"Great War Spearhead - unit frontages " Topic

As per another thread I started, I have recently been encouraged to buy GWSH by some other members of TMP – and, though I have not yet played it, I am pleasantly surprised at how good it seems.

One question:

Ground scale is given as 1" being about 80 yards, and bases are given as 30mm wide – four of which constitute a battalion. So a battalion frontage of about 400 yards, if they were put side-by-side.

Is this reasonable?

In a defensive position, that strikes me as about right, but for a battalion advance to contact, it seems a bit bunched up to me?
If we are talking 10 yards between men, that would mean only 40 men in each line (and a rather improbable 20 or so lines deep)… if we drop that to 5 yards between men, that's still only 80 men in each line. (meaning a battalion would still be about 10 lines deep)

Or does that seem 'about right' to the brains trust of TMP?

I am looking to tweak GWSH and use it for playing the Boer War (if anyone has done that, and can offer advice on converting it, please share) and spacing of about 10 yards between men was commonplace in infantry attacks from the very start of that conflict (and spacing got wider – at Diamond Hill, the Tommies advanced with 20 yards between men) – I would be surprised if infantry generally attacked in closer order in WW1?

Battalion assault frontages of around 400 yards were very common. A typical brigade frontage was around half a mile – 800 yards, or one battalion per 200 yards….

The troops were however arrayed in some depth with the companies in multiple waves – so more commonly a battalion occupied a square, roughly 400x400.

Later in the war, frontages extended somewhat with division attacking on a 3000 yard from rather than a 1500 yard one (or less).

German 1917+ defensive frontages were around 1000 yards per regiment (or 330 yards per battalion), however again, they were deployed in enormous depth (several km).

As John Keegan observed, the entire western front was manned at a higher troop density per yard than that found at Waterloo, so it is hardly surprising a breakthough proved a tad elusive.

In GWSH I wouldn't advise packing an entire brigade into a square of 4 bases x 4 bases. Makes quite a nice artillery target!

Martin Rapier

Very interesting – thanks.

Was there any reason to deploy battalions in such depth, rather than 'in width', one behind the other? Was it easier to control a narrow, deep formation, than a wider, shallow formation?

Not sure if I have explained what I mean very well – basically, why did the Germans prefer their battalions to be 330 yards wide, and 'several kilometers' deep (one beside the other), rather than (eg) a kilometer wide and 500 yards deep, with further depth positions held by other battalions?

I guess it was easier for a battalion holding defensive positions to cycle companies / platoons between the front line and 'quieter' positions further back, than to have to move whole battalions about?

It also meant that as you fell back you were not intermingling units…

Sorry, I wasn't clear. The defensive regimental frontages were a series of battalions – one up front, one behind and one waay back, each deployed in a series of positions.

Before 1917 they were more stuffed into the front line.

wrt 'deep' rather than 'wide' battalions, they are much easier to control and give the battalion CO the option of committing the various waves.

Battalions in WW2 commonly deployed in at least four lines too, as do modern ones. Commanders at every level keep a reserve and there is no point shoving loads of chaps up front as modern weapons have very large beaten zones, so more guys just means more targets.

Think Napoleonic attack columns, just a bit more dispersed. The above are huge generalisations.

Samuels covers this stuff very well in 'Command or Control. Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888-1918'.

link

The reprint of the 1916 British Divisional Tactics manual is illuminating, as the US translation of the 1917 French one (the latter is on CMH, the former available from Caliver Books).

Green Leader, Martin has explained things very well, but just want to add. The Command Zone is what gives you the flexibility to form up in a number of ways to lessen the effect of artillery or to tighten up for maneuverability. As martin points out – packing troops tightly will result in a lot of removal of bases as the artillery will eat you up. But at the same time – over spacing will result in no support, lack of command and control and no ability to counter attack or support function. In defense of established positions this might be okay, but in the fluid fields of the East/Med fronts or in the West in 14 and 18 – it can be dangerous – just like the real thing.

Shawn

Frontage in attack and defense are widely different ( def x2+ ) and gets somewhat wider later in the war.
400 m early on in the attack will be for two companies up and two back.

Thanks to all for some interesting replies.

So I guess spacing between men would have been around about 5 yards?

On average, yes. In defense at least, there was a tendency to have teams concentrated on key defensive positions that provided mutually supporting fire. There was less concern about maintaining a continuous front as any defenders who 'broke in' through the gaps would find themselves becoming more isolated and vulnerable to counter-attacks.

Some commanders struggled with this concept though. The French général Duchęne, GOC French Sixth Army in 1918, disagreed with Pétain's request to defend in depth. As a result, the German attack on the Chemin des Dames ridge in Operation Blücher-Yorck steamrolled over the French and British units, causing heavy casualties and advancing 19km on the first day.

Still the lesson was not learned, however. Ludendorff planned a further operation to pinch out the strategic city of Reims. It had held out during the Chemin des Dames offensive, narrowing the shoulder of the breakthrough towards the Marne and making German re-supply much more difficult. The French had warning of the attack but Général Gouraud also wanted to ignore Pétain's advice. This time Pétain did not stand for any truck. He forced Gouraud to defend in depth, with small teams providing mutually supporting fire and covered by artillery. The much-vaunted specialist German assault troops were brought to a halt with heavy casualties and no break throughs were achieved. This was the last major offensive launched by the Germans on the Western Front.

Robert

Robert

My apologies – I meant in an attack / advance to contact situation.