"French Battalion in Field" Topic

Hmmm…after all this time studying the Russians, I now realize I know zip about the French.

This started by trying to setup the 61st Line for Shevardino, using a 1:20 representation ( potentially 1:10 or 1:5). It's confusing for me b/c most games at this scale use the company as the lowest-level building block, where I would think the basic unit of maneuver would be the peleton or vzvod.

At any rate, having seen a lot of action, in so far as I can tell, the 61st arrived with five battalions (and four light guns? sources vary), and a strength ranging from 360 per battalion to 446 per battalion (if you have better numbers, please chime in). At any rate, not the TO&E in Paris.

Questions would be: would the five very understrength battalions have been consolidated, say to four? Would they have moved people around to ensure the peletons were the same size? Would the flank peletons simply have gotten smaller, or would they have been filled from the center? Would the number of ranks remained at 3, thus halving the frontage of the peleton, or would the preference be to lose the third rank to keep them as close as possible to their original, full-strength files?

Thanks!
jeff

I once did some research into French in the Peninsula, based on several passages in Oman, which showed a pattern of understrength Regiments being consolidated from 4 to 3, and 3 to 2 battalions, thus keeping battalions at optimum strength. The spare Officers and NCOs were then sent back to France to act as the base for newly raised battalions.

I did a similar one based on Nafziger's Invasion of Russia, plus his trilogy on the 1813 campaigns in Germany, which shows the same effect.

Moving men around to ensure that peletons in any one battalion were equalised was standard. The men were just temporarily attached to other tactical peletons, but still belonged to their original administrative companies. Most, if not all, Armies did this. The British certainly did, hence the distinction between British tactically equalised "divisions" and administrative "companies".

Rod

Rod

Hi, Jeff. Not to be snide nor disrespectful, but could you please explain what difference it would make at the Battalion level in performance overall? The questions you pose all seem to be answered by "it depends…" I should think that the force a battalion commander would turn to for the hardest jobs be kept up to strength at the expense of the other companies (assuming once up to strength someone higher didn't take it away from me to bolster a higher formation of elites).

Size of the companies- To distribute them equally may not be the best thing to do. What if Major LeBlanc (highest ranking officer I have left to place in command) is good at logistics but can't lead men out of a paper bag; but Capt. Courageous can accomplish wonders in his sleep? Are the men sensative to being led by Lt. Korpralkiller?

Regardless how many pieces the pizza gets sliced into, it still remains a finite entity as to the space it can control. Once you have decided this is the way it was, compare it with another like unit. Do the battle records mirror each other? (probably not…because no two men are the same and each unit is made up of men/individuals- no two could ever the same in every way). In Napoleonic times, no two units were trained in the same degree by the same "trainers".

So I am wondering, other than focusing on what each company should look like (would have to be on any given day), how would that impact on the functioning of the battalion? Am curious as to why such seemingly in the weeds details should be reflected in a rules set/game.

I applaud your question, though.

v/r
Tom

Really non-trivial questions, excellent questions!
I want to do some research before trying to answer most of them. But for a start ….

"where I would think the basic unit of maneuver would be the peleton or vzvod"
I could not agree more : the peloton for the the French and the vzvod for the Russians.
It is only confusing because for late period French army infantry, the number of compagnies and the number of pelotons was the same (six). But they were not identical at all – neither in composition nor in purpose – and that is why there are two different words.

"Would they have moved people around to ensure the peletons were the same size? Would the flank peletons simply have gotten smaller, or would they have been filled from the center?"

They would equalize pelotons regularly, certainly just before an assualt battle like Shevardino. This was done equally among all six pelotons of the late period organization.
If the flank pelotons were lacking, a center compagnie soldier was assigned temporarily as, for example, a "grenadier postiche". Also, if the capitaine des grenadiers was to be absent, another capitaine was supposed to be assigned as an "officier postiche", so that the rignt-most peloton had an experienced officer to command it.
At the same time, if there was a shortage of corporals in any peloton, a "caporal postiche", a temporary corporal, would be chosen from among experienced soldiers susceptible to promotion (actually just like the Russian "yefeitor").

"would the five very understrength battalions have been consolidated, say to four? "

The French rather rarely consolidated battalions. Changing the number of battalions was exceptional, and required a decree or order from the war ministry or the grand headquarters, and the approval of the head-of-state Napoléon. This was unlike the Russians, who I think you know, had specific limits on the number of files of the vzvody that could trigger a more or less automatic consolidation batal'onov. The passages from Oman that Rod refers to reflect this : the greatest number of such consolidations occurring in two or three general reorganizations (years apart) that effected many units in Spain at the same time – the last of these resulting from the need to get experienced cadres back to France to rebuild the army after 1812.

That said, in the instant case (a 6e bataillon, in Russia), these had been compagnies de dépôt that had been plussed up and ordered to the régiments only in late 1811. They were in some cases ordered to be consolidated. So I will see if there is any record of this for your régiment that I can find for the weeks before Shevardino.

Just a start ….

- Sasha

P.S. Rod, I am not disagreeing with you at all. It was very rare for the British to consolidate battalions, so French consolidations seem rather common in comparison. The Russians consolidated easily and rather often, and had standard regulations for it, so French consolidations seem much less common by comparison. I think the question was placed in the context of "I just finished doing Russians" and so wanted to throw up a little warning.

The thing with a French battalion is that the company was an administrative division, not a tactical one. In battle, the men were grouped into equal-sized platoons. This enabled the battalion to carry out tactical evolutions. Imagine trying to form square with un-equally sized companies….

Beaten to it by an excellent post from Alexandre!

:-) Yes, Cedric--not only is Sasha amazingly well read, he's fast! I'm looking forward to the follow-up.

Tom, you raise excellent questions, but it'll take me a minute to organize a response.

Next ….

From the regimental history :
link

The answer is "no consolidation" – actually the most chewed up bataillon, the 2e, was re-manned by drafts on the other four after Borodino.

So we have 5 bataillons in the field for Shevardino.

For battalion strengths, I have (and I am sure you do, too) numbers for mid-April and a (similar) regimental total mid-June of 101 officers and 3570 men

I have overall regimental losses for 5-7 September (19 officers and about 400 men) and strength as of 15 September (54 officers and 1366 men). So we might infer something like 73 officers and about 1770 men for Shevardino. This would give a battalions of average strength in the range of 15 officers and 355 men, or 370 total. This appraoch appears to support your battalion strength figures.

Jeffrey, where did you get your battalion strength figures? Somewhere in the Fabry? Can you give them by battalion? I assume that the strengths were after Smolensk and before Shevardino, and thus must be the from the report of 1 September, yes?

Also Jeffrey, are you interested in the names of the officers? I think that i can work out the peloton commanders and above for Shevardino if I work at it a bit. Do you name your officers? Do you care if you have the real names?

- Sasha

Next ….

I have no reason to think that they were in anything other than three ranks. It was an assault scenario, on a rather constricted or crowded frontage.

Also, since the regimental history notes only the movement of men to re-staff the the 2e battlaion after Borodino, I have no reason to think that teh bataillons were equalized before Shevardino, only the pelotons within each bataillon.

- Sasha

Jeff. No Problem. I am probably at least 6 hours ahead of you so I will read it tomorrow. (It's 0135 here.)

Sasha, Awfully impressed with the quick and authoritative response! Have a couple of Russian text books I'd love to have summarized for me- especially applicable to before, during and shortly after the Napoleonic wars. Need to send another order, anyway.

v/r
Tom

compagnie d'artillerie régimentaire ….

The regimental artillery was 4 pieces of captured Austrian 3-lber cannon, which had before tthe campign 2 officers, 91 men and 111 horses, under the command of capitiane en 2e d'artillerie Lerique (or Leriche), who was mortally wounded at Borodino and succumbed to his wounds on the 3rd of October.

As far as I know, the maréchal Davout insisted that the regimental artillery be used as intended : not grouped together, and not sent to the rear, but instead under the direction of the général de brigade commanding each large régiment.

- Sasha

Yes, Alexandre, as I recall now, the Russians captured a couple of the 101st's pieces. Unfortunately, my only French references are in English (Riehn, Nafziger), and I extrapolated, as nobody seems to have anything conclusive. I'm guess those are based on Fabry?

Actually, just trying to get a reasonable OB w/strengths for Shevardino. I always thought it an insignificant pre-amble, but after researching, the combat was quite intense, and as you note, on a small patch of fields. A nice companion to Saltanovka, which you guys helped fill out earlier on TMP.

It is useful to remember that the French would maintain three ranks for their tactical peletons until the number of files fell below 12 (or 216 men in the battalion).

Allan

This is as far as I have gotten with the strength of the regiment. I feel I am missing something.

I do not have the Riehn.

Nafziger gives the 15 August strength (before Smolensk) as 86 officers and 2643 other ranks. By the way, what he labels as the 1 August strength is actually the 15 June, the "entry into the campaign" figures – an editing mistake that he has acknowledged.

The French were having some trouble counting men at this point. In the Fabry ( link ), you will see Davout writing to Napoléon on 6 August explaining why the return of 1 August is so much lower than the last report, assumedly that of 15 July. Davout explains this as the result of leaving small detachments in the rear (343 men from the 61e de ligne) which should not have been included in the July report, and administrative errors in the previous counts. Sounds more like straggling to me, and Davout trying to show that such bad behavior did not happen in his corps.
And then Fabry stops at 10 August.

Summary ….

strength return of 15 April (caserne at à Lunebourg) : 3875 all ranks
--- état-major régimentaire : 28 all ranks
--- 1er bataillon : 752 all ranks
--- 2e bataillon : 761 all ranks
--- 3e bataillon : 736 all ranks
--- 4e bataillon : 752 all ranks
--- 6e bataillon : 753 all ranks
--- compagnie d'artillerie régimentaire : 93 all ranks
(part of the état-major régimentaire and 3 compagnies du 5e bataillon at the dépôt at Worms, 1 compagnie "embarked" on le vaisseau "l'Illustre" which was blockaded in at Antwerp)

strength return of 15 June (nearing the Neimen River, "entry into the campaign") : 101 officers, 3570 other ranks / 3671 all ranks

strength return of 15 August (nearing Smolensk, after Saltanovka) : 86 officers, 2643 other ranks / 2729 all ranks

strength return of 1 September (nearing Borodino, after Smolensk) : ESTIMATED 75+ officers, 1800+ other ranks / 1875+ all ranks

losses 5-7 September : 19 officers and about 400 other ranks / about 419 all ranks

strength return of 15 September (entry into Moscow, after Borodino and several other smaller engagements) : 54 officers, 1366 other ranks / 1420 all ranks

- Sasha