"WW2's European turning point - Stalingrad or Kursk?" Topic

If you had to justify *one* of the two as WW2's real European turning point, which would you go for?

I was recently surprised to see a modern British secondary school History textbook go for the latter, and totally ignore the former. The main reason given was that Kursk was the last time the Germans went on the offensive in the East – thereafter, the Russians had the initiative.

Whay do you all think, folks?

I'm moderately impressed that a modern textbook even mentions Kursk and Stalingrad….but I'm afraid my answer would be neither.

I was always taught that it was Alamein that was the turning point as it gave all the Allies hope.

Or was it Pearl Harbour, I can't remember now.

IMHO, I would say Stalingrad as the effects of the destruction of the Axis forces in 1942 were really devastating. Not only were the personnel and material hard to replace, it depressed the German people and allies, really motivated the Soviets, and gave heart to the rest of the Allies. The Soviets could replace their losses; the Germans could not. The Soviets gained the strategic initiative and (mostly) held it for the rest of the war.

Kursk is certainly important but Stalingrad was even more so. Stalingrad is a lot bloodier though so many Western commentators seem not to like to use it as a symbol of a great strategic victory as much as a devastated city.

Off question trigger warning!

Others might even argue Moscow in 1941 was the turning point where the initial German invasion culminated. The German Army in 1942 had to rely a lot on less capable Italian/Hungarian/Rumanian forces after the losses in 1941. Kursk was just a last roll of the dice hoping the Soviets would fall apart from the strength of the German attack.

My 2 cents.

Stalingrad by all.means. Kursk in many was was already doomed before it started.

Hitler declaring war on America after Pearl harbor.

Stalingrad.

Kursk is a reasonable argument (the Germans still carried out large offensives until then, afterwards, it was only desperation moves) but Stalingrad is the big defeat that marked the beginning of the end.

Imho one could argue Operation Barbaroosa was the turning point as it opened up Germany to two fronts, but I suppose Stalingrad pretty much sealed Germany's fate more or less.

Christopher

Stalingrad by far. Kursk was a well-laid trap by the Soviets. Even with a German success at Kursk, the Pyrrhic victory would have had no long term strategic effect on the German ability to win the conflict. Stalingrad on the other hand was the high water mark for German aspirations. In 1942 for Germany, it was the wrong battle fought for the wrong reasons. For the Soviets, it was a gift opportunity to fight a battle of attrition with replaceable losses against a foe who no longer could afford such losses.

Stalingrad

Phil

David Glantz says Smolensk, July 1941.

I agree it would rather be the end of the blitzkrieg in 1941 with the start of the Russian Winter. Was it at Smolensk? Or at Moscow's gates? Or was it much earlier, even on the Balkan when the German Army had to sort the mess in Yugoslavia and Greece which led to a delay of Barbarossa by a couple of very crucial months?

Stalingrad was certainly not the first defeat, but it was a decisive one. Even today, Stalingrad is a synonyme for utter defeat in Germany.

Kursk was surely not THE turning point, but a last effort to change the initiative on the Russian Front.

The Barbarossa delay approach might mean the the decisive battle of ww2 was actually the Italian invasion of Greece :-)

Kursk. The Red Army had its first major victory in a Summer Campaign rather than retreating and reacting to the Germans. IN this they reacted to the Germans. Contained them. Then went on the offensive and Kursk really ended at the end of the Soviet counter attack. Orel, Smolensk, Kharkov and Kiev, really most of Ukraine was back in the fold. Lands were liberated. This was the Turning point in which the Germans would not mount the offensive to counter the inevitable conclusion. The difference would be the strategic defense in place of Kursk by the Germans. Defend rather than Attack. That is another story. Big fan of the Back hand strategy. E Von Manstein is one my favorite studies.

JH

Stalingrad

Whichever planning meeting it was where the German logistics experts (who said Barbarossa was not doable) were over-ruled by the "real" soldiers.

If the Russians could have done as they planned and pinched off the axis retreat from the caucuses, Stalingrad would have caught two Romanian armies,a Hungarian army, the Italian expeditionary corps and another German army or two besides the German Sixth Army.

Stalingrad certainly broke the back of the Germans.

Kursk was a loss, but it didn't destroy an entire German army in the process, IIRC.

Stalingrad.

As important as Kursk was, the one resounding feature of the German plan at Kursk (Citadel) was it's limited scope. The 1941 and 1942 summer offensives were strategic in scope, hoping to achieve a knock-out blow against the Soviets. Citadel had no such ambitions. It was a pre-emptive strike, an effort to cause enough harm to the Soviets, and to shorten the line enough, so that the Germans could hope to face the coming Soviet summer offensive.

In other words, but the time of the Kursk battles, the Germans already KNEW they could not knock Russia out of the war. And Stalingrad was the reason.

The counter-offensives launched to encircle Stalingrad not only crushed the German 6th Army (which we all know, of course), but also crushed the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, and the Italian 8th Army. Romanian forces were limited to a few corps in Crimea for almost a year, and the Italians never returned to combat on the eastern front. That effectively took almost 1 million men out of the Axis order of battle on the eastern front. Germany never had enough men in the east to cover the front after that.

Barbarossa does not qualify, as there is no real validity to the presumption that Germany could not have won in the east. They did not win, but that does not mean they could not have. But after Stalingrad they could no longer win. And after Kursk they could do nothing but lose.

El Alamein does not qualify, as it was but a trifle, little more than a reconnaissance-in-force by the standards of the eastern front. Almost 80% of the European Axis losses occurred on the eastern front. That's where the issue was decided.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I believe Mark 1 nails it for me. Stalingrad determined that the Germans could not win the war outright, by knocking out the Soviets. But there was the bare chance of a negotiated settlement afterwards, until Kursk. Kursk showed that Germany would certainly lose the war, and the only question then was "when" and "how badly?"

I beg to differ; Alamein does count as it was indeed the turning point in Allied fortunes. That is not to say it decided the outcome of the war in Europe, although it was more than "a trifle" it clearly didn't, but it was generally an uphill struggle for the Allies before Alamein and downhill (in a good way) after the first decisive victory. A pivot point if you will.

Look at it this way. Between Moscow and Kursk the German offensive capability slowly eroded away, while their military command became more erratic thanks to the Bohemian Corporal.

As outlined before the German army had to rely on allies to hold the line at Stalingrad, not a very good sign. After Stalingrad the Germans never regained the advantage they had in 1941.

Kursk may have been a major offensive there was no real strategic plan involved. It was the last hurrah, even a resounding German victory would have seen another scorched earth Soviet retreat followed by an inevitable counter-attack when the German offensive was spent. The only difference is that the opportunity for the Soviets to march onto Berlin would have moved back six months or so.

Stalingrad is therefore a major event that could be considered the tipping point.

Neither. It was the United States' belated entry that swung the balance.

I was going to say Kursk. There is no doubt that it had a major impact on the war afterwords. However, here is a short post I did for a paper regarding one of the most important events in WW II. If anything lead to the demise of the Axis (and Germany specifically) this was it.

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There are many major events that occurred during WWII that one could argue as being important. However, outside of the Holocaust and the dropping of the atomic bomb, The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor proved to be just as important. According to the textbook, Hunt tells the reader Japan "launched an all-out attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii" (Hunt et. al., 897), December 7, 1941.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would change the situation facing both the Allies and Axis powers at the time of late 1941. The greatest impact would be the "globalization" of the war; making it truly a "world war". Hunt tells us regarding the attack, "Germany quickly joined its Japanese ally and declared war on the United States—an enemy, Hitler proclaimed, that was "half Judaized and the other half Negrified." Mussolini followed suit" (Hunt et. al., 897).

Considering how the Axis Powers were already faced with war in the East (Russia), as well as in the West and Africa, this commitment to war against the United States would prove devastating to the Axis Powers. Hunt also says "… the Allies had advantages: greater manpower and resources and access to goods from their global empires" (Hunt et. al., 897).

Ultimately, this would lead to one of the greatest military invasions of history; the Allies launched the D-Day Invasion of June 6, 1944. Combined with the war in the east against Russia, this would gradually lead to the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. Hunt says regarding this, "British, Canadian, U.S., and other Allied forces simultaneously fought their way eastward to join the Soviets in squeezing the Third Reich to its final defeat" (Hunt et. al., 904).

Kurtus

Bibliography

Hunt, Lynn, Thomas R, Martin, Barbara H. Rosenstein, and Bonnie G. Smith. 2012. The

Making of the West: Peoples and Cultures. 4rd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins.

Another piece about the topic and the turning point in the war.

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One thing that is important to note about the Japanese government of the time was it was very militaristic, with a strong sense of national "destiny" (Hunt et. al., 890). They understood that conflict with the western powers, and America, was inevitable. From the textbook it is read, "The militarist Japanese government decided to settle matters once and for all with the United States, which was blocking Japan's access to technology and resources in an attempt to stop its expansionism" (Hunt et. al., 897). Up until this time, Japan was greatly dependent on resources from the United States.

The document from the textbook, "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity" offers a glimpse into the mind-set and strategy over-all of the Japanese government of the early 1940's. It outlines the secret plans of Japan to unify Asia from Eastern Siberia to India and Australia. From the document it is revealed that one of the objectives was to drive out "Aggressive American and British influences in East Asia" (Hunt et. al., 890), and war with the United States was something of an inevitable reality, if not necessity, for the Japanese government.

Another interesting element to Japan's decision to wage war on the United States, was an economic one. The Japanese government "viewed an expanded empire as key to pulling agriculture and small business from the depths of economic depression" (Hunt et. al., 890). Such thoughts were not only with the government, but among the business leadership of Japan as well.

Ultimately, considering the mind-set of the Japanese leadership of the period, with a focus on national "destiny", need for a betterment of the economy, and the will to dominate the greater part of Asia freeing Asia from western aggression, a war on the United States, and the western powers in general was almost inevitable.

Kurtus

Bibliography

Hunt, Lynn, Thomas R, Martin, Barbara H. Rosenstein, and Bonnie G. Smith. 2012. The

Making of the West: Peoples and Cultures. 4rd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins.

"It was the United States' belated entry that swung the balance."

….. Being of the opinion that the Soviet Union would not have been able to successfully prosecute its war in the East without the stupendous support of Lend Lease, I agree with the above statement.

B

The OP question concerned The European war, as opposed to the entirety of WWII, an important distinction.

It depends how far back you want to go really, Germany was never likely to win the European war, although nobody really had the information to reach that conclusion at the time.
Certainly not win in the total and unconditional manner ultimately achieved by the allies…perhaps the German refusal to entertain a negotiated settlement after the fall of France marked a point from which there was no return.

Within the terms of the question which seems to focus on "battles" (rather than including the economic and political – which is a bit limited really)

There is a good argument for the failure of operation Typhoon, but Stalingrad probably nips it.
As for Kursk, the writing was on the wall in great big letters by then and(I know its a difficult thing for the industrial ego of the USA to cope with), but in terms of the European war their entry was not the turning point. Likewise Alamein (not, the first "decisive" victory either-that's probably Rostov in Nov 41- another small sideshow comparable in size to Alamein) a better claim than Alamein might be Tunisia, but I think Stalingrad was critical because it marked a point whereby The German Government couldn't hide its failure from its people and army.

The point is, you really can't limit the "turning point" in Europe to just looking at a single battle or two. On the ground, yes, Kursk had a dramatic influence in the following battles. But Kursk alone was not the turning point; neither Stalingrad. The war was not fought in a vacum. You have to look at the grand scope of the war to get a true glimpse of "turning points" in Europe or otherwise.

Stalingrad. IMHO Kursk was to the East what Bulge was in the West: a big, resource draining effort to disrupt the current momentum in the war & hopefully change the outcome. As was said so many times before; before Stalingrad the Germans still appeared unbeatable. Stalingrad brought them down to the reality that the dream of the Third Reich was over. Kursk was about changing momentum, not about securing the end of the war.

How about the Battle of Britain as a turning point? Had Germany won that and forced Great Britain to the negotiating table in 1940, the course of the war would have been very different.

Nearly all the alternatives offered here have some validity, some offering unknown "what ifs?" but that wasn't the question.
The question was Stalingrad or Kursk?

I would say Dunkirk. If he had let the panzers crush the BEF. Britian would have been forced to sued for peace. Germany attacks Russia and the West doesn't send any leadlease to the East and the Russians loss.

Then with the Spoils of the East he Turn on the West and we get a Axis ruled World. Que the sad music and fad to Black.

How about the Battle of Britain?
Not "sinking" the giant aircraft carrier/amphibious task force on your coast is pretty dumb

I agree with JimDuncanUK. El Alemein was another turning point in World War II. Stalingrad was another turning point, in the east, for the war. Both battles showed the limit of resources of Germany.

I am very interested in the battle of Kursk, but I don't see it as a turning point for the war. Stalingrad had already decided that. Kursk, to me, represented a last desperate gamble to win the war in the east.

I would also add Midway as another turning point for the war.

Given the premise of the OP, my inclination is to favour Kursk over Stalingrad.

Stalingrad was the first major defeat the Germans suffered, losing several armies in the course of it. But it was mid-winter, a period when German disadvantages were maximised. Come spring, the heads of the Russian attacks were cut off and destroyed (as usual) and the Germans dusted themselves off for a summer offensive (as usual).

Kursk was an unparalleled catastrophe, not so much in the strategic defeat of the offensive, but in the completely unprecedented series of Soviet summer offensives which then drove the Germans back over the Dniepr. The Russians had never conducted successful front level offensives in summer before, nor had the German summer offensive ever been stopped in its tracks before.

I would agree it is a close call, but for me, Kursk has it.

In the war as whole, there were other turning points. Hitlers Germany was doomed when they declared war on the USA in 1941.

Moscow: A loss of operational focus and the consequential failure of Army Group Centre to seize Moscow in 1941 led to Germany losing the strategic initiative in the Second World War.

Furthermore, the political decision to declare war on the USA, during the same approximate timeframe (05-16 Dec 41) that the Red Army was conducting a series of coordinated counterattacks against a stalled Army Group Centre, coupled with the operational failures of BARBAROSSA & TYPHOON made the loss of the 'European' war by Germany a foregone conclusion.

There definitely is room for debate between the BARBAROSSA-TYPHOON theory and the BLAU-cum-BRAUNSCHWEIG (Caucasus – Stalingrad) theory, however, to answer the original question, I would choose Stalingrad (coupled with the Axis loss of North Africa) over Kursk as the significant turning point in the 'European' war.

I'm liking the different conclusions presented here and I find myself having a hard time choosing. Martin makes a good case for Kursk. I had previously been inclined to Stalingrad. Moscow is also an intriguing option outside the OP options.

After having read Bloodlands last year, I'm becoming ever more intrigued by the strategic considerations of Stalin's asian theater. Moscow without the agreement between Stalin and Japan after their defeat at Khalkin Ghol would have meant no Siberian reserves in front of the capital or to counter Typhoon with possibly major strategic consequences. No Khalkin Ghol might mean no Pacific strategy for Japan and thus no confrontation with the US and thus no Lend Lease due to a continuing isolationist policy.

Just so many possibilities…

I agree that a US and Japanese showdown might have been inevitable, but what form would it take? Certainly a carrier strike on Pearl Harbor was not necessarily inevitable. If Japan was still concerned with expansion in Asia against the Soviets, they might have been more prone to a longer or less direct militarily aggressive approach to the US thus not necessarily awakening that slumbering giant so to speak.

I'm not a big fan of historical inevitabilty theories. Human life just usually doesn't work that way.

Moscow

Day one of Barbarossa, once committed to a two front war the Axis were doomed.

Of the two mentioned though, it's Stalingrad for me.

3rd of September 1939, the day Germany annoyed us enough to declare war on them. It was all over for them after that, just a matter of when not if.
Only slightly tongue in cheek

a number of good options arise
1. Pearl Harbor, or even the japanese/german alliance – The day america entered the war
2 Barbarossa
3 Moscow
4 Stalingrad
5 battle of france, failure to eliminate british units
Interesting to look at steel and oil production and populations of the axis compared to the allies. The axis were at a huge disadvantage

Well….assuming we are still going on this one….

In college I took a course taught by a former U.S. Naval Academy professor. He was firm in his belief that there are only two decisive battles in World War 2. None of them on the East Front.

The first was the Battle of Britain. If England fell there would have been no two front war and nowhere for the U.S. to build up. No England, no North Africa.

The second decisive battle was the Battle for the Atlantic. If The Arsenal of Democracy could not supply Europe, England would have starved, and the USSR would not have had adequate I material to continue the fight. Again, there would also be no second front. As most of us wargamers are landlubbers we forget how important this naval war was.

Agree or disagree, he made a compelling argument. To him Stalingrad was significant, but Germany still had enough to fight on, at least defensively. Russia would not have given up or gone under if they lost.

The Eastern front was definitely the key front of the war and by far the biggest. But it was a grinding and brutal campaign with many key battles, but none meeting the definition of decisive, or so he taught…..

Outside the premise of the OP, Richard Overy makes a very compelling case that Germany could still have won the war in 1943 (in 'Why the Allies Won') as their latent economic potential was vast in 1942. They just completely mismanaged it.

In many ways the individual battles were largely irrelevant, the war was primarily determined by the output and consumption of resources – munitions, fuel, equipment, people… most battles contributed to relative loss rates, but that was about it, a few exceptions apart, mainly early in the war.

Or was it much earlier, even on the Balkan when the German Army had to sort the mess in Yugoslavia and Greece which led to a delay of Barbarossa by a couple of very crucial months?

But would the weather have allowed Barbarossa to start earlier anyway?

I'd vote for Dec '41 when Barbarossa stalled and the U.S. came into the war. Battle of Britain was important, but not sure Germany could have successfully invaded Britain even if it had air supremacy over the Channel and southern England. Battle of the Atlantic was also key, but not strictly "war in Europe."

donlowry

I agree with your points, though I do not think Germany would have needed to invade the UK had they won the Battle of Britain.
In my humble opinion, that would have been one defeat too many for the Brits, Churchill would have fallen and a negotiated settlement would have followed… leaving Hitler with one 'flank' secure.

Simo Hiya:
Interesting to look at steel and oil production and populations of the axis compared to the allies. The axis were at a huge disadvantage

Martin Rapier:
Richard Overy makes a very compelling case that Germany could still have won the war in 1943 (in 'Why the Allies Won') as their latent economic potential was vast in 1942. They just completely mismanaged it.

Martin (and Overy) make the point that I find so compelling, and so often mis-understood (as witness Hiyo's comment).

In 1942 the European Axis controlled a LARGER population, and a LARGER industrial capacity, than the USSR.

So often I see people talking about the endless Russian manpower … but in 1942 the Axis had more manpower at their disposal. And they had more industrial might.

Yes they could not compete with US economic potential, but it was not until 1944 that the US was able to put any sizable army into the field against the European Axis powers. So it was not at all inevitable for the Germans to lose in 1942. They had a window of opportunity, even AFTER Moscow, or the Battle of Britain, or Dunkirk, or declaring war on the US. None of those things made Germany's loss inevitable UNLESS they did not knock the Soviets out in 1943.

It was Stalingrad that made it impossible to knock the Soviets out in 1943. Taking 1 million men out of the Axis order of battle for 1943 made it impossible for Germany to even contemplate trying a knock-out blow. The best they could come up with was Citadel, a spoiling attack intended to de-fang the Soviets for another year.

If Kursk had gone the other way, the Germans were still in deep doo-doo because the war in the east would still be going full force when the western allies came ashore in France in 1944. But if Stalingrad had gone the other way the Soviets would have been crippled. They would have lost their access to petroleum and more than half of their lend-lease material flow. Posit a German win at Stalingrad -- a successful isolation of the Caucasus, and 1 million more men in the Axis OOB in the east -- and you have an industrially crippled Soviet Union ripe for a German knock-out blow in the summer of 1943. And then the notion of Britain and the US launching a 6 division invasion of France in 1944, against 100+ German divisions not otherwise employed, would have been a non-starter.

There just aren't many candidate events that score anywhere near to a million-man swing in forces for the critical Axis window of 1942/43.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Good points Mark, as I said, for me Kursk vs Stalingrad is a really close to call but I enjoyed putting together a case for Kursk:)

For some reason everyone forgets the destruction of the Italian, Hungarian and two Rumanian armies as well as Sixth Army at Stalingrad. I find the fate of Sixth Army particularly poignant as it was reconstituted only to be surrounded and destroyed again in 1944.

Greenleader: Good point.