"Yamamoto's Prediction." Topic

When asked if he would win the war, Yamamoto said "I will run wild for six months, but after that I guarantee nothing." He was of course speaking of the huge industrial might and potential of the United States which would swamp the Japanese. Yet when the six months was up (Midway and Guadalcanal), the war was essentially lost to the Japanese and American industrial might had not significantly altered the balance materially. Luck had.

1) The Japanese were extravagantly lucky that all the warning signs were ignored by the Americans that pointed to a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. They were extravagantly lucky in the damage they did and that they were not detected and counter-attacked.

2) The Americans were extravagantly lucky that their carriers were not caught in harbor at Pearl Harbor. Or that the Japanese did not linger to find them.

3) The Americans were extravagantly lucky that their force was not seen and sunk, and that they got off with such a daring plot, and that it would have the enormous morale effect it had on the Japanese, which they weren't looking for at all, only to boost allied morale.

4) The Battle of the Coral Sea was another exercise in chance and luck. At each stage it was a matter of happenstance that the other side knew the other was there at all, or where in particular they were. The Code-breaking gave the Americans a solid edge, but it was not one that could not have been overcome by mere materiel at that time. Who found who and sunk who was largely a matter of luck.

5) Midway. We've all read Miracle at Midway, and we all know that in spite of codes and plans and materiel, the war was won in an hour by luck.

None of this takes one iota of glory and gratitude against the men of either side, or the planners or the admirals. But it does call into question the quote of Yamamoto. Did he REALLY mean that American Industrial production would swamp him after six months, or did he mean that he, a consummate gambler, knew that luck would only last so long and that by six months SOMETHING was going to happen that would cause his luck to run out.

In this case we can credit games with something. At one time the group I was in engaged in a twelve game program of Avalon Hill's Victory in the Pacific, which assumed that the war began with the American Carries in Pearl when the Japanese struck. In all cases the Japanese went for the carriers and ignored for the most part the battleships. The rest of the game saw eventual American Victory, but had a truly heartbreaking part where American Battleships (which had had less damage) were not used sacrificially in desperate attempts to hold on and regain ground that looked awfully like the real life Japanese attempts.

So was it really material? or was it luck. And if so , what does this say about our games.

Luck always plays its part in battle Ottoathome, but even without it, I still can't see a way 1942 Japan could have win against the might the US could unleash against it once the Americans got their economy on a full scale war footing.

As for our games, believe me mate, with me throwing the dice, the Isle of Man would have a chance of occupying Washington! :O)

Getting to Midway/Pearl was as far as Japan would have been able to go, even if they had luck. They could have completed that task within six months or so. After that they would be at the mercy of US production.

I don't think even Yamamoto foresaw just what kind of beating Japan would get from a handful of US carriers.

I remember running across a quote from a US Admiral from just before the war that stands as a sort of reverse perspective to Yamamoto's. Admiral Harold Stark was in a meeting with the Japanese special ambassador, Nomura K. One wonders what promoted such a scathing remark, and what Nomura must have thought, but Stark pulled no punches.

"If you attack us we will break your empire before we are through with you. While you may have initial successes…the time will come when you too will have your losses, but there will be this great difference. You will not be able to make up your losses but will grow weaker when time goes on: while on the other hand we will not only make up our losses but will grow stronger as time goes on. It is inevitable that we will crush you before we are through with you."

Hardly diplomatic, but with the Essex, Washington, South Dakota, Iowa, Baltimore, Cleveland, Atlanta, Fletcher and Gato classes already well under construction, certainly prophetic. This may have been in Yamamoto's mind.

But chuchullain, no one is arguing that. I am simply positing that by the time US industrial preponderance was beginning to be felt, the war was already won, and the material status of either side had not changed significantly except for combat losses. By the start of Guadalcanal Amercia had lost TWO carriers, Lexington and Yorktown, and the Japanese had lost four, Akagi-Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu, and effectlvely lost two more due to damage and decimation of air crew – Shokaku, Zuikaku. That is of the six big fleet carrriers available to each side at the start of the war,

American, Lexington, Saratoga, Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown and Wasp

Japanese, Akagi,Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku ,

The Japanese had lost four and two were unavailable, and the Americans had lost two.

All of these were pre-war construction, All of these were lost to existing enemy units.

The point is that what caused the loss of this or that on either side was not material preponderance, but luck or good fortune.

My point is that the importance for wargamers is that in this specific case, carrier combat in WWII in the pacific, far more depends on luck than material. After Midway, whenever one side has carrier superiority it is a slaughter for the other, and largely it's a tale of extreme and desperate measure and sacrifice for the Japanese which has absolutely no hope of ever bringing victory- like the means to resupply Guadalcanal.

The point of my post is that luck in this period should be overwhelming. As it was.

You can stack up all the classes of this or that like all the kings horses and all the king's men, and YES that counts later in the war, but, in this the start of the war, they might as well have been on the dark side of the moon,

Yamamoto certainly had American productive capacity in his mind, but I suspect he also knew that his luck would run out long before it could come into play.

LPinder, I have never heard of that Stark quote before. Can you cite a source? It sounds pretty much like an internet circulated quote to me.
It sounds pretty much made up after the fact.
To be simple, I don't believe a word of it or that was ever spoken.

So was it really material? or was it luck.

The initial six-month run of Japanese victories, and its sudden termination at Midway, were arguably luck. But the Japanese war strategy was never to destroy the US Navy, nor to invade California, nor to dictate peace terms in Washington DC.

The Japanese strategy was to seize a perimeter of Pacific island bases, and to operate defensively within that perimeter, to slow or stop an American counter-offensive for years, inflicting casualties until the American public lost heart for an endless war.

The Japanese miscalculated, that the American counter-offensive would require ports, and that the Japanese could defend, or destroy bases like Rabaul, Truk, Saipan and Guam, and stall the Americans for years.

They did not reckon that American mechanized contruction engineers (the SeaBees) could build bases in weeks that would have taken Japanese forces years to build out, that American shipyards could turn out 1,000 LSTs (a thousand! in less than four years) and render ports irrelevant, enabling the American amphibious offensive to skip from island to island and on to the Home Islands in weeks, not years. And the US could build 20 carriers to 1 Japanese carrier, 20 destroyers to 1 Japanese destroyer, 50 aircraft to 1 Japanese plane, could mount an unrestricted submarine campaign that wrecked the Japanese merchant marine and a strategic bombing campaign that wrecked the Japanese cities, all with part of one hand, while defeating Germany First.

I am firmly convinced, it was American production that won the Pacific War. The Japanese never had a chance.

No, it wasn't all over in June 1942. There was still the long road back to victory. American production made that feasible.

All the luck in the world is pointless if you don't have the resources to follow it up. As an example Lets look at Midway:

It wasn't luck that put the US carriers in a position to win at Midway, it was intelligence operations.

It wasn't just luck that had the Americans spot the Japanese force. It was having enough recon A/C (i.e. material)to cover the area.

It may have been luck that had the Americans arrive when the Japanese were most vulnerable, but there was enough "Bad Luck" (torpedoes not working, bombs malfunctioning)to counter that. It was the skilled flyers (another resource the Japanese were running out of) of the American dive bombers that brought that luck to fruition.

It was the skill- not the luck – of the Japanese that let them follow the Americans back to the U.S. carriers.

And finally it was the skill of the US crews that keep the Yorktown afloat so that that cause the Japanese to think it was a fresh carrier, sparing the others.

If you examine the whole war this way, you'll see ultimately it comes down to Americas superior resources.

The Japanese miscalculation owed a lot to their own cultural biases They believed that the West were not a pure races like the Japanese but a society of mongrels that lacked strength purposes and in some cases divine help. The West,when faced with the Japanese conquests and the destruction of much of their navies would simply give in to the stronger force. To the Japanese the West, particularly America and Britain, lacked the martial spirit to fight in a lost cause .

The Japanese did not realize the anger they would incur and the desire for revenge through their sneak attacks Yamamoto saw it when he talked abut a fierce resolve a point the remaining Japanese leadership ignored

Being the biggest sure is nice.

I wonder who the next "biggest one" will be?…

I agree with Toronto. It wasn't luck. The best explanation of what happened I have ever heard is found in the immortal words of the late great Richard Pryor, God rest his hilarious soul..

"What was on their mind to be bombing Pearl Harbor and s##t? They sat around saying, "We bombed Pearl Harbor! They'd never f##k with us again!" That's coz they'd been to the University of California. It's all white people, laid back. They hadn't been down to the University of Alabama or Mississippi. I'm not lyin', they got white folks down there they have to keep on chains in the basement!"

Bottom line, they messed with the wrong people. We took the chains off and the rest is history.

One of the great what ifs would be if the DoW had arrived before the attack as planned. I don't think it would have made a lick of difference personally, getting the official news an hour or so ahead of time would not have had any effect on the rage the US felt. Say it if came a day early and the US fleet set sail and was destroyed at sea, which almost certainly would have happened, it would have been a fair fight and not the surprise attack to cause rage, would we have cut a deal then? Who knows.

I first encountered the quote toward the end of Shattered Sword, by Parshall and Tully. They attributed it to a secondary source, The Barrier and the Javelin, by Wilmott. Wilmott's cite is to a rather anti-intuitive source, the British National Archives, Minutes and Memoranda of the War Cabinet, Joint Planning Committees, Cab 84/42/144,147.

Ottoathome, I somewhat disagree, on two counts, *but* I also think you have a point.

First, I think you're confusing Japan losing the opportunity to win the war with the US actually winning the war. The US did not win the war at Midway; there was plenty of hard fighting ahead, with plenty of opportunities for disaster (pretty much the entire Guadalcanal campaign post-dates Midway, for example). If the war had ended the day after Midway the Japanese were still very much ahead. What happened at Midway was that the Japanese lost the ability to gain much more than they had already taken, and thereby push the Allies into some sort of peace agreement (as unlikely as that was).

Second, what the massive US industrial advantage meant was that the US didn't *need* luck; it could in fact be incredibly unlucky and still win the war. For example, let's say that Midway goes entirely the other way; all US carriers sunk, all Japanese carriers intact. Incredibly bad for the US, right? Except by September 1943 the US again reaches carrier parity with the Japanese, by mid-1944 has a *2-to-1* advantage over the Japanese, not counting CVE conversion, even with Japan building as hard and as fast as it can. The US could actually afford to lose *several* Midway scale battles from 1942 on and still be ahead!

So I think that Yamamoto was indeed talking about US industrial capacity. But what US production meant was that the US didn't really suffer from bad luck, and went a long way towards mitigating all the benefits of Japanese good luck. So yes, he might have been looking at the situation with a gambler's eye, and seen that the US chip pile was formidable, and the Japanese one was paltry in comparison. The US could bet high every time, and come back from bad hands, for the Japanese every bad hand was a disaster. So I think luck does have something to do with it; but for the US the deck was stacked, the cards marked, and the chips were piled high. The US didn't need the luck, Japan did.

-Will

1) The Japanese were extravagantly lucky that all the warning signs were ignored by the Americans that pointed to a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. They were extravagantly lucky in the damage they did and that they were not detected and counter-attacked.

There were no such warning signs. Except in the minds of the conspiracy theory freaks.

It was more than luck or even US material superiority. It was the Japanese strategy, or to be more accurate, the conflicting Japanese strategies -Mainland Asia vs the Pacific- what put the Japanese in an impossible position. They tried to win two different wars at the same time, with the resources to fight successfully only one. I know that the US also fought two wars, but while the US had the material resources to do so, Japan didn't.

However, if Japan would have concentrated all her resources in just one conflict, with a clearly defined strategy and all the assets available under the control of a real Joint Chiefs of Staff board they *might*, just might, have given the US a better run for their money. The reality, of course, was that the Japanese spread their scarce resources over a gigantic theatre of war, with conflicting interests and with the Army and the Navy basically fighting their own war almost without regard to the other branchs of the service.

Japan's military history from the late 19th century to 1945 reads much like a Greek tragedy mixed with a comedy of errors.

Increasingly the Japanese began to believe in their own "manifest destiny" a huge and costly enterprise they tried to fund by annexing places like Manchuria, which ended up costing more resources, which forced them to expand even more, while the various nationalistic/militaristic movements grew increasingly more fanatical in their attempts to purge government of what they perceived as corruption and evil foreign influences.

Soon even the more moderate factions found themselves helmed by people who would raise the fanaticism stakes to a level where reality was replaced by complex fantasies about Japan imminent clash with the West, which would once and for all establish Japan as the major world power in Asia.

Japan's new militaristic government was a fascinating mix of highly adept personnel forced to make plans based on the fantastical world view that Japan was guided by divine providence and the West was weak, morally corrupt and would be swept aside with ease. The realities of the problems in China were either ignored or handwaved into "Once we have the right resources we can finish the job …"

A lot of people at the top knew Japan's collision with the USA might not work out as expected, but in a world ruled by fanatics nobody wants to be the dissenting voice, so they joined in, hoping providence might work in their favour.

Japan assumed that when they attacked Pearl Harbour, the US would attack like a raging madman, rushing their fleet into a carefully planned battle that would destroy their remaining battleships and carriers, forcing the US to recongnize Japanese might and sue for peace. Japan's leaders believed for too long that the US was weak and unwilling to pursue the war while they mistook their own blind fanaticism for military excellence.

One thing that almost always seems to be forgotten is the decision by the Western Allies to put the emphasis on Europe first. In addition if you're looking for lucky things for the Japanese you could probably add Hitler abiding by a treaty and declaring war on the US. While the PTO was always a priority for the Navy/ Marines it wasn't for the Army/USAAF. Except for the B29 , 8th and 9th Airforces always had priority over anyone in the PTO. Cargo ships that were running to Europe would have been available to support the Pacific instead. And when you read what surviving Japanese aircrew had to say about their late war production of planes and engines it becomes clear, they needed a quick victory to win.

I remeber reading somewhere that only 20% of US resources went to the PTO. That alone was enough to defeat Japan.

> I remeber reading somewhere that only 20% of US resources went to the PTO

Don't want to forget the Chinese (listed first since so often totally overlooked), the British, the Australians, etc… I wonder how true that 20% figure is, nearly all of the US ship building went to the pacific war (warships anyway).

LSTs are warships I believe… Auxiliaries but warships…

And about those Liberty Ships that kept food going to the UK…

The Empire was a major member of the effort but to say

nearly all of the US ship building went to the pacific war (warships anyway)

seems a bit extreme.

link

This method became so efficient that a single Liberty ship to be fully assembled, launched, outfitted and delivered went from a program average of almost 240 days at the beginning of 1942 to only 56 days at the end of the year.

BTW, the USMC mentioned getting the lion's share is the US Maritime Commission.

link

America would not make the same mistake again. The Commission adopted a long-range building program of 50 new ships a year for the next 10 years. America's moribund shipyards, including those in the Bay Area, came to life. Rehabilitation and expansion began immediately. In preparing for global war, the need for naval vessels was parallel to the need for merchant ships. Contracts for both types of vessels were awarded to Bay Area shipyards.

After December 7, 1941, the shipbuilding program responded to the shifting strategies and progress of the war. New types of vessels were needed, in particular, convoy escort warships in the early stages of the conflict when allied shipping was most vulnerable to German submarines. As the Allies gained the initiative, landing craft and other assault types became top priority.

link

Look at what each star built numbers wise:

Eleven on the east Coast/Gulf, Four on the West Coast.

link

usmaritimecommission.de

usmm.org/libyards.html

US and Canada – shipbuildinghistory.com

link

And that is just Maritime construction.

Check out the WW2 section for some tidbits.

link

A book of unknown quality – link

Carriers – link

link

Okay, I will stop.

Japan's new militaristic government was a fascinating mix of highly adept personnel forced to make plans based on the fantastical world view that Japan was guided by divine providence and the West was weak, morally corrupt and would be swept aside with ease. The realities of the problems in China were either ignored or handwaved into "Once we have the right resources we can finish the job …"

Boy, this reminds of some "people" currently running riot in the Middle East.

I wonder how true that 20% figure is, nearly all of the US ship building went to the pacific war (warships anyway).

US Naval Forces deployed for Operation Torch, in November of 1942, included:

Fleet Carrier: Ranger
Light or Escort Carriers: Chenango, Sangamon, Santee, Suwanee
Battleships: Massachusetts, New York, Texas
Cruisers: Augusta, Brooklyn, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Savannah, Tuscaloosa, Wichita
Destroyers: 38 in 4 Squadrons, 2 Divisions, and several detachments
Submarines: 4

Yes there were more fleet carriers in the Pacific. But I am pretty sure that Torch was the largest combined action by USN forces, Atlantic or Pacific, up to that time in the war.

Anyone want to try counting up the USN forces deployed for Sicily or Normandy?

My point is only this -- to say that nearly all US warships went to the Pacific is simply not true. Maybe nearly all the stories some of us have read about USN actions were in the Pacific, but that does not mean that the USN did not operate VERY substantial forces in the Altantic.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I think that Yamamoto was indeed talking about US industrial capacity. But what US production meant was that the US didn't really suffer from bad luck, and went a long way towards mitigating all the benefits of Japanese good luck. So yes, he might have been looking at the situation with a gambler's eye, and seen that the US chip pile was formidable, and the Japanese one was paltry in comparison. The US could bet high every time, and come back from bad hands, for the Japanese every bad hand was a disaster.

This is very well stated.

Consider this: from the time Yamamoto's predicted window closed (after 6 months) to the end of the war, the US completed and commissioned about 100 aircraft carriers (of all sizes and types). That is to say, in about three years the US put into service more than twice as many aircraft carriers as all of the rest of the world's navies combined have produced and commissioned in the entire 100+ year history of naval aviation to date.

This at the same time that the US was producing the world's largest battleship fleet, cruiser fleet, destroyer fleet, and merchant marine fleet, not to mention land vehicle fleet and aircraft (transport, fighter AND bomber) fleets.

This was the issue Yamamoto predicted. Maybe not specifically by the numbers, but in effect. It didn't matter what Japan did once the US was committed to carrying the war through to completion. There was nothing the IJN could have done to change the outcome, other than to delay the inevitable. Much like the UK, as an island nation their fate is determined by who controls the seas around them. And they had no hope, under any scenario, of preventing the USN from controlling the seas around Japan if the US was committed to controlling those seas.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)