

Now if you don't know, the patrol menu includes Recon Patroling. Which is not a combat patrol. You go out to find and observe enemy locations, operations, etc. not ot engage if possible. Of all those ops Check Points are probably the easier of those tactical tasks. And unfortunately Check Points make good targets. Especially for suicide bombers. They are much more vulnerable than an LP/OP, etc. … And I've seen plenty of US troops manning Check Points. Most likely backed up and covered by concealed troops. For support. Standing around in the open even behind sandbags is not an Infantry's favor position.

Also a good way to get intel is the raid and ambush patrol. The intel gathered by the other assets I mentioned, can give you some good intel. But if you recall, all the the intel gathered from the UBL and Sayyaff raids. Along with killing the bad guys. PCs, notebooks, maps, overlays, journals, letters, picutures, etc. were all taken away from those raids. Also in an ambush after all the enemy in the Kill Zone is either dead or dieing. You sweep across the KZ and take any intel off the enemy. Like the items I mentioned in the Raid mission. Also if required a POW(s) can be taken from a raid or ambush. That can yield intel once interrogated by the Intel guys. Which next to gathering up PCs, maps, etc., can be some of your best sort of intel.

And yes, we understand hearts and minds, but that iss onlt part of COIN. Give candy to the kids, providing medical assistance, etc. is all well and good. But if you remember, in the past. It was not as successful as you'd like. In Vietnam the SF working with the 'yards was probably the most successful in that conflict. The average South Vietnamese looked down on the "hilliybillies", the feral people of the mountains. That made it that much easier to work with.

In Iraq, the US Military eventually got the locals to work with them instead against them. Because both realized that AQ was killing more moslems than the Coalition was. The US was the lesser of two evils. And the US used that to work with the local militias against AQ. Don't even know if that would equate to "Hearts & Minds" ? And as far as Afghanistan, I don't think it was very effective. Not as effective as paying off local warlords for their support. "Hearts & Minds", IMO is important but not to be over stated. Threat the locals well, but don't look weak of foolish. And in the long run … trust no one.

"Trolls, Mr. Rico. Zillions of 'em!"

Excuse my previous post, in my haste I made a number of typos … but regardless I think my comments are discernible …