"WW2's European turning point - Stalingrad or Kursk?" Topic

The same would have happened if they hadn't have pulled off Dunkirk, with 300,000 British Pows Churchill would have resigned or been forced out and those prisoners would have been a massive bargaining chip for Germany.

None of the above. Even if the Germans had crushed the British at Dunkirk, they lacked the seapower to challenge the Royal Navy and get into the UK. The British did not have the ability to successfully contest the land strength of Germany in WWII. El Alamein was a needless battle as the presence of US forces in the German rear within the month made the German position in North Africa untenable and would have bloodlessly requied a retreat from Egypt.

The turning point really isn't a single battle at all but the German attack on the USSR in June 1941; Hitler's declaration of war against the USA in December 1941 merely sped up the deadline to the end of the European war. Up until June 1941 German casualties per month had been light; afterwards they were in the tens of thousands and were losses they could not sustain. Recall that the vast majority of the German casualties were sustained on the Eastern Front – it was just a matter of time before the Red Army recovered and the Soviet juggernaut steamrolled west to destroy the Third Reich. It would certainly have taken the Soviets longer to do but they would likely have been able to defeat Germany without the need for Allied intervention in the west.

Poland 1939.

The only hope for Germany was a political one. After the absorption of the rump of Bohemia it was clear to all what Hitler was like.

After the absorption of Bohemia it was time for Hitler to pick up his chips and go home. Then, bring Poland into the anti=comintern pact and build her up as a strong satellite- after all they were the only people in Europe who hated the Bolsehviks more than the Germans.

Martin (and Overy) make the point that I find so compelling, and so often mis-understood (as witness Hiyo's comment).

In 1942 the European Axis controlled a LARGER population, and a LARGER industrial capacity, than the USSR.

So often I see people talking about the endless Russian manpower … but in 1942 the Axis had more manpower at their disposal. And they had more industrial might.

It is a far more complex picture than that, and I would refer people to "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze.

Yes, in the summer of 1940 the Greater German European bloc (including neutrals that were forced to favour Germany) could have had a combined GDP that was greater than that of the USA or the British Empire, but it relied upon maintaining pre-war levels of economic activity to achieve that. Ultimately this proved to be impossible to reach.

Whilst Germany had coal it did not have oil. It needed annual imports of 1.5 million tons of oil (mostly from Romania) to keep its armed forces and domestic economy going. Seizing the stocks of France did not help because it simply added the French need for oil (5.4 million tons per year pre-war) to its own. Plus the needs of the other conquered nations. From the summer of 1940 France only received 8% of its pre-war supply of petrol. France essentially went back to the days before motorisation. Tooze gives the example of thousands of litres of milk going to waste because there was no transport to collect it.

Italy and its armed forces needed oil and it could only come from Romania or the stocks that Germany had. Germany itself had to economise through drastic measures. For example, ‘Demotorisation' of the Wehrmacht was seriously suggested. Soldiers were given driving licences having had less than 15km of road experience, a measure blamed as responsible for the high attrition rate to motor vehicles on the Russian front. Opel temporarily shut down its truck assembly lines because there was no fuel to enable the company to check the fuel pumps of new vehicles.

Before the war many Western European countries imported coal from Britain. With this source removed these countries had to look to Germany to supply them. In a perfect world this would almost have been possible, total demand fell short of total supply by only a few percent. But it would have required a highly efficient and organised rail network to move the coal around Europe and this just did not exist. The German railways had been starved of funding whilst the focus shifted to building autobahns and promoting bus and truck transport. Purchase of new rolling stock did not keep pace with wear and tear. Eventually coal production had to be cut back because it was piling up at the pit head with little rail capacity to take it away. In time stock from French, Dutch and Belgian railways eased the problem for Germany but just made the issues in those countries worse.

Pre-war France was Europe's largest importer of coal. It was also the third largest producer of coal after Germany and Britain. Unfortunately for Germany (and France) French coal production fell by 18% in 1940 and never recovered. The amount of coal available to France fell to half of pre-war levels and the corresponding output of steel fell too.

The Luftwaffe placed orders with the French aircraft industry to supply 3,000 aircraft and 13,500 aero-engines. To produce them the French would require aluminium. They had bauxite and smelting capacity but not the coal to produce electricity. 120,000 tons per month would be required but Germany could only supply 4,000. Consequently, by the end of 1941 Britain had received 5,012 aircraft from the USA whilst Germany got 78 from France and the Netherlands. By the end of the war Germany had received only 2,517 aircraft from France and 947 from the Netherlands. It took four times as many workers to produce a German aircraft in France as it did to produce the same aircraft in Germany.

Food was also in short supply, and activities such as mining required a high calorie diet. The dairy farms of Denmark, France and the Netherlands required imported animal feed. The source was mainly Canada and Argentina and the British blockade cut off supplies. France and Germany were major producers of grain, but this depended upon supplies of fertiliser. Production of fertiliser used the same raw materials as explosives. You could have one or the other, but not both in the quantities required.

The farms of Western Europe required manpower and draught animals. The need for men and horses in the army, chemicals for explosives, and the loss of imported animal feed all impacted upon agriculture to the detriment of the daily ration. Tooze describes Germany's Western European empire as "a basket case".

So the European Axis may have had a larger population and greater industrial capacity than the USSR, but what good was that if the population was not as productive as it should have been and the industrial capacity was not realised?

Tooze states that by autumn 1942 the Eastern Front force ratio was 2:1 in favour of the Russians. They out-produced Germany 3:1 in small arms and artillery, 4:1 in tanks and 2:1 in aircraft. This ‘production miracle' came at a price that Stalin was prepared to pay. Farm labour was slashed to provide manpower for the army and factories. The net result was that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, starved to death. The populations of German occupied Europe, where they had a choice, were just not prepared to go that far for a German victory.

So I decided to pull out some statistics. The sources are non existent and hopefully someone has better, but this may be a start to help answer an important question. With these statistics it is my belief that without USA intervention/lend lease and a serious threat of invasion from Great Britain that Germany could have successfully conquered the Russians. I believe that Germany maintained a high enough kill ratio to override the disparity in population.

Gdp per person
German 590
Soviet 138
4.27 differential

Total pop
german 75million
soviet 120?million
.625

Oil
Germany 360
Soviet 75
4.8

Steel and iron
Germany 34.6 +27.8 (62.5)
Soviets 8.5 +4.2 (12.7)
4.92

link

link

Russia put a high percentage of women to work while Germany did not.

The failed French offensive into the Saar in 1939. This ensured many years of death, destruction and misery for the rest of the world.

Russia put a high percentage of women to work while Germany did not.

Not the case I'm afraid. The percentage of German women in the workforce in 1939 was higher than that reached by either the USA or Britain by the end of the war. 51% of German women were economically active in 1939. Britain, for example, only reached 41% in 1944.

I am fascinated to see so many contributors suggest that the Soviet war effort was so dependent on US/British industrial support – presumably in the shape of trucks, tanks, etc.

Is that really true? Or could the Soviets have beaten Germant without all this materiel?

Re those that are never right but never in doubt:

Albert Speer, master of the German war production: "How wise you were to bring your women into your military and into your labor force. Had we done that initially, as you did, it could well have affected the whole course of the war. We would have found out as you did, that women are equally effective, and for some skills, superior to males."

In 1924 about 27% of Soviet industrial strength would be composed of women (Hayden [1979] 1984:248)
Since WWII 50% of the employment sector was comprised of women.

Quoting Speer doesn't alter the facts Mobius. Do some research on where these German women were working and then Speer's words might make more sense to you.

I wasn't disputing the Soviet's use of female labour either.

I believe if it was left up to the Generals, the Germans could have defeated the Soviet Union by taking Moscow before winter & the Caucus' the following year. Bear in mind that most of the Soviet army was sent to the front at gun-point. As soon as the head was taken off of the beast, it would have lost much of its fighting capability.

However, the fact that Hitler continued to meddle with the armies in the East can't be ignored and as long as he was moving the pawns the Soviets would have beaten Germany (and conquered all of Europe) without any assistance from the West.

BTW, this is a great discussion! Some great points have been made I hadn't considered before.

deephorse

That's one of the most interesting posts I have read on here. Fascinating stuff.

I always thought it was bizarre in wargames like 'Third Reich', 'Hearts of Iron' or 'World in Flames' or whatever, that when you capture 'industry' or 'resources' then you just grab them and they start working away for you instead. It always struck me as totally unrealistic, and that the side who grabs these assets should only get (eg) 10% of their value to reflect the sort of things you mention.

Re Lend-Lease, the typical view is confined to the amount of weapons supplied. Usually left unaddressed is the absolutely mind-boggling enormity of industrial and agricultural goods and raw materials of every sort provided – food, explosives, steel, aluminum, aviation fuel, radios and electronics, medicines, railroad locomotives and rolling stock and the rails upon which they ran, precision manufacturing machines. The point of interest is to compare what Lend-Lease provided versus Soviet usage/consumption.

One of the reasons why the Soviets were able to commit so many men to the military was because they were not needed as workers in the economic sector to produce what Lend-Lease was providing.

B

@GreenLeader

Mr Tooze deserves any credit going. I recommend his book. It opened my eyes.

deephorse

I have ordered it from amazon… the only problem being that I am in Iraq at the moment so won't get it for a while.

Over generalization, but I felt Stalingrad the turning point with Kursk the nails in the coffin.

Quoting Speer doesn't alter the facts Mobius. Do some research on where these German women were working and then Speer's words might make more sense to you.

Who would know if not Speer? Pulling some number off Wikipedia isn't much research. Where the women were working is more important than the percent. In 1939 they were not likely making planes and munitions but cleaning houses, cooking, and gathering eggs and potatoes.

Who said anything about Wikipedia? What is it about some TMP members that makes them incapable of disagreeing with you without insulting you as well?

Cleaning houses and cooking is not being economically active. You made a statement that Germany did not put a high percentage of its women to work. I pointed out the contrary. You provide no evidence, just catty remarks. I provide some informaton for the benefit of readers.

In the correct context Speer's statement makes sense, but on its own it is not evidence of what you apparently think it is.

Who said anything about Wikipedia? What is it about some TMP members that makes them incapable of disagreeing with you without insulting you as well?

You provide no evidence either.

The whole "soviets only fought at gunpoint" view is sort of interesting, given that the Nazi atrocities managed to turn even the Ukrainians against them.

LL was not as critical to the Soviets as is made out. For instance the claim LL Locomotoves made up '90%' of Soviet stock. Whilst true if you only use 192-45 Soviet Locomotive production numbers it fails to take into account the 30,000 pre war Soviet locos or that LL Locos (c 1200) did not start arriving until late 1944. You can do the same with (for example) boots/food figures. Whilst LL was helpful and useful it was never 'the' factor in the Soviet victory.
I have always held the opinion that those trying to take the credit for the Soviet victory by claiming it was due to the LL 'we' sent them is no different to factory workers claiming the kudos for firemen putting out fires and saving people because they made the fire engines that were used in the rescues.

mkenny

A fair point, but actually getting the lend lease items to the USSR was an especially hazardous and deadly task and many merchant seamen and naval personnel died as a result. Not quite the same as working in a factory and building fire engines.

Recent scholarship benefiting from the opening of Soviet archives after the collapse of the USSR sheds a rather different light on the Lend-Lease subject.

B

Two things.

First would second the recommendation for Wages of Destruction. Big book but if you are at all interested in why WW2 played out in the way it did is a must read. Might not agree with Tooze on everything but his research and arguments are all with reading and hearing.

Secondly an answer to the 'if Speer does not know who would?' question.

We have clear evidence that Speer was responsible for the massive upswing in German war production after 1943. We also have clear evidence that Speer was responsible for negating Hitlers order to more or less turn German into a desert when the war was lost.

This clear evidence mainly comes from one place – Speer himself. Yes, Speer is a primary source. But as one of the leading lights of the Nazi party in the second half of the war he is a massively bias one. Any evidence that comes from such a source should be treated with extreme caution.

This clear evidence mainly comes from one place – Speer himself. Yes, Speer is a primary source. But as one of the leading lights of the Nazi party in the second half of the war he is a massively bias one. Any evidence that comes from such a source should be treated with extreme caution.

You may have to better target your massive bias claim. Acknowledging that women are effective in production skills doesn't seem to differ from modern day experience.

But I will save your bias quote for some future discussion of British sources.

No one is denying that woman are not effective in production skills.

I think that claiming that Speer may have been biased about how he presented information about the collapse of the Nazi regime and war machine as he was so closely involved in it is fairly uncontentious? Unless someone is claiming he was disinterested? I also feel it is a point worth making as in the Historiography Speer has an interesting position as overseeing the massive expansion of German war production (almost single handed). When looking at the evidence for this however, most of it is claims that Speer made himself, which just strikes me as a touch suspect. 'I'm a fricking genius me I am', hmmm.

I am just as suspicious of the 'the Germans would have won the war in the east if that bungler Hitler had stayed out of it and let the German generals command in the war'. This is a fairly early trend in the historiography that is still going strong today. This claim comes more or less from the pens of er, German generals on the Eastern front. 'I'm a fricking genius me, and so are my mates, it was all Hitlers fault……' Hmmmmm

Would also agree with you about bias in British sources. If a British source claims something as a fact with no corroboration I feel that this would be just as questionable.

Reading your last post you seem angry about something and somewhat defensive. If my comment about Speer (or Toozes book for that matter) upset you I unreservedly apologise.

I read the wikipedia entry on women in industry in ww2, and IIRC the german percentages were as listed, but of 14,000,000-odd listed, 8,000,000 were in agriculture and only 2,700,000 were in industrial occupations. Not sure how that compares to other nations or the significance, but most talk about women entering the workforce in WW2 is referring to the factory floor and not minding the farm.

Haven't got the relative figures to hand for each nation (and cant really be to bothered to find them out)but don't downgrade the importance of woman working in agriculture.

Although it does not have the 'sexiness' of building planes in factories as war work – as exemplified by the classic 'we can do it' poster, it is just as important. In Britain the Woman's Land Army had tens of thousands of woman working the land – including some that were conscripted and many from cities. This was because placing lost labour on farms was just as important as replacing lost labour in the factories. I believe there was a similar organisation in the US as well. In Germany, there was greater need earlier in the war for labour on the land as A. Working on the land paid poor and was hard work so there was already a labour shortage in the 30s as the war production sucked in labour. B. Unlike skilled factory work agricultural was never protected from conscription so the army devouring men from rural areas hit earlier and harder. Trying to keep the nation (and armies) fed was vital though so both German female labour and POW labour were both exploited. Leading to possibly the ultimate nazi nightmare of German woman er, 'mixing' with slavs and other 'subhumans' for which I believe the death penalty was introduced.

Picking potatoes might not have the same wow factor as building tanks. Production wise however it was just as important – and probably harder and a far more horrible job to boot.

I've tried to find the source of this Speer quote but without much success. It is oft repeated but never precisely sourced. The best I can find so far is that it came from a 1975 interview and Speer was apparently commenting on the American practice of putting women to work in wartime.

I think that Speer was being disingenuous, and buttering up either the interviewer, the intended audience, or both. German women were already in the labour force 'initially' in large numbers, as posts above show. Moving them from agriculture to factory production etc. would indeed have changed the course of the war. The Germans would have been starved into submission. The presence of these women on the land was essential to the war effort. Who did Speer have in mind to take their place?

Reading your last post you seem angry about something and somewhat defensive. If my comment about Speer (or Toozes book for that matter) upset you I unreservedly apologise.

Nothing about you, just I'd like to see some balance in skepticism. There is a lot of assigning some agenda behind what Germans have related about WWII but not to authors from other countries, well other than Russians. There is the British Official Secrets Act which authors have to dance around in the UK.

I think that Speer was being disingenuous, and buttering up either the interviewer, the intended audience, or both. German women were already in the labour force 'initially' in large numbers, as posts above show.

Reading on from the initial 51% in 1939 you will find the percentage went down as the war progressed. It did not return to this amount until 1944.

Regarding Lend Lease. It may have been that the Soviets could have defeated the Germans without it (or that it was less a factor in their victory than thought), but that begs the question: how far west would the Soviets gone had they not had it? I would think all those trucks and all that fuel and food might have been why they met us on the Elbe and not the Oder or somewhere further east.

Pizzagrenadier

I would tend to agree with you. From my reading, Stalin was desperate for as much Lend Lease as he could get, and the Royal Navy / Merchant Navy (plus others) sustained terrible losses to deliver it… so someone at the time must have thought it was more than a little important.