"Pentagon: The Iraqi Army Abandoned Tanks, Artillery..." Topic

… And Humvees' To The Islamic State When They Fled Ramadi.

"Extent of Iraqi army chaos revealed by Pentagon alongside claims that corrupt officers sold battle plans to jihadists

The full extent of the Iraqi army's failure in its defeat by Isil in the key western city of Ramadi has been revealed by Washington, which said it left behind tanks, armoured vehicles and other weapons to the jihadists.

A Pentagon spokesman said that the Iraqi security forces (ISF) abandoned "half dozen tanks" as it fled, along with a similar number of artillery pieces, even more armored personnel carriers and about 100 other vehicles such as Humvees.

The revelation – confirming previous claims by jihadist websites – came on top of allegations by an Iraqi adviser and analyst that army officers had been bribed by the jihadists to hand over plans for Ramadi's defence…"
Full article here
link

Thing amount to be BAD!

Amicalement
Armand

What a royal CF…. Is there any 'army' (and I'm using the term very loosely) more useless than the 'Iraqi Security Force'?

Brave Iraqi Army ran away.
("No!")
Bravely ran away away.
("We didn't!")
When danger reared it's ugly head,
They bravely turned their tails and fled.
("no!")
Yes, brave Iraqi Army turned about
("We didn't!")
And gallantly they chickened out.

****Bravely**** taking ("We never did!") to their feet,
They beat a very brave retreat.
("all lies!")
Bravest of the braaaave, Iraqi Army!
("We never!")

Nicely done, Cyrus!

It would make an excellent comedic skit, if it wasn't so pitiful.

I do recognize your narrative, which fits very well with the situation.

Whereas it's easy to laugh, I wonder how well the American Army would fight if it wasn't being paid?

Considering what we did pay them, and how we supported them, I'd say pretty well. An if ISIS was marching through Georgia, I'd say they'd be very motivated.

While designing "A Fistful of TOWs 3", I used the work of Trevor Dupuy and his "quantified judgment model" to calibrate troop quality. Dupuy's methodology calculates an effectiveness rating for each during a given battle. So, for example, after analyzing 100 WW2 battles, he concluded that, on average, 1 German soldier was as effective as (say) 2.7 Russian soldiers. This is after correcting for things like posture, size, equipment, terrain, weather, surprise, etc.

He applied the methodology to the postwar conflicts and found, not surprisingly, that Arab armies were strikingly ineffective. And the worst, as it turned out, were the Iraqis. This was the case through the 1973 war.

One thing that the QJM illustrates is that effectiveness ratings of nationalities doesn't really change all that much. The effectiveness ratings of WW1 Germans, Russians and Brits were similar to their WW2 counterparts. Of course, external factors would cause the effectiveness ratings to move some. The U.S. Army in WW2 got better as it gained more experience. The German Army got a little worse in 1944-45 as it began to take in less qualified manpower. But even these moves were relatively minor. The upshot is that the QJM, if accurate, offers considerable evidence that military effectiveness is like most cultural characteristics -- relatively immutable over an extended period.

So, the argument goes, the 1973 Iraqis would be expected to look a lot like the 2015 Iraqis.

That sure seems the case here.

Certainly they've not fought well – though the ebst units have been fighting for something like 18 months solid without much, if any leave or respite time.

I'm going to guess that has an effect as well.

Mind you, possibly the same is true for ISIS.

It's time for us to stop pretending that any kind of moderate all-inclusive regime is possible in Iraq, wash our hands of this mess and say to ISIS and Iran: "May the best faction win."

Whereas it's easy to laugh, I wonder how well the American Army would fight if it wasn't being paid?

Probably the same as any Welsh Regiments. Of course neither the U.S. or Wales are fighting for their nation's survival.

According to the Iraqi Army National Spokesmen, they didn't run away but are firmly in control of the whole country, and in fact have destroyed all the enemy forces in both Iraq and Syria with no help whatsoever.

According to the Iraqi Army National Spokesmen, they didn't run away but are firmly in control of the whole country, and in fact have destroyed all the enemy forces in both Iraq and Syria with no help whatsoever.

Here he is now:

Look on the bright side.

The performance of the Iraqis has made the WWII Italians look like Waffen SS.

Whereas it's easy to laugh, I wonder how well the American Army would fight if it wasn't being paid?

Probably the same as any Welsh Regiments. Of course neither the U.S. or Wales are fighting for their nation's survival.

Exactly, not only are they fighting for their nation's survival. Which in many cases means little to many Iraqis, because they have more affilition to religion, tribes, ethnicity etc., etc. … But if it is a choice of fighting for your own and your comrades' survival … real soldiers fight ! Whether you get paid or not. It's not like if you are captured by the Daesh, you will be treated well. WE all know what happens. You and your comrades will by lucky if you just get a shot to the back of the head. The US ARMY in combat would not stop fighting because of lack of pay. That means little when in a tactical combat situation. Of course the US ARMY is a professional volunteer force. Regardless, you don't stop fighting if it means death to you and your comrades. I'm going say it a again, and this may upset some. But If you were a soldier you'd know this. Words like duty and honor mean something. Regardless, whether or not you believe that, if it's a choice between fighting or getting captured and executed. I know what my comrades and I would choose … And no matter what … You DON'T abandon and drop your weapons and run away …

And the point is that when their families are actually at stake, the Iraqis fight very well – look at all the tribal issues Daesh has had… and AQ before them.

So it must be a problem with the Iraqi Army. It can't be a case of 'All Arabs Are Cowards' because the Syrians are still going after five years and show no signs of giving in.

Perhaps apart of the problem is that, unlike Syria, the Iraqis don't feel the nation is worth fighting for?

I think the problem lies in Iraq's instability after the invasion. After Saddam was deposed in 2003, Iraq became weak and lacked a "Strongman" to lead the fractured country. For all his tyranny Saddam was popular and ruled with an iron fist through his Baath Party. Also, the professional Iraqi army and "hardcore" Republican Guard were dismantled because they were seen as Baath Party loyalists. Many of them later joined AQ and ISIS.

Syria hasn't disintegrated to the extent of Iraq because of Assad's iron rule and Iran's support via Hezbollah.

OTOH there just isn't a legitimate "country" or government in Iraq to rally behind right now.

So it must be a problem with the Iraqi Army. It can't be a case of 'All Arabs Are Cowards' because the Syrians are still going after five years and show no signs of giving in.

Agreed, and of course not all Arabs are cowards. That would be a very bad case of underestimating your enemy … or ally.

Perhaps apart of the problem is that, unlike Syria, the Iraqis don't feel the nation is worth fighting for?

That is the point, I think we all see or some are beginning to see. Iraq is an artifical region. That came about at the decisions made by long dead European politicians after WWI. There was no consideration of the religious, ethnic, tribal, etc., differences when drawing lines on the map. And Iraq is not the only place where this occurred. So in Iraq's case you really should 3 separate nations. Kurdistan to the North, "Shiastan" to the East and "Sunnistan" to the West. Of course this is all much easier said than done. Bottomline, most in the region called Iraq have more affiliation to religion, enthicity, tribes, local clerics, etc., etc. than "the State" … And the underline ongoing Sunni-Shia Religious [Un]Civil War is the elephant in the room. Until that is worked out, it appears there will be no peace among the followers of Islam. And they have to do it themselves, without "infidel" assistance …

Like I said, let ISIS and Iran's proxies duke it out, wish them both the best of luck and "May the best team win."

Nothing brings stability better than natural selection.

I seem to recall an underpaid, underfed, rebel army defeating your countrymen, and ours, quite handily, a few centuries ago, Bangor.

Not everything is about money.

Are these guys defending their own homes or "some place I got stationed" ?

That might make a difference as far as their willingness to confront a bunch of fanatics.

My understanding is that Iraq has very little in the way of "military culture" where such a thing is seen as a positive.

Mako – recall all you like, but you had considerable help from a lot of well paid professionals from France, Spain and the Netherlands…

You forgot Prussia.

Still, England lost the war.

The libertarian ideals against "taxation without representation" are much worthier to fight and die for than anything Iraq has to offer.

The explanation for Arab and particularly Iraqi military ineptitude lies in the tribal basis of Arab culture. Sociologists have a term -- amoral familists -- that describes an inability to form relationships of loyalty and trust outside one's clan. The problem is that you can't run a competent national military force if each soldier has to choose between loyalty to his unit/commander or loyalty to his clan. For instance, consider a platoon commander from tribe A who commands a platoon of soldiers from tribes A, B and C. He will be under irresistible cultural pressure to give the best jobs to members of tribe A and the worse/most dangerous jobs to members of tribes B and C. Small wonder that this platoon routs from the field when it comes under fire; it has no unit cohesion.

In the case of ISIS, the tribal bonds are supplanted by religious fanaticism just barely enough to give them a decisive edge over the Iraqi national forces.

And that's why the Iraqis lose.

This is also why ISIS will be decisively defeated by any Western military force (regardless of equipment).

Still, England lost the war.

That is the Bottom line … However, as we have noted before. Some anti-US bias still exist to this day by some …

This is also why ISIS will be decisively defeated by any Western military force (regardless of equipment).

Very true … if NATO or the Western nations of the UN, en masse decided to go to total war with Daesh. And purge the world of these medieval butchers. Which all agree must happen. However, the collateral damage would be horrendus. Non-combatant causalities would be high. But as we saw in WWII to purge the Nazis and Jap Imperialists, total war the only way to do this …

Legion – the question being would you have won without the extra help?

Personally I think no… though it's less humiliating to consider oneself to be beaten in a civil war than by the French :)

But all nations have their myths, including mine.

Mako – recall all you like, but you had considerable help from a lot of well paid professionals from France, Spain and the Netherlands…

And the US, UK and others haven't helped the Iraqis? The Iraqis have had professionals training them better than their opponents, equipping them better than their opponents, as well as flying air support for them.

Tango made some good points in one of the other duplicate threads on this subject, regarding some of the other factors that wear down an army. He speaks from first-hand experience being on the losing side in war, and we don't hear a lot of that around here.

There's also something to be said for an effective military tradition, and that's certainly lacking in Iraq.

And yeah, there are a lot of cultural issues/attitudes that make it hard for an Arab national army to function. "The Arab Mind" is recommended reading, btw.

The Iraqis have had plenty of help, but not the boots on the ground Washington enjoyed.

Though Washington didn't get air cover either )

The problem seems to be a lack of cohesiveness… as I've said before, Iraqis can fight, just not when in uniform.

Arab armies can fight. Look at the Jordanians. Or indeed, right now, the Syrians.

In their few combats with them, the Lebanese gave ISIS a bloody nose as well.

It's worth noting too that many militaries in the region have views of discipline and officer-private relations that are reminiscent of 19th century Prussians but without the nationalism or culture of subordination that kept the Prussians in the field.

Throw in loyalties or affinities for this or that sect and the simple fact that the grunt that runs away gets to not be beheaded, and it's no real wonder.

That is the Bottom line … However, as we have noted before. Some anti-US bias still exist to this day by some …
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I wish there'd be some Sharpe novels where he gives a bloody nose to the American invaders trying to subjugate the poor Canadians (though O'Brien's novels do feature some Anglo American punch ups and are also I think not biased either way – I suspect a Sharpe novel would have to have lascivious Southern plantation owners etc as they do rather fall into the stereotypes of the French, Spanish etc – Napoleanics for Sun readers really as the 95th are the SAS sans MP5s and black body armour)

"Arab armies can fight. Look at the Jordanians."

One of the interesting things that came out of Dupuy's quantified judgment model (QJM) is that the Jordanians, while the most effective Arab army during the Arab-Israeli Wars, were overrated. In the 1967 war, for instance, the Israelis were about 1.5 times as effective as the Jordanians. In other words, after correcting for equipment, terrain, mission, surprise etc., one Israeli soldier was as effective as 1.5 Jordanian soldiers. The Israeli superiority against other Arab armies in the 1967 war was 1.75 vs Egyptians, 2.63 vs Syrians and 3.5 vs Palestinians.

What's really surprising though, is that the Israeli effectiveness was just as good in the 1973 war. 1.88 vs Egyptians, 2.54 vs Syrians and 3.54 vs Iraqis. The initially poor Israeli performance in the 1973 war is explicable by surprise and by being badly outnumbered in the opening days.

So while Arabs may be able to fight, they have repeatedly failed to field effective armies against Western opponents.

1973 was an awful long while ago – in my case just about a lifetime.

But during Black September they did repel a bunch of Syrians without much effort.

Whereas we've no way of knowing if the Jordanians have got any better, recent evidence suggests the IDT might have got a little worse.

Bangorstu--

If Dupuy was right, then the combat efficiency values are comparatively immutable. I find this extremely credible, since cultural factors profoundly affect military effectiveness and culture is extremely resistant to change.

As noted, the Germans, for instance, were about as effective in 1871 as they were in 1914 and 1944. The British and Americans* showed a similar level of consistency.

Thus, I see no reason to radically change the values on the Jordanians. Regarding the IDF, remember that in 1973 and in the 1982 Bekaa Valley campaign, pundits declared that the IDF had lost its edge. However, the QJM determined that they'd actually improved a bit.

Given the IDF's past performance (and the fact that it cannot afford to,lose a single,war), I'm very skeptical of claims that they've lost a step.

Regarding the Jordanians vs Syrians, the QJM would predict that Jordanians would be much better than Syrians -- about 1.75 times as effective (the same disparity between the Israelis and Egyptians in 1967).

*The Americans, intriguingly, show the greatest variation (though not as much as one might think). I think this is due to,the fact that in the two World Wars, the U.S. essentially built new armies from scratch, so there was a learning curve. And then, in the 1970s, the U.S. transitioned to an all volunteer professions force.

I think Dupuy isn't remotely right, it sounds dangerously like 'national characteristics'.

The Germans were perfectly OK in 1870. They got their arses kicked twenty years before by the Danes (or at least the Prussian did).

The French in 1870 seem to have deteriorated somewhat from 1806.

So, anyone can see it's BS.

Legion – the question being would you have won without the extra help?

Personally I think no… though it's less humiliating to consider oneself to be beaten in a civil war than by the French :)

But all nations have their myths, including mine.

I have to agree with all of that … however, I was not around during the AWI …

I wish there'd be some Sharpe novels where he gives a bloody nose to the American invaders trying to subjugate the poor Canadians (though O'Brien's novels do feature some Anglo American punch ups and are also I think not biased either way

Not once but twice the US tried invading Canada ! But again, I was not there … so I'll have to take your word for it …

Bangorstu --

Given Dupuy's credentials as an accomplished historian and military analyst, the hundreds of battles studied, the fact that the QJM was peer reviewed, the fact that it not only predicted the historical battles but came amazingly close to accurately predicting the outcome of Operation Desert Storm (closer than any other model) and the fact that the mathematical models were fully disclosed and subject to independent validation, I think that it is FAR more likely to be accurate than your bald dismissal as "BS". While the QJM's conclusions may be emotionally disturbing to you, facts are stubborn things and have a distressing tendency to exist regardless of our feelings.

Of course, not everyone agrees that the QJM is completely accurate. But having reviewed a lot of the most critical literature, I'm struck by the fact that most of the criticisms were relatively minor and would have made very modest changes in the QJM outputs.

I note that the QJM even agrees with you when you stated that the Jordanians were much better than the Syrians.

I'd add that the QJM produces conclusions that, in general, are hardly unprecedented -- i.e., that some armies are simply more effective than others, even allowing for equipment, terrain, mission, weather, surprise, etc. Can anyone seriously argue that the 1941 Russian Army was as effective as the 1941 Wehrmacht? Or that the 1967 Syrian Army (which turned in one of the most inept performances in military history) were as effective as the 1967 IDF?

So while Arabs may be able to fight, they have repeatedly failed to field effective armies against Western opponents.
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Notwithstanding Col Dupuy analysis, i think the point is that some posters here appear to be denying that they can fight at all.

The initially poor Israeli performance in the 1973 war is explicable by surprise and by being badly outnumbered in the opening days.
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i thought it was also the result of doing tank attacks over open desert against defensive positions with plenty of ATGMs (due perhaps to a certain arrogance on their part that a whiff of gunpowder would cause the natives to run) and carrying out airstrikes when you didn't realise that your opponent had rather a lot of SAMs.

Shh… the Israelis are 'Western' and therefore superheros.

They've enver been out-thought or outfought by Arabs who are, as we all know, cowards.

Especially not during the crossing of the Suez Canal….

Ok, Stu. If the Egyptians were so good in 1973 (and the Israelis so bad), please explain how, after their initial successes (which were very well planned and executed; kudos to the Egyptians for that), they managed to get an entire army surrounded and have Israeli armored columns roaming unchecked on the Egyptian side of the canal with nothing between them and Cairo?

The initial Israeli response in the south was hurried and lack sufficient infantry (in droves) and was against a well prepared enemy who had a previously unknown advantage (the Sagger). That will almost always end badly. Once they realized what they needed to do (do armor/infantry combined tactics), the Sagger advantage fell away and the Israelis were able to take the initiative.

Might do a little research, Stu, before shooting your mouth off….

Again, Stu, facts are stubborn things.

The facts are that Arabs have repeatedly proven themselves unable to field effective armies against Western opponents. And Dupuy's QJM simply quantified the general degree of effectiveness of various 20th century combatants. And to precisely no one's surprise (at least no one who actually knows anything about the subject) it found Arab armies were strikingly ineffective compared to Israeli (and later American) armies. Since this is hardly news, I wonder what made you react so viscerally? Was it perhaps that the QJM also showed a modest *improvement* in Israeli effectiveness?

In any case, your overwrought "supermen" comment is absurd. The consensus among military historians and professionals is that the Egyptians did a superb job in 1973 of (a) preparing for the Suez crossing; and (b) surprising the Israelis. So your implication to the contrary is inaccurate at best and disingenuous at worst.

However, the Egyptians were woefully inept once surprise wore off and very nearly had their entire army destroyed. The Israelis, by contrast, recovered incredibly quickly and performed superbly in the subsequent campaign, ultimately encircling the Egyptian army and having an unopposed path to Cairo. The Israeli performance on the Golan Heights was equally superb.

I'd also note that pointing out Arab ineffectiveness is not the same as calling them cowards. I haven't done that and your insinuation to the contrary is false.

These are the facts and I'm sorry if you don't like them. Military history really isn't very interested in your multicultural angst.

Neither am I, come to think of it.

Stu, you're not suggesting that any poster to this thread has…anti-Arab beliefs? Are you?

Because you don't know what someone else is thinking. Someone could be repeatedly and obsessively attacking…Arabs…for any number of reasons.

Don't you agree?

Given the IDF's past performance (and the fact that it cannot afford to,lose a single,war), I'm very skeptical of claims that they've lost a step

Their performance in 2006 vs Hezbollah was a bit underwhelming. Dunno if anyone has applied QJM to that conflict. It's the first time I've heard of this model, but mathematical models for Operational Analysis is kinda new to me. I was just at a lecture on Linguistic Geometry by Boris Stillman last month. Pretty interesting stuff…

Noble713--

The QJM is designed to assess conventional wars. Insurgency type operations like the IDF engaged in with Hezbollah aren't assessed by the QJM. (It will assess insurgencies with large conventional battles like Vietnam).

The IDF was dissatisfied with its performance in 2006 and apparently made a number of serious changes. But struggling in a single insurgency campaign is hardly evidence that the IDF has lost its way in my opinion.

GNREP8--

"i thought it was also the result of doing tank attacks over open desert against defensive positions with plenty of ATGMs (due perhaps to a certain arrogance on their part that a whiff of gunpowder would cause the natives to run) and carrying out airstrikes when you didn't realise that your opponent had rather a lot of SAMs"

I don't think arrogance had anything to do with it. The Israelis were caught by surprise. All they had available at the beginning were a few armored reserves that they committed to counterattacks to buy time. These were cut to pieces by lavish quantities of Egyptian ATGM (and RPG-2 and 7).

In addition, the Israeli Air Force did not recognize the importance of ECM systems on their aircraft, thinking that pilot skill would counter the SAMs. And credit where due to the Egyptians, who executed a well-planned crossing of the Suez Canal and who (with Soviet help) put together a very formidable air defense system to cover the canal. And of course, managed to surprise the IDF.

Once the Israelis recovered from the initial shock, they mobilized their reserves and switched to combined arms operations. At the same time, the IDF hastily re-equipped with ECM systems and began to methodically take the Egyptian SAM network down.

I'm not saying the Egyptians are a super army.

Merely pointing out that the Israelis, for the first part of the Yom Kippur War, got their arses handed to them in short order by a well planned and conducted attack.

Which rather disproves the views I see here.

And if the IDF is so brilliant, they'd have done rather better against Hezbollah….even the Israelis admit that didn't exactly go as planned.

Note, incidetnally, that shortly after the Yom Kippur War, Israel handed Sinai back to Egypt…..

So who won? Certainly the IDF was obviously not keen to have another go against an enemy which was getting better on every occasion it fought.

"Which rather disproves the border-line racist views of Arab cowards \i see here."

Oh good grief. Take your social justice whining somewhere else, please. We're discussing military history and *facts*. I seriously doubt anyone is interested in your cliche-ridden bleating about (non-existent) racism. Really…no one cares about your multicultural sensitivity.

Do you actually have anything to say that doesn't involve you calling other folks RAAACCCIIISSTTTSSS merely because they accurately relate the performance of Arab armies in the field? Perhaps we should apply your reasoning to you -- by your standards, doesn't your obvious animus against the IDF make you antisemitic?

And no one here has disputed that the Egyptians acquitted themselves quite well in the opening stages of the 73 war. So why do you keep arguing the point against nonexistent opponents?

And I'm sorry, but the QJM disagrees with you regarding the alleged improvement in the Egyptian army. As does history. While the Egyptians did well initially, they were catastrophically incompetent once the Israelis recovered from the surprise. Unless "getting better" somehow means "getting your entire army surrounded by a numerically inferior foe". I think the QJM has it right -- the Egyptian Army got slightly worse. In the intensely planned canal crossing, they did as good a job as any army could. But once the war became mobile, the Egyptian Army was simply outclassed and outfight by the IDF.

Oddly enough, the Arab army that did get better in 73 was the Syrian Army, which went from "worst army ever" to "merely awful army". The Syrian performance in 1967 was among the most abysmal in the history of conventional warfare. As Dupuy states in a white paper:

"It is almost incredible to a military observer that any military force could have scaled the escarpment from the Huleh Valley to the Golan Plateau in a few hours against a force with the wealth of weapons and equipment available to the Syrians. One must draw the conclusion that, with a few individual exceptions, the Syrian Army was hardly better than a mob in uniform, commanded by individuals who could not cooperate with each other, or coordinate subordinates. The reason for this is evident in the …nine military coups d'etat [1949-1967] and after each coup the successful upstart had cleared out all potential rivals or enemies in the officer corps. The result was turmoil in the armed forces, with inevitable incompetence of the sort demonstrated in the 1967 War. During the following winter, however, there had been one more coup d'etat, led this time by the then Minister of War, Air Force General Hafez al Assad. The new President again swept the senior commanders away (the evidence of the recent war suggests that this could not have done serious harm), and put in his own men… Thus an improvement in Syrian performance…was inevitable…"